

Youth Anxiety, Aspiration, and Activism

SURVEY REPORT



Copyright ©2021, Niti Foundation

This survey report has been produced by Niti Foundation with the support of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Cover Photo: Monika Deupala/Nepali Times
Design: Square Studio



International
Labour
Organization

Foreword

This survey report on *Youth Anxiety, Aspiration, and Activism* was produced by Niti Foundation—a Nepali not-for-profit public interest organization that accompanies locally-led policy reform, in partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Considering the potentially outsized impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on youth, as well as recent youth activism around crisis response and politics, the need to better understand the perceptions and anxieties of Nepali youth is more critical than ever. The survey on *Youth Anxiety, Aspiration, and Activism* was commissioned with this purpose.

Thematically, this survey report focuses on three areas of salience for Nepali youth: 1) employment and other related livelihood concerns; 2) anxiety and mental well-being; and 3) political awareness and engagement. In doing so, it provides insights into the representation of youth interests in Nepali society, politics, and economy from a policy perspective. Further insights and recommendations are available in a separate policy brief developed from the survey data.

We are grateful to Jagannath Lamichhane and Sanjaya Mahato for close support to the entire survey exercise; Sushav Niraula for coordinating day-to-day activities, including report preparation; and George Varughese for overall guidance throughout the survey process. We thank our survey partner for fieldwork, Rooster Logic, and the enumerators, for timely data collection during these difficult times. We also thank Mahabir Paudyal, Iain Payne, and Shreya Paudel for their written inputs to this report.

Richard Howard, Director of ILO, deserves special mention for understanding the need for the survey and lending institutional support of funding and of his ILO colleagues Nita Neupane, Nabin Karna, Prakash Sharma, and Saurabh Shah, who were very helpful to the survey exercise.

Finally, the survey benefited from the valuable advice of a Survey Advisory Group. We are grateful to advisory group members and to Jagannath Lamichhane for his convenorship of the group.

We hope that this report is a useful baseline on youth perceptions at a time of crisis in Nepal and serves to inform programs and policies concerning Nepali youth.

Mohan Das Manandhar
Executive Director
Niti Foundation

Contents

Key findings	iii
1. Introduction	1
2. Sample demography	3
3. Formal and Informal sector participation	6
4. COVID-19 and problems faced	9
5. Current and future plans of Nepali youth	12
6. Foreign employment	16
7. Government support for youth	18
8. Anxiety and mental well-being	25
9. Youth awareness on socio-political issues	28
10. Interest in politics	30
11. Socio-political and civic association	34
12. Perceptions and opinions	37
13. Expressing dissatisfaction	41
Bibliography	43

List of tables

Table 9.1: Youth Awareness on socio-political issues (N=2000)	28
Table 9.2: Individuals with whom youth prefer to discuss socio-political issues (N=835)	29
Table 9.3: Most discussed social issues (N=2000)	29
Table 12.1: Perception on aspects of the current situation of Nepal (N=2000)	38
Table 12.2: Opinions on the current government (N=1741)	38
Table 12.3: Perception on contemporary socio-political issues (N=1656)	39
Table 12.4: Perception on aspects of life in 10 years (N=2000)	39
Table 12.5: Trust in government and independent institutions (N=2000)	40
Table 13.1: Common mediums for expressing dissatisfaction against steps (N=1326)	42

List of figures

Figure 2.1: Sample demography and its disaggregation by gender (N=2000)	3
Figure 3.1: The proportion of employed and unemployed youth (N=1597)	6
Figure 3.2: The proportion of working youth in the formal and the informal sector (N=1297)	7
Figure 3.3: Ethnicity/caste, gender, age, province, and education-wise disaggregation of the proportion of working youth in the formal and the informal sector (N=1297)	7
Figure 3.4: Work engagement-wise disaggregation of workers in formal and informal sector (N=1297)	8
Figure 4.1: Problems faced due to the COVID-19 related restrictions (N=2000)	9
Figure 4.2: Ethnicity/caste, gender, and age-wise disaggregation of the problems faced due to the COVID-19 related restrictions (N=2000)	10
Figure 4.3: Province-wise disaggregation of the problems faced by youth due to the COVID-19 related restrictions (N=2000)	11
Figure 5.1: Current and future plans of Nepali youth (N=2000)	12
Figure 5.2: Occupational status-wise disaggregation of current and future plans (N=2000)	13
Figure 5.3: Gender-wise disaggregation of current and future plans (N=2000)	14
Figure 5.4: Ethnicity/caste and province-wise disaggregation of current and future plans (N=2000)	14
Figure 6.1: Country of return of foreign employed returnees (N=73)	16
Figure 6.2: Reasons for return of foreign employed returnees (N=73)	17
Figure 6.3: Current and future plans of the foreign employed returnees (N=73)	17
Figure 7.1: Awareness of government measures to support the integration of youth into the labor market (N=2000)	18
Figure 7.2: Ethnic/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation of the awareness of government integration measures (N=2000)	19
Figure 7.3: Accessing government integration measures (N=569)	20
Figure 7.4: Ethnicity/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation on accessing government integration measures (N=569)	20
Figure 7.5: Types of government measures accessed (N=128)	21
Figure 7.6: Ethnicity/caste, gender, province, age, and education-wise disaggregation on the types of government measures accessed (N=128)	22
Figure 7.7: Perception on being able to access the subsidized loans/grants from banks and other government entities to support their business or startups (N=2000)	23
Figure 7.8: Ethnicity/caste, gender, province, age, and education-wise disaggregation of the perception on being able to access the subsidized loans/grants from banks and other government entities to support their business or startups (N=2000)	23
Figure 7.9: Policy suggestions for integrating youth in the labor economy (N=2000)	24
Figure 8.1: Experience of anxiety due to the COVID-19 (N=1856)	25
Figure 8.2: Ethnicity/caste, gender, province, age group, and level of education-wise disaggregation of experiencing anxiety due to the COVID-19 (N=1856)	26
Figure 8.3: Anxiety disaggregation based on informal and formal labor employment status (N=1564)	27

Figure 8.4: Anxiety disaggregation based on the frequency of expressing dissatisfaction against government activities (N=1564) 27

Figure 10.1: Nepali youth interest in politics (N=2000) 30

Figure 10.2: Ethnicity/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation on having an interest in politics (N=2000) 31

Figure 10.3: Discussing political issues (N=2000) 32

Figure 10.4: Ethnicity/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation of youth discussing political issues (N=2000) 32

Figure 11.1: Youth association with various organizations/groups (N=970) 34

Figure 11.2: Ethnicity/caste and province-wise disaggregation of youth association with various organizations/groups (N=970) 35

Figure 11.3: Gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation of youth association with various organizations/groups (N=970) 36

Figure 12.1: Reasons that Nepal is heading in the wrong direction (N=663) 37

Figure 13.1: Frequency of expressing dissatisfaction against the steps taken by the government (N=2000) 41

Figure 13.2: Best way to compel the government to listen (N=2000) 42

List of acronyms

COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease of 2019
ILO	International Labour Organization
PAN	Personal Account Number
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction
SSF	Social Security Fund

Key findings

- Of the 2000 youth surveyed, only a third (34%) thought that the country is heading in the right direction.
- Eighty-four percent of the youth surveyed reported having experienced anxiety due to COVID-19.
- Among the country's governance institutions, the courts were the most trusted, followed by the army, media, the police, local government, provincial government, and the federal government. Political parties were the least trusted institutions. The president ranked second-last in trust among youth.
- Forty-four percent of the respondents were not interested in politics at all; 40 percent said they are interested to 'some extent', and only five percent said they are 'very interested'. Sixty-three percent of respondents who said they are 'very interested' in politics were men while only 37 percent were women.
- Youth were also asked about their awareness of socio-political issues. Out of the seven socio-political issues presented to them, respondents were most aware of the fact that the functions of government have been divided among three tiers and were least aware of the activities of political parties.
- Youth think that posting/commenting/sharing their dissatisfaction on social media is the best way (preferred by 42% of respondents) to compel government to hear their voices. Sit-in/hunger strikes (preferred by 8% of respondents) and other strikes (*Bandha* and *Chakka Jam**) (preferred by 11% of respondents) have been the two least prioritized courses of action for the youth to compel government to hear their voices.
- Of the 920 youth who reported being part of an association, most were engaged with youth clubs (44%), cooperatives (39%), and self-help groups (33%). On the other hand, a smaller proportion of youth were connected to trade unions (7%) and political parties (14%).
- Despite being similar in population and sampling size, young women represent 56 percent of informal sector workers and only 39 percent of formal sector workers.

* A form of strike where vehicle movement is forbidden, and market and offices are forced closed.

- Work-wise disaggregation shows that youth 'contributing family work' (helping without pay in a household/family business) account for the largest share of the informal sector workforce. Forty-two percent of youth working in informal sectors come from the 'contributing to family works' segment.
- Due to COVID-19 related restrictions, most youth (58%) faced problems related to transportation, followed by problems of accessing medical facilities (54%), loss of income (52%), and accessing markets (47%).
- Due to COVID-19 pandemic, youth from 'Illiterate' (72%), 'Literate' (67%), and 'Basic education' (66%) categories reported having experienced problems related to 'loss of income' the most.
- Majority of the respondents (74%) expressed a preference to work in Nepal in some form. This also includes nine percent of respondents who wanted to work in the agriculture sector in Nepal. Only nine percent of youth wanted to go overseas for foreign employment.
- Of the youth who wanted to work in the agriculture sector in Nepal, 60% are women and 40% are men.
- Of the youth who do not have any current or future plans, women (70%) comprised a significantly larger proportion than men (30%).
- Of the 73 returnee migrants surveyed, only four percent were on paid leave. The most common reasons for return were: job termination by companies because of the COVID-19 pandemic (29%), non-renewal of contract/visa (23%), unpaid leave (19%), and companies not providing the salary as per the contractual agreement (18%).
- Despite the broad range of programs planned and implemented by the government to integrate youth into the labor market, 72 percent of respondents were unaware of the government measures. Out of the 28 percent of youth who knew about the government integration measures, only 22 percent have accessed the measures.
- Forty-one percent of youth surveyed believed that they cannot access the subsidized loans/grants from banks and other government entities to support their business or startups.
- Of the youth who have accessed government measures, most of them took a grant (65%) followed by a subsidized loan (59%) and agricultural tools (44%).

1. Introduction

While the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are borne by all Nepalis, youth are a particularly vulnerable demographic. The Nepal Labor Force Survey 2017/18, for example, shows that while young people between 15-24 years of age make up 27.3 percent of the working-age population, they comprise only 18 percent of those employed (Central Bureau of Statistics 2019). Of the employed youth, 65 percent work in the informal sector (ibid). This disproportionate representation of youth in the informal sector is also shown by the ILO and Niti Foundation's *Diagnostic Report on Extent, Circumstances, Causes, Factors and Nature of Informality in Nepal* (2021). These youth are most likely to be paid below the prescribed minimum wage and work jobs without any formal contractual relationship or social security. Informal sector employees are vulnerable and are also the hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic (Niti Foundation 2020). This is confirmed by a recent government report, which mentions that out of the 1.5 million Nepalis who lost jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most were working in the informal sector (OnlineKhabar 2020).

The pandemic has also led to increased anxiety and a decrease in the overall wellbeing of Nepalis (Poudel and Subedi 2020). Nepali youth are at a high risk of being affected by anxiety and depression. Along with worsening employment prospects and concentration in the informal sector, the lockdown measures taken by the government from March 24, 2020 led to the shutting down of educational institutions, health clubs, and so on, disproportionately affecting youth.

Anxiety has begun to be publicly expressed amidst the COVID-19 crisis. Since May 2020, youth in Kathmandu and across the country have organized a series of non-violent, citizen-led, nonpartisan protests. Their demands have included proactive government action to tackle the pandemic through increasing the scope and coverage of PCR testing for everyone at risk; secure quarantine facilities; recognition of, and a targeted response for, stranded migrant workers, daily wage workers, and marginalized communities; and transparency and accountability across all governmental responses to the pandemic. These protests drove some change in the government's functioning in dealing with the COVID-19 (OnlineKhabar 2020).

However, significant issues impacting youth are still largely overlooked by government. The situation, as it stands now, is worrying. There is evidence that youth unemployment, anxiety, and social unrest are linked (e.g. Pervaiz et al. 2012). Despite the obvious need for youth-related data, the youth are rarely researched in Nepal.


The only comprehensive perceptions studies to focus on youth-related issues have been the Youth Survey of Nepal in 2011 and the Youth Involvement in the Peaceful and Sustainable Development of Nepal in 2017 (British Council 2011, UNPFN 2017). In light of the potentially outsized impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on youth and recent youth activism, the need for data to better understand the perceptions and anxieties of young people in Nepal at this time is more critical than ever. The *Youth Anxiety, Aspiration, and Activism* aims to fulfill that need.

Conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic in October-November 2020, the *Youth Anxiety, Aspiration, and Activism* survey provides insights into youth interests in Nepal's politics and policymaking. The survey explores immediate youth concerns regarding the economy, in particular labor market vulnerabilities emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent anxieties and insecurities experienced by youth. It also takes into account youth perceptions of the situation of the country, the measures adopted by Nepali governments in tackling the pandemic and youth-related policy problems it has mitigated or further posed. The final battery of survey questions seeks to understand the level of youth political awareness and get a sense of political activism among this demographic. The survey team hopes that the findings of the survey will give voice to Nepali youth concerns and assist Nepali government and other stakeholders to help mitigate these concerns.

2. Sample demography

The Niti-ILO survey on *Youth Anxiety, Aspiration and Activism* is a nationwide survey with a total sample size of 2000 youth between 18-40 years of age. Since the survey had questions relating to political awareness and activism¹, the survey team made the decision to sample youth between 18-40 years of age, rather than 16-40 which is the government's official age bracket for defining youth (Ministry of Youth and Sport 2015). The population projection by the Central Bureau of Statistics has been used to identify the target population for this survey. The sample is drawn ensuring a proportionate representation of provinces and gender.

Figure 2.1: Sample demography and its disaggregation by gender (N=2000)



¹ The eligible age for voting in Nepal is 18 and above (Government of Nepal 2015).

Data on gender, province, and age-wise disaggregation

- Gender-wise disaggregation shows, 990 women (49.5%) and 1,010 men (50.5%) were surveyed.
- Province-wise disaggregation shows, 338 (17%) respondents from Province 1, 382 (19%) from Province 2, 438 (22%) from Bagmati Province, 180 (9%) from Gandaki Province, 347 (17%) from Lumbini Province, 119 (6%) from Karnali Province, and 196 (10%) from Sudurpaschim Province were surveyed.
- Age-wise disaggregation shows, 501 (25%) respondents between 18-22 years of age, 573 (29%) respondents between 23-27 years of age, 431 (22%) between 28-32 years of age, and 495 (25%) respondents between 33-40 years of age were surveyed.

Challenges and Adjustments

As data collection for the survey took place amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the survey team faced many challenges. Firstly, lockdown measures made it difficult for the enumerators to travel. Secondly, individuals—especially people living in rural areas—were skeptical of strangers coming and asking questions. Thirdly, given the pandemic, enumerators found all the members of a household clustered together in their home to avoid contact with others. Under such circumstances, initially, it was difficult for enumerators to request a female member to speak to them alone.

To mitigate, the enumerators took local leaders' support to build trust and recruit selected respondents for survey interview, including women. This way proportionate representation of men and women was ensured. Further, various safety protocols were adopted to lessen respondents' fear. Firstly, to limit the transmission and participants' fear, the enumerators conducted, where possible, the survey interview in an open setting. Besides, standard safety protocols (physical distancing, wearing of facemasks, use of hand sanitizer, etc.) were strictly followed.

There was an additional challenge related to adequate representation of youth who were foreign employed returnees. To mitigate, enumerators went to the field in November 2020 after the main data collection effort and, maintaining rural and urban balance, randomly selected 433 youth between 18-40 years of age across the seven provinces. Of these 433 youth, 73 were foreign employed returnees. The responses from these 73 youth form the base of the 'foreign employment' section of the questionnaire.

Cronbach Alpha Test and Likert Scale

To test internal consistency, Cronbach's alpha test was used. Any value of Cronbach alpha within 0.6 to 0.7 is assumed to be acceptable. Except for question number 38 whose alpha value was 0.59, the calculated Cronbach alpha value for all items is more than 0.7.

For questions on perception and frequency, the survey team also used a Likert scale. Perception is ordered on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = Strongly agree; 2 = Agree;


3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly disagree; and 6 = Don't know. The 'Don't know' responses were very few; thus, they have not been included in the analysis.

For frequency questions, a four-point frequency Likert scale was used: Always (1), Often (2), Sometimes (3), and Never (4). To measure trust, a five-point trust Likert scale was deployed: 1 = Fully trust; 2 = Trust; 3 = Moderately trust; 4 = Do not trust; and 5 = Do not trust at all.

3. Formal and Informal sector participation


This section contains information on working youth participation in the formal and informal sector.

Figure 3.1: The proportion of employed and unemployed youth (N=1597)




Of the respondents part of the labor force, 81 percent were employed and 19 percent were unemployed.

Figure 3.2: The proportion of working youth in the formal and the informal sector (N=1297)



Of those who work amongst the survey respondents (refer figure 3.2), the share of youth who work in the informal sector is greater at 53 percent.

Figure 3.3: Ethnicity/caste, gender, age, province, and education-wise disaggregation of the proportion of working youth in the formal and the informal sector (N=1297)



Out of the 47 percent of the youth working in the formal sector, Khas-Arya comprise the largest proportion (39%), followed by Adivasi-Janjati (29%) and Madhesi (20%). Madhesi, Muslims, and Dalits are represented in higher numbers in the informal sector (respectively, 24%, 10%, and 11%) than in the formal sector (respectively, 20%, 5%,

and 4%), while Tharu youth have even representation in both the formal (3%) and the informal sectors (3%).


The gender-disaggregated data shows how, despite being similar in population and sampling size, women are more engaged in the informal sector than men. Women represent 56 percent of total informal sector workers and only 39 percent of the total formal sector workers.

Youth of older age categories have a higher probability of being part of the formal workforce. Of the total formal sector workers, youth between 33 and 40 years of age comprise 39 percent. This representation in the formal sector is higher than those between 28-32, 23-27, and 18-22 years of age.

The higher proportion of youth in Province 1, Province 2, and Lumbini Province are represented in the informal sector (respectively, 20%, 18%, and 24%) than in the formal sector (respectively, 18%, 12%, and 14%).

Youth with advanced education degrees have a greater chance of being represented in the formal workforce than in the informal workforce. Youth in 'Master', 'Bachelor', and 'Secondary education' education categories comprise 11 percent, 34 percent, and 31 percent, respectively, of the formal sector workforce. This proportion is higher than their representation in the informal sector (3%, 12%, and 28% respectively).

Figure 3.4: Work engagement-wise disaggregation of workers in formal and informal sector (N=1297)




Youth 'contributing family work' (helping without pay in a household/family business) account for the largest share of the informal sector workforce. Forty-two percent of youth working in the informal sector come from this segment.

4. COVID-19 and problems faced


This section contains information on the problems faced by youth due to COVID-19.

Figure 4.1: Problems faced due to the COVID-19 related restrictions (N=2000)



Nepali youth have faced many problems due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Amongst the respondents, most youth faced problems related to transportation (58%) followed by problems of accessing medical facilities (54%), loss of income (52%), accessing markets (47%), food shortages (45%), hampering of studies (41%), and shortage of agriculture input (32%). Notably, the hurdles to foreign employment opportunities and participation in sports was not an immediate concern for the majority of youth, identified as an issue by only 15 percent and nine percent respondents respectively.

Figure 4.2: Ethnicity/caste, gender, and age-wise disaggregation of the problems faced due to the COVID-19 related restrictions (N=2000)




Lack of access to transportation, loss of income, and lack of access to medical facilities were among the most common problems faced by youth of all caste and ethnic groups. Amongst Khas-Arya, Madhesi, Muslim, and Tharu youth, the most common problem faced related to transportation, with 65 percent of Khas-Aryas, 55 percent of Madhesi, 61 percent of Muslims, and 55 percent of Tharu youth reported to have faced transportation-related problems. Among Adivasi-Janajati youth, difficulty in accessing medical facilities (60%) was the most commonly reported problem. Among Dalit youth, problems related to the loss of income (63%), followed by food shortage (54%) were the most acute problems reported.

Survey data does not show a significant difference between the nature of problems faced by men and women. For both, problem related to transportation (57% of men and 59% of women), loss of income (54% of men and 50% of women), and problems in accessing medical facilities (55% of men and 53% of women) were the most pressing problems.

The majority (70%) of youth between 18 and 22 years of age reported that COVID-19 lockdowns hampered their study. Figure 4.2 also shows that lack of access to transportation, loss of income, and lack of access to medical facilities were common problems faced by youth between 23 and 40 years of age.

Figure 4.3: Province-wise disaggregation of the problems faced by youth due to the COVID-19 related restrictions (N=2000)



Province-wise, the problems faced by youth were varied. In Provinces 1 and 2, problems related to loss of income (51% and 55%, respectively), transportation (49% and 55%, respectively), food shortage (47% and 53%, respectively), accessing markets (51% and 44%, respectively), and medical facilities (37% and 51%, respectively) were most common.


The most common problems for youth from Bagmati and Karnali provinces were related to accessing medical facilities (64% and 88%, respectively). In Gandaki and Lumbini provinces, the problem of transportation was the most common (76% and 65%, respectively). In Sudurpaschim province, transportation problems (65%), difficulties in getting agriculture inputs (61%), and hampered studies (59%) were the most commonly reported problems.

The data also shows that 'Illiterate', 'Literate' and 'Basic Education' category youth reported to have been most affected by loss of income (72%, 67%, and 66%, respectively). One of the possible reasons for this is that these groups mostly work in the informal sector (refer to figure 3.3).

5. Current and future plans of Nepali youth


This section contains information on the current and future plans of youth.

Figure 5.1: Current and future plans of Nepali youth (N=2000)



When it comes to current and future plans, a majority of the youth surveyed (74%) expressed a preference to work in Nepal in some form. Of these youth, only nine percent preferred to work in the agriculture sector. Foreign employment was also not the preferred choice for the majority of youth—only nine percent of respondents preferred going abroad for employment.

Figure 5.2: Occupational status-wise disaggregation of current and future plans (N=2000)




Of the 11 percent (refer to Figure 5.1) who reported to have no current and future plans, figure 5.2 shows ‘contributing family work’ (helping without pay in a household/family business) (37%) and ‘student’ (28%) category comprised the largest subgroups. Out of the 38 percent (refer to Figure 5.1) of youth who expressed preference for searching for jobs in Nepal, figure 5.2 shows students (38%) and employees (32%) comprised the largest subgroup.

Amongst youth who expressed preference to go abroad for studies, students comprised 80 percent. The figure also shows that youth from ‘contributing family work’ (helping without pay in a household/family business) segment represent a significant portion (41%) of those who reported that their current and future plan involves engaging in agriculture.


There is a positive relationship between employer category and expressing preference for doing business. On average, about 1 in 3 youth who expressed preference for starting their own business in Nepal were from the ‘employer’ category. Of the youth who prioritized foreign labor migration, youth who are not employed but actively looking for jobs comprised 35 percent.

Figure 5.3: Gender-wise disaggregation of current and future plans (N=2000)



Of the youth surveyed who expressed preference to go for foreign labor migration, men (74%) prioritized to go in a higher proportion than women (26%). Men (59%) were also more likely to plan to start their own business than women (41%), while higher proportion of women (60%) expressed a preference to be engaged in agriculture than men (40%). Of the youth who did not have any current and future plans, women (70%) comprised a significantly higher proportion than men (30%).

Figure 5.4: Ethnicity/caste and province-wise disaggregation of current and future plans (N=2000)



Forty-two percent of Adivasi-Janajati, 39 percent of Khas-Arya, 39 percent of Madhesi, 31 percent of Tharu, 28 percent of Dalit, and 28 percent of Muslim youth expressed preference to search for jobs in Nepal.


Of the youth from all castes and ethnicities, Dalit and Tharu youth plan to engage in agriculture in the highest proportion—17 percent of Dalit and 15 percent of Tharu youth surveyed mentioned that they plan to do agriculture in Nepal. Across youth of all caste and ethnic groups, going abroad for studies and employment is not a popular option.

Except in Gandaki and Lumbini provinces, searching for jobs in Nepal is a preferred choice—40 percent of respondents in Province 1, 42 percent in Province 2, 47 percent in Bagmati province, 54 percent in Karnali province, and 45 percent in Surdurpaschim province reported that they plan to search for jobs in Nepal. Starting a business in Nepal was the most preferred option (37%) for youth in Lumbini province, while youth in Gandaki province were evenly divided between going abroad for study (23%) and starting their own business in Nepal (23%).

6. Foreign employment


This section captures response on the battery of questions asked to foreign employed returnees. The question ranged from the country of return, reasons of return, to current and future plans.

Figure 6.1: Country of return of the foreign employed returnees (N=73)




Of the youth returning from foreign employment, most came from the United Arab Emirates (22%), followed by Malaysia (19%), Kuwait (11%), India (10%), and Qatar (10%).

Figure 6.2: Reasons for return of foreign employed returnees (N=73)



The most commonly cited reasons for return were: job termination by companies due to the COVID-19 (29%), non-renewal of contract/visa (23%), unpaid leave (19%), and companies not providing salary as per the contractual agreement (18%). Of the 73-returnee youth, only four percent were on paid leave.

Figure 6.3: Current and future plans of the foreign employed returnees (N=73)




Of the 73 foreign employed returnees surveyed, 33 percent expressed a preference to leave again for foreign labor while five percent preferred going overseas to study. Meanwhile, 51 percent of returnee youth prioritized working in Nepal in some form. Out of the 73 returnee youth, 18 percent preferred to start their own business in Nepal, 19 percent preferred to search for jobs in Nepal, 14 percent expressed a preference to engage in agriculture in Nepal, and 11 percent reported to have no plans.

7. Government's support for youth


This section contains information on youth awareness of government measures, access of government measures, and perception on accessing government measures. It also captures information on the types of government measures mostly accessed by the youth and the policy suggestions for integrating youth in the labor market.

Figure 7.1: Awareness of government measures to support the integration of youth into the labor market (N=2000)



The Government of Nepal has been implementing several programs—such as Youth Self-employment Fund, Prime Minister Employment Program, and Subsidized Loans amongst others—to integrate youth into the labor market and encourage them to start businesses and enterprises in Nepal. Despite the broad range of programs planned and implemented by the government for the youth, 72 percent of respondents were unaware of the government programs.

Figure 7.2: Ethnic/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation of the awareness of government integration measures (N=2000)




Of the Khas-Arya youth surveyed, 39 percent were aware of the government's integration measures. This proportion was the highest amongst all ethnic and caste communities. Muslim and Tharu youth were the two least aware (respectively, only 10% and 17%) communities on government integration measures.

Amongst the provinces, youth of Karnali province were aware of the government's integration measures in the highest proportion (93% of 119 youth surveyed of Karnali). There is a significant difference between youth from Karnali province and other provinces when it comes to awareness of the government's integration measures. Youth of Lumbini province were least aware (11 percent of 347 youth) of government integration measures

Men (31%) knew about the government's integration measures in greater proportion than women (24%).


In general, awareness about integration plans for youth in the labor market increased with increase in age and level of education. Youth between 28-32 and 33-40 years of age knew more (35% and 34%, respectively) about the integration plan than other age groups. Youth in the 'Bachelor' (44%) and 'Master' (46%) education categories knew more about the government's integration measures than other categories.

Figure 7.3: Accessing government integration measures (N=569)



Out of the 28 percent of youth (refer to figure 7.1) who knew about government integration measures, only 22 percent had accessed measures. This represents about six percent of the total respondents

Figure 7.4: Ethnicity/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation on accessing government integration measures (N=569)




Of the total Dalit youth who were aware of the government's integration measures, 38 percent reported having accessed them. This proportion is the highest among youth of all caste and ethnic groups.

Sixty-nine percent of the youth from Sudurpaschim province who were aware of the government's integration measures also reported having accessed them. This access rate is the highest of all the provinces.

Of the total youth who were aware and accessed government integration measures, 39 percent were women and 61 percent were men.


Youth between 33 and 40 years of age have accessed the measures in greater proportion (32% of those who were aware) than other age groups. Youth from 'Literate' category have accessed the measures in greater proportion (57% of those who were aware) than other groups from the education category.

Figure 7.5: Types of government measures accessed (N=128)



Of the youth who have accessed government measures, most of them took a grant (65%), followed by a subsidized loans (59%) and agricultural tools (44%).

Figure 7.6: Ethnicity/caste, gender, province, age, and education-wise disaggregation on the types of government measures accessed (N=128)




Of those surveyed, all Muslim youth (100%) accessed subsidized loans, while Dalit (90%) and Adivasi-Janajati (73%) youth who have accessed government measures have also accessed subsidized loans. Of the Tharu and Madhesi youth who reported to have accessed government measures, 100 percent of the Tharus and 76 percent of Madhesi youth reported having received grants, the highest across all caste/ethnic groups. Among ethnic and caste groups, Dalit, Tharu, and Madhesi youth have received agricultural tools in a higher proportion (respectively, 60%, 50%, and 47%) than other ethnic groups.

The data also shows that men have accessed government measures in a higher proportion than women. Of the total youth who have received subsidized loans, grants, and agricultural tools, men comprised 62, 58, and 54 percent, respectively. These access rates are higher than of women respondents (respectively, 38%, 42%, and 46%).

Youth in Province 2 and Sudurpaschim province have accessed government integration programs in greater measure than in other provinces. Youth between 28-32 and 33-40 years of age have accessed more subsidized loans, grants, and agricultural tools than youth of other age groups.


Of the total youth from the 'illiterate' category who have accessed government measures, none accessed subsidized loans.

Figure 7.7: Perception on being able to access the subsidized loans/grants from banks and other government entities to support their business or startups (N=2000)



Forty-one percent of youth thought that they could not access the subsidized loans/grants from banks and other government entities to support their business or startups.

Figure 7.8: Ethnicity/caste, gender, province, age, and education-wise disaggregation of the perception on being able to access the subsidized loans/grants from banks and other government entities to support their business or startups (N=2000)




A significantly higher proportion of Khas-Arya (71%) and Tharu (66%) youth perceived that they can access government integration measures. Dalit (45%) and Muslim (46%) youth had the least confidence in being able to access government reintegration measures.

Youth from Karnali and Sudurpaschim provinces were more confident (96% and 72%, respectively) regarding their ability to access subsidized loans and grants. Of all the provinces, only in Province 1 did higher proportion (52%) of youth think that they cannot access subsidized loans and grants.

There was not a significant difference amongst men and women in their perception of being able to access subsidized loans/grants.

On average, youth of higher age and a higher educational level were more positive regarding their ability to access subsidized loans/grants. Youth from 'Master category' (84%) and 'Illiterate' category were the most and the least confident on being able to access government reintegration measures.

Figure 7.9: Policy suggestions for reintegrating youth in the labor economy (N=2000)




The survey team also asked the respondents to offer policy recommendations for integrating youth in the labor economy. Seventy-three percent of respondents said that the government should provide subsidized loans to youth to initiate their own business, 59 percent mentioned that the government should create jobs for youth in different sectors, 59 percent said that government should utilize the skills of the foreign migration returnees, 55 percent said that the government should provide training and apprenticeship for unskilled youth, and 45 percent suggested full scholarships to youth who want to pursue higher studies.

8. Anxiety and mental well-being


This section captures information on youth anxiety and mental well-being.

Figure 8.1: Experience of anxiety due to the COVID-19 (N=1856)



Eighty-four percent of youth reported having experienced anxiety due to COVID-19.

Figure 8.2: Ethnicity/caste, gender, province, age group, and level of education-wise disaggregation of experiencing anxiety due to the COVID-19 (N=1856)



Of all the ethnic and caste groups, youth from Dalit, Adivasi-Janajati, and Khas-Arya youth reported to have experienced COVID-19 induced anxiety in the highest proportion (93%, 89%, and 88%, respectively).


There was not a significant difference between men and women in their experience. Eighty-five percent of women and 83 percent of men reported having experienced anxiety.

Youth in Karnali province, Bagmati province, and Province 1 experienced anxiety in greater proportion (97%, 94%, and 90%, respectively) than in other provinces. The proportion of youth who experienced anxiety in Province 2 was lowest (68%).

There was a steady increase in anxiety with increase in age of respondents. Youth between 33 and 40 years of age reported to have experienced anxiety in a greater proportion (89%) than youth between 18 and 22 (78%), 23 and 27 (83%), and 28 and 32 (87%) years of age.

Figure 8.2 also shows that the level of education does not have a significant bearing on the experience of anxiety.

Figure 8.3: Anxiety disaggregation based on informal and formal labor employment status (N=1564)



Youth working in the informal sector were only marginally more likely to experience ‘high anxiety’ and ‘severe anxiety’ than youth working in the formal sector. Thirteen percent of youth working in the informal sector and 12 percent formally employed youth experienced high or severe anxiety. Similarly, 33 percent of informally employed youth mentioned having experienced high anxiety; high levels of anxiety were reported by 28 percent of formally employed youth. Of all youth working in the formal sector, a significant proportion (52%) reported being moderately anxious.

Figure 8.4: Anxiety disaggregation based on the frequency of expressing dissatisfaction against government activities (N=1564)




Figure 8.4 shows that youth with severe anxiety were more likely to respond that they ‘often’ (27%) and ‘always’ (5%) express dissatisfaction in response to government activities.

9. Youth awareness on socio-political issues

This section captures information on the battery of questions related to youth awareness on socio-political issues.

Table 9.1: Youth awareness on socio-political issues (N=2000)

Statements	Mean	Standard Deviation
The functions of the government have been divided into three tiers— i.e. federal, provincial and local.	2.72	1.01
In 2015, Nepal got a new Constitution.	2.76	1.02
Citizens can participate in decision-making on development activities in their locality.	2.78	1.02
Knowledge about social security system	2.82	0.95
Reservation for the marginalized groups	2.96	1.01
Authority and responsibility have been delegated to local governments to run their administration, formulate laws and deliver justice.	2.98	1.02
Activities of political parties	3.01	1.03

To gauge the respondents' awareness of various socio-political issues, enumerators read out seven statements concerning contemporary social and political issues and asked the respondents to categorize them in five different ways: Very well aware (1), Aware (2), Somewhat aware (3), Unaware (4), and Not aware at all (5). The scores in the brackets were averaged and are presented in the table above. The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table. Out of the seven statements, youth were most aware of how the functions of the government are divided into three tiers (mean 2.72). Comparing the seven statements, youth were the least aware about the activities of political parties (mean 3.01).

Table 9.2: Individuals with whom youth prefer to discuss socio-political issues (N=835)

Category	Mean	Standard Deviation
Friends	1.79	1.29
Family members	2.15	1.47
Community leaders	3.75	1.85
Political party leaders	4.66	1.87
Teachers	5.16	1.64
NGO workers	5.51	1.58
Public/government officials	5.96	1.91

Enumerators also asked respondents to rank in ascending order (1 to 7) the individuals/ groups with whom they discuss socio-political issues the most. The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table. Their responses show that they discuss political issues mostly with friends (mean 1.79) followed by family members (mean 2.15), community leaders (mean 3.75), political party leaders (mean 4.66), teachers (mean 5.16), NGO workers (mean 5.51), and public officials (mean 5.96).

Table 9.3: Most discussed social issues (N=2000)


Social Issues	Mean	Standard Deviation
Rape	2.76	0.90
Anxiety and stress	2.78	0.86
Delinquency/ drug abuse/drinking	2.85	0.91
Gender based violence	2.89	0.86
Dowry	2.93	0.89
Caste based discriminations	2.95	0.84
Acid attack	3.02	0.86
Cyber crime	3.13	0.87

Enumerators provided respondents with eight social issues (in the table above). Respondents were asked to rank the frequency that they discussed each issue: Always (1), Often (2), Sometimes (3), and Never (4). The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table. Based on the calculation of mean scores, youth tend to discuss rape (mean 2.76) and issues related to anxiety and stress (mean 2.78) most. Among the eight issues listed, cyber-crime (mean 3.13) was discussed the least.

10. Interest in politics


This section captures information on youth interest in politics and their tendency to discuss political issues.

Figure 10.1: Nepali youth interest in politics (N=2000)



Forty-four percent of respondents reported that they are ‘not interested at all’ in politics, 40 percent said that they are interested to ‘some extent’, and only five percent said they are ‘very interested’.

Figure 10.2: Ethnicity/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation on having an interest in politics (N=2000)




Interest in politics varied across ethnic and caste groups. Ethnicity-wise, 53 percent Adivasi-Janajati, 52 percent of Dalit, 49 percent of Muslim, 39 percent Khas-Arya, 37 percent Madhesi, and 34 percent of Tharu youth reported that they were 'not interested at all' in politics.

Of all the provinces, a higher proportion of youth from Bagmati (53%) and Gandaki (52%) provinces are 'not interested at all' in politics.

Gender-wise, 63 percent of respondents who said they are 'very interested' in politics were men while only 37 percent women were very interested in politics.


Figure 10.2 also shows that interest in politics is positively correlated with age and level of education. Of the youth surveyed between 33 and 40 years of age, 45 percent reported being 'interested to some extent'. This is notably higher than 18-22-year-olds, of whom only 30 percent had interest to some extent. Similarly, of the total youth in the 'Master' education category, 54 percent reported being 'interested to some extent', compared to only 16 percent of illiterate respondents.

Figure 10.3: Discussing political issues (N=2000)



Of the total youth surveyed, 58 percent mentioned that they discuss about political issues while 42 percent replied that they do not.

Figure 10.4: Ethnicity/caste, province, gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation of youth discussing political issues (N=2000).



57 percent of Tharu, 48 percent of Madhesi, and 43 percent of Khas-Arya youth discussed political issues. This ratio is higher than that of Dalit (41%), Adivasi-Janajati (37%) and Muslim (26%) youth.

Youth in Province 1 (60%) and Province 2 (48%) discuss politics much more than youth from the other five provinces.


There is a positive correlation between higher age and education level and the tendency to discuss political issues. Forty-nine percent of respondents between 33 and 40 years of age discussed political issues. This proportion is highest across all age groups.

Figures 10.2 and 10.4 show a positive relationship between higher educational qualifications and tendency to discuss political issues and expressing interest in politics.

11. Socio-political and civic association


This section captures information on socio-political and civic association of Nepali youth.

Figure 11.1: Youth association with various organizations/groups (N=970)



Of the youth surveyed who reported to be part of different organizations, 44 percent were associated with youth clubs, 39 percent with cooperatives, 33 percent with self-help groups, 19 percent with cultural/ethnic organizations, 19 percent with user groups, 17 percent with professional organizations, 16 percent with NGOs, 16 percent with religious organizations/groups, 14 percent with political parties, and seven percent with trade unions.


Figure 11.2: Ethnicity/caste and province-wise disaggregation of youth association with various organizations/groups (N=970)



Of the Khas-Arya youth who are part of different organizations, 49 percent were associated with cooperatives, 42 percent with youth clubs, and 41 percent with self-help groups. Madhesi, Adivasi-Janajati, and Dalit youth reported higher levels of participation in youth clubs (45%, 49%, and 39% respectively). A majority (59%) of Muslim youth are associated with religious organizations/groups. Tharu youth are associated at a higher rate (38%) in cultural/ ethnic organizations.

Province-wise, youth in Province 1 have higher levels of engagement with cooperatives (49% of those who are part of an associations). Youth in Province 2 are more engaged (49% of those who are part of an associations) in religious organizations/groups. Of the total youth in Bagmati province, 53 percent youth reported engagement in self-help groups, followed by 52 percent in youth clubs, and 43 percent in cooperatives. Of the total youth in Gandaki province who are part of an organization, 43 percent are engaged in self-help groups followed by 37 per cent in youth clubs. Of the total youth in Lumbini province who are part of an organization, 38 percent are engaged in cooperatives followed by 35 percent in self-help groups. Youth in Karnali province are more engaged in cooperatives (70% of those who are part of different associations). In Sudurpaschim province, youth clubs are the most engaged organization (38%).

Figure 11.3: Gender, age, and education-wise disaggregation of youth association with various organizations/groups (N=970)



Women were associated with self-help groups in higher numbers (57%), followed by NGOs (54%); whereas men were associated in higher numbers with youth clubs (64%), followed by user-groups (65%) and political parties (65%). Men also reported more engagement in trade unions (62%) and religious organizations/groups (62%).

Youth between 18 and 22 years of age tended to be associated more with youth clubs (67%) than other age groups. Of respondents between 23 and 27 years of age who were part of an organization (refer to figure 11.1), most (51%) were associated with youth clubs. Youth between 28 and 32 years of age were associated more with cooperatives (43%). Forty-eight percent of the total youth between 33 and 40 years of age who are part of different organizations were associated with cooperatives.


Figure 11.3 shows that youth from the 'Illiterate' category tended to join cultural/ethnic and religious organizations in higher numbers (respectively, 44% and 33%). The association with youth clubs is higher among youth in the 'Secondary education' and 'Bachelor' categories (respectively, 53% and 52%). Similarly, youth engagement in political parties was more common among respondents from the 'Literate' and 'Master' education categories (respectively, 20% and 19%).

12. Perceptions and opinions

This section captures information on perceptions and opinions of youth on questions ranging from current government, direction Nepal is heading, current situation and future prospects of Nepal, and trust in government and other related government and independent institutions.

Amidst the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal in 2015 and subsequent holding of local, provincial, and federal elections in 2017, a National Governance Survey found 80 percent of respondents (between 18 and 39 years of age) optimistic, saying that the country is going in the right direction (Nepal Administrative Staff College 2018). For this youth survey conducted during October-November 2020, the same question was asked to respondents between 18 and 40 years of age, with a significantly different answer. Only 34 percent said that the country is going in the right direction, 33 percent said that the country is heading in the wrong direction, and 33 percent preferred not to reply.

Figure 12.1: Reasons that Nepal is heading in the wrong direction (N=663)



Enumerators asked respondents why they thought the country is headed in the wrong direction. The most common reason cited (by 68%) was that the political leaders are

not performing well. Other reasons given were: the country not developing as expected (65%), political instability (58%), intra-party disputes (56%), ill-designed government policies (49%), mismatch between policies and economic development (47%), external interference (45%), and high inequality (38%).

Table 12.1: Perception on aspects of the current situation of Nepal (N=2000)

Aspects of current situation of Nepal	Mean	Standard Deviation
Your own standard of living	2.65	.77
Job market	2.92	.99
Economic condition of Nepal	2.98	.88
Public service delivery	3.01	.93
Accountability of the government	3.06	.87
Integrity among the public officials	3.15	.90
Political stability of Nepal	3.18	.91

Youth were also asked to categorize different aspects of the current situation of Nepal into five categories: Very good (1), Good (2), Neither good or bad (3), Bad (4), and Worse (5). The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table.

The mean scores—averaging around 3 for all the seven categories suggest—a rather neutral response. Out of the seven categories, youth were most pessimistic with regard to political stability (mean 3.18), integrity of public officials (mean 3.15), and the accountability of government (mean 3.06).

Table 12.2: Opinions on the current government (N=1741)

Opinions The current government...	Mean	Standard Deviation
...is successful in testing, tracing the COVID-19 cases and managing quarantine.	3.25	1.16
...is focused on solving the problems of common people.	3.33	1.01
...is doing a better job in developing Nepal.	3.35	1.07
...has done a good job in incorporating youth voices in designing its policies and programs.	3.36	1.02
...is successful in addressing the youth unemployment problem.	3.4	1.10
...has adopted zero tolerance policy in controlling corruption	3.4	1.08
...is positive in addressing the problems of youth	3.45	1.07

Enumerators asked youth about their opinion on the performance of the current government. Respondents were asked to give their opinion on seven statements (presented in Table 12.2) with five options: Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Neither agree nor disagree (3), Disagree (4) and, Strongly disagree (5). The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table.

The mean score hovers between 3 to 3.5 for all seven questions, revealing a neutral or slightly disagreeable view in response to the steps taken by the current government.

Of the seven statements, youth disagreed most with the statement that ‘the current government is positive in addressing the problems of youth’ (mean 3.45).

Table 12.3: Perception on contemporary socio-political issues (N=1656)

Socio-political issues	Mean	Standard Deviation
The government should provide relief to workers in the time of the COVID-19	2.1	0.98
The government should provide incentives to corporations to sustain them	2.15	0.95
Media provides unbiased message	2.92	0.92
The current government will control corruption	3.21	1.04
The current government will improve the public service delivery	3.27	1.01
Political parties represent the feelings of the people	3.28	1.02
The current government will encourage youth participation in politics	3.31	0.96
The steps taken by the incumbent government are satisfactory in controlling the COVID-19	3.4	1.07

Youth were also presented with eight opinions on contemporary socio-political issues and asked to categorize their opinion under five categories: Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Neither agree nor disagree (3), Disagree (4), and Strongly disagree (5). The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent’s scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table.

On average, youth agreed that the government should provide relief to workers in the time of COVID-19 (mean 2.1) and that government also should provide incentives to corporations to sustain them (mean 2.15). Youth were more neutral in their responses to the statement ‘media provides unbiased message’ (mean 2.92), and were more skeptical that the current government will control corruption (mean 3.21), that the current government will improve public service delivery (mean 3.27), that political parties represent the feelings of the public (mean 3.28), that the current government will encourage youth participation in politics (mean 3.31), and that the steps taken by the government have been satisfactory when it comes to controlling the COVID-19 (mean 3.4). Out of the eight socio-political issues presented, youth were most skeptical regarding the statement that the measures taken by the current government in controlling the COVID-19 were satisfactory (mean 3.4) and that the government will encourage youth participation in politics (mean 3.31).

Table 12.4: Perception on aspects of life in 10 years (N=2000)

Aspects	Mean	Standard Deviation
Education	2.27	.73
Quality of life	2.41	.74
Individual liberties and rights	2.49	.73
Health care	2.52	.83
Democracy	2.52	.81
Local bodies	2.60	.77
Security	2.62	.80
Employment	2.64	.88
Federalism	2.75	.85

Enumerators asked youth to label different aspects of Nepali society based on how optimistic/pessimistic they are about them. For calculating mean score youth responses were categorized into five categories: Much better (1), Better (2), Same as present (3), Worse (4), and Much worse (5). The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table.

The response suggests that youth are most optimistic about education (mean 2.27), followed by quality of life (mean 2.41), individual liberties and rights (mean 2.49), health care (mean 2.52), democracy (mean 2.52), local bodies (mean 2.6), security (mean 2.62), employment (mean 2.64), and federalism (mean 2.75).

Table 12.5: Trust in government and independent institutions (N=2000)

Institutions	Mean	Standard Deviation
Court	2.39	0.92
Army	2.4	0.92
Media	2.68	0.84
Police	2.72	0.95
Local government	2.86	0.91
Provincial government	3.02	0.89
Federal government	3.07	0.87
President	3.09	1.02
Political parties	3.18	0.96


Youth were asked about the level of trust they had in eight government and independent institutions. For calculating the mean trust scores, their responses were categorized into five categories: Fully trust (1), Trust (2), Moderately trust (3), Do not trust (4), and Do not trust at all (5). The standard deviation values tell how far, on average, each respondent's scoring lies away from the mean score presented in the table.

Courts were the most trusted (mean 2.39), followed by the army (mean 2.4), media (mean 2.68), police (mean 2.72), local government (mean 2.86), provincial government (mean 3.02), and federal government (mean 3.07). Political parties (mean 3.18) were the least trusted. Notably, the president (mean 3.09) ranked second-last on trust with Nepali youth.

13. Expressing dissatisfaction

This section contains information on frequency and mediums for expressing dissatisfaction against the steps taken by the government.

Figure 13.1: Frequency of expressing dissatisfaction against the steps taken by the government (N=2000)




Thirty-four percent of the youth 'never' express, 48 percent 'sometimes' express, 16 percent 'often' express, and two percent never express their dissatisfaction against steps taken by the government.

Table 13.1: Common mediums for expressing dissatisfaction against steps (N=1326)

Mediums for expressing dissatisfaction	Mean	Standard Deviation
Talk among friends, relatives, and people	2.09	1.38
Posts/comments/share the dissatisfaction on social media (Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram)	2.35	1.80
Write/ Submit petition letter to the government	3.96	1.88
Organize/participate in rallies organized by different groups	3.99	1.62
Sit-in/hunger strike	4.63	1.70
Strike (<i>Bandha</i> and <i>Chakka Jam</i>)	5.51	1.64

Youth who express dissatisfaction were also asked to rank the mediums they use to express dissatisfaction in ascending order of importance. The table above shows that talking with friends and relatives (mean 2.09) is the most common medium, followed by posting/commenting/sharing their dissatisfaction on social media (mean 2.35), writing/submitting petition letter to the government (mean 3.96), organizing/participating in rallies organized by different groups (mean 3.99), going for sit-in/hunger strike (4.63), and finally participating in other strikes (*Bandha* and *Chakka Jam*) (mean 5.51).

Figure 13.2: Best way to compel the government to listen (N=2000)



All respondents—whether or not they express their dissatisfaction against the government—were asked which medium they think is the best to compel the government to hear their voices. On average, youth thought that posting/commenting/sharing dissatisfaction on social media is the best way (preferred by 42%). Sit-in/hunger strike (preferred by 8%) and Strike (*Bandha* and *Chakka Jam*) (preferred by 11%) were the two least prioritized options to compel the government to hear their voices.

Bibliography

- British Council, 2011. *Youth Survey of Nepal* [online]. Kathmandu: British Council. Available from: https://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Nepal_2011_Youth_Survey.pdf.
- Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019. *Report on the Nepal Labor Force Survey 2017/18* [online]. Government of Nepal. Available from: https://nepalindata.com/media/resources/items/20/bNLFS-III_Final-Report.pdf [Accessed 3 Dec 2020].
- Government of Nepal, 2015. *Constitution of Nepal 2015* [online]. Available from: https://www.mohp.gov.np/downloads/Constitution%20of%20Nepal%202072_full_english.pdf.
- Ministry of Youth and Sport, 2015. *National Youth Policy 2072 (2015)* [online]. Government of Nepal. Available from: http://www.mois.gov.np/sites/default/files/nitiheru/National%20Youth%20Policy%202072_2.pdf.
- Niti Foundation, 2020. *COVID-19 and the Forgotten Majority in Nepal: Why are informal workers hardest hit?* [online]. Kathmandu: Niti Foundation. Available from: https://nitifoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Niti-Foundation-COVID-19-and-the-Forgotten-Majority-in-Nepal_29-April.pdf [Accessed 3 Dec 2020].
- Niti Foundation and ILO, 2021 (to be published). *Diagnostic Report on Extent, Circumstances, Causes, Factors and Nature of Informality in Nepal*. Kathmandu: Niti Foundation and International Labour Organization (ILO).
- OnlineKhabar, 2020. कोरोनाका कारण साढे १५ लाख नेपालीले गुमाए रोजगारी. *Online Khabar* [online]. Available from: <https://www.onlinekhabar.com/2020/12/913072> [Accessed 3 Feb 2021].
- OnlineKhabar, 2020. After protests, Nepal govt makes public details of Covid-19 expenses. *Online Khabar* [online], 2020. Available from: <https://english.onlinekhabar.com/after-protests-nepal-govt-makes-public-details-of-covid-19-expenses.html>.
- Pervaiz, H., Saleem, M. S. Z., and Sajjad, M., 2012. *Relationship of unemployment with social unrest and psychological distress: An empirical study for juveniles*. *African Journal of Business Management*, 6 (7), 2557–2564.
- Poudel, K. and Subedi, P., 2020. *Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on socioeconomic and mental health aspects in Nepal*. *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 66 (8), 748–755.
- UNPFN, 2017. *Youth involvement in the peaceful and sustainable development of Nepal* [online]. Kathmandu: United Nations Peace Fund Nepal (UNPFN). Available from: https://un.org.np/sites/default/files/doc_publication/Youth%20Report%20Digital%20version.pdf.



Dugar Marg, Naxal, Kathmandu, Nepal
+977-1-4537520 • info@nitifoundation.org

www.nitifoundation.org