AFGHANISTAN

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS
March - November 2022
Issued in May 2022

Despite a lull in conflict, severe acute food insecurity remains unprecedented across Afghanistan; humanitarian assistance prevented a human catastrophe

CURRENT MARCH - MAY 2022

19.7M
47% of the population

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	20,000 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	6,593,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	13,037,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	14,626,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	7,451,000 People in food security

PROJECTED JUNE - NOVEMBER 2022

18.9M
45% of the population

People facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	5,976,000 People in Emergency
Phase 3	12,945,000 People in Crisis
Phase 2	14,536,000 People in Stressed
Phase 1	7,882,000 People in food security

Overview

High acute food insecurity persists across Afghanistan, as a combination of a collapsing economy and drought is depriving nearly 20 million Afghans of food, classified in Crisis or Emergency (IPC Phases 3 or 4), between March and May 2022 (the lean season), latest data shows. Among these are about 6.6 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 13 million in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). A significant amount of Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) was provided, easing the food crisis for the most affected households. However, Afghanistan's food security situation remains highly concerning, exacerbated by economic decline and high food prices. With 38% of the population targeted for HFA, nearly 20 million people, representing half the country's population, are still experiencing high and critical levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phases 3 and above) between March and May 2022. Among these, about 6.6 million people are classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), characterized by large food gaps and/or employing emergency coping strategies to access food. For the first time since the introduction of IPC in Afghanistan, Catastrophe conditions (IPC Phase 5) were detected for 20,000 people in the province of Ghor, one of the most remote, vulnerable provinces of Afghanistan and immediate action is needed to prevent further deterioration.

Compared to the previous period, November 2021 to March 2022, which classified 22.8 M people in IPC Phase 3 and above, the reduction of the population facing high and critical level of acute food insecurity has been minimal and mainly driven by partners' efforts in scaling up HFA. The increased capacity of humanitarian actors to reach beneficiaries in vulnerable rural areas compared to the peak of the winter season is playing a big role in this respect. The persistence of this high magnitude and severity of food insecurity is due to a combination of a successive series of droughts, rising food prices, lingering impact of decades of conflict and the economic collapse resulting from the political transition. In the projected period, between June and November 2022, harvest will allow a minimal improvement in food availability and access, from 19.7 Million people facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) to 18.9 million. Overall, 13 million will likely be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 6 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). With below average prospects for the harvest in most of the country, several factors are further expected to hamper the foreseeable seasonal improvement. Among these, many are fundamental socio-economic changes, such as the expected contraction of the GDP from 20 to 16 billion USD in 2022; the lack of development projects; the disruption of supply chain and further increase of food, fuel and fertilizer prices linked to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which add up to unprecedented inflation at country level; and the remaining sanctions on the de facto authorities. More specifically, at household level, the situation is compounded by the forecasted reduction of Humanitarian Food Assistance after the month of May. HFA is expected to decrease from 38% of the population receiving on average two third food ration in the current period, to 8% in the June-November projection due to lack of funding.

Current Acute Food Insecurity March - May 2022



Projected Acute food Insecurity June - November 2022



Key Drivers

Economic Decline: Rapid reduction in international grant support, loss of access to offshore assets, disruption to financial linkages and impact of the Ukraine crisis have led to a major contraction of the economy, increasing poverty and macroeconomic instability as well as leading to high unemployment and high food and agricultural input prices.

Drought: Below-average cumulative precipitation during the wet season (2021 - 2022) accompanied with high agriculture input costs (seed & fertilizers) resulted in a reduced level of winter wheat cultivation, which would likely result in a 7 to 13 percent reduction in the expected wheat harvest compared to the long-term average.

High Food Prices: High prices of commodities compounded by reduced incomes for 97% of the total population have negatively affected the purchasing power of people. The terms of trade of casual labor against wheat prices have fallen by 35% compared with June 2021

Impact of the Ukraine Conflict: Afghanistan typically has a deficit in cereals production (against consumption requirements) and relies on imports to meet their food demand. In 2021/2022 the cereal import requirement is expected to be 20% higher than average. The negative impact of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is expected to further raise global food prices, while placing pressure on countries in the region supplying wheat to Afghanistan to place export bans on food, giving priority to their respective domestic consumption.

Additional aggravating factors are the expected reduction of remittances, especially from Iran, a further decrease of formal and informal employment opportunities, increasing debt levels and distress livestock sales. The improvements observed when comparing results in the IPC timeline (22.8M, 19.7M, 18.9M food insecure in the last three analyses periods) are far from indicating a positive trend of food insecurity. Not only is the decrease of people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above are relatively low compared to the massive HFA scale up reminiscent of the underlying vulnerabilities experienced by Afghan families; such a decrease was only possible thanks to the prominent scale up of HFA in the current period - as the overall deteriorating conditions outrank these efforts.

CURRENT SITUATION OVERVIEW (MARCH – MAY 2022)

In the current period, 19.7 million (47% of the analysed population) were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. This includes 20,324 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 6.6 million people (16%) in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 13 million (31%) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Of the 45 analytical domains analysed (34 rural and 11 urban), 17 analytical domains, including 13 rural (Badakhshan, Badghis, Balkh, Bamyan, Daykundi, Faryab, Ghor, Jawzjan, Nimroz, Nuristan, Samangan, Uruzgan and Wardak) and four urban (Jawzjan urban, Kandahar urban, Nangarhar urban, and Takhar urbanan) were classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). Of high concern in particular is the disruption of HFA in the province of Ghor that has contributed to the unprecedented classification of 20,000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). Ghor is one of the most remote, chronically food insecure and vulnerable provinces of Afghanistan. It is mostly mountainous with limited flat or arable land. Due to access challenges, the two districts of Charsada and Passaband did not receive any assistance during the current period until the end of March. The districts also show the highest levels of food insecurity outcomes[1] in the province. The severity of the situation is only partially mitigated by the unprecedented surge of humanitarian assistance that covers 38% of the total population of Afghanistan in the current period. In the absence of such assistance, the magnitude and severity of needs would be dramatically higher.

The current period (March-May 2022) corresponds to the peak of the lean season before the winter wheat harvest. Most households have already depleted their stock from the previous harvest, considering drought translated into a harvest below the long term average. According to the Pre-Lean Season Assessment (PLSA), on average, cereal stocks from the previous harvest lasted less than 4 months. This early depletion of stocks pushed households to rely primarily on markets for their food needs, with the vast majority of households (88%) reporting purchase from market as the main source of cereals, while only 7% relied on own production for cereal consumption. This high dependency on markets further increases households' vulnerability considering the record high food prices observed.

WFP monthly market monitoring data (April 2022) showed that, compared to June 2021, price of wheat increased by 45%, wheat flour by 49%, rice by 20%, cooking oil by 32%, pulses by 23% and sugar by 25%. The increase in prices was mainly due to the Afghani currency having lost 12% of its value against the US dollar in less than one year.

Additional pressure on prices will be generated from the ongoing Ukraine conflict, which further raised global food, fuel and fertilizer prices, while also increased regional competition for commodities. For the current period, although no complete ban on the export of wheat has been imposed by Afghanistan's major trade partners, the situation remains volatile and requires strict monitoring. The overall decrease in affordability of food is indicated through falling terms of trade of casual labour against wheat prices: compared with June 2021 these decreased by 35%; while the terms of trade for livestock have decreased by 26%.

To further compound the situation, the PLSA indicated a significant reduction in income for 80% of surveyed households and an increase in debt. In fact, almost 40% of the surveyed households purchased cereals on credit. Around 92% of households reported having debt, and 88% of them cited food purchase as the main reason for borrowing. With the increasing dependency on the market due to significantly lower production and increased prices, the level of debt is expected to increase, further constraining households and limiting their economic recovery. Almost the totality (97%) of households reported that their income levels had decreased compared to the same period last year, with reduced employment opportunities and loss of jobs being the main causes. In terms of income, while some public sector salary payment resumed, albeit at a lower rate, most of the 500,000 people employed by Afghan National Forces and other security services are still unemployed. In general, unemployment levels remain exceptionally high and only a small proportion of households have access to productive or sustainable remunerative employment.

Moreover, the abovementioned issues are compounded by the economic shock due to the collapse of government that caused a major disruption to livelihoods, especially in urban areas. The recent employment prospects assessment in Afghanistan by the International Labour Organization (ILO) shows that the ensuing crisis has paralyzed the economy and continues to have dire impacts on the labour market. More than half a million workers in the formal sectors are estimated to have lost their job in the third quarter of 2021, relative to a hypothetical scenario with no change in administration, which represents 8 percent fewer working women and men. The impact on female employment is severe. In the absence of any substantial policy shift, female employment losses are expected to increase to 21 per cent by mid-2022. As a result of this economic collapse, UNDP estimates that more than 90% of the Afghanistan population will fall below the poverty line by the middle of 2022 in a worst case scenario.

[1] Levels of food insecurity outcomes: analysis at district level is indicative only and not considered statistically significant.

Beside the expected mitigating effect of HFA, which will be subsequently described in the dedicated section, recent months have been characterized by a reduction of conflict events and displacements caused by the relative return to stability post Taliban takeover. Furthermore, physical access though still limited is likely to improve in the current period compared to the early part of the year (when remote areas of Badakshan, Ghor Daykundi, and Nuristan were cut off from markets and livelihood opportunities due to the harsh winter conditions limiting physical movement). The slight increase in temperature starting in April is contributing to improved access for households residing in remote areas.

PLSA outcome overview :

The impacts of the conditions described manifested in large food consumption gaps and livelihood erosion, clearly detectable from the outcome indicators employed in the IPC analysis. Across all areas, around 53% of households had a Poor food consumption score (FCS), while 21% have Severe and Very Severe hunger (HHS). In terms of dietary diversity (HDDS), 22.9% were consuming less than two food groups. To mitigate some of these food gaps, households are forced to engage in negative coping strategies which will have detrimental long term impacts on their food security conditions. Around 31% percent of households adopted emergency livelihood coping strategies (LCS), and 40% resorted to crisis livelihood coping strategies to mitigate their food consumption gaps.

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY CURRENT SITUATION (MARCH - MAY 2022)



Current Flowminder population table: March – May 2022

Province	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Badakhshan	1,401,209	140,121	10	490,423	35	420,363	30	350,302	25	0	0	4	770,665	55
Badghis	730,566	109,585	15	219,170	30	255,698	35	146,113	20	0	0	4	401,811	55
Baghlan	1,077,131	161,570	15	484,709	45	269,283	25	161,570	15	0	0	3	430,852	40
Baghlan Urban	271,631	54,326	20	108,652	40	67,908	25	40,745	15	0	0	3	108,652	40
Balkh	1,356,012	203,402	15	406,804	30	474,604	35	271,202	20	0	0	4	745,807	55
Balkh Urban	650,163	65,016	10	260,065	40	227,557	35	97,524	15	0	0	3	325,082	50
Bamyan	658,750	65,875	10	263,500	40	197,625	30	131,750	20	0	0	4	329,375	50
Daykundi	686,593	102,989	15	205,978	30	240,308	35	137,319	20	0	0	4	377,626	55
Farah	748,435	224,531	30	261,952	35	187,109	25	74,844	10	0	0	3	261,952	35
Faryab	1,295,551	129,555	10	453,443	35	453,443	35	259,110	20	0	0	4	712,553	55
Faryab Urban	178,951	35,790	20	62,633	35	53,685	30	26,843	15	0	0	3	80,528	45
Ghazni	1,811,190	362,238	20	724,476	40	543,357	30	181,119	10	0	0	3	724,476	40
Ghor	1,016,220	152,433	15	355,677	35	254,055	25	233,731	23	20,324	2	4	508,110	50
Helmand	1,803,082	360,616	20	540,925	30	631,079	35	270,462	15	0	0	3	901,541	50
Helmand Urban	119,410	23,882	20	41,793.50	35	35,823	30	17,912	15	0	0	3	53,735	45
Hirat	2,074,221	414,844	20	725,977	35	622,266	30	311,133	15	0	0	3	933,399	45
Hirat Urban	771,395	115,709	15	308,558	40	231,419	30	115,709	15	0	0	3	347,128	45
Jawzjan	637,862	95,679	15	255,145	40	159,466	25	127,572	20	0	0	4	287,038	45
Jawzjan Urban	162,493	24,374	15	56,873	35	48,748	30	32,499	20	0	0	4	81,247	50
Kabul	1,006,843	201,369	20	302,053	30	352,395	35	151,026	15	0	0	3	503,422	50
Kabul Urban	5,911,781	1,182,356	20	1,773,534	30	2,069,123	35	886,767	15	0	0	3	2,955,891	50
Kandahar	1,158,551	231,710	20	347,565	30	405,493	35	173,783	15	0	0	3	579,276	50
Kandahar Urban	701,944	140,389	20	245,680	35	175,486	25	140,389	20	0	0	4	315,875	45
Kapisa	649,102	129,820	20	227,186	35	194,731	30	97,365	15	0	0	3	292,096	45
Khost	846,134	169,227	20	338,454	40	253,840	30	84,613	10	0	0	3	338,454	40
Kunar	663,847	132,769	20	232,346	35	232,346	35	66,385	10	0	0	3	298,731	45
Kunduz	1,256,451	188,468	15	565,403	45	376,935	30	125,645	10	0	0	3	502,580	40
Kunduz Urban	254,549	50,910	20	89,092	35	76,365	30	38,182	15	0	0	3	114,547	45
Laghman	655,998	98,400	15	229,599	35	229,599	35	98,400	15	0	0	3	327,999	50
Logar	577,418	173,225	30	173,225	30	173,225	30	57,742	10	0	0	3	230,967	40
Nangarhar	1,896,240	379,248	20	663,684	35	568,872	30	284,436	15	0	0	3	853,308	45
Nangarhar Urban	365,844	73,169	20	146,338	40	73,169	20	73,169	20	0	0	4	146,338	40
Nimroz	244,000	36,600	15	85,400	35	73,200	30	48,800	20	0	0	4	122,000	50
Nuristan	217,760	32,664	15	65,328	30	76,216	35	43,552	20	0	0	4	119,768	55
Paktika	1,030,877	103,088	10	412,351	40	360,807	35	154,632	15	0	0	3	515,439	50
Paktya	813,474	162,695	20	366,063	45	203,369	25	81,347	10	0	0	3	284,716	35
Panjsher	225,884	67,765	30	79,059	35	56,471	25	22,588	10	0	0	3	79,059	35
Parwan	980,635	245,159	25	392,254	40	196,127	20	147,095	15	0	0	3	343,222	35
Samangan	572,253	85,838	15	200,289	35	171,676	30	114,451	20	0	0	4	286,127	50
Sari pul	825,504	123,826	15	330,202	40	247,651	30	123,826	15	0	0	3	371,477	45
Takhar	1,340,926	268,185	20	402,278	30	469,324	35	201,139	15	0	0	3	670,463	50
Takhar Urban	112,133	11,213	10	39,247	35	39,247	35	22,427	20	0	0	4	61,673	55
Uruzgan	579,684	86,953	15	231,874	40	144,921	25	115,937	20	0	0	4	260,858	45
Wardak	877,687	131,653	15	307,190	35	263,306	30	175,537	20	0	0	4	438,844	50
Zabul	510,919	102,184	20	153,276	30	178,822	35	76,638	15	0	0	3	255,460	50
Grand Total	**41,727,303**	**7,451,417**	**18**	**14,625,723**	**35**	**13,036,510**	**31**	**6,593,329**	**16**	**20,324**	**0**		**19,650,163**	**47**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action.

PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW (JUNE - NOVEMBER 2022)

For the projection analysis period (June to November 2022), corresponding to the harvest and post-harvest season, the total population facing high and critical levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) is expected to only minimally decrease (2%) from 19.7 million in the current to 18.9 million (45% of the analysed population). No province or urban centre analysed have been classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) or IPC Phase 1 (Minimal). Most of the twelve areas classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) in the current period will remain in this phase, with only slight changes in population during the projection period.

In a typical year, the observed improvement in conditions in the post-harvest period would be much more pronounced, considering that more than one third of the surveyed households (PSLA) declared having cultivated. However, following the extreme criticalities highlighted in the current analysis description and because of many of the aggravating assumptions, household resilience and ability to recover from the lean season are limited.

The unprecedented level of HFA for the March – May 2022 period will decrease significantly due to extremely limited funding prospects. The HFA will cover only 8% of the population and will therefore have minimal mitigating effects. Funding constraints remain a major challenge for the humanitarian sector. Of the 4.4 billion US dollars required for the Humanitarian Response Plan, only 601 million US dollars are confirmed. Moreover, although materialized so far in few areas and for a limited duration, the risk of interference of the de facto authorities in the implementation of humanitarian projects remains a concern for humanitarian actors during the projection period.

Despite a significant reduction in humanitarian assistance, the minimal improvement over the projection period is credited to the upcoming crop harvest from June to August. The positive impacts of the harvest will be mainly relevant for farming households, representing about 28% (those having access to agricultural land) of the population. Access to wheat seeds remained a significant challenge. According to the PLSA, 85% of farmers in rural areas did not have access to certified wheat seeds to cultivate their lands during the last season. As such, most of the farmers cultivated their lands using non-certified seeds, which means in the upcoming harvest the yield is going to be lower than what the certified seed provides.

Description of contributing factors

The economic outlook for Afghanistan continues to be bleak. According to the IMF, Afghanistan's economy may contract up to 30% this year with falling imports, a depreciating Afghani currency, and accelerating inflation. This would have major impacts on the living standards of the Afghan population and push millions more people into poverty. UNDP's economic outlook for Afghanistan estimates the per capita income will fall from 500 US dollars in 2020 to 350 US dollars in 2022 if economic conditions continues along the current trends.

The impact of the sudden disruption of more than 4 billion dollars in development projects is expected to continue in the projection period. Some mild mitigation will be observed as some suspended projects are in the process of partial resumption. Despite the criticality of these funds to resume for the kick-start of the Afghan economy, the extent of the mitigating impact and timeline of the resumption remain unclear, and the weight of this potential mitigation factor is assumed to be limited under the current scenario. The likely impact of the continued disruption of development funding is adding to the limited improvement in the post-harvest period (projection). The de facto authorities have effectively banned girls from secondary education by ordering high schools to re-open only for boys and denying girls the right to continue their education. The move has drawn international condemnation, and further affected development funding trends. If access to education for girls is not restored, there is a risk of negative impacts on the level of funding

Key Assumptions for the projection period

Living standards: Afghanistan's economy may contract up to 30% this year with falling imports, a depreciating Afghani, and accelerating inflation, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Sanctions: sanctions on the de facto authorities will continue to have economic impacts and limit cash availability, causing serious impediments to markets and trade.

Salary payment: government employees' salary payments by de facto authorities will continue as in the current period: at a lower rate and excluding former Afghan National Forces.

Unemployment will continue at high levels: the closure of private sectors, reduced foreign aid, closure of businesses and government institutions will continue to affect the urban population, especially women.

Development projects: the impact of the sudden disruption of more than 4 billion dollars in development projects is expected to continue in the projection period.

Conflict: the security situation is likely to remain stable with a reduced number of displacements. Some armed groups linked to ISK may still be active in the projection period, destabilizing access to humanitarian services.

Wheat harvest forecast: preliminary winter wheat harvest is estimated at 7 to 13% below the long-term average and import requirements will be above usual levels (about 20% more than average in the 2021-2022 marketing year – GIEWS). An increase in import requirements is considered as an aggravating factor as it is likely to constrain economic access to food given that prices are expected to be higher and challenges to import from neighboring countries are likely to limit the ability to cover cereal requirement gaps.

Pasture conditions in the North and North-east livestock-producing areas are expected to be suboptimal with an impact on livestock body conditions. Better conditions will be observed in the rest of the country.

Availability and prices of food, fuel and fertilizers will be affected by the Ukraine crisis. The Ukraine conflict will continue to impact on global food supplies and prices. If established, risks of export bans imposed by Afghanistan's major trading partners (Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan) will have major impacts.

Remittances from the Gulf states are expected to remain stable, while Iran remittances are expected to reduce due to recent security incidents in the country.

Humanitarian Food Assistance: HFA coverage is expected to decrease from the current level (38%) to 8%, with a significant impact on the food security of the most vulnerable not benefiting from the harvest. Currently only 601 million of the 4.4 billion HRP requirement is confirmed, while 2 billion have been pledged.

and operation of development projects in the country.

Partial resumption of salaries for permanent civil servants at a new lower rate was observed in the current period, and it is expected that this will continue in the projection period. These policies however only apply to male staff, and females will continue to be left out of the public sector. Moreover, the staff of the Afghan National Force and other security services are expected to continue to be unpaid. ILO predicts that by the middle of the year the number of job losses may increase to up to 900,000.

Recently, the United States has approved the partial easing of sanctions imposed on Afghanistan to facilitate a broad range of commercial activity that will benefit the Afghan people. While the sanctions on the de facto authorities remain in place, the General License 20 (GL20) clarifies that financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector companies can engage in wide-ranging transactions and activities in Afghanistan while complying with U.S. sanctions. Though designed to mitigate some of the worst impacts of the sanctions, the GL20 will not immediately offset the economic collapse that followed the government transition. The private sector risk appetite remains low, and the impacts of this policy are expected to be limited considering the Afghanistan central bank functionality remains limited.

The security situation is likely to remain stable during the projection period with an expected lower level of security incidents compared with previous years. Consequently, displacement and impacts of IDP inflows are likely to remain minimal in the projection period. It is however expected that some armed groups will remain active, with the potential for complex attacks that could cause instability and fear in Kabul, other urban centres and beyond, and may look to destabilise the de facto authorities and the economy. Any increase in security incidents can lead to temporary disruptions to HFA.

Availability

Overall below-average precipitation during the winter wheat cultivation combined with the high agriculture inputs cost (seed & fertilizers) resulted in the reduction in the area cultivated for wheat. Despite an improvement of precipitation levels in January reducing rainfall deficits in some part of the country, the main wheat producing area in the country (North and North-east) as well as the Central Highland, North-West regions and Zabul province in the South-east received insufficient precipitation. In details, about 20 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan received below average precipitation, 10 of which received well below average precipitation (60-80% compared to 2001-2015 average). In particular, Samangan, Sar-i-Pul and Balkh received precipitations even inferior to those of the 2021 drought year. Above-average temperatures during the current and projection period will also have negative impacts on the upcoming harvest.

The water basin of the country - Snow Water Equivalent (SWE) - is below average and is now rapidly declining due to warming temperatures. This will turn into shortages of water for irrigated crop in downstream areas.

At the national level, preliminary wheat production estimates indicated this would be 7-13% below average; however, this estimate is currently under revision as it is considered too optimistic. On the contrary, some mitigation could come from horticulture production that is estimated to be near average, especially in central and southern parts of the country.

Access

Especially for non-farming households, financial access to food will remain a main challenge. Prices of food commodities are historically high and will likely follow an increasing trend or will stabilise at a high rate. The continuation of the Ukraine and Russia crisis is expected to have major implications for food, fuel and fertilizer supply and prices globally. Both countries are major contributors to the world wheat market (17% and 12%, respectively) and sunflower oil market (28% and 50%), therefore any constraint in the export of these two commodities is likely to affect global prices with a ripple effect in Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is dependent on Kazakhstan for wheat imports, the sanctions/restrictions is already affecting the demand for Kazakhstan wheat in Central Asia.

With the deterioration of economic conditions in Afghanistan and limited foreign currency reserves, the financial ability of the private sector to procure wheat from international markets remains uncertain. **The persisting severity for domains where people rely on markets for food supply is corroborated by the fact that three of the four urban areas classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) in the current period will have the same classification in the projection period.**

The flow of remittances from gulf countries will likely be stable during the projected period with near to average levels applicable for south-eastern provinces (Paktya, Khost and Paktika) and some other parts of the country, however, they might also progressively decrease linked to global price inflation. The inflows from Iran, on which a considerable proportion of the population relies (particularly in the central highland and west region), is expected to decrease in the projection period as a consequence of a recent security incident involving Afghan nationals in Iran.

During the projection period, however, significant improvements to physical access to markets will be observed in areas that experienced winter blockades. The areas that will be most affected are Badakhshan, Nuristan, Daykundi and Ghor.

Against this outlook, the major mitigating factor in addition to the upcoming harvest is constituted by HFA that is forecasted to be reduced from a coverage of 38% to 8% in the projected period. Given the importance of this factor to prevent a further deterioration of the situation, a dedicated section exploring the levels and effects of HFA in the current and projected period has been developed

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION (NOVEMBER JUNE - NOV 2022)



Projection Flowminder population table: June - November 2022

Province	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Badakhshan	1,401,209	140,121	10	490,423	35	490,423	35	280,242	20	0	0	4	770,665	55
Badghis	730,566	146,113	20	219,170	30	219,170	30	146,113	20	0	0	4	365,283	50
Baghlan	1,077,131	323,139	30	430,852	40	215,426	20	107,713	10	0	0	3	323,139	30
Baghlan Urban	271,631	81,489	30	108,652	40	54,326	20	27,163	10	0	0	3	81,489	30
Balkh	1,356,012	203,402	15	474,604	35	406,804	30	271,202	20	0	0	4	678,006	50
Balkh Urban	650,163	65,016	10	260,065	40	227,557	35	97,524	15	0	0	3	325,082	50
Bamyan	658,750	164,688	25	197,625	30	197,625	30	98,813	15	0	0	3	296,438	45
Daykundi	686,593	137,319	20	171,648	25	240,308	35	137,319	20	0	0	4	377,626	55
Farah	748,435	261,952	35	261,952	35	149,687	20	74,844	10	0	0	3	224,531	30
Faryab	1,295,551	129,555	10	518,220	40	388,665	30	259,110	20	0	0	4	647,776	50
Faryab Urban	178,951	35,790	20	62,633	35	53,685	30	26,843	15	0	0	3	80,528	45
Ghazni	1,811,190	452,798	25	724,476	40	452,798	25	181,119	10	0	0	3	633,917	35
Ghor	1,016,220	152,433	15	355,677	35	254,055	25	254,055	25	0	0	4	508,110	50
Helmand	1,803,082	360,616	20	721,233	40	540,925	30	180,308	10	0	0	3	721,233	40
Helmand Urban	119,410	23,882	20	35,823	30	41,794	35	17,912	15	0	0	3	59,705	50
Hirat	2,074,221	414,844	20	725,977	35	622,266	30	311,133	15	0	0	3	933,399	45
Hirat Urban	771,395	77,140	10	269,988	35	269,988	35	154,279	20	0	0	4	424,267	55
Jawzjan	637,862	95,679	15	255,145	40	159,466	25	127,572	20	0	0	4	287,038	45
Jawzjan Urban	162,493	24,374	15	56,873	35	48,748	30	32,499	20	0	0	4	81,247	50
Kabul	1,006,843	251,711	25	251,711	25	402,737	40	100,684	10	0	0	3	503,422	50
Kabul Urban	5,911,781	886,767	15	1,773,534	30	2,364,712	40	886,767	15	0	0	3	3,251,480	55
Kandahar	1,158,551	289,638	25	347,565	30	405,493	35	115,855	10	0	0	3	521,348	45
Kandahar Urban	701,944	105,292	15	245,680	35	210,583	30	140,389	20	0	0	4	350,972	50
Kapisa	649,102	194,731	30	194,731	30	194,731	30	64,910	10	0	0	3	259,641	40
Khost	846,134	211,534	25	338,454	40	211,534	25	84,613	10	0	0	3	296,147	35
Kunar	663,847	132,769	20	265,539	40	199,154	30	66,385	10	0	0	3	265,539	40
Kunduz	1,256,451	314,113	25	502,580	40	314,113	25	125,645	10	0	0	3	439,758	35
Kunduz Urban	254,549	63,637	25	101,820	40	63,637	25	25,455	10	0	0	3	89,092	35
Laghman	655,998	98,400	15	229,599	35	262,399	40	65,600	10	0	0	3	327,999	50
Logar	577,418	144,355	25	202,096	35	202,096	35	28,871	5	0	0	3	230,967	40
Nangarhar	1,896,240	379,248	20	758,496	40	474,060	25	284,436	15	0	0	3	758,496	40
Nangarhar Urban	365,844	91,461	25	128,045	35	91,461	25	54,877	15	0	0	3	146,338	40
Nimroz	244,000	36,600	15	61,000	25	85,400	35	61,000	25	0	0	4	146,400	60
Nuristan	217,760	43,552	20	65,328	30	65,328	30	43,552	20	0	0	4	108,880	50
Paktika	1,030,877	154,632	15	360,807	35	360,807	35	154,632	15	0	0	3	515,439	50
Paktya	813,474	203,369	25	284,716	35	244,042	30	81,347	10	0	0	3	325,390	40
Panjsher	225,884	56,471	25	79,059	35	67,765	30	22,588	10	0	0	3	90,354	40
Parwan	980,635	245,159	25	392,254	40	245,159	25	98,064	10	0	0	3	343,222	35
Samangan	572,253	85,838	15	200,289	35	171,676	30	114,451	20	0	0	4	286,127	50
Sari pul	825,504	123,826	15	330,202	40	247,651	30	123,826	15	0	0	3	371,477	45
Takhar	1,340,926	335,232	25	469,324	35	402,278	30	134,093	10	0	0	3	536,370	40
Takhar Urban	112,133	16,820	15	44,853	40	33,640	30	16,820	15	0	0	3	50,460	45
Uruzgan	579,684	86,953	15	231,874	40	173,905	30	86,953	15	0	0	3	260,858	45
Wardak	877,687	131,653	15	351,075	40	263,306	30	131,653	15	0	0	3	394,959	45
Zabul	510,919	102,184	20	178,822	35	153,276	30	76,638	15	0	0	3	229,914	45
Grand Total	**41,727,303**	**8076291**	**20**	**14,730,490**	**35**	**12,944,658**	**31**	**5,975,864**	**14**	**0**	**0**		**18,920,522**	**45**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action.

FOCUS ON THE IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE

Assessing the levels and the broader mitigating effect of Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) is a key component of an IPC analysis, as IPC is a snapshot analysis and integrates all aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the current and projected situation. In the case of Afghanistan, HFA has played a major role in mitigating the effects of the on-going crisis in the country.

IPC protocols are not designed (nor should they be used) to assess or evaluate the impact of any humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity, or to monitor achievements towards programme level goals. Humanitarian food assistance to be considered includes direct resource transfers in response to acute events that aim to reduce food gaps, and protect and save lives and livelihoods. Only transfers that have an immediate positive effect on access to food are to be considered. Humanitarian food assistance may include different modalities, such as transfers of food, cash, livestock and other productive tools if they immediately improve households' access to food during the analysis period. For projections, only humanitarian food assistance that has been planned and is either already funded or likely to be funded and is likely to be delivered should be considered.

Current Analysis period

In the November 2021-March 2022 period, only 7% of the total population of the country was assisted. Starting from March 2022 a major scale up of assistance was initiated in Afghanistan. Based on data shared by the World Food Programme, an estimated 15.9 million (38%) people are assisted in the current period (March-May) with confirmed funding while the total plan for this period stands at 16.95 million (41%). As conditions currently stand, there are no major impediments to assistance delivery that would prevent this population from being served, although disruption of assistance have happen in some areas including in two districts (Charsada and Passaban) of Ghor province, where Catastrophe conditions were detected. Although an exact approximation of the impacts of assistance cannot be made through this analysis, the HFA scale up in March is among the primary drivers of the observed improvement of 22.8 million people in IPC Phase 3 and above (November 2021 to March 2022, pre-lean) falling to 19.7 million in this analysis, despite the onset of the lean season. The scale up was from 5 million people assisted (7% of the population) between November 2021 and March 2022, to 15.9 million people in March to May 2022 assisted with about two third food ration (5 million receiving 50% of their kilocalorie requirement and 10.9 million receiving 75% of their kilocalories

However, it is fundamental to notice that the increase in coverage of over 10 million beneficiaries only translated into a decrease of the food insecure population by 2%. This outcome is indicative that conditions on the ground have deteriorated substantially. Moreover, the size of the ration delivered varies significantly by domains from 75% to 50% of household total kilocalorie needs (averaging to 68% of kilocalories at national level). Therefore, in areas where households are only receiving half rations the impacts of the assistance may not be as substantial – or not enough to significantly reduce food gaps. Additionally, the strength of social networks and community support observed in Afghanistan also translate into the sharing of assistance, leading to an even more diluted impact. In areas where humanitarian actors faced challenges in delivering assistance, around 20,000 people are estimated to be in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). This analysis marks the first time any population has been classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), indicating a serious deterioration in the food security conditions in Afghanistan.

Projection Analysis period

A major decrease in HFA levels is expected in the projection period, corresponding to the post-harvest. In this period, households are expected to have some access to own production therefore traditionally the assistance in this period is reduced compared to what is delivered in the lean season. However, particularly in this last analysis the usual seasonal improvement is significantly hampered by many limiting factors, both at the socio-economic level and in terms of food availability and access at households' level. Due to fund limitations, against a plan to assist 25% of the population in the projected period, HFA to only 8% of the population has been confirmed as funded. This dramatic cut in plans is at the basis of the minimal decrease in population in IPC Phase 3 and above in the projected period. The situation is particularly critical since the prospects of a change in this scenario are quite negative: currently only 601 million US dollars of the 4.4 billion US dollars HRP requirement is confirmed, while 2 billion US dollars have been pledged. Moreover, the ripple effect of both the Ukraine conflict on the risk of donor agencies diverting resources to respond to the emergency, and the additional funding requirement per beneficiary in Afghanistan linked to increased costs of in-kind food assistance as well as cash transfer value to meet increased food prices, do not allow for an optimistic outlook of partners agencies to meet their plans.

In conclusion, any improvement observed when comparing results in the IPC timeline in the last three analyses periods - 22.8M highly food insecure between November 2021 and March 2022; 19.7M between March and May 2022; 18.9M between June and November 2022 - are far from indicating positive prospects, not only because they are minor, but because the decrease in the highly food insecure population does not align with partners scale up of HFA - as the overall deteriorating conditions outrank these efforts.

Acute Food Insecurity and HFA 2021-22

		IPC Analaysis September 2021		IPC Analysis March 2022	
		Post Harvest	Pre-Lean	Lean	Post Harvest
		Sept - Oct 21	Nov 21 - Mar 22	Mar - May 22	Jun - Nov 22
Beneficiaries considered for IPC based on confirmed funding/pipeline	Number of people assisted	2.1 million	2.9 million	15.9 million	3.2 million
	% of total population covered	5%	7%	38%	8%
Population in IPC PHASE 3 and above		*19M IPC Phase 3+*	*23M IPC Phase 3+*	*20M IPC Phase 3+*	*19M IPC Phase 3+*
			HFA increased by almost 1 million beneficiaries however, the food insecure increased by 4 million	*HFA increased by more than 10 million beneficairies however the food insecured decrease only by 3 million*	*HFA increased by more than 1 million beneficiaries compared with period of maximum volatility last year, however the food insecure are 19 million*

THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION IN SELECTED URBAN AREAS

Eleven major towns of selected provinces were analyzed to assess the specific vulnerabilities of urban households. Urban areas have been particularly hit by the recent waves of crises in Afghanistan, starting with the global COVID-19 pandemic and more recently the August 2021 transition of the government. Economic downturn and soaring unemployment levels compounded by unrelenting inflation levels have pushed millions of urban households into poverty.

The recent HFA scale up plans include all urban areas, however the major urban centers of Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat have witnessed intermittent disruptions to HFA delivery since the transition of government with de facto authorities.

Across the urban areas in the current period, around 4.6M people (48% of the urban population) are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), of which 1.5M people (16%) are classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Urban centers of Jawzjan, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Takhar are classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) whereas the rest are classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).

The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is expected to increase in the projected period (June - November 2022) to 4.9 million people (52%). The primary driving factor for the deterioration is the expected decrease in HFA, high levels of prices, and continued degradation in economic conditions and employment opportunities. In particular, the urban areas of Hirat, Helmand, Kabul, and Kandahar are expected to see the population in Phase 3 and higher increase in the projection period, with a high reliance on markets from non-agriculture based livelihoods.

In the semi urban areas where people rely on mixed (agricultural and non-agricultural) livelihood sources such as in Baghlan Urban, Kunduz Urban, Takhar Urban and Nangarhar Urban the conditions are expected to improve slightly with increased food availability through the harvest, as well as an increase in livelihood opportunities in the harvest period.

Current Urban FLM: Population Table for the Current Period (March - May 2022)

Province	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Baghlan Urban	271,631	54,326	20	108,652	40	67,908	25	40,745	15	0	0	3	108,652	40
Balkh Urban	650,163	65,016	10	260,065	40	227,557	35	97,524	15	0	0	3	325,082	50
Faryab Urban	178,951	35,790	20	62,633	35	53,685	30	26,843	15	0	0	3	80,528	45
Helmand Urban	119,410	23,882	20	41,794	35	35,823	30	17,912	15	0	0	3	53,735	45
Hirat Urban	771,395	115,709	15	308,558	40	231,419	30	115,709	15	0	0	3	347,128	45
Jawzjan Urban	162,493	24,374	15	56,873	35	48,748	30	32,499	20	0	0	4	81,247	50
Kabul Urban	5,911,781	1,182,356	20	1,773,534	30	2,069,123	35	886,767	15	0	0	4	2,955,891	50
Kandahar Urban	701,944	140,389	20	245,680	35	175,486	25	140,389	20	0	0	4	315,875	45
Kunduz Urban	254,549	50,910	20	89,092	35	76,365	30	38,182	15	0	0	3	114,547	45
Nangarhar Urban	365,844	73,169	20	146,338	40	73,169	20	73,169	20	0	0	4	146,338	40
Takhar Urban	112,133	11,213	10	39,247	35	39,247	35	22,427	20	0	0	4	61,673	55
Grand Total	**9,500,294**	**1,777,135**	**19**	**3,132,466**	**33**	**3,098,529**	**32**	**1,492,165**	**16**	**0**	**0**		**4,590,694**	**48**

Projection Urban FLM: Population Table for the Projection Period (June - November 2022)

Province	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Baghlan Urban	271,631	81,489	30	108,652	40	54,326	20	27,163	10	0	0	3	81,489	30
Balkh Urban	650,163	65,016	10	260,065	40	227,557	35	97,524	15	0	0	3	325,082	50
Faryab Urban	178,951	35,790	20	62,633	35	53,685	30	26,843	15	0	0	3	80,528	45
Helmand Urban	119,410	23,882	20	35,823	30	41,794	35	17,912	15	0	0	3	59,705	50
Hirat Urban	771,395	77,140	10	269,988	35	269,988	35	154,279	20	0	0	4	424,267	55
Jawzjan Urban	162,493	24,374	15	56,873	35	48,748	30	32,499	20	0	0	4	81,247	50
Kabul Urban	5,911,781	886,767	15	1,773,534	30	2,364,712	40	886,767	15	0	0	3	3,251,480	55
Kandahar Urban	701,944	105,292	15	245,680	35	210,583	30	140,389	20	0	0	4	350,972	50
Kunduz Urban	254,549	63,637	25	101,820	40	63,637	25	25,455	10	0	0	3	89,092	35
Nangarhar Urban	365,844	91,461	25	128,045	35	91,461	25	54,877	15	0	0	3	146,338	40
Takhar Urban	112,133	16,820	15	44,853	40	33,640	30	16,820	15	0	0	3	50,460	45
Grand Total	**9,500,294**	**1,471,668**	**15**	**3,087,967**	**33**	**3,460,132**	**36**	**1,480,527**	**16**	**0**	**0**		**4,940,659**	**52**

COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSES

Methodological note

This IPC analysis, as in the previous IPC analysis used the Flowminder population numbers (projected for 2022) as the base for calculating population in need figures. The analysis results from the September 2021 IPC and the March 2022 IPC analysis can be compared directly in terms of population base. Considering that Afghanistan undertakes two analyses per year, the periods covered in this analysis do not align directly with the September 2021 analysis but can be looked at more broadly as "lean season and post-harvest" for the purpose of evaluating how conditions are evolving.

Comparison among the last three analyses periods (November 2021 to November 2022)

Compared to the previous period analysed (November 2021 to March 2022, pre-lean), the current period (March to May 2022, lean) indicates a slight improvement in terms of number of food insecure (IPC Phase 3 and above) from 22.8 to 19.7 million (55% to 47% of the population. This minor improvement is only attributed to the massive scale up in HFA and the relative stability of the conflict situation. In the following period, June to November 2022, a minor decrease from 19.7 to 18.9 million (47% to 45% of the population) will be further observed in link with the onset of the harvest starting from June.

Comparison with analyses conducted prior to August 2021

Overall, there is an increase in the severity of food security conditions in Afghanistan when compared against periods prior to the August 2021 political transition. For the 2021 lean season analysis (March-May 2021), only 35% of the population was classified in IPC Phase 3 and above, compared with 47% in the 2022 lean season (March-May 2022). The only occasion a similar severity was observed was in the 2018 drought year. In addition, despite the favourable seasonal pattern in the June-November 2022 period, the projection shows a rampant increase of people in IPC Phase 3 or above compared to the same period in 2021, from 30% to 45%. Compared to 2018, currently there is Afghanistan's economic crisis adding to the shocks.



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Response Priorities

1. Urgent scale up of Humanitarian Food Assistance is required to save the lives of the 20,000 people classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) in Ghor. Sustained food assistance is required to save lives and livelihoods for the populations in Phase 4 (Emergency) and Phase 3 (Crisis). The highly vulnerable provinces of Badakshan, Ghor and Daykundi need to be prioritized for HFA scale up. An increase in populations classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) cannot be excluded if timely and sufficient assistance is not provided or sustained over a longer period.
2. Although an exact approximation of the impact of assistance cannot be made through this analysis, it is assumed that some portion of households classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stress) and IPC Phase 1 (Minimal) are also highly vulnerable and are only classified in the lower phases because of the level of assistance delivered. Therefore, it is crucial to monitor the situation and implement activities that help mitigate the potential negative impact on their livelihoods and continue assisting those households to prevent them from moving to higher phases.
3. Food assistance should be integrated with livelihoods protection and promotion to prevent loss of life and support rehabilitation of local food and market systems, contain asset depletion and irreversible negative coping mechanisms. There is a need for increased livelihoods support to protect and increase livelihood options, reduce sale of productive assets, support the restoration of productive assets and reduce income gaps. Livestock support should be provided to small and medium-scale farmers, especially women farmers, to contain livestock asset depletion. This will help in reducing malnutrition in women and children. Due to lack of availability and soaring prices of agricultural inputs, agricultural inputs (seed and fertilizer) should be pre-positioned in time for the spring and next autumn season.
4. Interventions designed to support at-risk women and children need to be a priority as women continue to be left out of the formal employment sector. Programs targeting pregnant and lactating women and children under five should be priority.
5. Infrastructure rehabilitation is urgently needed to increase access to irrigation, market infrastructure and road networks.
6. High-level advocacy and resource mobilisation efforts are needed to ensure the HRP is fully funded so as to address the immediate food security needs of populations in IPC Phase 3 and above.
7. The humanitarian agencies should advocate with the international community for development support to kick-start the economy in all sectors. The stabilization of Afghanistan's economy is essential for the wellbeing of the population as it contributes to increased employment, which in turn contributes to increased income opportunities and revitalisation of both the formal and informal sector.
8. There is a need to strengthen early warning and anticipatory actions to enhance households' capacity to mitigate risks and shocks while building household and community resilience.

Situation Monitoring and Update of Activities

Considering the volatile nature of key food security drivers and the severity of the situation, the TWG will meet monthly to review evidence from established monitoring systems and field surveys. Critical will be the incorporation of the crop survey being conducted by FAO which will provide an estimate of the area under wheat cultivation and expected harvests. The TWG may decide to undertake a review of the recent analysis and its estimates of the population based on new information.

The Afghanistan food security and nutrition clusters will need to collaborate to acquire up to date information on nutrition emanating from the Afghanistan Health Management Information System, screening and surveys carried out by cluster members.

The key factors to monitor are:

- The impact of the Russia – Ukraine conflict on the level of humanitarian funding, supply chain and price inflation.
- The impact of the prolonged dry spells on the food security in rural areas that can trigger an early lean season onset. Water availability for the second crop should also be monitored to alert the humanitarian community on the possible impact.
- Any interruptions to the delivery of HFA by de facto authorities.
- Pasture condition and fodder availability for livestock to avoid distress sale resulting in long-term food insecurity for livestock rearing communities.
- Economic activities, income change and remittances inflow, especially in urban areas. Measures to monitor the performance of the urban wage sector and its impact on food security of the urban poor.
- Food price monitoring and market functionality should also continue in the major markets of the country.
- Crop pests and diseases, livestock diseases and their potential affect on crops and livestock.

PROCESS, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Process and Methodology

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis was conducted for two time periods. The current period (March – May 2022) was mainly based on Pre-Lean Season Assessment (PLSA) data conducted in January – February 2022, along with other secondary data sources. The projection period (June – November 2022) was based on the PLSA, other secondary data sources and forward-looking assumptions on economic outlook, expected impacts of La Niña, remittances, food prices, trade, and crop harvests. The analysis covered all 34 provinces of the country. For 23 provinces analysis was done at the provincial level and for 11 provinces rural and major urban centres were analysed separately, making the total analysis units 45. The analysis workshop was held between 19–28 March, 2022 in Kabul, Afghanistan with in-person modality. The IPC workshop was facilitated by the country TWG with support of IPC GSU and JRC-EC experts. The workshop was attended by 55 experts from across Afghanistan, UN organizations, international and national NGOs, technical agencies, and academia. The active participation and support of FAO and WFP management is highly acknowledged. The data used in the analysis was organized according to the IPC analytical framework and entails food insecurity contributing factors, outcome indicators and multiple secondary sources.

Sources

Data sources used for the analysis included: 1) Pre-Lean Season Assessment (PLSA) conducted by the World Food Program (WFP) under overall leadership of FSAC. 2) FAO Data In Emergencies (DIEM) - Monitoring of Shocks, Agricultural Livelihoods, Food Security and Value Chains in Afghanistan conducted by FAO. 3) Flowminder population estimation from UNFPA. 4) Population estimation from NSIA. 5) Community-Based Need Assessment from IOM. 6) Climate, precipitation, NDVI, provincial seasonal calendars and food security outlook – FEWSNET. 7) Refugee & IDP data from UNHCR, OCHA, FSAC and IOM. 8) Precipitation, temperature, snow, and estimated risk of natural disasters – iMMAP. 9) ERM HEAT, Humanitarian Situation Monitoring (HSM), Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (Mid-Year WoAA 2022) and Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) from REACH Initiative. 10) Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) – FSAC. 11) Data on humanitarian assistance delivered and planned from WFP. 12) Countrywide Market Prices from WFP. 13) Agro-ecological zoning – FAO. 14) Economic outlook 2022 – World Bank and IMF. 15) Nutrition data from PLSA - FSAC. 16) Other localized assessment conducted by I/NGOs FSAC partners. This analysis did not include information available after the 29th of March, 2022.

Acute Food Insecurity Phase name and description

Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine
Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; **or** • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either: • have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; **or** • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)

What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

Contact for further Information

IPC Global Support Unit

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC , FAO, FEWSNET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IGAD, Oxfam, PROGRESAN-SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNICEF and WFP.

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ANNEX 1: THE RISK OF FAMINE

Introduction

A Risk of Famine (RoF) analysis was conducted for Afghanistan between April 6th and 7th 2022, and covered two highly vulnerable provinces of the country. The opportunity to conduct such an analysis was discussed among and agreed upon by representatives of the IPC National Technical Working Group and IPC GSU to account for the volatile nature of the context in Afghanistan.

Methodology: An initial shortlist of provinces was prepared by the IPC TWG to share with the IPC GSU. To ensure the most productive outcomes of the Risk of Famine analysis, the TWG agreed to start with the most vulnerable provinces, and in the event no RoF was identified, the other shortlisted areas would not be analyzed. GSU staff with previous experience of RoF analyses facilitated the process. The RoF was conducted by selected members of the analysis teams from the provinces that were selected for the review.

i. Identification of first shortlisted provinces potentially eligible for RoF

ii. Selection of the most vulnerable provinces for the first stage of RoF analysi

iii. RoF analysis in selected provinces

For step 2 of the RoF process, Ghor province was selected as the first possible analysis area. The actual RoF analysis was completed for Ghor and Badakshan. The selection of Ghor was based on the very high levels of acute food insecurity detected, in addition to recent restrictions, limiting the flow of aid to some vulnerable districts. In the current period, only Ghor had populations classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe). The selection of Badakshan was based on the high degree of vulnerability in the district. The highly volatile conditions in the country and prevailing vulnerability put both districts at a risk of famine in the event of a worst-case scenario.

The elements considered for potential famine in a worst-case scenario for the analyzed districts include a complete harvest failure in the projection period, as well as an outbreak of localized conflict. Restrictions to Humanitarian Food Assistance were also considered for the analysis. The immediate impacts of these elements on humanitarian access as well as household ability to access their food and livelihoods were also considered. In the event of a complete harvest failure, household ability to find alternate sources of food was also factored into the analysis

Results: The GSU facilitated the RoF analysis with the analysis teams for two vulnerable provinces. The results of the analysis found no Risk of Famine in the worst-case scenario. The principal mitigating factor was the harvest, which was expected in the projection period as well as the ability for affected population to move to safer locations. As no risk of famine was detected in the two most vulnerable provinces, no further analysis was completed on the remaining areas identified.

GHOR PROVINCE

Projection assumptions in the most likely scenario



- **Prices:** Prices in Ghor are already at significantly high levels following the regime change. In the projection period a gradual increase of food prices as per current trends (+23% from same time last year) will continue. This trend will likely be aggravated by the effect of the Ukraine crisis but with some mitigation provided by the harvest, supporting more food availability at province level. Some export disruptions from Kazakhstan are already observed, impacting prices.
- **Harvest:** Ghor received 89 percent of the average rainfall for the season (FEWSNET). The delay in start of season has been compensated by above average rainfall later in the season. The harvest will be below average.
- **Conflict and displacements:** the current relative stability will continue in the coming months, with displacements decreasing compared with previous years.
- **HFA:** Expected to be significantly reduced (10% of the population covered). After the scale up in the lean season, up to 50%.
- **Foreign aid:** Some resumption of development aid is expected. Although funding is not confirmed, there are some positive indications of foreign assistance channeled through the UN system.

Projection assumptions in the worst-case scenario:

- **Prices:** Sharp increase linked to the risk of export bans from Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan, from where Afghanistan imports wheat, which is the main staple.
- **Harvest:** As crop is at growing stage – in the worst case scenario if precipitation does not continue there will be a significant impact on the quality and quantity of the harvest beyond the already forecasted below average harvest projected.
- **Conflict and displacements:** Possible resumption of resistance against de facto authorities as well as an escalation of Islamic State Khorasan activities. However, the major risk in this area would actually be impediments to displacement to cope with food insecurity due to restrictions on movement placed by de facto authorities. Moreover, there is a possibility of an increase of returnees from Iran following a security incident involving Afghans in Iran.
- **HFA:** HFA suspension in two districts was recently resolved following negotiations with de facto authorities, but there is a risk that it might be reinstated in this area.
- **Foreign aid**: Political evolutions might lead some countries to go back on the promises of support. The Ukraine crisis can divert attention towards other world crises or reduce the support to Afghanistan.

Conclusions

In Ghor, the team concluded that there is not a Risk of Famine during the projection period. In a Worst Case Scenario there would be a sharp increase of population in IPC Phase 3, 4 and even 5. However, even with this increase, the proportion of population classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) is unlikely to reach 20%. Acute Malnutrition and mortality may shift over a longer period to Phase 5 but would be unlikely in the projection timeframe.

This is because of mitigating factors, mainly:

1. The harvest period will provide a certain level of food availability. Even if only about one third of the population is having access to land, the local availability will provide a safety net as the tradition of wealthier families (50% are in IPC Phase 1 and 2) supporting the most vulnerable will likely activate to prevent starvation;
2. Access-related issues even in the most likely scenario can happen but is unlikely to last for a long period and especially not likely to affect food assistance. Previous HFA suspensions related to targeting questioning and not aiming at preventing an area population from being assisted have been resolved within a reasonable time period. De facto authorities showed a certain openness to negotiation and suspensions do not usually last for long time. In conclusion, if the situation would deteriorate so rapidly it is likely that a scale up of assistance in the area would prevent starvation

BADAKSHAN PROVINCE

Projection assumptions in the most likely scenario



- **Prices:** Price levels in Badakshan have been increasing (the wheat grain price has increased by 23% compared to the same time last year.) While there will be some downward pressure on prices as physical access to markets improves in the warmer months with the melting of snow, as well as the harvest, this will likely be counter balanced with the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, which will indirectly affect prices of wheat flour and oil imported primarily from Kazakhstan. Some export disruptions from Kazakhstan have already been observed. Overall, an increase in prices is expected in the projection period.
- **Harvest:** Badakhshan received 69% of average rainfall (Oct-March). In some high altitude areas, the new snow is affecting the crops. A below average harvest is expected for the 30.8% who have access to land.
- **Conflict** and displacements: relative stability despite risks linked to National Resistance Front of Afghanistan.
- **HFA:** will decrease from 50% of population to 12%.
- **Foreign aid:** Some resumption of development aid is expected. Although funding is not confirmed, there are some positive indications of foreign assistance.

Projection assumptions in the worst-case scenario:

- Prices: Sharp increase linked to the risk of export bans from Kazakhstan, Pakistan from where Afghanistan imports wheat, which is the main staple. Some districts bordering and relying on Tajikistan for food imports will be most affected if Tajikistan closes border for trade.
- Harvest: In the Worst-case there will much lower harvest.
- Conflict and displacements: It is possible that the frontline of the resistance from the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan will move to Badakhshan. In the event that the resistance moves to this province, there is an added risk of de facto authorities blocking certain districts as a pressure tactic. Moreover, there is a possibility of an increase of returnees from Iran following a security incident involving Afghans in Iran.
- HFA: Very limited HFA was expected in the projection period in the most likely scenario. In the worst case scenario with access limited it is possible this HFA will also not be delivered as de facto authorities may block delivery as they did in Ghor.
- Foreign aid: Political evolutions might lead to some countries to go back on the promises of support. The Ukraine crisis can divert attention towards other world crises or reduce the support to Afghanistan.

Conclusion

In the worst case scenario there will be no Risk of Famine. The population classified in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) will increase sharply to 10-15%, but will not cross 20%. Mortality is unlikely to reach famine levels in this short time span. Unlike in Ghor, the situation in Badakshan is borderline and will require close monitoring. The main mitigating factors preventing famine are as follows:

- Although in the worst-case scenario the harvest will be significantly reduced there will be a small proportion of the population that will benefit. Around 30% of households have access to land and 42.8% have access to livestock. The presence of strong social networks would see support from better off families avert widespread starvation and destitution.
- As the severe conditions in Badakshan are long running, households have developed several coping strategies to mitigate the impacts of the harsh conditions, particularly in periods where access is limited.
- There is some possibility for most affected populations to move to neighboring provinces to avoid starvation, especially with improved road access in the projection period.

ANNEX 2: NSIA Population table for the current period: March – May 2022

Province	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5			Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Badakhshan	1,072,785	107,279	10	375,475	35	321,836	30	268,196	25	0	0	4	590,032	55
Badghis	559,297	83,895	15	167,789	30	195,754	35	111,859	20	0	0	4	307,613	55
Baghlan	818,676	122,801	15	368,404	45	204,669	25	122,801	15	0	0	3	327,470	40
Baghlan Urban	215,084	43,017	20	86,034	40	53,771	25	32,263	15	0	0	3	86,034	40
Balkh	945,292	141,794	15	283,588	30	330,852	35	189,058	20	0	0	4	519,911	55
Balkh Urban	598,172	59,817	10	239,269	40	209,360	35	89,726	15	0	0	3	299,086	50
Bamyan	504,312	50,431	10	201,725	40	151,294	30	100,862	20	0	0	4	252,156	50
Daykundi	525,529	78,829	15	157,659	30	183,935	35	105,106	20	0	0	4	289,041	55
Farah	573,146	171,944	30	200,601	35	143,287	25	57,315	10	0	0	3	200,601	35
Faryab	987,216	98,722	10	345,526	35	345,526	35	197,443	20	0	0	4	542,969	55
Faryab Urban	142,312	28,462	20	49,809	35	42,694	30	21,347	15	0	0	3	64,041	45
Ghazni	1,386,764	277,353	20	554,706	40	416,029	30	138,676	10	0	0	3	554,706	40
Ghor	777,882	116,682	15	272,259	35	194,471	25	178,913	23	15,558	2	4	388,941	50
Helmand	102,161	20,432	20	30,648	30	35,756	35	15,324	15	0	0	3	51,080	50
Helmand Urban	1,370,001	274,000	20	479,500.51	35	411,000	30	205,500	15	0	0	3	616,501	45
Hirat	1,520,887	304,177	20	532,311	35	456,266	30	228,133	15	0	0	3	684,399	45
Hirat Urban	666,282	99,942	15	266,513	40	199,884	30	99,942	15	0	0	3	299,827	45
Jawzjan	478,141	71,721	15	191,257	40	119,535	25	95,628	20	0	0	4	215,164	45
Jawzjan Urban	135,340	20,301	15	47,369	35	40,602	30	27,068	20	0	0	4	67,670	50
Kabul	771,099	154,220	20	231,330	30	269,885	35	115,665	15	0	0	3	385,550	50
Kabul Urban	4,614,427	922,885	20	1,384,328	30	1,615,049	35	692,164	15	0	0	3	2,307,213	50
Kandahar	896,548	179,310	20	268,964	30	313,792	35	134,482	15	0	0	3	448,274	50
Kandahar Urban	535,328	107,066	20	187,365	35	133,832	25	107,066	20	0	0	4	240,898	45
Kapisa	496,840	99,368	20	173,894	35	149,052	30	74,526	15	0	0	3	223,578	45
Khost	647,730	129,546	20	259,092	40	194,319	30	64,773	10	0	0	3	259,092	40
Kunar	508,224	101,645	20	177,878	35	177,878	35	50,822	10	0	0	3	228,701	45
Kunduz	850,614	127,592	15	382,776	45	255,184	30	85,061	10	0	0	3	340,245	40
Kunduz Urban	309,510	61,902	20	108,329	35	92,853	30	46,427	15	0	0	3	139,280	45
Laghman	502,148	75,322	15	175,752	35	175,752	35	75,322	15	0	0	3	251,074	50
Logar	442,037	132,611	30	132,611	30	132,611	30	44,204	10	0	0	3	176,815	40
Nangarhar	1,452,696	290,539	20	508,444	35	435,809	30	217,904	15	0	0	3	653,713	45
Nangarhar Urban	282,835	56,567	20	113,134	40	56,567	20	56,567	20	0	0	4	113,134	40
Nimroz	186,963	28,044	15	65,437	35	56,089	30	37,393	20	0	0	4	93,482	50
Nuristan	166,676	25,001	15	50,003	30	58,337	35	33,335	20	0	0	4	91,672	55
Paktika	789,079	78,908	10	315,632	40	276,178	35	118,362	15	0	0	3	394,540	50
Paktya	622,831	124,566	20	280,274	45	155,708	25	62,283	10	0	0	3	217,991	35
Panjsher	172,895	51,869	30	60,513	35	43,224	25	17,290	10	0	0	3	60,513	35
Parwan	751,040	187,760	25	300,416	40	150,208	20	112,656	15	0	0	3	262,864	35
Samangan	438,235	65,735	15	153,382	35	131,471	30	87,647	20	0	0	4	219,118	50
Sari pul	632,182	94,827	15	252,873	40	189,655	30	94,827	15	0	0	3	284,482	45
Takhar	961,843	192,369	20	288,553	30	336,645	35	144,276	15	0	0	3	480,922	50
Takhar Urban	151,330	15,133	10	52,965	35	52,965	35	30,266	20	0	0	4	83,231	55
Uruzgan	443,804	66,571	15	177,522	40	110,951	25	88,761	20	0	0	4	199,712	45
Wardak	671,817	100,773	15	235,136	35	201,545	30	134,363	20	0	0	4	335,909	50
Zabul	391,150	78,230	20	117,345	30	136,903	35	58,673	15	0	0	3	195,575	50
Grand Total	**32,069,160**	**5,719,959**	**18**	**11,304,386**	**35**	**9,958,981**	**31**	**5,070,277**	**16**	**15558**	**0.05**		**15,044,815**	**47**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action.

ANNEX 2: NSIA Population table for the current period: June – November 2022

Province	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
		#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Badakhshan	1,072,785	107,279	10	375,475	35	375,475	35	214,557	20	0	0	4	590,032	55
Badghis	559,297	111,859	20	167,789	30	167,789	30	111,859	20	0	0	4	279,649	50
Baghlan	818,676	245,603	30	327,470	40	163,735	20	81,868	10	0	0	3	245,603	30
Baghlan Urban	215,084	64,525	30	86,034	40	43,017	20	21,508	10	0	0	3	64,525	30
Balkh	945,292	141,794	15	330,852	35	283,588	30	189,058	20	0	0	4	472,646	50
Balkh Urban	598,172	59,817	10	239,269	40	209,360	35	89,726	15	0	0	3	299,086	50
Bamyan	504,312	126,078	25	151,294	30	151,294	30	75,647	15	0	0	3	226,940	45
Daykundi	525,529	105,106	20	131,382	25	183,935	35	105,106	20	0	0	4	289,041	55
Farah	573,146	200,601	35	200,601	35	114,629	20	57,315	10	0	0	3	171,944	30
Faryab	987,216	98,722	10	394,886	40	296,165	30	197,443	20	0	0	4	493,608	50
Faryab Urban	142,312	28,462	20	49,809	35	42,694	30	21,347	15	0	0	3	64,041	45
Ghazni	1,386,764	277,353	20	485,367	35	346,691	25	138,676	10	0	0	3	485,367	35
Ghor	777,882	116,682	15	272,259	35	194,471	25	194,471	25	0	0	4	388,941	50
Helmand	102,161	20,432	20	40,864	40	30,648	30	10,216	10	0	0	3	40,864	40
Helmand Urban	1,370,001	274,000	20	411,000	30	479,501	35	205,500	15	0	0	3	685,001	50
Hirat	1,520,887	228,133	15	456,266	30	456,266	30	228,133	15	0	0	3	684,399	45
Hirat Urban	666,282	66,628	10	233,199	35	233,199	35	133,256	20	0	0	4	366,455	55
Jawzjan	478,141	71,721	15	191,257	40	119,535	25	95,628	20	0	0	4	215,164	45
Jawzjan Urban	135,340	20,301	15	47,369	35	40,602	30	27,068	20	0	0	4	67,670	50
Kabul	771,099	192,775	25	192,775	25	308,440	40	77,110	10	0	0	3	385,550	50
Kabul Urban	4,614,427	692,164	15	1,384,328	30	1,845,771	40	692,164	15	0	0	3	2,537,935	55
Kandahar	896,548	224,137	25	268,964	30	313,792	35	89,655	10	0	0	3	403,447	45
Kandahar Urban	535,328	80,299	15	187,365	35	160,598	30	107,066	20	0	0	4	267,664	50
Kapisa	496,840	149,052	30	149,052	30	149,052	30	49,684	10	0	0	3	198,736	40
Khost	647,730	161,933	25	259,092	40	161,933	25	64,773	10	0	0	3	226,706	35
Kunar	508,224	101,645	20	203,290	40	152,467	30	50,822	10	0	0	3	203,290	40
Kunduz	850,614	212,653	25	340,245	40	212,653	25	85,061	10	0	0	3	297,715	35
Kunduz Urban	309,510	77,378	25	123,804	40	77,378	25	30,951	10	0	0	3	108,329	35
Laghman	502,148	75,322	15	175,752	35	200,859	40	50,215	10	0	0	3	251,074	50
Logar	442,037	110,509	25	154,713	35	154,713	35	22,102	5	0	0	3	176,815	40
Nangarhar	1,452,696	290,539	20	581,079	40	363,174	25	217,904	15	0	0	3	581,079	40
Nangarhar Urban	282,835	70,709	25	98,992	35	70,709	25	42,425	15	0	0	3	113,134	40
Nimroz	186,963	28,044	15	46,741	25	65,437	35	46,741	25	0	0	4	112,178	60
Nuristan	166,676	33,335	20	50,003	30	50,003	30	33,335	20	0	0	4	83,338	50
Paktika	789,079	118,362	15	276,178	35	276,178	35	118,362	15	0	0	3	394,540	50
Paktya	622,831	155,708	25	217,991	35	186,849	30	62,283	10	0	0	3	249,132	40
Panjsher	172,895	43,224	25	60,513	35	51,869	30	17,290	10	0	0	3	69,158	40
Parwan	751,040	187,760	25	300,416	40	187,760	25	75,104	10	0	0	3	262,864	35
Samangan	438,235	65,735	15	153,382	35	131,471	30	87,647	20	0	0	4	219,118	50
Sari pul	632,182	94,827	15	252,873	40	189,655	30	94,827	15	0	0	3	284,482	45
Takhar	961,843	240,461	25	336,645	35	288,553	30	96,184	10	0	0	3	384,737	40
Takhar Urban	151,330	22,699	15	60,532	40	45,399	30	22,699	15	0	0	3	68,098	45
Uruzgan	443,804	66,571	15	177,522	40	133,141	30	66,571	15	0	0	3	199,712	45
Wardak	671,817	100,773	15	268,727	40	201,545	30	100,773	15	0	0	3	302,318	45
Zabul	391,150	78,230	20	136,903	35	117,345	30	58,673	15	0	0	3	176,018	45
Grand Total	**32,069,160**	**6,039,940**	**20**	**11,050,317**	**35**	**10,029,334**	**31**	**4,658,803**	**14**	**0**	**0**		**14,688,137**	**45**

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action.