LEBANON

ECONOMIC CRISIS, CURRENCY DEPRECIATION AND UNPRECEDENTED INCREASE IN FOOD AND NON-FOOD PRICES WORSEN LEBANON FOOD SECURITY SITUATION

IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY ANALYSIS

SEPTEMBER 2022 - APRIL 2023

Published on December 22, 2022

CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY (Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees) September - December 2022

1.98M 37% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	306,000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	1,678,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	2,419,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	962,000 People in Food Security

PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY (Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees) January - April 2023

2.26M 42% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	354,000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	1,906,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	2,143,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	961,000 People in Food Security

Overview

The first Lebanon IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis indicated that, between September and December 2022, about 1.98 million Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees corresponding to 37 percent of the analyzed population, are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. A total of 306,000 people (6 percent) are in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 1.68 million people (31 percent) in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Population classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above require urgent humanitarian action to reduce food gaps, protect and restore livelihoods and prevent acute malnutrition. 1.29 million Lebanese residents (33 percent of the resident population) and 0.7 million Syrian refugees (46 percent of the total total number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon) are estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above between September and December 2022.

The analysis projected that, between January and April 2023, about 2.26 million people, corresponding to 42 percent of the analyzed population are expected to face high levels of food insecurity IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, impacted by a further deterioration of the economic situation and depreciation of the Lebanese Pound (LBP), protracted inflation, and soaring international prices. The analysis estimated that 354,000 individuals (7 percent) are expected to face Emergency acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4), and 1.91 million (36 percent) are expected to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Specifically, 1.46 million Lebanese resident (38 percent of the resident population) and 0.80 million Syrian refugees (53 percent of total number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon) are projected in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above.

Key Drivers

Inflation

The Food Price Index rose by 208% between September 2021 and September 2022

Limited job opportunities

The unemployment rate jumped from 11% in 2018-2019 to 30% in 2022 while the employed population declined from 43% to 31%

Loss of purchasing power

In August 2022, the average monthly wage among Lebanese residents covered 29% of the SMEB while the income of Syrian refugee households corresponded to 21% of the SMEB

Currency depreciation

The local currency lost 49% of its value between October 2021 and October 2022 and more than 94% since the start of the crisis

Limited value of assistance

Despite high levels of humanitarian and social assistance, the transfer values do not ensure an adequate coverage of needs

Phase out of subsidies

Removal of subsidies resulted in signifigant price increases of food, fuel, health, transport, communications and other basic services

Current AFI September – December 2022



Projected AFI January - April 2023



CURRENT IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY SITUATION (SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 2022)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY
September - December 2022

1.29M 33% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	195,000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	1,094,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	1,792,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	783,000 People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES - CURRENT ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY
September - December 2022

0.70M 46% of the population analysed People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION	Phase 5	0 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	111,000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	584,000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	627,000 People in Stressed
	Phase 1	179,000 People in Food Security

Background

Since October 2019, Lebanon has been confronted with a severe crisis, facing its largest economic recession since the end of the civil war in 1990, a protracted political stalemate, and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic crisis resulted in a 21.4 percent contraction of the GDP in 2020 and an estimated 7 percent contraction in 2021 while, in nominal terms, the GDP decreased from USD 55 billion in 2018 to USD 20.5 billion in 2021. At the beginning of July 2022, the World Bank downgraded Lebanon to a lower middle-income country for the first time in 27 years as the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita dropped from USD 7,590 in 2018 to USD 3,450 by 2021 (WFP, 2022a).

Lebanon has an estimated population of 5.8 million, including 3.8 million Lebanese residents, 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 207,700 Palestinian refugees and around 14,800 refugees from other countries. The country has the highest share of displaced people with respect to the total population in the world (LCRP, 2021). Lebanon is administratively divided in 8 governorates that are further divided in 26 districts. However, a National Census has not been conducted since 1932 (WFP, 2022a). Among these population groups, the IPC analysis covered Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees.



The Current Situation

The economic and financial crisis that affected Lebanon since October 2019 has significantly undermined the food security situation of both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees. The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis carried out in all 26 districts showed that 33 percent of the Lebanese resident population corresponding to about 1.29 million people and 46 percent of the Syrian refugee population corresponding to 0.7 million people were estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, requiring urgent humanitarian action to reduce food gaps, protect and restore livelihoods and prevent acute malnutrition. Among them, 195,000 (5 percent) Lebanese residents and 0.112 million (7 percent) Syrian refugees were estimated to be in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). The current period corresponds to the sowing season of barley and wheat, and harvest season for vegetables and citrus fruits.

Lebanese residents: In the current period, residents living in 17 out of the 26 districts were classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and nine districts were classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed). The highest incidence of acute food insecurity was observed in four districts: Akkar, Baalbek, El Hermel, and El Minieh-Dennie. In these districts, the percentage of the population classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above exceeded 50 percent, of which 10 percent was estimated in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). In seven districts (Aley, Rachaya, Saida, Sour, Tripoli, West Bekaa, Zahle) the percentage of the population classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above ranged between 40 and 45 percent and the population classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) ranged between 5 and 10 percent. In absolute terms, with over

160,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above, Akkar was the district with the highest number of highly food insecure. Akkar was followed by Baabda (144,000), Baalbek (96,000) and Tripoli (90,000).

Syrian refugees: In the current period, refugees living in 24 out of the 26 districts were classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), with the remaining two districts classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed). The highest incidence of acute food insecurity was observed in seven districts (Akkar, Baalbek, El Hermel, El Koura, Marjaayoun, Tripoli and West Bekaa) where the percentage of the population classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above ranged between 55 and 60 percent, and the population classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) ranged between 5 and 15 percent. In three districts (Beirut, El Minnieh- Dennie and Saida) the percentage of the population classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above reached 50 percent. In absolute terms, with 110,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above, Zahle was the district with the highest number of highly food insecure Syrian refugees, followed by Baalbek (99,000) and Akkar (93,000).

POPULATION TABLE FOR THE CURRENT PERIOD (SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 2022)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Residents	298,000	30,000	10	104,000	35	134,000	45	30,000	10	0	0	3	164,000	55
	Refugees	154,000	15,000	10	46,000	30	70,000	45	23,000	15	0	0	3	93,000	60
	Total	452,000	45,000	10	150,000	33	204,000	45	53,000	12	0	0		257,000	57
Aley	Residents	212,000	32,000	15	95,000	45	74,000	35	11,000	5	0	0	3	85,000	40
	Refugees	88,000	13,000	15	40,000	45	31,000	35	4,000	5	0	0	3	35,000	40
	Total	300,000	45,000	15	135,000	45	105,000	35	15,000	5	0	0		120,000	40
Baabda	Residents	411,000	82,000	20	185,000	45	123,000	30	21,000	5	0	0	3	144,000	35
	Refugees	148,000	15,000	10	74,000	50	52,000	35	7,000	5	0	0	3	59,000	40
	Total	559,000	97,000	17	259,000	46	175,000	31	28,000	5	0	0		203,000	36
Baalbek	Residents	192,000	19,000	10	77,000	40	77,000	40	19,000	10	0	0	3	96,000	50
	Refugees	180,000	18,000	10	63,000	35	81,000	45	18,000	10	0	0	3	99,000	55
	Total	372,000	37,000	10	140,000	38	158,000	42	37,000	10	0	0		195,000	52
Bcharre	Residents	21,000	6,000	30	12,000	55	2,000	10	1,000	5	0	0	2	3,000	15
	Refugees	3,000	1000	20	1,000	45	900	30	100	5	0	0	3	1,000	35
	Total	24,000	7,000	29	13,000	54	2,900	12	1,100	5	0	0		4,000	17
Beirut	Residents	236,000	59,000	25	106,000	45	59,000	25	12,000	5	0	0	3	71,000	30
	Refugees	36,000	4,000	10	14,000	40	16,000	45	2,000	5	0	0	3	18,000	50
	Total	272,000	63,000	23	120,000	44	75,000	28	14,000	5	0	0		89,000	33
Bent Jbeil	Residents	85,000	21,000	25	34,000	40	26,000	30	4,000	5	0	0	3	30,000	35
	Refugees	13,000	6,000	45	5,000	40	2,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	2,000	15
	Total	98,000	27,000	28	39,000	40	28,000	28	4,000	4	0	0		32,000	32
Chouf	Residents	207,000	52,000	25	124,000	60	31,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	31,000	15
	Refugees	70,000	14,000	20	35,000	50	18,000	25	3,000	5	0	0	3	21,000	30
	Total	277,000	66,000	24	159,000	57	49,000	18	3,000	1	0	0		52,000	19
El Batroun	Residents	53,000	16,000	30	29,000	55	8,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	8,000	15
	Refugees	18,000	4,000	20	8,000	45	5,000	30	1000	5	0	0	3	6,000	35
	Total	71,000	20,000	27	37,000	52	13,000	19	1000	1	0	0		14,000	20
El Hermel	Residents	28,000	3,000	10	11,000	40	11,000	40	3,000	10	0	0	3	14,000	50
	Refugees	12,000	1,000	10	4,000	30	6,000	50	1,000	10	0	0	3	7,000	60
	Total	40,000	4,000	10	15,000	37	17,000	43	4,000	10	0	0		21,000	53
El Koura	Residents	73,000	22,000	30	40,000	55	11,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	11,000	15
	Refugees	22,000	2,000	10	8,000	35	10,000	45	2,000	10	0	0	3	12,000	55
	Total	95,000	24,000	25	48,000	50	21,000	22	2,000	2	0	0		23,000	24
El Meten	Residents	396,000	119,000	30	218,000	55	59,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	59,000	15
	Refugees	56,000	8,000	15	31,000	55	14,000	25	3,000	5	0	0	3	17,000	30
	Total	452,000	127,000	28	249,000	55	73,000	16	3,000	1	0	0		76,000	17
El Minieh-Dennie	Residents	122,000	12,000	10	49,000	40	49,000	40	12,000	10	0	0	3	61,000	50
	Refugees	76,000	8,000	10	30,000	40	30,000	40	8,000	10	0	0	3	38,000	50
	Total	198,000	20,000	10	79,000	40	79,000	40	20,000	10	0	0		99,000	50

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Hasbaya	Residents	26,000	4,000	15	13,000	50	8,000	30	1,000	5	0	0	3	9,000	35
	Refugees	8,000	800	10	3,800	45	3,000	40	400	5	0	0	3	3,400	45
	Total	34,000	4,800	14	16,800	49	11,000	32	1,400	5	0	0		12,400	37
Jbeil	Residents	116,000	35,000	30	64,000	55	17,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	17,000	15
	Refugees	10,000	2,000	20	4,500	45	3,000	30	500	5	0	0	3	3,500	35
	Total	126,000	37,000	29	68,500	54	20,000	16	500	0	0	0		20,500	17
Jezzine	Residents	27,000	7,000	25	16,000	60	4,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	4,000	15
	Refugees	4,000	1,000	25	2,400	60	400	10	200	5	0	0	2	600	15
	Total	31,000	8,000	25	18,400	60	4,400	14	200	1	0	0		4,600	15
Kesrwane	Residents	231,000	69,000	30	127,000	55	35,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	35,000	15
	Refugees	22,000	5,000	25	12,000	55	4,000	15	1,000	5	0	0	3	5,000	20
	Total	253,000	74,000	30	139,000	55	39,000	15	1,000	0	0	0		40,000	15
Marjaayoun	Residents	64,000	10,000	15	32,000	50	19,000	30	3,000	5	0	0	3	22,000	35
	Refugees	14,000	700	5	5,000	35	6,300	45	2,000	15	0	0	3	8,300	60
	Total	78,000	10,700	13	37,000	47	25,300	33	5,000	7	0	0		30,300	40
Rachaya	Residents	32,000	5,000	15	13,000	40	11,000	35	3,000	10	0	0	3	14,000	45
	Refugees	11,000	2,000	15	4,000	40	4,000	40	1000	5	0	0	3	5,000	45
	Total	43,000	7,000	15	17,000	40	15,000	36	4,000	9	0	0		19,000	45
Saida	Residents	208,000	31,000	15	94,000	45	73,000	35	10,000	5	0	0	3	83,000	40
	Refugees	60,000	6,000	10	24,000	40	24,000	40	6,000	10	0	0	3	30,000	50
	Total	268,000	37,000	14	118,000	44	97,000	36	16,000	6	0	0		113,000	42
Sour	Residents	198,000	30,000	15	79,000	40	69,000	35	20,000	10	0	0	3	89,000	45
	Refugees	41,000	4,000	10	21,000	50	14,000	35	2,000	5	0	0	3	16,000	40
	Total	239,000	34,000	14	100,000	42	83,000	35	22,000	9	0	0		105,000	44
Tripoli	Residents	201,000	30,000	15	81,000	40	70,000	35	20,000	10	0	0	3	90,000	45
	Refugees	59,000	6,000	10	21,000	35	26,000	45	6,000	10	0	0	3	32,000	55
	Total	260,000	36,000	14	102,000	39	96,000	37	26,000	10	0	0		122,000	47
West Bekaa	Residents	68,000	10,000	15	27,000	40	24,000	35	7,000	10	0	0	3	31,000	45
	Refugees	94,000	9,000	10	33,000	35	47,000	50	5,000	5	0	0	3	52,000	55
	Total	162,000	19,000	12	60,000	37	71,000	44	12,000	7	0	0		83,000	51
Zahle	Residents	140,000	28,000	20	56,000	40	49,000	35	7,000	5	0	0	3	56,000	40
	Refugees	246,000	25,000	10	111,000	45	98,000	40	12,000	5	0	0	3	110,000	45
	Total	386,000	53,000	14	167,000	43	147,000	38	19,000	5	0	0		166,000	43
Zgharta	Residents	73,000	22,000	30	40,000	55	7,000	10	4,000	5	0	0	2	11,000	15
	Refugees	23,000	5,000	20	10,000	45	7,000	30	1,000	5	0	0	3	8,000	35
	Total	96,000	27,000	28	50,000	53	14,000	15	5,000	5	0	0		19,000	20
	Residents	3,864,000	783,000	20	1,792,000	46	1,094,000	28	195,000	5	0	0		1,289,000	33
GrandTotal	Refugees	1,500,000	179,000	12	627,000	42	584,000	39	111,000	7	0	0		695,000	46
	Total	5,364,000	962,000	18	2,419,000	5	1,678,000	31	306,000	6	0	0		1,984,000	37

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

PROJECTED IPC ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY SITUATION (JANUARY – APRIL 2023)

LEBANESE RESIDENTS - PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY January - April 2023

1.46M
38% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	**0** People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	**233,000** People in Emergency
Phase 3	**1,228,000** People in Crisis
Phase 2	**1,620,000** People in Stressed
Phase 1	**783,000** People in Food Security

SYRIAN REFUGEES - PROJECTED ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY January - April 2023

0.80M
53% of the population analysed

People facing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above)

IN NEED OF URGENT ACTION

Phase 5	**0** People in Catastrophe
Phase 4	**121,000** People in Emergency
Phase 3	**678,000** People in Crisis
Phase 2	**523,000** People in Stressed
Phase 1	**178,000** People in Food Security

During the projected period that goes from January to April 2023, it is estimated that about 2.26 million people, corresponding to 42 percent of the analyzed population, will be facing high levels of food insecurity and will be classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. This represents a 5 percentage points increase from the 37 percent estimated to be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above in the current period (September to December 2022). The number of people in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) is also expected to increase from 306,000 to 354,000 people reaching 7 percent of the total population analyzed. The expected worsening of the food security situation in the projected period, is the reflection of an anticipated further deterioration of the economic situation and soaring prices.



Lebanese residents: As a result of the deteriorating economic situation, it was expected that the percentage of Lebanese residents classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above would increase by 5 percentage points to reach 38 percent (1.46 million people). In the projected period, residents living in 19 districts were classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and seven districts were classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed), while residents in two districts (Bcharre and Zgharta), were classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). The highest incidence of food insecurity was expected in Akkar, Baalbek, and El Hermel districts where the population classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above ranged between 60 and 65 percent. In these three districts, 15 percent were classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). In absolute terms, with over 190,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above, Akkar was the district with the highest number of projected highly food insecure people, followed by Baabda (165,000), Baalbek (115,000) and Tripoli (over 100,000).

Syrian refugees: 53 percent (0.8 million) were projected in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, a 7 percentage points increase if compared to the current period. The number of Syrian refugees facing IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) was expected to reach 8 percent (0.121 million). Syrian refugees in Akkar were classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) as 20 percent of refugees were expected in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 50 percent in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). Moreover, Syrian refugees in 23 districts were projected in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis). In El Hermel and Marjaayoun districts 65 percent of the population was classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above. In six districts (Baalbek, Beirut, El Koura, El Minieh-Dennie, Tripoli and West Bekaa), 60 percent of the population was classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above. In absolute terms, with 135,000 people in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above, Zahle was the district with the highest projected number of highly food insecure refugees, followed by Baalbek (108,000) and Akkar (108,000).

POPULATION TABLE FOR THE PROJECTED PERIOD (JANUARY – APRIL 2023)

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Akkar	Residents	298,000	30,000	10	74,000	25	149,000	50	45,000	15	0	0	3	194,000	65
	Refugees	154,000	15,000	10	31,000	20	77,000	50	31,000	20	0	0	4	108,000	70
	Total	452,000	45,000	10	105,000	23	226,000	50	76,000	17	0	0		302,000	67
Aley	Residents	212,000	32,000	15	84,000	40	85,000	40	11,000	5	0	0	3	96,000	45
	Refugees	88,000	13,000	15	31,000	35	40,000	45	4,000	5	0	0	3	44,000	50
	Total	300,000	45,000	15	115,000	39	125,000	41	15,000	5	0	0		140,000	46
Baabda	Residents	411,000	82,000	20	164,000	40	144,000	35	21,000	5	0	0	3	165,000	40
	Refugees	148,000	15,000	10	67,000	45	59,000	40	7,000	5	0	0	3	66,000	45
	Total	559,000	97,000	17	231,000	41	203,000	36	28,000	5	0	0		231,000	41
Baalbek	Residents	192,000	19,000	10	58,000	30	86,000	45	29,000	15	0	0	3	115,000	60
	Refugees	180,000	18,000	10	54,000	30	90,000	50	18,000	10	0	0	3	108,000	60
	Total	372,000	37,000	10	112,000	30	176,000	47	47,000	13	0	0		223,000	60
Bcharre	Residents	21,000	6,000	30	11,000	50	3,000	15	1,000	5	0	0	3	4,000	20
	Refugees	3,000	900	20	1000	35	1,000	40	100	5	0	0	3	1,100	45
	Total	24,000	6,900	29	12,000	48	4,000	18	1,100	5	0	0		5,100	23
Beirut	Residents	236,000	59,000	25	94,000	40	71,000	30	12,000	5	0	0	3	83,000	35
	Refugees	36,000	4,000	10	10,000	30	18,000	50	4,000	10	0	0	3	22,000	60
	Total	272,000	63,000	23	104,000	39	89,000	33	16,000	6	0	0		105,000	38
Bent Jbeil	Residents	85,000	21,000	25	30,000	35	30,000	35	4,000	5	0	0	3	34,000	40
	Refugees	13,000	6,000	45	5,000	40	2,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	2,000	15
	Total	98,000	27,000	28	35,000	36	32,000	32	4,000	4	0	0		36,000	37
Chouf	Residents	207,000	52,000	25	124,000	60	21,000	10	10,000	5	0	0	2	31,000	15
	Refugees	70,000	14,000	20	32,000	45	21,000	30	3,000	5	0	0	3	24,000	35
	Total	277,000	66,000	23	156,000	53	42,000	20	13,000	5	0	0		55,000	25
El Batroun	Residents	53,000	16,000	30	29,000	55	8,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	8,000	15
	Refugees	18,000	4,000	20	7,000	40	6,000	35	1000	5	0	0	3	7,000	40
	Total	71,000	20,000	27	36,000	51	14,000	20	1000	1	0	0		15,000	21
El Hermel	Residents	28,000	3,000	10	9,000	30	12,000	45	4,000	15	0	0	3	16,000	60
	Refugees	12,000	1,000	10	3,000	25	7,000	55	1,000	10	0	0	3	8,000	65
	Total	40,000	4,000	10	12,000	29	19,000	48	5,000	14	0	0		24,000	61
El Koura	Residents	73,000	22,000	30	40,000	55	11,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	11,000	15
	Refugees	22,000	2,000	10	7,000	30	11,000	50	2,000	10	0	0	3	13,000	60
	Total	95,000	24,000	25	47,000	49	22,000	23	2,000	2	0	0		24,000	26
El Meten	Residents	396,000	119,000	30	218,000	55	59,000	15	0	0	0	0	2	59,000	15
	Refugees	56,000	8,000	15	28,000	50	17,000	30	3,000	5	0	0	3	20,000	35
	Total	452,000	127,000	28	246,000	54	76,000	17	3,000	1	0	0		79,000	17
El Minieh-Dennie	Residents	122,000	12,000	10	43,000	35	55,000	45	12,000	10	0	0	3	67,000	55
	Refugees	76,000	7,000	10	23,000	30	38,000	50	8,000	10	0	0	3	46,000	60
	Total	198,000	19,000	10	66,000	33	93,000	47	20,000	10	0	0		113,000	57

District	Population	Total population analysed	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3		Phase 4		Phase 5		Area Phase	Phase 3+	
			#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%	#people	%		#people	%
Hasbaya	Residents	26,000	4,000	15	12,000	45	9,000	35	1,000	5	0	0	3	10,000	40
	Refugees	8,000	800	10	3,000	40	3,800	45	400	5	0	0	3	4,200	50
	Total	34,000	4,800	14	15,000	44	12,800	37	1,400	5	0	0		14,200	42
Jbeil	Residents	116,000	35,000	30	64,000	55	17,000	15	-	0	0	0	2	17,000	15
	Refugees	10,000	2,000	20	4,000	40	3,500	35	500	5	0	0	3	4,000	40
	Total	126,000	37,000	29	68,000	54	20,500	17	500	0	0	0		21,000	17
Jezzine	Residents	27,000	7,000	25	16,000	60	3,000	10	1,000	5	0	0	2	4,000	15
	Refugees	4,000	1,000	25	2,400	60	400	10	200	5	0	0	2	600	15
	Total	31,000	8,000	25	18,400	60	3,400	10	1,200	5	0	0		4,600	15
Kesrwane	Residents	231,000	69,000	30	127,000	55	35,000	15	-	0	0	0	2	35,000	15
	Refugees	22,000	6,000	25	11,000	50	4,000	20	1,000	5	0	0	3	5,000	25
	Total	253,000	75,000	30	138,000	55	39,000	15	1,000	0	0	0		40,000	16
Marjaayoun	Residents	64,000	10,000	15	29,000	45	22,000	35	3,000	5	0	0	3	25,000	40
	Refugees	14,000	1000	5	4,000	30	7,000	50	2,000	15	0	0	3	9,000	65
	Total	78,000	11,000	13	33,000	42	29,000	38	5,000	7	0	0		34,000	45
Rachaya	Residents	32,000	5,000	15	11,000	35	13,000	40	3,000	10	0	0	3	16,000	50
	Refugees	11,000	1,500	15	4,000	35	5,000	45	500	5	0	0	3	5,500	50
	Total	43,000	6,500	15	15,000	35	18,000	41	3,500	9	0	0		21,500	50
Saida	Residents	208,000	31,000	15	83,000	40	83,000	40	11,000	5	0	0	3	94,000	45
	Refugees	60,000	6,000	10	21,000	35	27,000	45	6,000	10	0	0	3	33,000	55
	Total	268,000	37,000	13	104,000	38	110,000	43	17,000	8	0	0		127,000	50
Sour	Residents	198,000	30,000	15	69,000	35	79,000	40	20,000	10	0	0	3	99,000	50
	Refugees	41,000	4,000	10	21,000	50	14,000	35	2,000	5	0	0	3	16,000	40
	Total	239,000	34,000	14	90,000	38	93,000	39	22,000	9	0	0		115,000	48
Tripoli	Residents	201,000	30,000	15	70,000	35	81,000	40	20,000	10	0	0	3	101,000	50
	Refugees	59,000	6,000	10	18,000	30	29,000	50	6,000	10	0	0	3	35,000	60
	Total	260,000	36,000	14	88,000	34	110,000	42	26,000	10	0	0		136,000	52
West Bekaa	Residents	68,000	10,000	15	24,000	35	27,000	40	7,000	10	0	0	3	34,000	50
	Refugees	94,000	9,000	10	28,000	30	52,000	55	5,000	5	0	0	3	57,000	60
	Total	162,000	19,000	12	52,000	32	79,000	49	12,000	7	0	0		91,000	56
Zahle	Residents	140,000	28,000	20	42,000	30	63,000	45	7,000	5	0	0	3	70,000	50
	Refugees	246,000	25,000	10	86,000	35	123,000	50	12,000	5	0	0	3	135,000	55
	Total	386,000	53,000	14	128,000	33	186,000	48	19,000	5	0	0		205,000	53
Zgharta	Residents	73,000	22,000	30	36,000	50	11,000	15	4,000	5	0	0	3	15,000	20
	Refugees	23,000	5,000	20	8,000	35	9,000	40	1,000	5	0	0	3	10,000	45
	Total	96,000	27,000	28	44,000	46	20,000	21	5,000	5	0	0		25,000	26
Grand Total	Residents	3,864,000	783,000	20	1,620,000	42	1,228,000	32	233,000	6	0	0		1,461,000	38
	Refugees	1,500,000	178,000	12	523,000	35	678,000	45	121,000	8	0	0		798,000	53
	Total	5,364,000	961,000	18	2,143,000	40	1,906,000	35	354,000	7	0	0		2,259,000	42

Note: A population in Phase 3+ does not necessarily reflect the full population in need of urgent action. This is because some households may be in Phase 2 or even 1 but only because of receipt of assistance, and thus, they may be in need of continued action. Marginal inconsistencies that may arise in the overall percentages of totals and grand totals are attributable to rounding.

KEY DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Lebanon is facing an economic and financial crisis that has undermined the food security of already vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees. Inflation, currency depreciation and loss of job opportunities negatively impacted the purchasing power of both Lebanese and Syrian refugees who since 2019 have been falling deeper into poverty.

Inflation

A key driver of food insecurity was high and rising inflation that hampered the ability of Lebanese residents and Syrian refugee families to meet basic needs. Inflation has been driven by the plummeting exchange rate, the exponential growth of the currency in circulation, the lifting of subsidies on several food and non-food products as well as the increase in international prices (particularly of food and energy).

In September 2022, Lebanon ranked second after Zimbabwe and before Venezuela among the 74 countries that experienced year on year food inflation of at least 15 percent (WFP, 2022c). The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 162 percent between September 2021 and September 2022 while the Food Price Index rose by 208 percent during the same period (CAS, 2022).

Similarly, the cost of the food component of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB)[1] that consists of basic food items providing 2,100 Kcal per day for a month, has increased 19-fold since the beginning of the crisis reaching LBP 988,000 (USD 27) in September 2022. The non-food SMEB that includes essential non-food items and services (hygiene products, rent, cooking gas, etc.) has increased six-fold since October 2019 reaching LBP 5 million (USD 136) in September 2022 (WFP, 2022b).

The cost of fuel, diesel, and cooking gas[2] also increased exponentially after the phase out of fuel subsidies starting January 2021 and accelerated significantly in the first half of 2021(WFP, 2022b)[3]. The cost of rent, that represents a significant share of Syrian refugees' household budgets rose by 170 percent between July 2021and July 2022 (VASyR, 2022).

Currency depreciation

As Lebanon relies on imports for most of its food and non-food needs, the depreciation of its currency has a considerable impact on prices. A higher exchange rate means more expensive imports, which results in more expensive goods, further eroding the purchasing power of Lebanese and Syrian families and their capacity to meet basic needs.

In the last 12 months, the Lebanese Pound (LBP) depreciated[4] by 49 percent and reached an all-time high of 40,600 LBP/USD in October 2022, while it lost nearly 95 percent of its value since the beginning of the crisis. This rate of depreciation positioned Lebanon fourth after Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Ghana and before Sri Lanka among the countries whose currencies experienced the largest value loss in the last 12 months (WFP, 2022c).

Discontinuation of state subsidies

Food insecurity has also been compounded by the gradual phase out of state subsidies on several food and non-food commodities as well as combustible fuels.[5] The discontinuation of subsidies started in May 2021 and since then, the cost of the food SMEB, rose from USD 13 to USD 27 reaching pre-crisis levels. Currently, the only remaining subsidy is for the import of wheat for local bread production (WFP, 2022a).

Loss of purchasing power

Among Lebanese residents, the economic crisis has disproportionally affected those with lower or middle incomes (smaller businesses and the labor force that is paid in Lebanese pounds) as there is high income disparity in the country (SIPRI 2021). As of August 2022, the average monthly wage among Lebanese resident households was LBP 2.5 million (USD 78 at the August exchange rate) and covered only 29 percent of the cost of the SMEB. Although this represents a slight improvement from the 24 percent registered in December 2021, the average wage remains largely insufficient to afford basic needs[6]. Before the beginning of the crisis, Lebanese wage workers could take home a salary of LBP 1,179,900 that, at the time, corresponded to nearly USD 800 (CAS, 2020).

[1] The Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) was developed by the Food Security and Agriculture Sector and the Basic Assistance Sector partners in 2014 and was further revised in 2016 and 2020. The basket serves as a benchmark to estimate the cost of food and other basic needs of a refugee family in Lebanon. The SMEB reflects the absolute minimum amount required to cover lifesaving needs. The cost of the SMEB is tracked monthly using WFP price monitoring data and the Consumer Price Index (WFP 2020 and Basic Assistance 2022c).

[2] Combustible fuels have a significant impact on food inflation as they affect the cost of food safety, storage, transportation, and processing.

[3] In September 2022 month-on-month energy inflation was 16 percent.

[4] In Lebanon a multiple exchange rate system rapidly emerged after the onset of the crisis. While the official exchange rate of LBP 1,507.5/USD remains in place only for administrative purposes, the informal market rate reflects the real value of the LBP against the U.S. Dollar.

[5] Subsidies were introduced by the Central Bank in September 2019 and allowed the import of up to 300 food and non-food commodities at the country's pegged currency rate of LBP 1,507 to the US dollar. After several revisions that significantly reduced the basket to less than 100 items, the lifting of subsidies started in May 2021 when the Central Bank established that all subsidized imports had to be pre-approved by the Bank, putting on hold most of the subsidies.

[6] The HDS is an index that ranks families based on the number of deprivations they face across five minimum living standards: i) food, ii) health, iii) education, iv) shelter, and v) livelihoods.

As it became more difficult for households to access food and other basic services, poverty also increased. Based on WFP's Household Deprivation Score[7], 60 percent of the Lebanese population was multi-dimensionally deprived in August 2022, up from 53 percent in December 2021 and 42 percent in January 2021 (mVAM, 2022).

Remittances from the Lebanese diaspora are an important safety net for Lebanese households. Remittances were estimated to have increased from 10.3 percent of GDP in 2020 to 15.9 percent of GDP in 2021 (World Bank, 2022). However, it is likely that the actual level of remittances is higher, as an increasing number of families resort to means not captured by official sources (WFP 2022a). It was estimated that in 2022, 15 to 30 percent of households relied on remittances, up from 10 percent in 2018 and 2019 (Mercy Corps, 2022).

Syrian refugees, as well, were heavily impacted by the economic crisis as they were also confronted with increased limited resources to meet basic needs. Syrian refugees, often residing in sub-optimal conditions[8] and lacking legal residency[9], face significant barriers in accessing the labour market and are highly reliant on assistance (VASyR, 2022)[10].

The average monthly labour income of a Syrian refugee family was LBP 1.7 million corresponding to USD 60 in June 2022 and was sufficient to cover only 21 percent of the SMEB. Food, rent, electricity, and health services accounted on average for 72 percent of the average household budget and over 90 percent of the Syrian refugees' households incurred debts to afford these basic needs. Over half of the Syrian refugees' households were late in paying rent, while 7 percent of them was at risk of eviction (VASyR, 2022).

In June 2022, over two third of Syrian refugees did not have the economic capacity to afford the minimum essential items needed to survive. If the value of assistance and credit had to be deducted from the household budget, then nearly 90 percent of the Syrian refugee households would not have the economic capacity to meet survival needs (VASyR 2022)[11].

Limited job opportunities

High unemployment and limited livelihood opportunities were also main drivers of food insecurity.

The employment to population ratio declined from 43 to 31 percent between 2019 and 2022, while the unemployment rate increased from 11 to 30 percent during the same period. Nearly half of the unemployed have been seeking work for more than a year and almost a third of youth aged between 18 and 24 was not in employment, education, or training (CAS-ILO, 2022). Since the beginning of the crisis, the share of informal employment increased by 7 percentage points while the size of the informal sector, that consists of firms that do not contribute to the tax base and are usually small, with low productivity and limited access to credit, increased by 13 percentage points, from 35 to 48 percent (CAS-ILO, 2022).

According to mVAM data, in August 2022, nearly 40 percent of the Lebanese resident population relied on temporary labour and other irregular income sources as remittances from within the country, gifts, or debts. Families relying on these livelihoods were affected by higher poverty levels and were more likely to be food insecure (WFP, 2022a).

Syrian refugees face significant regulatory barriers in the labour market particularly limiting their access to formal employment. These barriers push refugees into informal labour and expose them to exploitative working conditions, lower wages, and lack of legal protection (IRC 2020).

Among Syrian refugees, only 33 percent of the working age population was employed and nearly 30 percent of the households had no working members. The unemployment rate among Syrian refugees also exceeded 30 percent while 36 percent of Syrian youth aged between 15 and 24 who are in the labour force was not in employment and nearly 4 percent of children were engaged in child labour (VASyR 2022).

Temporary labour in the agriculture, construction, and services sectors, was the primary income source after assistance for Syrian refugees. These are the only sectors where Syrian refugees are allowed to work by the Lebanese Law. Syrian refugees also face limits on the maximum number of working hours as they are allowed to work maximum 60 hours per month (SIPRI 2021).

[7] The HDS is an index that ranks families based on the number of deprivations they face across five minimum living standards: i) food, ii) health, iii) education, iv) shelter, and v) livelihoods.

[8] According to VASyR 2022, nearly 60 percent of the Syrian refugee households were living in a shelter that was dangerous, substandard, or overcrowded.

[9] According to VASyR 2022, only 9 percent of the Syrian refugees' households had all members with legal residency and in 74 percent of the households there were no members with legal residency.

[10] According to VASyR 2022, 50 percent of Syrian refugee households reported humanitarian assistance as their primary income source.

[11] The Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) measures the percentage of households with economic capacity below the survival minimum expenditure basket (SMEB). Households with economic capacity below the SMEB are likely unable to access the bare minimum required to survive. It includes expenditures on all recurrent and regular food and nonfood items made in cash, as well as the estimated value of consumption from own production. When the objective of the analysis is to understand and estimate humanitarian needs, ECMEN is calculated excluding the value of assistance and expenditures on credit or gifts (cash or in-kind) because these do not represent a household making expenditures from their own capacity (WFP, 2020).

Widening gap between the value of assistance and cost of living

During the current analysis period, the coverage of food assistance was significant. In the second quarter of 2022, the Food Security and Agriculture Sector reached nearly 1.84 million Lebanese residents and Syrian Refugees through cash-based food assistance and in kind food parcels (FSS, 2022). AMAN a national social protection programme providing unconditional cash assistance for food and other essential needs, reached nearly 350,000 extreme poor Lebanese as of October 2022 (WFP, 2022d). In addition, the Basic Assistance Sector reached, under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), over 255,000 Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents' households with regular cash assistance for basic needs other than food (BA Sector, 2022a).

Over 25 percent of the population analysed received more than 50 percent of the caloric intake mostly through unrestricted cash-based transfers for essential needs including food. However, the cash transfer value that is intended to cover both food and non-food needs plummeted to less than 35 percent of the SMEB from 62 percent in August 2021 while the food transfer value remained above 50 percent of the food SMEB. The overall value of assistance was not sufficient to meet minimum living standards. In October 2022, Syrian refugees, received only 42 percent of the recommended transfer for essential needs (IA, 2022)[12].

Maintaining adequate transfer values of cash assistance, has been challenging for sector partners. While transfer values have been increased several times in the last two years to mitigate the effects of inflation, higher transfer values had always been offset by sharp cost increases of the SMEB. Barriers that prevent partners from increasing transfer values are not only linked to the available funding to meet increased needs, but also to social stability as the average labour wage was below 30 percent of the SMEB in August 2022 (Basic Assistance Sector, 2022b).

Political uncertainty

Since the start of the crisis, Lebanon has been without a fully functioning government for nearly 20 months. The current government was formed in September 2021 and assumed a caretaker function in May 2022. While the new government has not been formed yet, the presidential term came to an end in October 2022.

Heavy burden on public services

While people in Lebanon have been mostly relying on the private sector for basic services such as health, education, water and electricity, more and more people depend now on public services as they are no longer able to afford their cost (OCHA 2022). Public services, that have been already under pressure following the influx of Syrian refugees, suffered significant cuts in recent months. Frequent public sector strikes have put an additional strain on service delivery.

Access to electricity was a major challenge. The electricity provided through the public grid lasted on average 1.9 hours per day. Therefore, the population faced long electricity outages reaching an average 15 hours of blackout per day while 12 percent of the Syrian refugees had no access to electricity at all. Only 52 percent of the Lebanese residents and 47 percent of the Syrian refugees had access to a generator or to an alternative source of power as the cost of a basic connection became unaffordable for most of the population (VASyR 2022, mVAM 2022). The electricity crisis had a direct impact on food safety, as refrigeration and safe storage of products became a challenge (WFP, 2022a).

Lebanon health system has also been under significant pressure. It is estimated that up to 20 percent of nurses and 40 percent of doctors left the country. Hospitals are facing shortages of staff while medicines were scarce. Immunization rates of children have dropped by a third while maternal mortality more than doubled (OCHA 2022). According to mVAM 2022 data, nearly 50 percent of the Lebanese resident population faced challenges in accessing the health system. High costs of healthcare, lack of health insurance coverage, and shortages of medicines were the main access barriers to the health system (mVAM, 2022).

Access to safe and sufficient water for drinking and domestic use was also problematic. The public water network could no longer operate normally as it has been severely affected by budget cuts and electricity shortages, with increasing consequences on public health, hygiene, and the environment. Untreated wastewater dumping is increasing, and, in October 2022, the country registered its first cholera case since 1993. By the end of November, nearly 4,700 suspected and confirmed cholera cases and 20 deaths were reported across Lebanon. Private alternatives were costly and unsafe. The WASH Sector estimated that the cost for a household to receive sufficient water to meet basic needs was USD 58/month corresponding to nearly 75 percent of the average wage in July 2022 (WASH Sector, 2022).

The education system has been also severely hit by the economic crisis and the Covid 19 pandemic.[13] It has been estimated that more than 15 percent of private school teachers have left the country while public sector teachers, who have been on strike since the start of the year, can barely afford rising transportation and fuel costs (LCPS, 2022). Households have been increasingly reporting to have moved children from private to public schools while there has also been a significant increase in dropout rates as households can no

[12] *The recommended transfer value (TV) for food is determined based on the value of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), while the calculation of the non-food TV considers the average inco me earned by beneficiaries. As of September 2022, the recommended transfer values corresponded to 988,000.*

[13] *According to the World Bank, between January 2020 and February 2021, the Lebanese school system opened for less than 25% of the school year (WB, 2021).*

[14] *World Food Programme, mVAM 2022 and Vasyr 2022.*

longer afford tuition or transportation costs.[14] According to August 2022 mVAM data, 23 percent of the Lebanese resident population reported to have changed school of children while 5 percent reported to have withdrawn children from school. In addition, 9 percent of Lebanese families with children between 5 and 17 years old reported to not have children enrolled in school while 13 percent said that their children were not attending school regularly. Only half of Syrian refugees' children between the ages of 6 and 14 attended school regularly in 2022, while just 6 per cent of the older adolescents at upper secondary school level attended classes regularly in 2022 (VASyR, 2022).

Since June 2022, public sector strikes became more frequent. Public sector employees have been demanding an increase in salaries that have not yet been adjusted since the beginning of the crisis. In October 2022 strikes of employees of a main state-owned telecom company have caused widespread disruptions of the telecommunication network across the country. Public administration employs about 10 percent of the workforce.

Risk of rising malnutrition

Although the economic crisis did not yet result in a spike in global acute malnutrition, micronutrient deficiencies and sub-optimal feeding practices were widespread.

Based on the result of the Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey conducted in 2021, the overall prevalence of wasting was less than 5 per cent among all population groups. The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age was 2.5 percent among Syrian refugees' children and 1.8 percent among Lebanese children. The acute malnutrition rate among pregnant and lactating women reached 7.6 percent among Syrian refugees living in informal settlements and 5 percent among Lebanese women. The nutrition sector estimated that over 20 percent of children aged between 6 and 59 months were in need of micronutrient powder supplementation while, based on data from the treatment of acute malnutrition programme, during the first six months of 2022, over 70 percent of the children admitted to the programme were non-Lebanese and mainly Syrian refugees (Lebanon Nutrition Sector, 2022).

The prevalence of stunting among Lebanese children aged 6–59 months was 7 per cent nationally, 11.7 and 25 per cent among displaced Syrians residing out of settlements and in informal settlements respectively, an increase from 17 per cent in 2013 (Lebanon Nutrition Sector, 2022).

Almost 42 percent of women and 43 percent of children 6-59 months were suffering from anaemia, which was also high for Syrian refugees in tented settlements, reaching over 31 percent among women and nearly 33 percent among children. A significant proportion of the anaemia in the country can be attributed to micronutrient deficiency linked to poor uptake of hygiene and nutritional practices and services, in addition to deteriorating quality of the food consumed[15] (Lebanon Nutrition Sector, 2022).

Nationally, 70 percent of the 0–6-month-old children were not exclusively breast fed, a rate that was significantly lower than the global nutrition target for exclusive breastfeeding, set at 50 percent by 2025. Additionally, only 6 percent of children between 6 and 23 months met a minimum adequate diet which is reflective of the absence of both diet diversity and meals frequency. Some 47 percent of children under the age of two received solid, semi-solid and soft foods (plus milk feeds for non-breastfed children) the minimum number of times or more during the previous day. The prevalence of children who received foods from four or more food groups during the day prior to the survey was 23 percent (Lebanon Nutrition Sector, 2022).

A fragile food system

Lebanon imports most of its food supply and the contribution of the agriculture, forestry, and fishing sectors to the country's economy was 2.5 percent in 2020 (WB, 2022). Lebanon's cultivated agricultural area represented 27.5 percent of the total Lebanese land area (WFP, 2022a). The agricultural sector employed up to one-quarter of the labour force on a full or part-time basis (FAO, 2020). Agricultural labour also represented the main income source for 10 percent of the Syrian refugee households (VASyR 2022).

The economic crisis had a severe impact on farmers that have been facing high input costs and low value of production. In September 2022, for example, 80 percent of farmers interviewed through a survey targeting crop and livestock producers, reported a decrease in their income sources as they faced difficulties in marketing their crops, high costs of production and labour (FAO, 2022).

According to the same survey, the crop area planted reduced by a fifth while crop sales prices were the lowest in recent years due to high market supply during the spring-summer season and a reduction in exports of agricultural products.

The economic crisis has also put a strain on the country's capacity to secure hard currency to pay for its food imports. In July 2022, the food trade deficit was USD 181 million and exceeded USD 1.15 billion during the first 7 months of 2022. In September 2022, based

[15] Average weekly frequency of consumption of dairy products, animal proteins, and foods with high content of micronutrients such as fruits and vegetables has reduced significantly since the beginning of the crisis. The number households who were able to consume meat, poultry, fish or eggs at least one day per week declined from 82 to 53 percent. In August 2021, Similarly, households who consumed dairy products at least once in the seven days prior to the interviews declined from 83 to 60 percent.

on customs data, Lebanon total food import volume decreased by 17 percent if compared to September 2021 and by 44 percent if compared to October 2019 (WFP, 2022b). Moreover, it has been reported a decreasing diversity in products offered across the country as suppliers have been discontinuing imports of products priced at the informal market rate due to the decreasing purchasing power of consumers (WFP, 2022b).

The blast at the port of Beirut in August 2020, also significantly affected the country's import capacity. With the damage to Lebanon's central and main grain reserve, shipments of wheat were relying on smaller boats with limited capacity. In addition, frequent strikes of public employees have further delayed the quality control process of new shipments as food containers in the port courtyard awaiting testing before entering the country (WFP, 2022a).

FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption Score and Household Hunger Scale

Based on the Food Consumption Score (FCS), a proxy measure for diet adequacy, the quality and diversity of diets of both Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees has deteriorated in the past year. Based on mVAM data, the percentage of Lebanese residents' households unable to meet an adequate diet rose from 33 to 49 percent between December 2021 and August 2022, while the number of Syrian refugees rose from 46 to 57 percent between June 2021 and June 2022 (VASyR, 2022).

In August 2022, 51 percent of Lebanese resident households had an acceptable food consumption, 31 percent borderline and 18 percent poor. The highest diet inadequacy rates were recorded in El Hermel and Akkar districts. These districts also had the highest proportion of poor food consumption reaching 32 and 27 percent respectively (mVAM 2022). Among Syrian refugees, 18 percent had poor food consumption and 39 percent borderline. In El Minieh-Dennie and Marjaayoun districts the proportion of Syrian refugees with poor food consumption reached 30 percent (VASyR 2022).

Coping Strategies

When households do not have enough food or lack resources to buy food or to access other essential needs, they adopt strategies and behaviours to manage food shortages. Food coping strategies imply changes in food consumption patterns as relying on less expensive foods or reducing number of meals or portion sizes.

Around 87 percent of Lebanese households and 96 percent of Syrian refuges, reported to have used food based coping strategies. Among them, 57 percent of Lebanese residents and 44 percent of Syrian refugees had a Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI)[16], above the value of 18 indicating severe food access constraints. Lebanese residents at Akkar and El Minieh-Dennie districts have the highest proportion of rCSI above 19 (63 and 57 percent respectively) (mVAM 2022). Among Syrian refugees, Akkar hosted refugees with the highest rates of rCSI over 4 at almost 100 percent, while El Koura and Batroun districts have the highest percentage of refugees with rCSI scores over 19, reaching 90 and 82 percent respectively (VASyR 2022).

Livelihood Coping Strategies

Livelihood strategies are coping behaviours that cause changes in income earning activities or involve responses to food insecurity as asset sales that affect household resilience. Livelihood coping strategies are categorized as stress, crisis, or emergency strategies. While stress strategies indicate a reduced ability to deal with future shocks, crisis and emergency coping strategies reduce future productivity hindering resilience.

A national level, 9 percent of Lebanese households adopted emergency livelihood coping strategies and 68 percent adopted crisis strategies. El Hermel and El Minieh-Dennie districts registered the highest proportion of Lebanese households adopting emergency level livelihood coping strategies, reaching 16 percent (mVAM 2022).

As for Syrian refugees, 98 percent of households used livelihoods coping strategies. Some 56 percent implemented crisis strategies and 13 percent severe emergency strategies. Syrian refugees in Beqaa had the highest prevalence of crisis coping strategies at 73 percent, followed by 65 percent in South Lebanon and 61 percent in Beirut (VASyR 2022). According to the MSNA, covering Lebanese residents in 8 districts, on average 29 percent of households have high rCSI (Phase 3 or higher).[17] Around, 28 percent of Lebanese residents used Crisis coping strategies while 11 percent used Emergency coping strategies.

Household Hunger Scale

The Household Hunger Scale (HHS) is a measure that assesses if households have experienced severe food insecurity conditions in the preceding 30 days by measuring the severity of food insecurity, as reported by the households themselves. In addition to the FCS, rCSI and LCS, the HHS has been used for the classification of acute food insecurity of Lebanese residents of eight districts: Akkar, Beirut, El Koura, El Minieh-Dennie, Rachaya, Tripoli, Zahle and Zgharta. The HHS indicated an average of 14 percent of resident households suffering from moderate hunger, 1 with severe hunger and 0 percent with very severe hunger. With 31 percent of households reporting moderate and severe hunger Tripoli was the district with the highest prevalence of households reporting hunger episodes, followed by Akkar (24 percent) and Zgharta (19 percent) (MSNA 2022).

[16] The rCSI help understanding in a combined score both the frequency and the severity of the coping strategies used by the household. The rCSI uses a standard set of five coping behaviors and allows for comparison across different contexts. The rCSI can be used in a continuous form (as a scale or index) or as a categorical indicator (for estimating prevalence).

[17] Districts: El minieh-dennie, Akkar, Tripoli, Zahle, Rachaya, Zgharta, Beirut and El koura.

FOCUS ON HUMANITARIAN FOOD AND BASIC ASSISTANCE

In Lebanon, there are two multi-sector emergency response frameworks for the coordination of humanitarian and social assistance to Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees: the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and the Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The LCRP focuses on addressing the impact of the Syria crisis in Lebanon and targets Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese residents impacted by the influx of Syrian refugees. The ERP is an 18-month plan that started in August 2021 and addresses the needs of the most vulnerable among Lebanese residents, migrants, and Palestine refugees complementing the LCRP (ERP, 2022).

Within these response frameworks, in the third quarter of 2022, the Food Security and Agriculture Sector (FSAS), reached over 1.45 million Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees through cash-based food assistance and reached 0.38 million Lebanese residents through in-kind food assistance (FSC, 2022). In addition, the Basic Assistance Sector reached, under the LCRP, over 255,000 Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents' households with regular cash assistance for basic needs other than food (BA Sector, 2022). The Government of Lebanon also provided unconditional cash assistance through AMAN, a national social protection programme funded through a loan from the World Bank and supported by WFP, reaching 0.37 million extremely poor Lebanese in October 2022.

Lebanese residents receive assistance mainly through three large scale social assistance programs: The National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) implemented by WFP together with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, DAEM also supported by WFP, and WFP's Emergency Response (ER). In addition, FSAS partners also provide humanitarian food assistance through various programs. The National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) and AMAN assisted households with USD 20 for food assistance per person up to a maximum of six members and USD 25 per family for other essential needs per month. WFP provides an average of 1,900 Kcal food intake per person per day in kind food parcels.

Syrian refugees receive cash-based transfers to meet their food and other essential needs mainly through different modalities, including either restricted food vouchers or unrestricted cash for food and non-food needs. As of the third quarter of 2022, Syrian refugees received LBP 500,000 per person up to a maximum of six members for food and LBP 1 million per household per month for other essential needs. However, not all Syrian refugee households received the full assistance package covering both food and non-food needs.

Despite high levels of assistance, the deterioration of purchasing power, inflation, unfavorable exchange rate and high food prices are reducing the ability of humanitarian food assistance to mitigate food consumption gaps.

PROJECTED SITUATION OVERVIEW (January- April 2023)

Currency depreciation	Inflation	Social assistance	Recovery plans
The new official rate of LBP/USD 15,000 and a major increase in the monetary base along with uncertainties on the political situation and extension of Circular 161 were expected to continue fuelling currency depreciation. **The exchange rate was assumed to reach LBPs 50,000 in February 2023.**	Inflation was expected to further limit access to food and other basic needs. It has been assumed that the **CPI would rise by 50 percent by April 2023 and that the SMEB would reach LBPs 12 million in March 2023.**	The coverage of assistance was expected **to decline up to 20 percent impacting the most Syrian refugees. The level of assistance to Lebanese residents was expected to remain on current levels,** however impacted by increasing inflation.	It has been assumed no further progress would be made in the implementation of the structural and financial reforms required under the IMF Staff Level Agreement to access financial aid.

Increasing inflation and additional currency depreciation expected to further impact access to food and other basic needs

During the projection period, the economic situation is anticipated to further deteriorate. The Lebanese Lira is expected to continue depreciating, while increasing inflation will limit even more access to food and other basic needs. The further increase in prices will likely be driven by rising international prices, an increasing monetary base, and further depreciation of the LBP.

The Ministry of Finance announced that the Government planned a devaluation of the LBP by raising the official rate to LBP/USD 15,000 starting in February 2023. In addition, the Central Bank lifted all remaining subsidies on fuel and ceased providing the needed USD for the imports of fuel at the Sayrafa rate ($1= 30800 LL). Between August and October 2022, there has also been a significant increase in the monetary base, as the Central Bank injected over LBP 32 trillion into the economy. As of the end of October 2022, the M1 Supply that includes all local currency in circulation in addition to demand deposits reached LBP 80 trillion rising by 55 percent with respect to August 2022 (WFP 2022b).

These latest measures along with uncertainties over the presidential election, the formation of a new government and doubts over a possible extension of Circular 161[18] were likely to continue fueling currency depreciation between January and April 2023. It has indeed been assumed that in April 2023, the parallel market rate would break the barrier of LBPs/USD 50,000 and that the Food Price Index would rise by around 50 percent during the same period. Similarly, the SMEB would reach LBP 12 million (USD 240 at the USD/LBP 50,000 rate) rising by 20 percent in comparison to September 2022.

Uncertainty in Lebanon's governance structure likely to further delay the implementation of reforms

As Lebanon is facing the harsh consequences of the economic crisis, the country is also confronted with uncertainty in its governance structure. The reform package required by the IMF staff level agreement requires the approval of several laws by the parliament. However, the parliament, according to the constitution, can no longer legislate until the election of a new president. The progress on the financial reforms under the IMF Staff Level Agreement remained limited according to an IMF mission that took place in September 2022 (IMF, 2022). Reform actions include the Capital Controls and Deposit Withdrawal Limits and Banking Secrecy Laws. The agreement with the IMF could allow Lebanon to access up to USD 3 billion in financial aid.

An expected reduction in the level of assistance in January 2023 will impact Syrian refugees the most

The level of humanitarian assistance is expected to decline in January 2023 impacting mostly Syrian refugees. Cash assistance to Lebanese residents is expected to remain at the current levels, however the purchasing power of assistance will likely be impacted by increasing inflation. As for Syrian refugees, between January and March 2023, the level of food and basic needs assistance may be reduced up to 20 percent due to shrinking aid budgets.

Increasing international food prices will continue to threaten Lebanon food supply

A negative outlook over global wheat production and the eruption of the war in Ukraine pushed the FAO Cereal Price Index to reach an all-time high in May 2022. In September 2022, an updated FAO forecast that set world wheat production to the levels of 2021, and the decision from Russia to re-join the black sea grain initiative that guarantees safe passage to ships carrying grain exports from Ukraine have eased concerns over global food supplies. Prices of wheat have recently dropped to near pre-Ukraine crisis levels. Cereals prices, however, remain higher than in 2011 when they previously reached an all-time high during the food prices crisis (FAO, 2022).

In Lebanon, imports of wheat to produce Lebanese bread continues to be subsidized at the official exchange rate of USD/LBP 1,507.5. This subsidization mechanism is expected to continue until it will be replaced by a new import mechanism financed by a loan of USD 150 million from the World Bank that will de-facto continue the subsidization of bread for the near future. It is expected that the loan will cover wheat requirements up to 10 months at the current price of wheat on the international markets.

[18] *Circular 161 allows holders of LBP bank accounts to withdraw US dollar banknotes up to a maximum of LBP 100 million and had previously helped the LBP to quickly gain value by mitigating the demand for USD.*

RECOMMENDATIONS

Urgent action is required to save lives, reduce food consumption gaps, and protect livelihoods for populations categorized as being in Emergency and Crisis (IPC Phases 4 and 3) by improving access to food through appropriate modalities. Detailed identification of the characteristics of population in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) is important for the prioritization of Lebanese and Syrian households requiring urgent, life-saving actions and to prevent further deterioration of their situation.

Although an exact approximation of the impact of assistance cannot be made through this analysis, it is assumed that some portion of households classified in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) are also vulnerable and are not classified in more severe phases because of the level of assistance delivered. Therefore, it is crucial to monitor the situation and implement activities that help mitigate the potential negative impact on their livelihoods and continue assisting those households to prevent them from moving to higher phases.

Interventions that strengthen Lebanese and Syrian households' economy and resilience are recommended to ensure households remain food and nutrition secure. In addition, provision of assistance to agricultural households has been highlighted as nearly 95 percent of the agricultural households indicated a need for assistance (food, agricultural inputs, etc.) in the 3–6 months post-survey.

In addition, interventions to prevent multiple burden of malnutrition must be scaled up through multi-sectoral approach to improve diets, practices, and services.

Ensure alignment between the transfer value of cash for food and multi-purpose cash assistance with the market-based Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) values ensuring that cash transfers to all populations are regularly updated.

In addition, continued monitoring of risk factors is crucial to ensure the timely and effective identification of impacted population and to implement interventions in line with the situational and contextual developments. Risk factors to be monitored include currency devaluation, prices change of essential commodities and services, political developments, as well as food security status of Lebanese and Syrian households. Moreover, as the risk of rising malnutrition rates has been highlighted, monitoring the nutritional status through national survey is important. This allows timely detection of malnutrition prevalence and adopted feeding practices.

Situation Monitoring and Update

- **Humanitarian and social assistance:** The loss of purchasing power from continued inflation and deterioration of macroeconomic indicators may limit the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, as cash transfer values may not keep up with the changing context.

- **Prices:** Even with food imports the high fuel prices and other supply chain costs may keep the market prices for staples and essential non-food commodities beyond manageable levels.

- **Non-food expenditures:** Winterization and health costs may further increase the stain on households' purchasing power and expenditures in the coming months.

Risk factors to monitor

- Currency depreciation and exchange rates
- Inflation and commodity prices
- Change in nutritional status or increased morbidity, especially in areas with high acute food insecurity

PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

The IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis was conducted for two time periods. The analysis covered all 26 districts of the country. Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees have been analyzed separately at the district level. Given that this marks the first IPC analysis for Lebanon, a one-week training was provided by IPC Global Support Unit (GSU) experts between 5 and 9 September, and the analysis was conducted between 10 and 16 September 2022.

Both the training and analysis were held in Beirut, Lebanon with in-person modality. The workshop was attended by 55 experts including Technical Working Group members and analysts UN organizations, international NGOs, technical agencies, and governmental institutions. The data used in the analysis was organized according to the IPC analytical framework and entails food insecurity contributing factors, outcome indicators, and multiple secondary sources.

The main sources of data used for the analysis included: 1) mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) conducted by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) with data from June and August 2022; 2) The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) conducted jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and WFP including data from 2018 till July 2022; and 3) Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) by REACH/UNOCHA from including data from July to August 2022.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provided data on the effect of the Ukraine crisis on agri-food trade, Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) seasonal production 2022 calendar, price indices Jan 2021-Aug 2022, and food systems profile May 2022. Also, data from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) seasonal 2022 calendar and FAO and MoA's joint agricultural household survey data from July to Aug 2022 were included in addition to data on climate change, agriculture and livelihoods report as joint effort between WFP and American University of Beirut (AUB).

Assessing the levels and the broader mitigating effect of Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) is a key component of an IPC analysis, as IPC is a snapshot analysis and integrates all aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the current and projected situation. The IPC protocols are not designed (nor should they be used) to assess or evaluate the impact of any humanitarian food assistance on food insecurity, or to monitor achievements towards program level goals.

HFA that can be considered for an IPC analysis includes direct resource transfers that aim to reduce food gaps, protect, and save lives and livelihoods. Only transfers that have an immediate positive effect on access to food were considered in the analysis. Humanitarian food assistance may include different modalities, such as transfers of food, cash, livestock and other productive tools if they immediately improve households' access to food during the analysis period. For projections, only humanitarian food assistance that has been planned and is either already funded or likely to be funded and is likely to be delivered should be considered.

What is the IPC and IPC Acute Food Insecurity?

The IPC is a set of tools and procedures to classify the severity and characteristics of acute food and nutrition crises as well as chronic food insecurity based on international standards. The IPC consists of four mutually reinforcing functions, each with a set of specific protocols (tools and procedures). The core IPC parameters include consensus building, convergence of evidence, accountability, transparency and comparability. The IPC analysis aims at informing emergency response as well as medium and long-term food security policy and programming.

For the IPC, Acute Food Insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity found in a specified area at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration. It is highly susceptible to change and can occur and manifest in a population within a short amount of time, as a result of sudden changes or shocks that negatively impact on the determinants of food insecurity.

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Classification of food insecurity and malnutrition was conducted using the IPC protocols, which are developed and implemented worldwide by the IPC Global Partnership - Action Against Hunger, CARE, CILSS, EC-JRC , FAO, FEWSNET, Global Food Security Cluster, Global Nutrition Cluster, IGAD, Oxfam, PROGRESAN-SICA, SADC, Save the Children, UNICEF and WFP.

IPC Analysis Partners:

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