HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW

July 2024

CRISISINSIGHT

acaps

INTRODUCTION

ACAPS' Humanitarian Access Overview provides a snapshot of the most challenging contexts for humanitarian access globally in the past six months.

In the Global Humanitarian Access Index, ACAPS analysts considered nine variables to rank and compare humanitarian access levels worldwide. Data was gathered per specific crisis at the national, subnational, or regional levels. Information was then aggregated at the country level, and a country score was provided as an indication of the humanitarian access situation. Between December 2023 and June 2024, crisis-affected populations in 36 countries experienced high to extreme access constraints that made it difficult for them to meet their basic needs.

By June 2024, ACAPS was monitoring humanitarian crises in 93 countries around the world. Access scores show a **deterioration in 18% of the crisis-affected countries (17 countries)** and an improvement in 17% (16 countries), while the humanitarian access situation remained stable for 65% (60 countries). This stability, however, mostly indicates the persistence of severe access constraints, with 43% of the crisis-affected countries where humanitarian access remained stable scoring between high to extreme access levels (3–5).

Somalia and Nigeria saw a score increase from 4 to 5, recording extreme access constraints from December 2023 to June 2024. This deterioration is mainly attributed to a worsening of physical and security constraints for affected populations and humanitarian workers. These constraints include curfews, armed hostilities, and the imposition of military escorts for aid delivery in some conflict-affected areas.

Extreme constraints persist in Burkina Faso, Myanmar, Palestine, and Sudan given escalating conflict amid growing bureaucratic and physical restrictions for humanitarian responders.

The report highlights a selection of countries where there has been a significant change in access scores since the last global Humanitarian Access Overview issued in January 2024. These include **Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, and Zimbabwe**.

The report also **highlights major issues affecting humanitarian access** in a selection of countries. Insecurity linked to armed conflicts is the most common driver among the major concerns highlighted. In countries experiencing protracted crises like DRC, Haiti, Palestine and Sudan, the report examines how the disruption of humanitarian activities because of heightened armed hostilities has worsened the already challenging humanitarian access situation. The report also highlights countries like Kenya or Lebanon; specific areas of these countries are experiencing increasingly severe humanitarian access constraints because of increased insecurity.

Interference in humanitarian activities also appears to be a major concern in several crises such as in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Sudan, where through very different processes, humanitarian access, both for affected people and for humanitarian staff is challenging.

An underlying trend in countries like Greece, Egypt and Tunisia with refugee crises / mixed migration crises is the multiplication of administrative barriers, leading to a lack of access to services for refugees and migrants.

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HOW ARE ACCESS LEVELS CALCULATED?

ACAPS' methodology groups nine indicators under three dimensions:

PILLAR 1	Access of people in need to humanitarian aid	GO TO PILLAR 1

- Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
- Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

PILLAR 2	Access of humanitarian responders to people in need	GO TO PILLAR 2

- Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
- Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
- Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities
- Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

PILLAR 3	Physical, environmental and security constraints	GO TO PILLAR 3

- Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
- Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
- Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

For definitions and examples of the indicators used, along with details about the data model behind the methodology, please see here.

The scoring model rates indicators on a scale of 0–3 and then combines them in pillars, where they get a final score on a scale of 0–5. The overall access score by country is ranked according to the following scale:

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints

Read more about our methodology

INTRODUCTION

WHAT ARE OUR SOURCES?

ACAPS Humanitarian Access methodology uses qualitative and quantitative information sources. It collates these sources in a structured way in the Humanitarian Access Index to quantify the level of humanitarian access in a number of contexts. ACAPS analysts collect information from a range of credible and publicly available sources, including UN agencies, governments, international and local NGOs, international and local media, and humanitarians working in the countries and areas analysed.

SOME OF THE MOST RELIED-UPON SOURCES AND DATASETS ARE:

- Aid Worker Security Database by Humanitarian Outcomes
- Aid in Danger project by Insecurity Insight
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
- OCHA's Humanitarian Needs Overviews, Situation Reports, Humanitarian Snapshots, and Access severity mapping
- Landmine Monitor reports.

Read more about our methodology.

LIMITATIONS

ACAPS' Humanitarian Access Overview faces the same limitations as all secondary data reviews. Information might not be available without physical presence in the countries analysed, and information by third parties might come with a certain degree of delay, especially in very volatile contexts. When possible, analysts cross-check available information with humanitarians working in countries of operation.

ACAPS most often assesses contexts in the Humanitarian Access Overview at the country level, meaning some indicators might represent a sum of the crises present in a country. A more detailed granularity is available in the published dataset.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TRENDS

SCORE CHANGES SINCE THE JUNE–NOVEMBER 2023 PERIOD

This overview compares the overall level of humanitarian access between the last Global Humanitarian Access Index published in December 2023 (covering June–November 2023) and this latest ACAPS assessment (covering December 2023 to June 2024) published in July 2024. The trends are reported for all countries (with scores of 0–5). The reporting period of the trends and narratives corresponds to when the data was gathered for the index.

SCORE INCREASE
Humanitarian access has deteriorated

ANGOLA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BRAZIL
GUATEMALA
LEBANON
MONGOLIA
NIGERIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PHILIPPINES
SENEGAL
SOMALIA
SRI LANKA
UGANDA
TOGO
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

SCORE DECREASE
Humanitarian access has improved

ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
BELARUS
EL SALVADOR
ERITREA
ESWATINI
ETHIOPIA
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
MEXICO
MOZAMBIQUE
NICARAGUA
ROMANIA
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TÜRKIYE

SCORE STABLE
Humanitarian access remained the same

AFGHANISTAN
ALGERIA
BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
CONGO
COSTA RICA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)
DJIBOUTI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
ESTONIA
GREECE
HAITI
INDONESIA
IRAN
IRAQ
ITALY
JORDAN
KENYA
LATVIA
LIBYA
LITHUANIA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
MOLDOVA
MOROCCO
MYANMAR
NAMIBIA
NEPAL
NIGER
PAKISTAN
PALESTINE
PANAMA
PERU
POLAND
RUSSIA
RWANDA
SLOVAKIA
SOUTH SUDAN
SPAIN
SUDAN
SYRIA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TIMOR LESTE
TUNISIA
UKRAINE
VENEZUELA
YEMEN

CRISISINSIGHT
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SCORE MAP
JULY 2024

Global access ranking

- ● Extreme access constraints
- ● Very high access constraints
- ● High access constraints
- ● Moderate access constraints
- ● Low access constraints
- ● No significant access constraints

Date created: 19/07/2024

Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

This map illustrates the global ranking of the scores in the first pillar 'access of people in need to humanitarian aid'.

PILLAR 1 PILLAR 2 PILLAR 3

- Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance.
- Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance.

Ranking

- ● Extreme access constraints
- ● Very high access constraints
- ● High access constraints
- ○ Moderate access constraints
- ○ Low access constraints
- ○ No significant access constraints

Date created: 19/07/2024

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

This map illustrates the global ranking of the scores in the second pillar 'access of humanitarian responders to people in need'

PILLAR 1   **PILLAR 2**   PILLAR 3

- Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative).
- Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions).
- Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities.
- Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets.

Ranking

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints

Date created: 19/07/2024

Physical, environmental and security constraints

This map illustrates the global ranking of the scores in the third pillar 'physical, environmental, and security constraints'.

PILLAR 1   PILLAR 2   **PILLAR 3**

- Ongoing insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance.
- Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXOs).
- Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.).

Ranking

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints

Date created: 19/07/2024

ACCESS INDICATORS

Country	Afghanistan	Algeria	Angola	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bangladesh	Belarus	Benin	Brazil	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon	CAR	Chad	Chile	Colombia	Congo	Costa Rica	Czech Republic	Djibouti	Dominican Republic	DPRK	DRC	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Eritrea	Estonia	Eswatini	Ethiopia	Greece	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Hungary	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Italy	Jordan
Overall humanitarian access ranking	4	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	1	0	5	2	4	4	3	2	3	1	0	0	1	0	3	4	2	2	2	2	0	1	4	2	2	3	2	0	3	3	3	2	1
Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance	2	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0
Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance	2	1	1	0	1	2	2	1	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	2	3	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2
Impediments to enter the country	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	2	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Restriction of movement within the country	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	3	2	3	3	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	2	0	2	0	0	3	1	1	3	1	0	2	0	2	1	0
Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities	3	2	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	3	1	3	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	3	0	2	0	1	0	0
Presence of landmines, IEDs, ERW, and UXO	3	1	3	1	2	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	2
Physical constraints in the environment	3	1	3	0	0	3		3	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	1	0	2	0	3	3	3	2	2	2	0	0	3	0	3	3	3	0	2	2	1	1	0

Kenya	Latvia	Lebanon	Libya	Lithuania	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia	Mali	Mauritania	Mexico	Moldova	Mongolia	Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nepal	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Pakistan	Palestine	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia	Rwanda	Senegal	Slovakia	Somalia	South Sudan	Spain	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand	Timor Leste	Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Türkiye	Uganda	Ukraine	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe
3	0	3	4	0	2	2	2	4	1	3	0	1	2	3	5	1	1	1	3	5	4	5	2	2	3	2	0	0	3	1	1	0	5	4	0	1	5	4	2	2	0	2	1	2	2	3	5	3	4	2	3
3	0	3	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	2	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	2	0	2
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0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	3	3	1	3	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	0
3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	1	3	1	0	2
0	0	3	1	0	3	3	0	3	0	3	0	2	3	3	2	1	3	0	3	3	3	1	3	3	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	0	3	3	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	1	0	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	3

NIGERIA

Score: 5

Nigeria experiences worsening restrictions to humanitarian access, with the country's score increasing from 4 to 5. In March, food diversion allegations led to a one-week suspension of food distribution in Maiduguri, Borno state (RNI 13/03/2024). IDP camp closures by the Government also continue in the state, causing the return of IDPs to areas where the population faces limited freedom of movement and access to basic services. Some relocation sites are in regions where insecurity prevents access for humanitarian responders (Protection Cluster 30/04/2024; TNH 13/06/2024). Insecurity incidents in North Central and North East Nigeria have also led the Government to impose curfews preventing people's movement (BBC 24/01/2024; VOA 01/07/2024). In North East Nigeria, armed attacks, including banditry, kidnappings, and increased use of IEDs along main supply routes, severely hinder aid organisations from reaching certain areas (WFP 26/06/2023).

Access to affected populations remains severely limited across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. Non-state armed group (NSAG) attacks are the primary security threat, confining humanitarian assistance to military-secured garrison towns in many affected regions and requiring armed escorts for some organisations. The reliance on military security impedes access to communities in remote areas and undermines the perception of humanitarian responders as neutral in the conflict (Humanitarian Action 22/01/2024; OCHA 26/03/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT NIGERIA

SOMALIA

Score: 5

In Somalia, the humanitarian access situation has worsened, with the score rising from 4 to 5. Some affected groups, such as IDPs, often face exclusion or the denial of assistance. Cultural norms and discriminatory practices, particularly in Kismayo city, contribute to excluding these IDPs and minorities from receiving necessary aid (Humanitarian Action 23/01/2024; Protection Cluster 25/01/2024; BTI accessed 02/07/2024).

NSAG and government interference in humanitarian activities, as well as bureaucratic impediments for humanitarian responders, remain significant (OCHA 31/03/2024). The response encounters challenges with commercial air services, including extended waiting times for clearing humanitarian cargo and tax-related issues. At the Mogadishu airport and seaport, significant cargo clearance delays result from importation quality assurance procedures (Logistics Cluster 22/03/2024; OCHA 31/03/2024).

Insecurity remains a significant challenge for humanitarians and civilians, particularly affecting road access in central and southern Somalia (Logistics Cluster 22/03/2024). Al-Shabaab is exploiting the withdrawal of troops from the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the African Union's multidimensional military, police, and civilian mission, by making advances and notably increasing attacks in Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and Southwest states (IRC 29/04/2024; ACLED 26/04/2024).

The drawdown of ATMIS forces has hindered the movement of humanitarian staff, particularly in insecure areas such as Kismayo (OCHA 31/03/2024). Overall, military operations and hostilities continue to impede humanitarian movement in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states (Humanitarian Action 23/01/2024; OCHA 31/03/2024, 01/01/2024, and 30/01/2024).

Flooding from the onset of the Gu rainy season (March–May) severely damaged roads and bridges, significantly limiting access to airstrips and transportation routes in flood-affected regions. The most affected areas are Hirshabelle, Jubaland, and Southwest states (OCHA 19/05/2024; OCHA accessed 27/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

Score: 4

The humanitarian access situation has improved compared to the previous reporting period, mainly as aid diversion has not been reported since the resumption of food aid distribution in November 2023. On the other hand, access constraints related to conflict and insecurity have continued.

The conflict in Amhara region between the Federal Government and Fano militia has continued, with the state of emergency (SoE) in Amhara extended until June. Under the SoE, frequent road closures resulted in access impediments (ACLED 10/04/2024). These closures restricted humanitarians from accessing crisis-affected people and impeded the movement of people to access humanitarian assistance. Conflict-related insecurity, fuel shortages, and poor internet connection limited humanitarian movements and the distribution of supplies (FEWS NET 03/2024; Ethiopian Reporter 28/02/2024). Insecurity and clashes, including three incidents in Amhara, also killed seven humanitarians across Ethiopia during the reporting period (WFP 31/05/2024). As the conflict continues in Amhara, even with the expiration of the SoE, access impediments will likely remain.

In Tigray, both people in need and humanitarian responders continue to face access restrictions, largely in areas under the control of Amhara forces and where the presence of Eritrean forces is reported. The forced displacement of ethnic Tigrayans continues to occur; between December 2023 and February 2024, over 7,800 people were displaced in Tigray's North Western, Southern, and Western zones (which are under the control of Amhara forces), particularly from May Tsebri and Tselemti to Endabaguna, Maekel Adiyabo, and Tahtay Adiyabo woredas in North Western zone (VOA 14/02/2024; Shelter Cluster/IOM 27/02/2024). In the same period, over 4,400 people were displaced from areas under the control of Eritrean forces in Central, Eastern, and North Western zones along the border kebeles between Ethiopia and Eritrea (EHRC 19/02/2024; VOA 14/02/2024; IACS X 09/03/2024). Security-related challenges highly restrict access for humanitarians to these areas.

The volatile situation in western Oromia continues to cause security-related access impediments, affecting people's ability to access basic services and humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 12/06/2024; OCHA 31/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT EHIOPIA

BANGLADESH

Score: 3

In Bangladesh, the access score rose from 3 to 4. This indicates a deterioration in humanitarian access mainly resulting from climate hazards during the pre-monsoon (March – May) and monsoon seasons (June – October).

In late May, Cyclone Remal caused heavy rains and floods in at least 19 of the country's 64 districts, mainly in coastal areas (UNICEF 02/06/2024). Floodwaters cut off some villages and turned them into islands, with many affected people only accessible by boat. The cyclone also uprooted trees, blocking roads. These transportation issues hindered humanitarian assessments and the delivery of assistance (UN RC Bangladesh 29/05/2024; STC 30/05/2024).

Cyclone Remal also caused power outages and communication disruptions, hampering humanitarian coordination efforts (UN RC Bangladesh 29/05/2024; STChildren 30/05/2024). In June, monsoon rains damaged shelter and critical infrastructure, including WASH and health facilities, in the Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar (RRR 19/06/2024 a). The heavy rainfall proper damage assessments in these camps (RRR 24/06/2024 b).

IIncreased NSAG control is also contributing to the deterioration of humanitarian access in the Rohingya camps. Since 2021, armed groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army have been imposing significant control in the camps, especially at night. They have been taxing NGO volunteers, threatening women to stop working with NGOs or seeking healthcare, and conducting patrols (NYT 30/03/2024; IISS 11/12/2023; Prothom Alo 29/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT BANGLADESH

MOZAMBIQUE

Score: 3

The access score for Mozambique has improved, decreasing from 4 to 3. This period saw no reports of the denial of assistance to specific groups, unlike in the previous analysis, when government forces in eastern Macomia restricted access in insurgent-held areas. It is important to note, however, that this is likely the result of an information gap rather than a genuine improvement in access (INSO accessed 10/07/2024).

Conflict-related access constraints are still a major issue in northern Mozambique. These constraints have led to travel restrictions, forced displacement, and violence, limiting the movement of people to safety (OCHA 31/05/2024 and 09/04/2024). Service access requires IDPs to have proper documentation (Protection Cluster 10/04/2024; USAID 23/01/2024; UNHCR 30/05/2024). Security concerns also prompted curfews in Mueda and Palma districts on 12 and 28 January, respectively, limiting movement (OCHA 09/04/2024).

NGOs continue to face access challenges, especially with a complex registration process and visa application for international staff. NSAGs have also attacked these organisations and their premises. On 5 January 2024, an attack in Chibanga village, Mocimboa da Praia town, Cabo Delgado province, killed an INGO worker and injured another (AWSD accessed 19/06/2024; INSO 01/2024). Insecurity has led authorities to impose additional requirements (e.g. military escorts) delaying aid delivery in conflict-affected areas (OCHA 02/05/2024). In January, NSAG presence led to humanitarian staff relocations, suspending aid activities in Mecufi, Metuge, and Quissanga (OCHA 09/04/2024). In March, owing to unstable security conditions and the heightened presence of NSAGs, humanitarian staff temporarily relocated from Ibo to Pemba (OCHA 06/05/2024).

Physical constraints, such as rain, have further hindered access. In January, damage to already poor infrastructure and the shutdown of primary supply routes forced humanitarians to use longer alternative paths, such as the Sunate-Montepuez-Mueda route.

READ MORE ABOUT MOZAMBIQUE

ZIMBABWE

Score: 3

Humanitarian access in Zimbabwe is deteriorating, with the access score increasing from 2 to 3. The rainy season from November 2023 to February 2024 brought heavy rains and floods (FEWS NET accessed 30/06/2024; ACAPS accessed 11/07/2024). These damaged critical infrastructure, such as roads and bridges; in December 2023, heavy rains and flooding swept away the Sesame Bridge connecting Nemangwe, Nembudziya, and Sasami areas in Gokwe district, Midlands province. Until January 2024, repairs of the Sesame Bridge had not started, blocking people's access to services in Gokwe South (ZS 30/12/2023; AllAfrica 15/01/2024; NewsdzeZimbabwe 23/01/2024).

Logistical challenges, such as fuel price fluctuations, compounded by global events like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, make transporting aid supplies more expensive and difficult for humanitarian organisations. The situation highlights the delicate balance between economic challenges and humanitarian needs (iHarare 05/03/2024; OCHA 09/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT ZIMBABWE

AZERBAIJAN

Score: 2

In the past six months, the humanitarian access constraints in Nagorno-Karabakh have changed from severe to moderate, with the score dropping from 4 to 2. Until September 2023, an ethnic Armenian population predominantly inhabited Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan and controlled by a de facto self-governing administration. On 16 September, Azerbaijan took over the region in a one-day military operation, forcing over 100,000 of the region's 120,000 people to flee to Armenia (AJ 16/04/2024; Reuters 15/04/2024; CFR 20/03/2024; ORF 29/03/2024). No returns have since been reported despite calls from international organisations for Azerbaijan to guarantee people's right to return (HRW 05/10/2023; IIP 03/01/2024). Some of the displaced fear conflict re-escalation, preventing their return to the region.

The refugees in Armenia have received both state and international assistance, but the high numbers have stretched the Government's financial resources. This, coupled with limited job opportunities, challenges assistance provision and refugees' economic integration in Armenia (ICG 04/03/2024; BBC 24/04/2024).

With Azerbaijan taking over the region, its siege on Nagorno-Karabakh has ceased to exist. With most of the population fleeing to Armenia, access issues to the besieged population, such as the denial of entitlement to assistance, have also become inapplicable (ICG 04/03/2024; UNHCR 31/05/2024). These explain the improvement of the score in ACAPS' Global Humanitarian Access Index.

Despite this, the operational space across Azerbaijan remains challenging. Complex and arbitrary procedures for registering grant agreements and reported violations by the Government to freedom of association pose a significant barrier for both local and international NGOs (ICNL accessed 12/06/2024; Freedom House accessed 12/06/2024; HRHF 25/03/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT AZERBAIJAN

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Score: 2

Papua New Guinea's humanitarian access situation has deteriorated, with the score changing from 1 to 2. The confluence of climate hazards, including a landslide in Enga province, and violence has increased humanitarian access constraints in Highlands region.

On 24 May, a major landslide in Yambali village of Enga province damaged road infrastructure. This blocked off the main highway road and cut road connections to the village, impeding the transportation of fuel and food supplies from Wabag, the capital of Enga province, to landslide-affected areas. The landslide also made the terrain unstable, increasing the risk of more landslides. These transportation constraints and unstable terrain hindered the humanitarian assessments and response (IFRC 01/06/2024; UNICEF 14/06/2024).

Armed clashes also worsened between ethnic tribes in the same province. As a result, the national army had to escort humanitarian staff responding to the landslide to ensure the latter's safety (ECHO 26/05/2024; IFRC 01/06/2024). In January 2024, tribal violence-related burning damaged at least one primary school, one community health centre, and many houses in Western Highlands province (ACLED accessed 16/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PALESTINE →
Attacks against humanitarian staff, movement restrictions, and forced displacement

Score: 5

The recent Israeli military operation in Gaza responding to the October 2023 Hamas attacks has significantly increased the violence targeting humanitarian organisations and their staff, severely hindering the humanitarian response. In the first half of 2024, the violence killed more than 90 aid staff, including 50 from UNRWA. Shooting and aerial bombardments by the Israeli forces killed the vast majority (AWSD accessed 10/07/2024; OCHA 10/07/2024; UNRWA 09/07/2024). Since May 2024, intensified hostilities and evacuation orders in Rafah governorate have forced humanitarian organisations to relocate, with most offices in Rafah becoming non-operational (ETC/WFP 10/06/2024; WHO 10/06/2024; WFP 13/06/2024).

By the end of May, evacuation orders by the Israeli forces had placed 78% of Gaza under evacuation. Over 85% of the population in Gaza has been displaced, many multiple times. The displacement camps in the enclave lack infrastructure and face frequent bombardment (OCHA 03/06/2024; OCHA 15/05/2024).

In the first half of 2024, Israel continued to severely restrict humanitarian and essential supplies entering Gaza. Aid organisations also faced significant obstacles in transporting aid within the area. Attacks on Gaza's civilian police force hampered their ability to maintain public order and safety, increasing the risk of the looting of humanitarian convoys, particularly given the prolonged destruction of civilian infrastructure and aid delivery disruptions (AXIOS 24/02/2024). Israel's operations have destroyed critical infrastructure including warehouses and water wells, resulting in high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) for the vast majority of the population (UNRWA 09/07/2024; OCHA 03/06/2024; IPC 18/03/2024; IPC 21/12/2024).

In the West Bank, particularly in Area C1, East Jerusalem, and H22, Israel imposes severe restrictions through checkpoints and administrative barriers such as delaying the issuance of visas, limiting movement and disrupting aid delivery. In the first half of 2024, Israel refused to issue and renew visas for some humanitarian staff, hindering access. Israeli military raids, and settler violence have also led to Palestinian displacement, especially of Bedouin communities, to areas lacking services (ACU accessed 10/06/2024; Le Monde 15/03/2024; El País 07/03/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT PALESTINE

SUDAN →
Aid delivery obstruction by conflict parties

Score: 5

Insecurity and deliberate humanitarian assistance delivery obstruction by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue to highly restrict humanitarian access in Sudan (IASC 31/05/2024; ICG 11/04/2024). Armed groups and the expanding conflict and violence disregard the safety, security, and protection of humanitarian staff, supplies, and assets (MSF 16/01/2024; OCHA 08/01/2024). In Khartoum state (specifically in several neighbourhoods of Bahri, Khartoum city, and Um Durman) and Al Fasher town in North Darfur, RSF siege tactics restrict the movement of people and essential goods, such as food and medical supplies (UN 02/05/2024; MSF 18/01/2024).

Both the SAF and the RSF have instituted measures and procedures obstructing and delaying aid delivery (OCHA 24/06/2024; IASC 31/05/2024). For the movement of cargo and personnel, humanitarian organisations have to acquire permits from various levels of authority, including both national and state-level, or directly from conflict parties (OCHA 24/06/2024). Humanitarian organisations are grappling with increasing incidences of interference in activities by security authorities and the parties to the conflict (OHCHR 26/06/2024).

The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has revoked the use of the border crossing point in Adré, Chad, which acted as a key humanitarian supply route for the entire Darfur region. As a result, the UN has delivered only 60 trucks of humanitarian supplies through this crossing since the beginning of 2024 (OCHA 05/06/2024). Thousands of displaced and affected civilians, particularly in West Darfur but also in Central, East, and South Darfur, have not received assistance because of such restrictions.

READ MORE ABOUT SUDAN

MYANMAR →
Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities in Rakhine by conflict parties

Score: 5

Extreme access constraints persist in Myanmar. Armed conflict, movement and administrative restrictions, and violence have been severely restricting humanitarian access in the country. Reports on interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities, particularly in Rakhine state, have raised serious concerns.

The last six months saw reports of looting, occupation, and damage to/the destruction of humanitarian facilities by the military junta and possibly other groups involved in the conflict (OCHA 01/07/2024; Insecurity Insight 13/06/2024). In June, the military junta looted and later burnt a UN agency warehouse in Rakhine storing food and other supplies (OCHA 01/07/2024; BNI 28/06/2024). In the same month, a group involved in the conflict occupied, at least temporarily, two humanitarian facilities in a Rohingya IDP camp in Sittwe township and the offices of two international organisations in Maungdaw township (both in Rakhine state) (OCHA 01/07/2024).

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1. Area C comprises around 60% of all West Bank lands, and is under Israeli control, including with respect to land registration, planning and zoning.
2. Eastern part of Hebron City, also known as Al-Kahlil, under direct Israeli control (around 20% of the city).

In 2024, Rakhine state government camp management committees and village administrators interrupted humanitarian activities in some areas and questioned camp-based staff members on their travel authorisations (OCHA 24/05/2024).

Political issues and humanitarian assistance often overlap in Myanmar, and reports suggest that both armed groups and the military junta try to instrumentalise humanitarian aid, sometimes also trying to take control of aid distribution without guaranteeing delivery to the people in need (UN 02/06/2023; TNH 28/06/2023; The Irrawaddy 29/05/2023; BNI 28/06/2024). Generally, the military junta restricts aid delivery to areas held by anti-military groups as part of their' four cuts' strategy. This strategy originally has the objective to cut off opposition forces from accessing food, finances, intelligence, and recruits, but in practice, it also affects civilians (HRW 19/03/2024;TNH 28/07/2021; OHCHR 03/03/2023). In May, the military junta threatened to block international aid supplies for the Rohingya if the latter refused to join military training as part of conscription efforts (RFA 29/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT MYANMAR

AFGHANISTAN →
Taliban interference in the implementation of humanitarian operations

Score: 4

Afghanistan continues to experience humanitarian access restrictions, especially for women, mainly because of the Taliban's continuous ban on women's movement since their takeover of the country in August 2021. This has prevented women from accessing education and employment. The lack of female aid staff able to visit women-headed households or directly speak with women and girls in need without the presence of a man has limited the amount of humanitarian aid they can receive. Although there are exceptions where women get the chance to be employed with NGOs, without sufficient female presence, humanitarian organisations struggle to reach women and children (HRW 06/02/2024; UN 22/01/2024).

Taliban interference in the selection of aid recipients and the prioritisation of aid distribution has also affected the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. Reports indicate attempts by some members of the Taliban to influence this selection, pressuring organisations to prioritise aid for their affiliates. There are reports of the Taliban redirecting humanitarian aid from the UN and INGOs to benefit populations or groups aligned with them, undermining the effectiveness of assistance and preventing it from reaching the targeted beneficiaries. Their interference also extends to influencing staff recruitment and procurement activities, as well as demanding sensitive project and staff information although there are efforts by humanitarian organisations to prevent or reduce this. The Taliban can also delay the signing of necessary memorandums of understanding, obstructing the timely implementation of aid programmes (OCHA 19/05/2024 and 23/04/2024; Freedom House accessed 16/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO →
Conflict-related disruption of humanitarian activities in eastern DRC

Score: 4

Increased attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces and the March 23 Movement (M23) in Ituri and North Kivu provinces primarily restrict humanitarian access in eastern DRC. In North Kivu, fighting has spread to Lubero, Masisi, Nyiragongo, and Rutshuru territories, with more and more areas coming under M23 control.

Hostilities between the NSAGs and the Congolese army and its allies recurringly cause the temporary suspension of humanitarian activities. Since the beginning of 2024, violence against humanitarian staff and roadblocks have disrupted critical supply routes, forcing many national and international NGOs to suspend their operations in conflict-affected areas. These violent incidents have displaced thousands of people, and the suspension of humanitarian activities deprives them of assistance in several sectors, such as protection, WASH, food, and health (ICRC 04/06/2024OCHA 09/04/2024; AJ 29/03/2024).

The increasing presence of conflict parties near IDP sites further hamper the ability of humanitarians to provide aid. This increased presence of these parties heightens the risk of attacks on civilians and humanitarian staff and aggravates their needs, especially for those forced to flee several times (WFP 20/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

MALI

Humanitarian movement restrictions resulting from NSAG-imposed blockades

Score: 4

Movement restrictions remain significant in Mali, especially because of the enforcement of blockades by NSAGs. They restrict humanitarian access by controlling the main routes to affected areas and imposing movement restrictions on commerce and goods transportation, limiting populations' ability to obtain supplies. Since the beginning of 2024, NSAGs have established blockades in several locations in the centre (Bara Sara, Boni, and Markala towns) and north of the country (Diré Ber, Goundam, Gourma-Rharous, and Tombouctou towns), significantly restricting movement into and out of the affected areas. They have also blocked several roads, including the ones connecting Douentza-Gao and Douentza-Tombouctou (RN16). During the reporting period, NSAGs surrounded more towns around the main cities of Gao, Ménaka, and Tombouctou compared to the previous year. In Léré (Tombouctou), which is under blockade by the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Musliminhumanitarian programmes for displaced people are disrupted, and humanitarian staff are unable to travel outside the town (TNH 12/03/2024; STC 01/05/2024; INSO 02/05/2024).

In areas affected by the blockades, such as Gao, fuel shortages because of security concerns along supply routes further hamper operations. The Malian Armed Forces' requirement to secure airfields for each operation in certain areas under blockade also results in the authorisation of fewer flights, leading to the transport of fewer staff and less supply (WFP 28/02/2024 and 11/06/2024; STC 01/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT MALI

SOUTH SUDAN

Bureaucratic barriers and new tax laws impeding humanitarian access

Score: 4

South Sudan continues to experience very high humanitarian access constraints. Between February–May 2024, authorities imposed a series of new taxes and charges at border crossings and within the country. This tax dispute obstructed fuel tankers, holding them up at depots and the Ugandan border. The resulting depletion of fuel supplies led to the suspension of airdrops of food assistance, which affected 60,000 people (UN 29/04/2024; Reuters 24/04/2024). Although the South Sudanese Government already reversed the policy in May, firms contracted by UN agencies will still incur taxes because, according to the Government, they are profit-making entities subject to taxation (VOA 04/05/2024).

In June, the Council of Ministers passed the NGO Act 2016 Amendment Bill 2023, which mandates that NGOs recruit 80% of their staff from South Sudan (Eye Radio 15/06/2024; Radio Tamazuj 16/06/2024). This new requirement may interfere with coordination and programming as organisations restructure, potentially causing delays in interventions in the country.

Humanitarian organisations have faced numerous bureaucratic impediments, including lengthy bureaucratic procedures, unclear registration processes, and additional costs, which have affected the movement of humanitarian staff, especially in Central Equatoria, Unity, and Upper Nile states (OCHA 11/05/2024 and 12/04/2024). The State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in Central Equatoria state has issued an operational licence requiring international and national NGOs to pay a fee to operate (OCHA 06/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT SOUTH SUDAN

SYRIA →

Tensions over territorial control and the overlapping of politics and humanitarian issues

Score: 4

Humanitarian access constraints in Syria remain very high. The Syrian Government controls around 70% of the country, de facto Kurdish authorities control areas in northeastern Syria, and Turkish-backed armed groups control areas of northwestern Syria (EUAA accessed 17/06/2024; CFR 13/02/2024). People without documentation, including those who lost their papers during the 2023 earthquakes, face obstacles in accessing services in government-controlled areas, as the Syrian Government does not recognise documentation issued by opposition groups (TIMEP 14/02/2024; EUAA 15/04/2024; OCHA 03/03/2024). The blockade of shipments and movement between areas under different authorities of control has resulted in the systematic denial of humanitarian assistance to large parts of the country, including IDP camps (UN SC 25/06/2024; AI accessed 11/07/2024; OCHA 04/02/2024).

The Syrian Government also uses the detention and prosecution of NGO staff as punitive measures against those providing humanitarian aid in opposition-controlled areas. Complex registration procedures, insecurity, and the limited choice of local NGOs the INGOs can partner with due to politicisation and administrative limitations are additional obstacles to humanitarian response, especially in government-controlled areas (EC 21/12/2023; EUAA accessed 01/06/2024; COAR 18/04/2024; Crash/iReMMO 12/06/2023).

Since 2011, comprehensive US and EU sanctions on Syria have severely hindered humanitarian access, particularly in government-controlled areas. These sanctions have restricted bank transfers, fuel imports, and the movement of supplies and personnel, creating major challenges for people in need and humanitarian organisations (EC 28/05/2024; UN SC 30/05/2024 and 27/02/2024; OHCHR 22/02/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT SYRIA

HAITI →

Increased violence in Port-au-Prince affecting service delivery and putting humanitarian staff at risk

Score: 3

Since late February 2024, insecurity linked to criminal gang attacks in Port-au-Prince has been the main obstacle to humanitarian access for affected people and humanitarian organisations in Haiti's capital (France 24 10/03/2024). Between January–March 2024, 300 reported incidents restricted access for humanitarian staff in the city, including the temporary closure of the airport and main seaport, limiting the entry of supplies and humanitarian staff. By June 2024, the airport and seaport had reopened (UNICEF 16/03/2024; OCHA 27/03/2024).

This surge in violence has significantly restricted access to services. In June 2024, there were reports of health centres closing or functioning at minimum capacity given a lack of supplies and insecurity in both Port-au-Prince and Artibonite department. (UN 28/06/2024). Nearly 40% of healthcare facilities, including the country's main university hospital, were closed between May–June because of insecurity and looting, mainly by gangs (UN 01/07/2024; Courthouse News Service 12/04/2024).

Gangs controlled around 90% of the Port-au-Prince area by May 2024, further limiting the movement of the population and humanitarian staff. Frequent clashes on the streets expose civilians, including humanitarian workers or volunteers to security risks, killing, injuring, or kidnapping. The latest example is the killing by criminal gangs of three missionaries leaving a church in Port-au-Prince (NYT 25/05/2024; Courthouse News Service 12/04/2024; BBC 22/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT HAITI

INDONESIA →

Restriction/denial of access to humanitarian and human rights organisations in West Papua territory

Score: 3

High humanitarian access constraints persist in Indonesia's West Papua territory (also known as Western New Guinea). During the six-month reporting period, the region continued to face low-intensity conflict between the West Papua National Liberation Army and the Indonesian security forces, resulting in new displacements and damage to or the destruction of public infrastructure. The military also continues to occupy some of these public buildings, including hospitals and schools, limiting people's access to essential services (HRM 12/06/2024).

By 12 June 2024, the number of IDPs in the region was estimated to be nearly 77,000 (HRM 12/06/2024). They urgently need food, WASH, healthcare, and education assistance, with many living in remote areas such as forests. Although some newly displaced people received aid from the West Papua local government during the reporting period, the central Government continued to disregard the dire humanitarian situation of IDPs in the territory, downplaying their need for humanitarian assistance (HRM 12/06/2024; OHCHR 01/03/2022; The Diplomat 03/03/2022; Vanuatu Daily Post 06/04/2024).

The Government, through its armed forces, continues to severely restrict or, at times, deny the access of national and international NGOs, UN agencies, and media to the region and reject UN initiatives to monitor the human rights situation, which results on limited data on protection issues in the country (OHCHR 01/03/2022; HRM 17/04/2024 and 12/06/2024; Vanuatu Daily Post 06/04/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT INDONESIA

KENYA →

Increase bandit and Al-Shabaab attacks in northern Kenya

Score: 3

Humanitarian constraints in Kenya remain high, particularly in the northern counties, where banditry, Al-Shabaab-related insecurity, and intercommunal tensions severely hinder access. Insecurity has led to fatalities, displacement, and limited access to affected areas. From September 2023 to March 2024, violence further increased in Baringo and Samburu counties compared to the April–August 2023 period (ACLED 19/04/2024). The Ministry of Interior and National Administration has initiated an operation against the attacks, resulting in a night curfew that restricts movement in the affected areas (ACLED 19/01/2024; Nation 16/12/2023; Crisis24 29/12/2023). Intercommunal tensions have also increased roadside insecurity in northern Kenya, including Baringo, Samburu, and West Pokot counties. Consequently, some NGOs have temporarily suspended non-essential travel in many locations across northern Kenya and are using alternative routes for travel (INSO 02/2024; Nation 28/02/2024).

Al-Shabaab-related insecurity is predominantly concentrated in the border counties of Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa, limiting movement and targeting infrastructure. Mandera experienced twice the number of political violence incidents involving Al-Shabaab in March 2024 compared to the same month in the previous year. Indiscriminate IED attacks on frequently used roads have also resulted in numerous casualties (ACLED 19/01/2024; Africanews 26/03/2024). Sometimes, the police limit movements in IED-affected areas. In January, the police limited movement and military escorts — which are advised when operating at the Kenya-Somalia border — along the Dadaab-Garissa road in Garissa county in response to multiple threats and reports of IEDs along the route. This restriction severely disrupted NGO activities in the region (INSO 01/2024; ACLED 19/04/2024; VOA 26/03/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT KENYA

LEBANON →
Physical access restrictions as a result of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict escalation

Score: 3

Since the escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and Israeli forces near the southern Lebanese border on 8 October 2023, humanitarian access restrictions have increased. Nearly 60,000 people remain in southern Lebanon, facing challenges in accessing basic services with hostilities limiting movement. Humanitarian organisations report difficulties and unsafe conditions in reaching affected areas (OCHA 23/02/2024).

Restricted movement because of insecurity and the targeting of public services, such as hospitals, is a key constraint. Bombardments have led pharmaceutical companies to halt medical supply deliveries to hospitals in the south. Consequently, hospitals rely on staff to procure supplies from Beirut, Nabatiye, or Sour districts, delaying the provision of health services. The insecurity has also resulted in a shortage of doctors and nurses, with unsafe roads preventing them from reaching their workplaces (AJ 19/05/2024). Some Israeli air strikes have targeted healthcare staff; in March, an air strike killed seven volunteer paramedics (The Guardian 06/05/2024). Other air strikes have targeted vehicles on main roads, further complicating travel. The clashes have damaged infrastructure, including hospitals and schools, and closed at least six primary healthcare facilities in Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil districts, severely limiting healthcare access, especially for those requiring regular medication (OCHA 29/06/2024).

Since the conflict escalation on 8 October 2023, the authorities have established checkpoints in southern Lebanon and near the Blue Line zone, further restricting movement. Some checkpoints are located in insecure areas, which air strikes have targeted, compounding the difficulties facing those who need to travel for services (UN SC 08/03/2024). Syrian refugees, in particular, struggle to evacuate to safer areas, fearing detention or deportation by security forces if found to lack legal documents (UNHCR 11/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT LEBANON

EGYPT →
Bureaucratic restrictions to accessing services for Sudanese refugees

Score: 2

Humanitarian access restrictions are notably affecting Sudanese refugees in Egypt, especially since 10 June 2023, when the Egyptian Government imposed new regulations requiring new visas without exemptions. These regulations have been limiting the ability of Sudanese and other nationalities to seek refuge from Sudan through Egypt's southern border crossings at Argeen and Qustul. The visa requirement is a significant change from previous policies, which exempted women, children under 16, and people over 60 from Sudan seeking asylum in the country. The passport is a requirement to obtain a visa to enter Egypt, but insecurity-related movement restrictions in Sudan make it challenging for refugees to obtain passports and travel documents. The situation at the border between Egypt and Sudan continues to be dire, with refugees (already estimated at the thousands in early 2024) enduring long delays in entry procedures, extreme temperatures, and a severe lack of food, water, and sanitation facilities. Inside Egypt, the process for securing and renewing residence permits is notably complex and often delayed, further restricting Sudanese refugees' access to essential services, including shelter, food, healthcare, and education (UNHCR 09/06/2023 and 29/05/2024; AJ 11/06/2023; Egyptian Streets 12/06/2023; TNH 25/04/2024; Le Monde 16/04/2024).

There are also reports of Egyptian authorities forcibly returning approximately 800 Sudanese refugees between January–April 2024. These pushback and detention strategies have displaced Sudanese refugees from potential aid and services in Egypt, as they were forced to return to unsafe conditions in Sudan (AI 19/06/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT EGYPT

GREECE →

Complex regulatory system against humanitarian organisations working on mixed migration

Score: 2

Local and international NGOs working with people on the move in Greece continue to face a complex regulatory environment and administrative obstacles, which challenge their ability to provide assistance to people in need. These organisations encounter stringent registration criteria that demand exhaustive details, hindering their operations and subjecting them to heightened government scrutiny (ECRE/AIDA accessed 10/07/2024; RSA 24/01/2024).

At the same time, the Government's use of criminal investigations to intimidate NGOs and journalists examining abuses further complicates humanitarian access in the country. The use of litigation against humanitarian staff has led to the termination or scaling back of the operations of several organisations aiding migrants (Freedom House accessed 10/07/2024; Reuters 30/04/2024).
Pushback tactics by the Greek authorities, including coercive boat towing and the abandonment of people on the move at sea, result in asylum seekers being denied access to international protection and asylum procedures, violating the principle of nonrefoulement (MSF 20/02/2024; Oxfam 12/06/2024; RSA 20/02/2024; ECRE 26/01/2024; ECRE/AIDA accessed 12/06/2024).

Many of the people on the move who reach Greece endure prolonged stays in reception facilities with inadequate healthcare and infrastructure, such as an insufficient number of toilets, and many face arbitrary detention in pre-removal centres with limited access to legal counsel and medical aid.

These access constraints are expected to persist or worsen as parties with strong anti-migration stances hold power in Greece and conflicts in countries such as Palestine, Sudan, and Syria drive increased arrivals (MoMA accessed 12/06/2024; ECRE/AIDA accessed 12/06/2024; RSA 31/01/2024; BVMN 24/01/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT GREECE

TUNISIA →

Forced relocation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers away from services

Score: 2

Humanitarian access restrictions in Tunisia have been increasingly affecting migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, particularly in cities like Sfax. These groups have repeatedly faced forced relocation to remote border areas. On 2 May 2024, security forces forcibly relocated at least 400 migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, including women and children, to desert areas near the Algerian border. This expulsion left individuals in isolated and harsh environments with limited access to essential services, including food, water, and shelter (MMC 07/02/2024; The National 07/05/2024; AJ 03/05/2024).

The situation has further deteriorated following government rhetoric inciting violence against Sub-Saharan African migrants. This rhetoric has led to a crackdown on migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, resulting in their forced relocation and the targeting of humanitarian organisations (Cuttitta and Chaouch 10/2023; MCC 07/02/2024). Since 3 May, authorities have targeted leaders, former staff, and members of at least 12 local organisations, accusing them of financial crimes for providing cash assistance to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Staff from a Tunisian organisation collaborating with a UN agency have been arrested and investigated. These government actions have hindered the operations of humanitarian organisations, further limiting people's access to services (AI 16/05/2024; HRW 17/05/2024).

READ MORE ABOUT TUNISIA

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