# Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025

# Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025

For the OECD, this work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.

For ADB, the views expressed in this publication are those of the ADB authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of ADB or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent.

The names and representation of countries and territories used in this joint publication follow the practice of the OECD.

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

ADB and the OECD do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accept no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by ADB or the OECD in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

Specific territorial disclaimers applicable to the OECD:
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Specific territorial disclaimers applicable to the ADB:
ADB recognises "China" as the "People's Republic of China" and "Korea" as the "Republic of Korea".

**Please cite this publication as:**
OECD/ADB (2025), *Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bc89cb32-en.

ISBN 978-92-64-46614-2 (print)
ISBN 978-92-64-31534-1 (PDF)
ISBN 978-92-64-57451-9 (HTML)

**Photo credits:** Cover © joyfull/Shutterstock.com.

Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/support/corrigenda.html.

# *Preface*

Southeast Asia has achieved remarkable development gains over recent decades, with strong economic growth improving livelihoods and expanding access to essential services. Driven by trade liberalisation, infrastructure investments and their young populations, countries in the region have emerged as dynamic engines of global growth. Investments in health, education and public services have advanced wellbeing, and governments in the region demonstrated resilience in responding to recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Sustaining this progress will require further improving the resilience and transparency of public institutions to better support the management of the region's evolving fiscal, social, environmental and technological challenges — from public debt pressures to the digital transition and climate resilience.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are proud to support Southeast Asian countries on this journey through the joint second edition of the Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia report. This report brings together the complementary strengths of the two institutions: the OECD's global expertise in governance standards and best practices, and ADB's deep knowledge and operational experience in strengthening governance and institutional capacity across Asia and the Pacific. It also supports mutual learning within the region and benchmarking against the OECD and its member countries. The opening of OECD accession discussions in 2024 with Indonesia and Thailand – the organisation's first Southeast Asian accession candidates – marks an important milestone in deepening engagement with the region.

Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025 provides insights to help the region's public institutions enhance governance and improve the quality of public service delivery. By offering internationally comparable data on the governance processes and practices used by public institutions in Southeast Asia, the report contributes to a robust evidence base to help inform governments' policy priorities and guide public governance reforms.

With new infrastructure investment needs rising across Southeast Asia, this edition of the report also explores infrastructure governance practices for the first time. The findings underscore the need to upgrade appraisal processes and risk management to ensure long-term value. The 2025 report builds on the 2019 edition and deepens its analysis of digital government issues, highlighting both the progress achieved and the untapped potential of emerging technologies, especially artificial intelligence. Furthermore, the report underscores the importance of empowering citizen engagement, including through open data and participatory governance to improve transparency, accountability and public trust in government.

Together, we are pleased to present this publication as a resource for policymakers, citizens and researchers working to strengthen governance across the region. The OECD and ADB will continue to support developing countries in the region through policy dialogue, capacity development and targeted investments. We are confident the insights provided will contribute to stronger institutions and more effective public policies across Southeast Asia.

Mathias Cormann
OECD Secretary-General



Masato Kanda
ADB President

# *Foreword*

*Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025* is the 2nd edition in this series, following a previous edition in 2019. The report is a joint publication of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

The report provides data describing how a range of governance processes are managed in public institutions in Southeast Asia (SEA). Nine SEA countries are included in the report: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Data are presented for these countries wherever available.

Data in the report have been collected using survey questionnaires answered by government officials in the participating countries. In most cases, the same questionnaires have also been answered by OECD Member countries. This allows for accurate comparisons of governance processes across SEA and OECD countries, helping governments understand their governance systems and processes in comparison to peers in the region and elsewhere. Comparisons to OECD countries are presented throughout the report. Where possible, information is also presented on how practices have evolved since the 1st edition of the report.

The topics included in the report have been selected to help governments find improvements in governance processes in areas that are likely to affect development prospects in coming years. Chapter 1 provides an overview of findings from across the report. Chapter 2 presents the most recent public finance data for SEA countries, allowing a broad understanding of context. Chapter 3 examines budgeting processes, which play a crucial ongoing role in economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and in building a stable macroeconomic environment to support growth. Chapter 4 examines infrastructure governance, which is key in supporting quality public investment in this rapidly growing region. Chapter 5 examines governments' digital practices and capabilities, with a view to supporting them to maximise gains from new and digital technologies. Chapter 6 looks at how public services are managed and provides comparable information on aspects that SEA governments may need to improve.

# *Acknowledgements*

*Government at a Glance Southeast Asia 2025* was prepared by the OECD Directorate for Public Governance, under the leadership of Elsa Pilichowski, Director, and by ADB Public Sector Management and Governance Sector Office, under the leadership of Jose Antonio R. Tan III, Director. The work was overseen and managed by Conor Das-Doyle (OECD) and Irfan Qureshi (ADB) under the direction of Monica Brezzi (OECD), Santiago González (OECD) and Jose Antonio R. Tan III (ADB) and with support from Maria Rowena M. Cham (ADB). Major drafting contributions were provided by Timothy Tennant, Alessandro Lupi, Anne Keller, Andrew Blazey, Brett Carson, Jacob Arturo Rivera Perez, Cecilia Emilsson, Ricardo Zapata, Marco Beltrán Navarro, Albert Rapha, Vania Atika Sari and Tenzin Dekyi (OECD). The report has benefited from valuable comments from Gillian Dorner (OECD), Luis Almeida, Jaehwa Lee, Anjum Israr, Dai Chang Song, Henry Ma and Nyda Mukhtar (all ADB). Julie Harris edited the publication.

This joint publication of the OECD and ADB is the result of contributions from a wide range of sources and expertise. The OECD and ADB would like to acknowledge financial support from the Republic of Korea e-Asia and Knowledge Partnership Fund (EAKPF), provided through the technical assistance (TA) 6952: Policy Advice for COVID-19 Economic Recovery in Southeast Asia Phase 1 (PACER II). The OECD-Korea Policy Centre supported networks of regional officials on digital government (Chapter 5) and public administrative services (Chapter 6), which were instrumental in enabling the development of these chapters.

The authors express their gratitude to country officials from Southeast Asia who replied to surveys and helped during the data validation process. In particular, we thank officials from the agencies that acted as national contact points for their countries, who have provided invaluable assistance in the co-ordination and completion of the report: Prime Minister's Office (Brunei Darussalam), Ministry of Economy and Finance (Cambodia), Ministry of State Apparatus Utilisation and Bureaucratic Reform (Indonesia), Ministry of Interior (Lao People's Democratic Republic), Ministry of Finance (Malaysia), Department of Budget and Management (Philippines), Office of Public Sector Development Commission (Thailand), Prime Minister's Office - Public Service Division (Singapore), and Ministry of Home Affairs (Viet Nam).

# *Table of contents*

# Executive summary

**The 2025 edition of *Government at a Glance Southeast Asia* takes stock of governance practices in public institutions in Southeast Asia (SEA).** It offers a range of data describing how governments in SEA undertake important governance functions and processes. Comparable data are presented on how these functions are managed in OECD countries and, where possible, relative to performance in SEA in the 2019 edition. Nine SEA countries are included: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Data are presented for these countries wherever available.

**SEA countries continue to experience robust economic growth while advancing human development.** After a sharp contraction around the COVID-19 pandemic, all countries returned to growth by 2022. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts regional economic growth of 4.7% in both 2025 and 2026. Eight of nine countries improved their Human Development Index scores between 2013 and 2023, and where available, data indicate that poverty in the region is falling.

**Public finances have largely recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic, but public debt levels are higher.** Where data are available, SEA governments provided support to citizens and businesses during the pandemic, averaging 9.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in extra public spending and foregone revenue (some also provided significant off-budget support to businesses and people). As a result, budget balances deteriorated from -0.9% of GDP in 2019 to -5.2% in 2020, before partially recovering to -2.1% of GDP as of 2023. However, the pandemic has left higher public debt across the region: on average, general government gross debt levels rose from 44% of GDP in 2019 to 58% in 2023.

**Maintaining sound fiscal frameworks will require effective budgetary practices; greater domestic revenue mobilisation could also help.** SEA countries generally have budgetary practices to support a sound fiscal framework. Six of seven have fiscal rules and objectives to support sustainable fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability, and seven of eight use multiannual top-down expenditure ceilings to constrain and focus medium-term expenditure plans. However, governance practices to provide external oversight and accountability for budgetary decisions are less well-developed. Only four of eight SEA countries (50%) have an independent fiscal institution, compared to 76% of OECD Member countries. Improving domestic revenue mobilisation would also support sound fiscal frameworks and provide additional resources to support government priorities. In 2023, general government revenues averaged only 17.8% of GDP across SEA countries, compared to 34% in OECD countries.

**In infrastructure governance, SEA governments generally demonstrate strong capacity in evidence-based decision making and in balancing policy objectives across the infrastructure life cycle.** All four countries with data available have long-term, cross-sectoral infrastructure plans and have adopted procurement practices that promote value for money and market access. Environmental considerations are also well integrated into infrastructure planning. However, only one of four governments in SEA for which data are available conducts independent and impartial reviews of infrastructure projects, compared to 72% of OECD countries, which do so for at least some projects. This points to a broader opportunity to strengthen appraisal processes and better incorporate lifecycle costing and risk analysis to meet development and environmental challenges.

**SEA governments could substantially improve their digital government practices, particularly on artificial intelligence (AI) and open data.** SEA countries score an average of only 0.37 out of 1 in the OECD Digital Government Index – which assesses maturity of digital governance – compared to 0.61 in OECD countries. SEA countries perform best on the "Digital by design" pillar (0.6 out of 1), with most having a National Digital Government Strategy in place, and institutional structures to oversee digital government work. SEA countries performed poorly on average in "Proactiveness" (0.23), that is, anticipating people's and businesses' needs and responding to them promptly. This could be enhanced substantially through the effective use of AI. SEA countries can also make government data more openly available. SEA countries' average score on the OURdata Index, which examines open data maturity, is 0.22 out of 1, compared to 0.48 on average in OECD countries. Only 23% of high-value datasets in SEA are currently easily accessible to the public, compared to an average of 47% in OECD countries. This assessment dataset considers topics of public interest, including the economy, environment, meteorology, government finances, justice, education, health and social welfare

**People are largely satisfied with healthcare, education and justice, yet large room exists to improve public administrative services, including through digital tools.** SEA enjoys high levels of satisfaction with public services, with 87% of people reporting themselves satisfied with healthcare services and 89% with education services. Many objective measures of service delivery, such as the number of doctors and the availability of educational materials, have improved over the past 10-15 years. However, while seven out of eight SEA countries have a strategy to improve public administrative services, only four out of eight countries regularly publish information on public service performance, and some do not regularly survey users to understand their needs. Digital services remain underdeveloped and are not widely adopted. Additionally, in seven of eight countries, most online public services are not accessible through a secure and user-friendly digital identity. In seven out of eight countries, most of the eligible population have not created a digital identity to access public services.

**Public institutions across SEA can do more to foster public participation and feedback.** Gaps in practices to enable public engagement and transparency appear in each of the areas examined in the report. In budgeting, only one of seven SEA countries currently uses digital and interactive fiscal reporting platforms to make budgetary information more publicly accessible, compared to 75% of OECD countries. In infrastructure, no SEA country for which data are available currently mandates consultation with stakeholders during the construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of infrastructure assets, compared to 45% of OECD countries. In digital government, only two out of eight SEA countries test new digital public services with users or providers before they are launched, compared to 60% of OECD countries. Building stronger public engagement into governance practices is an important next frontier for governments across the region.

*Chapter 1*

# Governance reform in Southeast Asia

## Introduction

Southeast Asia (SEA) is an economically vibrant and diverse region, home to nearly 700 million people and encompassing a mix of lower-middle to upper-middle-income economies. The region has demonstrated strong economic performance since the turn of the century, significantly reducing poverty and advancing human development. However, governments across the region will need to manage interlocking and complex challenges over the coming years in order to sustain development progress. These include mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change, ensuring that public finances remain on a sustainable path in the aftermath of the shock of COVID-19, and meeting the needs and expectations of citizens. To support SEA governments, this 2nd edition of Government at a Glance Southeast Asia presents an up-to-date overview of key public governance processes and practices across the region, with a practical focus on areas of public sector practice where SEA governments can improve to better serve the public.

Southeast Asia's development has been driven by robust growth over the past two decades, with many countries in the region maintaining resilient economic trajectories (Figure 1.1). Driven by trade liberalisation, infrastructure investments and demographic advantages, the region has emerged as a dynamic engine of global growth. Recent macroeconomic challenges have tested the region's resilience, including the effects of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, inflationary pressures, and rising levels of public and private debt. Governments across the SEA region have responded with policy interventions, such as subsidies, tax relief and price controls, which have helped temper inflation compared to OECD Member countries (OECD, 2024[1]). Despite the challenges and uncertainties surrounding the global economic environment and evolving trade dynamics at the time of writing, SEA's economic outlook remains cautiously optimistic. Growth is expected to be driven by resilient domestic demand, a steady recovery in tourism following the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing public and private investment (ADB, 2025[2]). At the time of writing, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts regional economic growth of 4.7% in both 2025 and 2026 (ADB, 2025[2]). Growth is forecast to be highest in emerging economies, including Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter "Lao PDR") and the Philippines (ibid.).

**Figure 1.1. Nominal GDP growth rate of SEA countries, 2003-2026 (projected)**




*Note:* Data for 2024, 2025 (projected) and 2026 (projected) have been calculated by ADB; SEA refers to the average of national growth scores across selected countries.
*Source:* World Bank (2025[3]), "GDP growth (annual %)", *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG*; ADB (2025[2]), *Asian Development Outlook (ADO) April 2025*, *https://dx.doi.org/10.22617/FLS250135-3*.

StatLink https://stat.link/s2753k

In parallel with strong economic growth, SEA has made substantial gains in human development over the past two decades, with significant improvements in poverty levels, education and healthcare (Figure 1.2) (UNDP, 2025[4]). Eight of nine countries in the region improved their Human Development Index (HDI) scores between 2013 and 2023, which measure a combination of educational achievement, health outcomes, and poverty levels. Viet Nam and Cambodia have seen the most rapid growth in HDI scores, rising by 6.2 and 5.2 percentage points (p.p.), respectively, between 2013 and 2023. Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have also made gains in human development over the past two decades. The highest-ranked countries in the region, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, have both maintained their high performance. While the availability of poverty data differs across countries, trends indicate a positive trajectory of declining poverty rates across most of SEA over the last decade. For example, Lao PDR and the Philippines have seen drops in the proportion of people living below national poverty lines. In Lao PDR, poverty rates declined from 33.5% in 2003 to 18% in 2023, driven mainly by skills improvements, increased land access and non-agricultural job growth (World Bank, 2015[5]) (World Bank, 2020[6]).

**Figure 1.2. Human Development Index scores of SEA countries, 2003-2023**




*Note:* SEA refers to the average of national HDI scores across selected countries.
*Source:* UNDP (2025[4]), "Human Development Index (HDI)", *https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI*.
StatLink *https://stat.link/0j92fw*

However, significant challenges remain. The benefits of development have not always been evenly spread across all residents in SEA countries, particularly in rural and remote areas, where poverty and vulnerability are more entrenched. Where data are available, trends in income inequality present a mixed outlook (World Bank, 2025[7]). Thailand has made consistent progress in narrowing income inequality, with its Gini coefficient falling from 37.8 in 2013 to 33.5 in 2023. This progress has been aided in part by targeted social protection programmes and investments in rural development. Indonesia has also experienced a steady decline from 38.9 in 2013 to 34.9 in 2024. However, in many SEA countries, non-income inequalities persist, including those between men and women, across different regions of the country, and in access to infrastructure. For example, in Viet Nam, economic growth has concentrated in the Red River Delta, the Southeast and the Mekong River Delta, with significantly slower income growth rates for those living in other areas (Vengadeshvaran, Saumik and Guanghua, 2017[8]). Disparities have been further exacerbated by external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters, which have, in some cases, widened pre-existing differences in social and economic development (ADB, 2022[9]). Disparities of this sort may undermine broader development goals if unaddressed (UN ESCAP, 2024[10]).

The quality of public governance will be a key factor in determining how effectively SEA countries can deliver the policies and services needed to sustain development progress. This Government at a Glance suggests two strategic goals to help guide and focus public governance reform efforts in SEA governments. The first is **building prosperity and resilience**. A core focus of governments across the region must be to support economic growth and the economic security of citizens, including in the face of shocks. To do this, it will be crucial that governments manage the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic on public finances, while also mitigating the impact of shocks, including those resulting from long-term temperature increases and extreme weather events. The first section of this chapter examines how public governance processes in SEA can be improved to better safeguard the sustainability of public finances, build fiscal space to address development needs, and effectively address environmental shocks.

The second goal is **building human-centred institutions and public services**. It is essential that public institutions in the SEA region work to build trust with the public by involving them in decision-making processes and being responsive to address their needs. The second section of the

chapter examines how issues of transparency and public engagement can be addressed in public governance processes, with a focus on public service delivery, which is the most common form of interaction between the public and their institutions.

## Building prosperity and resilience

### *Managing public finances sustainably*

Governments across the SEA region, as in OECD countries and elsewhere in the world, made significant expenditures through the early 2020s to help businesses and the public cope with the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The policies announced to support the COVID-19 response during 2020 and 2021 averaged 9.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in additional expenditures and revenues foregone (Figure 1.3; see also Figure 2.18). In some cases, the scale of the response is undercounted by these metrics. For example, in Viet Nam, significant off-budget measures were used to support businesses and the public (OECD, 2023[11]). Estimates suggest that the scale of economic support for workers in SEA countries during the pandemic was similar to that in OECD countries. However, support for workers in the informal sector, which is larger in SEA countries, was somewhat more limited than that for those in the formal sector (see Figure 2.19 and Figure 2.20) (Hale et al., 2021[12]).

This extensive support was important for public welfare during the unprecedented challenges of the COVID-19 outbreak. However, the costs of providing it contributed to sharp increases in budget deficits across the region during the early 2020s. Across several major SEA economies, budget deficits deteriorated from -0.9% of GDP in 2019 to -5.2% in 2020, before partially recovering to -2.1% of GDP as of 2023 (see Figure 2.2). Primarily as a result of this shock, public debt levels have risen across the SEA region since 2019. On average, general government gross debt levels rose from 44% of GDP in 2019 to 58% in 2023 (Figure 1.4; see also Figure 2.7). Gross debt as a percentage of GDP increased over this period in seven of nine SEA countries. Similar trends were also observed in many OECD countries, and general government gross debt increased in the four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region between 2019 and 2023. Looking ahead, while debt ratios remain on a stable trajectory, adverse shocks, such as lower economic growth, persistent fiscal deficits, elevated interest rates, or exchange rate depreciations, could substantially increase debt levels. Factors specific to individual economies could also pose additional risks (ADB, 2025[2]).

**Figure 1.3. Additional spending and revenue foregone in response to COVID-19, as of October 2021**




*Source:* IMF (2021), *Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic*, *https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Fiscal-Policies-Database-in-Response-to-COVID-19*. See also Figure 2.18.

StatLink https://stat.link/1h4dsc

**Figure 1.4. General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database). See also Figure 2.7.

StatLink https://stat.link/q2ypkc

As of 2023, six of the eight SEA countries for which data are available continued to run a primary budget deficit, with an average primary deficit across the region of -0.8% of GDP (Figure 1.5; see also Figure 2.3). This implies that, under current revenue and spending policies, governments are unable to fully fund their non-interest expenditures, including public services and investment, without further borrowing to cover the costs of public debt. This raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of public finances in the absence of fiscal reforms or stronger revenue mobilisation. Moreover, on average, net interest payments on public debt consume around 1.85% of GDP in SEA countries, or just under 10% of total public expenditures. This reduces the resources available for other public policy priorities, such as investing in new public infrastructure, which not only enhances nationwide efficiency but also contributes to short-term economic growth and long-term sustainable development.

**Figure 1.5. General government primary balance and net interest spending as a percentage of GDP, 2023**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: *OECD National Accounts Statistics* (database). See also Figure 2.3.

StatLink https://stat.link/pdzm9g

To build prosperity and resilience to shocks and support long-term national development, public finances across the region would benefit from further reform to place them on a more sustainable footing. On the expenditure side, governments will need to ensure that public financial management and budgeting processes support the efficient allocation of public resources and overall constraints on budgetary aggregates, helping to contain debt at sustainable levels.

As explored further in Chapter 3, medium-term and top-down budgeting practices are important for sustainability as they enable policymakers to assess the fiscal impact of current decisions over time, and to reinforce fiscal discipline by setting top-down spending limits that align budgets with the government's financial strategy and policy priorities. In 2024, all eight SEA countries for which data are available used top-down expenditure ceilings (see Table 3.3), with seven having multi-year top-down expenditure ceilings in place. This is similar to OECD countries, of which 33 out of 36 survey respondent OECD countries use top-down expenditure ceilings, and 26 out of 36 use them on a multi-year basis.

SEA countries also have well-established fiscal rules and objectives to help support sustainable fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability. Fiscal rules are legally binding constraints on fiscal policy that establish numerical limits on budgetary aggregates, providing a long-term anchor for public finances. Fiscal objectives are politically mandated targets without legal enforcement (Moretti, Keller and Majercak, 2023[13]). In 2024, six of seven SEA countries for which data are available had fiscal rules or objectives in place (see Table 3.1). The most common types are limits on public debt, adopted by six out of seven countries and a balanced budget, applied in five out of seven countries. To balance rules with flexibility, the four SEA countries that have fiscal rules embedded in their constitutions and legislation have escape clauses.

Nonetheless, SEA countries could strengthen their safeguards for the sustainability of public finances by providing greater oversight of spending decisions by their legislatures. Parliamentary budget offices (PBOs) are independent public institutions established under the statutory authority of the legislature to provide objective analysis of public finances. In 2024, only four out of eight SEA countries for which data are available had established a PBO, and the remaining four SEA countries had no plans to establish one (Figure 1.6; see also Figure 3.4). Moreover, only two SEA PBOs for which data are available independently initiate and publish analysis of the public finances, as recommended in the OECD Recommendation on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions (OECD, 2014[14]). These institutional arrangements create gaps in oversight of public finances in many SEA countries, potentially posing risks to longer-term fiscal sustainability.

**Figure 1.6. Existence of independent fiscal institutions, including parliamentary budget offices, in SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: *OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database* (2021). See also Figure 3.4.

*Notes:* Data are not available for Viet Nam. Data for SEA countries refer to PBOs. Data for OECD countries refer to IFIs, including PBOs. PBOs in OECD countries are shown with an asterisk. Data for the Philippines refer to the Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department (CPBRD). Four offices in the Philippine Congress perform the functions of a PBO: the CPBRD in the House of Representatives; and the Senate Economic Planning Office, the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office, and the Senate Tax Research Office in the Senate. Cambodia's National Assembly (lower house of parliament) does not have a PBO, but the Senate (upper house) has a PBO, the Budget Research Department. The Parliamentary Expertise Agency of Indonesia (Badan Keahlian DPR R) serves as a PBO in Indonesia. It is the research and analysis arm of the Indonesian House of Representatives.

StatLink https://stat.link/v0mbkp

Another priority for managing public finances sustainably among SEA countries is to improve domestic revenue mobilisation. Currently, domestic tax revenues account for an average of 14% of GDP across SEA countries. By comparison, OECD countries collect an average of 34% of GDP as taxes, with all four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region collecting at least 29% of GDP (Figure 1.7, see also Figure 2.13). While not the focus of this report, research on the region has identified several avenues through which SEA countries can prospectively expand revenue mobilisation. These include making personal income taxes more progressive, so as to gather higher revenues from higher earners; introducing some forms of wealth taxes (such as inheritance taxes) and progressive forms of property taxation; and introducing taxes on the rapidly expanding digital services sector (ADB, 2022[15]). Improving domestic revenue mobilisation, both through policy changes and administrative reform of revenue agencies, would improve the ability of governments in the region to finance their policy priorities. It would also support greater resilience in the face of future external shocks.

**Figure 1.7. General government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2022 and 2023**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: *OECD Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries* (database). Data for OECD countries: *OECD Revenue Statistics* (database). See also Figure 2.13.

StatLink https://stat.link/u7i0lb

### *Building resilience to environmental risks*

Building prosperity and resilience will also require that SEA countries have effective structures in place to ensure their resilience to shocks by planning for and managing environmental risks. SEA countries face significant threats from the long-term rise in temperatures and extreme weather events (ADB, 2024[16]). El Niño events, in particular, bring elevated surface temperatures and extreme weather patterns, with the most recent El Niño episode posing an immediate threat to the region's climate resilience (OECD, 2024[1]). Such episodes significantly increase the likelihood of record-breaking temperatures (Thirumalai et al., 2017[17]). New risks to economic security and the livelihoods of individuals in SEA may also emerge from environmental risks. For example, while poverty rates continue to decline in Indonesia, rising temperatures and extreme weather events threaten to reverse this trend by forcing the near-poor population back below the national poverty line (ADB, 2022[18]).

The OECD has identified governance practices and processes that countries should have in place to design, implement, and sustain effective policies addressing environmental risks (OECD, 2025[19]). The framework is built around three pillars: 1) **commitment** involves structuring public institutions to ensure they are credibly committed to long-term implementation of environmental policies; 2) **capabilities** involves building the skills, practices and processes within public institutions to ensure designing and implementing environmental policies, using a mix of policy tools effectively; and 3) **consensus** involves building broad and lasting public support for environmental policy. It is especially important when

policy to manage environmental risks involves managing trade-offs or welfare costs across different groups, and positive perceptions of effectiveness and fairness are needed to maintain support.

Data are not available to provide a full analysis of governance standards in SEA against each pillar of this framework. However, the data presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report provide a preliminary examination of the extent to which relevant governance practices are implemented in two key aspects of the capabilities pillar: governance of infrastructure and budgeting practices. In both areas, encouraging good practice is emerging across SEA countries.

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGIs) examine the extent to which a government's practices for planning, commissioning and managing infrastructure support resilient and environmentally sustainable infrastructure development. Four countries in the SEA region took part in the IGIs as part of Government at a Glance (Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Three countries for which data is available for the IGI on environmentally sustainable and resilient infrastructure outperform the OECD average, indicating that relevant governance practices are becoming institutionalised and effective (Figure 1.8; see also Figure 4.8). However, it is important to note that this is a partial sample only, and information to assess the strength of relevant infrastructure practices in other SEA countries is not available.

**Figure 1.8. Delivering environmentally sustainable and resilient infrastructure, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD). See also Figure 4.8.

StatLink https://stat.link/6f28is

Among the SEA countries for which data are available, practices are advanced in a number of areas. A key area of strength is the integration of environmental criteria into public procurement processes. All four SEA countries with available data provide relevant guidance and information, placing them on par with OECD leaders such as Japan, Korea and New Zealand. Singapore stands out for offering infrastructure-specific guidance, a practice in place in only 3 of 29 OECD countries.

SEA countries are also moving beyond guidance toward mandatory environmental obligations in procurement. In Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore, it is mandatory to include environmental requirements in the technical specifications of infrastructure projects. Indonesia and Singapore mandate that environmental criteria be included in bid evaluation frameworks, ensuring that environmental considerations are embedded not only in the design but also in the contractor selection process. Only 14 of 27 OECD countries surveyed do the same. Several SEA countries also place environment-related expectations directly on contractors. Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, require suppliers to follow international environmental standards, such as those set by the International Organization for

Standardisation (ISO), and include contract clauses related to environmental resilience. These measures reflect a proactive and standards-based approach to embedding climate goals in infrastructure delivery.

Green budgeting is also increasingly being embedded in public financial management systems across the SEA region. Among the eight SEA countries for which information is available, four have already introduced green budgeting practices, and a further two are planning to do so (Figure 1.9; see also Figure 3.2). This mirrors the rapid uptake of green budgeting practices across OECD countries over the past decade. As of 2022, two-thirds of OECD countries (24 out of 36) had implemented green budgeting practices in some form, and a further three were planning to implement them (OECD, 2024[20]). The legal basis for green budgeting in SEA is primarily grounded in administrative instruments, such as budget circulars and guidelines, as well as specific legislation to support implementation. Three out of the four SEA countries with green budgeting frameworks use administrative and/or legislative tools (see Table 3.4). This mirrors the practice in OECD countries, where 21 out of 24 also rely on administrative procedures.

**Figure 1.9. Existence of green budgeting, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Green Budgeting*. See also Figure 3.2.

StatLink https://stat.link/kzsp8l

Nonetheless, SEA countries could improve significantly in the practices they employ to implement green budgeting. Many analytic tools that can support effective green budgeting are used by only a small number of SEA countries. Most notably, only 1 of 4 SEA countries conducts reviews of harmful tax expenditures, compared to 12 of 24 among OECD countries that practice green budgeting (see Table 3.5). Other underdeveloped tools for green budget analysis – especially when compared to OECD countries – include carbon assessments of budget measures (two out of four countries) and environmental cost-benefit analysis (one out of four countries). More generally, creating additional fiscal space will play a crucial role in addressing environmental risks, as only about 7.4% of disaster-related adaptation needs are currently met (UN ESCAP, 2023[21]). This funding gap creates a risk of a cycle in which a government's financial and other resources are diverted towards emergency response and recovery, at the expense of supporting long-term preparedness.

While the data collected for this report suggest that encouraging areas of good practice in planning and managing environmental risks are emerging across the SEA region, this represents a relatively limited set of governance practices required to effectively ensure long-term resilience. In particular, where information is available on the commitment and consensus dimensions, this suggests governance practices may need further improvement.

One area in which data are available is on the public availability of high-value datasets (HVD) on environmental issues. Access to information on environmental conditions enables the public to make informed decisions about resilience priorities, monitor the actions being taken by government, and hold public institutions accountable. However, across SEA countries, on average, only 19% of HVD on earth observation, meteorological and geospatial data are available to the public as open data, compared to the OECD average of 56% (Figure 1.10; see also Online Figure D.2.3).

**Figure 1.10. Availability of open data on environmental issues in SEA countries and OECD countries, 2023**




*Note:* The categories of high-value datasets are determined by the OECD and primarily based on the G8 Open Data Charter. Data are considered available if they are machine-readable, free of charge and provided with an open licence. Composite scores for the availability of open, high-value datasets on environmental issues range from 0 to 100 and are calculated as the average of three equally weighted parameters: "earth observation and environment are available as open data"; "geospatial is available as open data"; and "meteorological is available as open data". Data are not available for Hungary and the United States. On data for Israel, see *https://doi.org/10.1787/888932315602*. See also Online Figure D.2.3.

*Source:* 2023 OURdata Index, see OECD (2023[22]), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*; OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink *https://stat.link/q29cpd*

To ensure that environmental resilience objectives are delivered efficiently, further work is needed to thoroughly understand the relevant governance structures across the SEA region and to support countries in moving closer to best practices. There are gaps in systematic information on areas of governance, including the extent of independent oversight of environmental policy, consideration of environmental risks in regulatory policy and public procurement, engagement with the public and stakeholders in the development of environmental policy, and the quality of efforts to make public sector operations more sustainable. It will also be important to seek and share good practices which are a fit for the administrative structures and capacities of SEA countries. An example is Indonesia's efforts around procurement, which highlight how middle-income countries can institutionalise sustainability within procurement systems, creating a bridge between high-level climate commitments and practical action (Box 1.1).

Box 1.1. **Public procurement and resilience to environmental risks in Indonesia**

Indonesia demonstrates how public procurement can serve as a powerful tool for advancing environmental resilience and sustainability goals. With public procurement accounting for over 45% of government spending – equivalent to approximately 6.6% of GDP in 2021 – the government holds considerable influence over market demand and production standards, and significant leverage to promote sustainable development through purchasing decisions. Recognising this potential, Indonesia has embedded green public procurement into its national development plans and its 10-year Sustainable Consumption and Production programme.

Presidential regulations provide a foundation for sustainability in procurement. These are operationalised through detailed regulations that guide the purchase of eco-labelled products and set technical criteria. Implementation tools have also matured. Indonesia's national e-procurement platform now includes sustainability tagging, facilitating the identification and monitoring of purchases with lower environmental impacts. Environmental criteria are incorporated directly into bid evaluations, and infrastructure tenders frequently reference international environmental standards, such as ISO and FIDIC (International Federation of Consulting Engineers). These practices help ensure that sustainability is a decisive factor in contractor selection and project implementation.

*Source:* IISD (2024[23]), *Green Public Procurement in Indonesia: Policies, Practices and Ways Forward*, *https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2024-11/green-public-procurement-indonesia.pdf*.

## Building human-centred institutions and public services

A second guiding priority for governance reform in SEA is to help ensure public institutions focus on the needs of citizens. It is essential that public institutions promote meaningful public engagement by providing transparent information and effectively involving the public in decision-making processes. Public governance processes that allow the public a voice in decisions that affect them and impart a sense of dignity when interacting with government contribute substantially to building trust in public institutions (OECD, 2024[24]). In turn, this supports long-term development. As discussed below, across all of the topics covered in this report, there is scope for governance processes across the region to better foster public participation and feedback. One particular area in which SEA governments can improve their responsiveness to citizens is in delivering effective and responsive public services, which are typically the most frequent form of interaction between citizens and their public institutions. Both are explored below.

### *Fostering public participation and feedback*

Governments across the SEA region could improve their effectiveness by more systematically engaging with the public across their different processes and delivery areas. Doing so would support better policy decisions, while also improving accountability and trust in public institutions. Data points from across the surveys collected for this report suggest that there is scope for governments across the SEA region to improve their engagement with the public and further support transparency in their processes. Limited public engagement is a feature in many digital government processes in the region.

The Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index assesses how effectively governments develop and implement open data strategies, engage stakeholders in data sharing and re-use, and ensure that key datasets are publicly available (OECD, 2023[22]). Data underpin evidence-based policymaking, enhance the quality of public services, and foster transparency and accountability. When made openly available, data increase government accountability, empower the public and strengthen public trust.

Eight SEA countries completed the OURData Index, with a regional average score of 0.22, on a scale from 0 to 1 (Figure 1.11; also see Figure 5.10). This was below the OECD average of 0.48. Issues of open data and data transparency ("open by default") were the area in which SEA countries record the weakest average scores. There are widespread gaps across the region in terms of the extent to which

governments have established robust open data frameworks and publish HVD; the ease with which users can find, access and understand open data; and the extent to which government support for data re-use assesses actions taken to promote the use of open data. Overall, only 23% of HVD in SEA are currently available as open data, and only 35% of published HVD are easily accessible.

**Figure 1.11. OURdata Index, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2023[22]), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. See also Figure 5.10.

StatLink https://stat.link/r0e1od

Gaps in public engagement and transparency are also visible in budgeting practices across the region. The majority of SEA countries for which data are available publish core budget reports, including the executive's budget proposal and the approved budget (six out of seven countries), and key reporting documents such as the year-end budget execution reports and year-end financial statements (five out of seven countries) (Table 3.8). However, SEA countries lag in the implementation of digital and interactive fiscal reporting (DIFR) platforms. These are online platforms that offer comprehensive open data access to fiscal data, and/or include tools like interactive visuals and plain-language explanations. They can complement traditional reporting methods to enhance public understanding and engagement (OECD, 2025[25]). While 27 out of 36 OECD countries have developed DIFRs, among SEA countries, only Singapore has done so currently. In a related area, only two out of eight SEA countries for which data are available (Indonesia, the Philippines) are currently implementing gender budgeting (see Figure 3.3). Gender budgeting systematically examines how men and women may be affected differently by budget measures, allowing consideration of these effects to be integrated into budgetary decision making. It promotes policies and investments that help close gaps between men and women. These practices are significantly less prevalent in SEA than in OECD countries, where 23 of 38 countries are currently implementing gender budgeting.

While data are available on governance practices for public infrastructure in fewer countries, it is again suggestive of gaps in public engagement. Stakeholder participation can help to ensure that infrastructure projects are more predictable and have fewer delays, and that their benefits are distributed more evenly across different potential users. When considering environmental impacts, all four SEA countries for which data is available undertake early-stage participation, which involves external stakeholders and the public in decisions during the planning, appraisal, funding, design, and/or procurement stages of new infrastructure development (see Figure 4.7). However, no SEA country currently mandates late-stage consultation. That is, no country mandates that external stakeholders and the public need to be consulted on environmental impacts during the construction, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of infrastructure. In contrast, 13 of 29 OECD countries mandate late-stage consultation.

Limited public engagement is also often a feature in SEA governments' design processes for digital services. Involving members of the public in the design of digital public services is an important mechanism for ensuring that these services meet the needs and requirements of the people who use them. However, only two out of eight SEA countries, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, test the usability of digital public services with users or providers before launching a service. Singapore is the only country in the region that uses focus groups or public consultation websites to allow members of the public to support the design or improvement of the public services they use (see Table 5.4). This gap makes it more challenging to ensure that digital public services are aligned with user needs and can adapt as user needs change.

One area where more effective public engagement does emerge is in user surveys for public services. User surveys ask members of the public about their experiences and satisfaction levels when using public services. They are a key evidence base for governments seeking to understand how to improve public services to better meet the needs of the public. User surveys are already in use in seven of eight SEA countries for which data are available. This mirrors the situation in OECD countries, where 25 of 27 countries conduct surveys of this kind. An example of good practice in the region is the Philippines Citizen Satisfaction and Business Satisfaction Surveys (Box 1.2).

### Box 1.2. **The Philippines' citizen and business satisfaction surveys**

The Citizen Satisfaction Survey (CitSat) is a research and citizen feedback survey conducted by the Philippines every two years. The survey asks users of frontline government services about their experiences during recent interactions with public institutions, their satisfaction with these experiences, and the factors that may drive their satisfaction. Results from the 2022 survey identified several aspects of service interactions with public institutions that contribute to improving citizen satisfaction, including responsive contact points, clear application and bureaucratic processes, and affordable costs. Surveys are conducted among users of a wide range of public agencies, allowing survey results to clearly identify which agency clusters are performing better in responding to public needs. Surveys are also conducted in different cities across the country, allowing the government to understand how public satisfaction varies between different geographic regions. The accompanying Business Satisfaction Survey (BizSat) undertakes a similar exercise, with businesses rather than private citizens. These findings provide feedback from businesses to the government on areas such as regulatory barriers and compliance costs, as well as issues of fair treatment and integrity when business representatives interact with public institutions, among other topics.

*Source:* Productivity and Development Center (n.d.[26]), "Citizen Satisfaction e-Survey (e-CitSat)", *https://pdc.dap.edu.ph/index.php/citizen-satisfaction-e-survey-e-citsat/* (accessed on 3 October 2025); Development Academy of the Philippines (2023[27]), "2021 e-BizSat reveals 10 key drivers of business satisfaction in frontline government services", *https://dap.edu.ph/2021-e-bizsat-reveals-10-key-drivers-of-business-satisfaction-in-frontline-government-services/*.

### *Making services more responsive*

Public services have long-term impacts on countries' development and economic growth, as well as on the long-term well-being and opportunities of individuals and businesses. Indicators from a variety of sources show improvements in the delivery of public services in the health, education and justice sectors across the SEA region over the past decade. In healthcare services, eight of nine SEA countries have increased physician-population ratios since 2010 (see Figure 6.4), and seven of nine SEA countries reduced out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures between 2012 and 2022 (see Figure 6.5). In education services, the region as a whole has nearly achieved universal primary school completion, with an average completion rate of 97%, (see Figure 6.7). Moreover, five of seven SEA countries for which data are available improved the availability of educational materials in schools between 2018 and 2022

(see Figure 6.8). These improvements appear to be reflected in citizens reporting increased satisfaction with the public healthcare and education systems (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2).

While progress in service delivery in the human development sector is positive, there appears to be room for improvement in the delivery of public administrative services. These are the administrative processes that individuals must undertake to access or use publicly provided goods or services, comply with legal requirements or assert their rights. Examples include birth or death registration, obtaining identity documents, applying for government permits or licences, enrolling in public education or registering with a public healthcare provider (OECD, 2024[28]).

There is limited data on the accessibility, responsiveness or quality of public administrative services across countries in the SEA region. However, the data that do exist suggest potentially significant gaps in provision, especially in rural and underserved communities. The most complete data are on birth registration, which is an essential administrative service, and often a precondition for accessing many other public services and legal rights. As of the most recent year for which data are available, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Thailand have achieved near-universal birth registration (Figure 1.12, see also Figure 6.13). However, in other countries in the region, registration rates remain uneven, ranging between 73% in Lao PDR and 96% in Viet Nam. Moreover, rural birth registration rates are lower than urban rates in every country for which data are available. This suggests that certain parts of the population face systemic barriers in accessing or receiving fundamental administrative services.

**Figure 1.12. Percentage of children under age five whose births are registered, 2021 or latest available year**




*Source:* World Bank (2025), *World Bank Open Data*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.REG.BRTH.ZS*. See also Figure 6.13.

StatLink https://stat.link/tj8qyl

A prerequisite for making public administrative services more responsive to user needs is to have a clear vision and strategy in place that identifies the government's priorities and assigns responsibility to the relevant agencies for delivering them. All SEA countries for which data are available in the region have designated an agency within the central government to be responsible for improving public administrative services. Five of eight countries have named an agency within the prime minister's or president's office, and three out of eight within their ministry of public administration or interior (see Figure 6.16). Moreover, seven of eight SEA countries have provided strategic direction to their reform efforts by agreeing and publishing a public services reform strategy (Figure 1.13, see also Figure 6.17). This is similar to OECD countries, where currently, 14 out of 27 countries for which data are available (52%) have standalone government-wide strategies for service improvement, and 9 countries (33%) include them within broader strategies (OECD, 2025[29]).

**Figure 1.13. Government-wide strategies for improving public administrative services, SEA countries, 2024**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*. See also Figure 6.17.

StatLink https://stat.link/76wuoj

However, governments in the SEA region need to further develop the operational capabilities to make public administrative services more responsive to users' needs. This is most notable in the area of digital government. The OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) evaluates whether governments have the foundations to deliver digital transformation, based on six core dimensions aligned with the OECD Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies (OECD, 2014[30]).

To help assess the readiness of SEA countries to leverage data and technology in service delivery, the DGI was undertaken by eight SEA countries for the first time. The average DGI score for SEA countries is 0.37 out of 1 as of the end of 2023 (Figure 1.14; see also Figure 5.1). This is lower than the OECD average of 0.61. Singapore (0.62) and Indonesia (0.61) scored highest in the region, followed by Thailand (0.48) and Viet Nam (0.43).

Focusing on public services, the **user-driven** dimension of the DGI examines the extent to which governments place people's needs and convenience at the centre of digital processes, services and policies (OECD, 2020[31]). An important part of this dimension is the extent to which governments deliver inclusive and user-driven public services, with a focus on how digital technology can support equitable access to services and personalised service delivery to the public.

On average, SEA countries scored 0.33 out of 1 on this dimension, indicating a significant scope for strengthening practice. One major practical gap is in setting service standards, that is, high-level principles that guide public service teams in designing, iterating and improving services to address the needs of users of public services. Only three out of eight countries for which information is available in SEA have implemented a whole-of-government service standard (see figure 5.7). By comparison, 28 of 33 OECD countries have such standards in place. No SEA country currently has standards for curating tools, practices and resources that different public sector organisations can re-use in their own service design and delivery processes. Nor does any country have standards for cross-border digital public services.

**Figure 1.14. Digital Government Index scores by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*. See also Figure 5.1.

StatLink https://stat.link/0eyvd9

Gaps in digital government capabilities across the SEA region are reflected in limited digital access to public administrative services in SEA countries. Only Singapore has made at least 75% of public services accessible through secure and user-friendly digital identity solutions, such as SMS, e-mail, or an authenticator app (Figure 1.15, see also Figure 6.14). Other countries in the region have made less than 50% of public services accessible in this manner. This is a significant gap, as secure digital identity plays a key role in facilitating public access to administrative services and is reflected in low take-up rates for online services. In seven out of eight countries in SEA, less than half of the population that is eligible to use online services are actually accessing them (Figure 6.15). Singapore is the only country in SEA where at least 90% the eligible population are using digital identity solutions to access public services. By comparison, 9 of 29 OECD countries have access rates of more than 75%, including Korea. Expanding the availability and usage of digital services is particularly important in rural and remote island communities of the SEA region, where it is often not feasible to establish physical service infrastructure, thereby ensuring wider and more convenient access and improved responsiveness to user needs. An example of an emerging good practice in the region comes from Viet Nam (Box 1.3).

**Figure 1.15. Percentage of online public services accessible through secure and user-friendly digital identity solutions (SMS, app, e-mail, 2FA), SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*. See Figure 6.14.

StatLink https://stat.link/hfbwye

### Box 1.3. **Accelerating the digital government transformation in Viet Nam**

Viet Nam has made significant strides in digital government reform, with rapid progress in expanding access to public administrative services through digital identity. A cornerstone of this progress is VNeID, Viet Nam's national digital identity platform, which became the default access point for public services in 2024. Through VNeID, citizens can now securely access a growing range of services, including tax filing, health insurance registration, social welfare applications and judicial certification – eliminating the need to visit service centres. Key features, such as digital signatures and real-time authentication, have streamlined administrative procedures, thereby reducing the burdens on users.

Adoption has been rapid. By early 2024, VNeID recorded over 29 million monthly sessions, with more than 235 public services integrated into the National Public Services Portal. In May 2025, the platform also notably served as a tool for national civic participation, enabling over 17 million citizens to submit feedback on proposed constitutional amendments. These achievements serve as an impressive example in the region for the successful and rapid implementation and expansion of digital service delivery.

*Source:* Borak, M. (2024[32]), "Vietnam integrates national digital ID and tax system", *https://www.biometricupdate.com/202410/vietnam-integrates-national-digital-id-and-tax-system*; VietnamPlus (2025[33]), "Millions contribute to Constitution amendment via VNeID", *https://en.vietnamplus.vn/millions-contribute-to-constitution-amendment-via-vneid-post319996.vnp*.

## *References*


ADB (2025), *Asian Development Outlook (ADO) April 2025*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/FLS250135-3*. [2]

ADB (2024), *Striving to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals: Next Steps for Policymakers and Practitioners*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.56506/ACFH4829*. [16]

ADB (2022), *Building Resilience of the Urban Poor in Indonesia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/TCS210404-2*. [18]

ADB (2022), *COVID-19 Pushed 4.7 Million More People in Southeast Asia Into Extreme Poverty in 2021, But Countries are Well Positioned to Bounce Back — ADB*, *https://www.adb.org/news/covid-19-pushed-4-7-million-more-people-southeast-asia-extreme-poverty-2021-countries-are-well*. [9]

ADB (2022), *Strengthening Domestic Resource Mobilization in Southeast Asia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/tcs220185*. [15]

Aguilar Jaber, A. et al. (2020), "Long-term low emissions development strategies: Cross-country experience", *OECD Environment Working Papers*, No. 160, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1c1d8005-en*. [50]

Borak, M. (2024), *Vietnam integrates national digital ID and tax system*, *https://www.biometricupdate.com/202410/vietnam-integrates-national-digital-id-and-tax-system*. [32]

Development Academy of the Philippines (2023), *2021 e-BizSat reveals 10 key drivers of business satisfaction in frontline government services*, *https://dap.edu.ph/2021-e-bizsat-reveals-10-key-drivers-of-business-satisfaction-in-frontline-government-services/*. [27]

Hale, T. et al. (2021), "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)", *Nature Human Behaviour*, Vol. 5/4, pp. 529-538, *https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01079-8*. [12]

IISD (2024), *Green Public Procurement in Indonesia: Policies, Practices and Ways Forward*, International Institute for Sustainable Development, *https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2024-11/green-public-procurement-indonesia.pdf*. [23]

Lafortune, G. and B. Ubaldi (2018), "OECD 2017 OURdata Index: Methodology and results", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 30, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2807d3c8-en*. [37]

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, *https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en*. [13]

OECD (2025), "Empowering fiscal reporting with digital and interactive approaches", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2025/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/82070ddb-en*. [25]

OECD (2025), "Governing for the green transition", *OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers*, No. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/5b0aa7d0-en*. [19]

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*. [29]

OECD (2025), *Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en*. [51]

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*. [48]

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en*. [43]

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*. [1]

OECD (2024), *Enabling Digital Innovation in Government: The OECD GovTech Policy Framework*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a51eb9b2-en*. [45]

OECD (2024), "Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?", *OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers*, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en*. [46]

OECD (2024), *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9aea61f0-en*.[20]

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en*. [24]

OECD (2024), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*. [28]

OECD (2023), *2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings*, OECD Publishing, Paris. [52]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [22]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [47]

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/8f2a6ecb-en*. [11]

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en*. [41]

OECD (2021), "Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD/LEGAL/0463, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463*. [49]

OECD (2021), *The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en*. [39]

OECD (2021), "The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/4e7c3f58-en*. [40]

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*. [34]

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*. [31]

OECD (2019), *The Path to Becoming a Data-Driven Public Sector*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/059814a7-en*. [42]

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies", *Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate*, Vol. July. [38]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies*, OECD/LEGAL/0406, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0406*. [30]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions*, OECD/LEGAL/0401, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401*. [14]

OECD (forthcoming), *Effectively Managing Investments in Digital Government: OECD Digital Government Investments Framework*. [44]

OECD (n.d.), *Infrastructure Toolkit*, OECD, Paris, *https://infrastructure-toolkit.oecd.org/*. [36]

OECD/European Union/EC-JRC (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264043466-en*. [35]

Productivity and Development Center (n.d.), *Citizen Satisfaction e-Survey (e-CitSat)*, *https://pdc.dap.edu.ph/index.php/citizen-satisfaction-e-survey-e-citsat/* (accessed on 3 October 2025). [26]

Thirumalai, K. et al. (2017), "Extreme temperatures in Southeast Asia caused by El Niño and worsened by global warming", *Nature Communications*, Vol. 8, *https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15531*. [17]

UN ESCAP (2024), *New UN report: Along with gender, where people live is a key factor in determining levels of poverty and inequality in Asia and the Pacific*, *https://www.unescap.org/news/new-un-report-along-gender-where-people-live-key-factor-determining-levels-poverty-and*. [10]

UN ESCAP (2023), *Seizing the Moment: Targeting Transformative Disaster Risk Resilience*, United Nations, *https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12870/6258*. [21]

UNDP (2025), *Human Development Index (HDI)*, *https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI*. [4]

Vengadeshvaran, S., P. Saumik and W. Guanghua (2017), "Structural transformation, growth and inequality: Evidence from Viet Nam", *ADBI Working Paper Series*, Vol. 681, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/231546/adbi-wp681.pdf*. [8]

VietnamPlus (2025), *Millions contribute to Constitution amendment via VNeID*, *https://en.vietnamplus.vn/millions-contribute-to-constitution-amendment-via-vneid-post319996.vnp*. [33]

World Bank (2025), *GDP growth (annual %)*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG*. [3]

World Bank (2025), *Gini index*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ID-TH-VN*. [7]

World Bank (2020), *Lao PDR Poverty Profile and Poverty Assessment 2020*, *https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/publication/lao-pdr-poverty-profile-and-poverty-assessment-2020*. [6]

World Bank (2015), *Drivers of Poverty Reduction in Lao PDR*, *http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/590861467722637341/pdf/101567-REPLACENENT-PUBLIC-Lao-PDR-Poverty-Policy-Notes-Drivers-of-Poverty-Reduction-in-Lao-PDR.pdf*. [5]

*Chapter 2*

# Public finances

The fiscal balance is the difference between government revenues and expenditures over a year. When government spends more than it receives in revenues, a fiscal deficit occurs. Governments typically cover a deficit by borrowing, which increases public debt. A deficit does not necessarily indicate underlying issues with a country's public finances. Deficits can occur, for example, when a government invests in assets that will yield returns, such as new infrastructure. However, sustained deficits over time can increase public debt, which can limit governments' future spending choices.

Deficits in countries in Southeast Asia (SEA) increased during the early 2020s as the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic lowered revenue and increased spending. After the initial shock of the pandemic in 2020, SEA countries have generally improved their fiscal balances, though as of 2023, not all had fully recovered to their pre-pandemic situation. SEA countries had an average fiscal deficit of -2.1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023 (Figure 2.1). Eight of nine countries had a fiscal deficit in 2023. Fiscal deficits in SEA countries were higher in 2023 than in 2019, when they averaged -0.9% of GDP. Deficits increased in Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Thailand and Cambodia went from a fiscal surplus in 2019 to a fiscal deficit in 2023. The Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter "Lao PDR") was a regional exception, moving from a deficit of -3.2% of GDP in 2019 to fiscal equilibrium in 2023, following a period of expenditure controls (ADB, 2024). Singapore maintained a surplus of +3% to +4% of GDP across the period. Deficits in SEA remain smaller on average than those in the OECD, where the average deficit in 2023 was -5.3% of GDP.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, SEA countries had generally maintained deficits at a stable level (Figure 2.2). Viet Nam's steadily decreased through much of the 2010s. All countries for which data are available saw significant increases in public deficits between 2019 and 2020. Indonesia moved from a deficit of -2.1% of GDP in 2019 to -6.1% in 2020, and Viet Nam from -0.4% to -2.9% of GDP. Thailand shifted from a surplus of +0.4% to a deficit of -4.5% in 2020. A similar trend was seen in OECD Member countries, where the average deficit increased from -3.3% of GDP in 2019 to -10.2% in 2020. Since the pandemic's largest impacts in 2020 and 2021, most OECD Member countries and SEA countries have begun to return to the fiscal positions they held prior to COVID-19, although most had not yet fully done so by the end of 2023.

Primary fiscal balance is a government's fiscal balance excluding interest payments on public debt. A government with a primary deficit is not able to pay interest on public debt after covering other expenditures, and needs to borrow to service its existing debt. A primary deficit is not sustainable in the medium to long term. Six out of eight SEA countries held primary deficits in 2023 (Figure 2.3). Their average primary balance was -0.8% of GDP. OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region also had a primary deficit in 2023. On average across OECD countries, governments had a primary deficit of -2.4% of GDP. Net interest payments on public debt averaged 1.8% of GDP for SEA countries in 2023, and 2.3% for OECD countries. However, SEA governments spend a smaller proportion of GDP than OECD governments. Interest payments thus restrict the expenditure choices of many SEA countries more than OECD countries.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for OECD Member countries are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics database, which is based on the System of National Accounts (SNA) framework. Data for SEA countries come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (April 2025), which is based on the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). The GFSM is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, including the overarching SNA. Differences between the GFSM and SNA frameworks are addressed via correspondence criteria between the two systems. Figures may differ from nationally reported data due to differences in definition, coverage, time period or accounting basis.

Fiscal balance, also referred to as net lending / borrowing of general government, is calculated as total government revenues minus total government expenditures. Primary balance is the fiscal balance excluding net interest payments on general government liabilities (i.e. interest payments minus interest receipts).

## *Further reading*

ADB (2024), *Asian Development Outlook: Lao PDR*, Asian Development Bank, Manila, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/957856/lao-ado-april-2024.pdf*.

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3. Data for 2023 for Viet Nam are forecasts. For more information on country-specific notes, see *https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/April*.

Figure 2.3. Data for Singapore not available. In Brunei Darussalam, where there are no net interest payments, the primary balance is also the overall fiscal balance.

**Figure 2.1. General government fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/5jypgv

**Figure 2.2. General government fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP, 2007-2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/7utlo1

**Figure 2.3. General government primary balance and net interest spending as a percentage of GDP, 2023**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/pdzm9g

Structural balance is a measure of the sustainability of a government's fiscal policies over the medium to long term. Budget balances in any one year are affected by the state of the economy. In a recession, finances will tend to worsen, and in a boom, they will tend to improve, even without any changes in government policy. They may also be affected by one-off events, such as large windfalls from selling public assets or expenses on significant public investments. Structural balance aims to estimate what the budget balance would have been had no such effects or events been present. By examining what the budget balance would be in a "normal" year, the structural balance can help illuminate whether a government's current policies on resources and expenditure can be sustained over the medium to long term.

The structural balance is estimated to have worsened across SEA countries from -1.3% of GDP in 2019 to -2.0% in 2023 and 2024 (Figure 2.4). The balance worsened in all five countries for which data are available. Singapore was the only country estimated to have had a structural surplus in both years, though this decreased from +1.7% in 2019 to +1.1% in 2024. Similar trends were seen across the OECD, where the average structural deficit is estimated to have increased from -3.6% of GDP in 2019 to -4.7% in 2024. Two of the four OECD Member countries in the Asia-Pacific region are estimated to have worsened their structural balance over this period, and all four are estimated to have had a structural deficit in 2024.

Where data are available, COVID-19 was a major driver of the worsening of structural balances across the region (Figure 2.5). Both Indonesia and Thailand are estimated to have experienced a sharp deterioration in their structural balance through 2020 and/or 2021, before partially recovering from 2022 onwards. Similar trends were observed across OECD countries during this period. As explored below, the COVID-19 pandemic decreased government revenues and increased government expenditures, worsening governments' budget balances.

Structural deficits will not be sustainable in the medium to long term. Both SEA and OECD countries will need a combination of growth and fiscal policy adjustments to return their finances to a more sustainable position. However, only two of the five SEA countries for which data are available are projected to improve their structural balance between 2024 and 2026 (Figure 2.6): the Philippines (+1.2% of GDP) and Malaysia (+0.9% of GDP). All countries in the region are forecast to remain in structural deficit in 2026, other than Singapore. Thailand's structural balance is forecast to worsen from around -1.3% during 2024-2026 to around -1.1% in 2026. Thailand is expected to increase public expenditures, partly to finance new infrastructure investments (ADB, 2024). Three of the four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region are projected to decrease their structural deficits between 2024 and 2026. However, the OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region other than New Zealand are projected to remain in structural deficit in 2026; on average, OECD countries are forecast to have a structural deficit of -4.6% of GDP in 2026.

### Methodology and definitions

For OECD countries and the OECD average, data are from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 117 database, which is based on the SNA framework. Data for SEA countries are from the IMF WEO database (April 2025), which is based on the GFSM. The GFSM is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, including the overarching SNA. Differences between the GFSM and SNA frameworks are addressed via correspondence criteria between the two systems.

Structural fiscal balance represents the fiscal balance as reported in the SNA framework, adjusted for the state of the economic cycle (as measured by the output gap) and non-structural elements beyond the economic cycle (e.g. one-off fiscal operations). The output gap measures the difference between actual and potential GDP, where potential GDP is an estimate of the level of GDP that would prevail if the economy were working at full capacity (potential GDP is not directly observable).

### *Further reading*

ADB (2024), *Asian Development Outlook: Thailand*, Asian Development Bank, Manila, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/957856/tha-ado-april-2024.pdf*.

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

### *Figure notes*

Figures 2.4, 2.6. Data for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam are not available. Data for 2024 in some countries refer to forecasts.

Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6. For more information on country-specific notes (e.g. coverage of general government), see *https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/April*.

**Figure 2.4. General government structural balance as a percentage of potential GDP, 2019, 2023, 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD Economic Outlook No. 117 (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/6fwj0z

**Figure 2.5. General government structural balance as a percentage of potential GDP in SEA, OECD and the largest SEA economies, 2007-2026**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD Economic Outlook No. 117 (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/ma5zbe

**Figure 2.6. Projected general government structural balance as a percentage of potential GDP in 2025 and 2026, and projected change 2024-2026**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD Economic Outlook No. 117 (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/vteod1

Public debt refers to the stock of government borrowing due to past budget deficits. Higher public debt means a government must spend more money each year on capital and interest repayments. If financial markets believe a government may have difficulty repaying its debt,its access to credit can be affected; thus, governments need to manage public debt levels. Ideally, borrowed funds should be used in ways that support economic growth, making it easier to repay debt in the future. As fiscal balances worsened across the SEA region due to the COVID-19 pandemic, public debt levels also increased.

Levels of public debt vary widely across SEA countries, from 2% of GDP in Brunei Darussalam to 173% in Singapore (Figure 2.7). On average, general government gross debt levels rose from 44% of GDP in 2019 to 58% in 2023. Gross debt increased over this period in seven of nine countries. This impact is also shown in figures showing increased budget deficits (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.4) across much of the region during the pandemic. Similar trends were seen in OECD Member countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with general government gross debt increasing in all four between 2019 and 2023.

This recent increase is seen clearly when debt levels are examined over time (Figure 2.8). Debt levels increased substantially between 2019 and 2020 in Indonesia (from 31% to 40% of GDP) and Thailand (from 41% to 49% of GDP, then 62% by 2023). Viet Nam is a notable regional outlier, having reduced its gross debt from 41% of GDP in 2019 to 34% in 2023. During the pandemic, Viet Nam prioritised reallocation of spending from other policy areas in order to contain debt accumulation. Financing through state-owned enterprises (e.g. soft loans provided by state-owned banks) and extra-budgetary funds (i.e. social security funds) was also mobilised to cover additional financial support to affected households and businesses. Together with positive economic growth, these efforts helped to contain general government debt (though liabilities may have accrued outside of this accounting measure) (OECD, 2023).

Another metric for examining debt levels is public debt per capita. On average across SEA countries, general government gross debt per capita increased from around USD 6 250 PPP in 2019 to around USD 10 400 PPP in 2023 (Figure 2.9). All nine countries in the region saw increases in public debt per capita during this period, as did the four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region. On average across OECD countries, general government gross debt per capita increased from around USD 58 100 PPP in 2019 to around USD 72 400 PPP in 2023. While debt per capita is significantly higher in OECD countries than in most SEA countries, OECD countries also have higher levels of income per capita and a higher ability to repay debts. A similar situation applies in Singapore, which has the highest debt per capita among SEA countries (around USD 252 600 PPP in 2023) but also has the highest income levels and debt repayment capacity in the region.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for OECD countries are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics database, which is based on the SNA framework. Data for SEA countries are from the IMF WEO database (April 2025), which is based on the GFSM. The GFSM is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, including the overarching SNA. Differences between the GFSM and SNA frameworks are addressed via correspondence criteria between the two systems. Figures may differ from nationally reported data due to differences in definition, coverage, time period or accounting basis.

Debt is generally defined as all liabilities requiring payment of interest or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date(s) in the future. The treatment of government liabilities in relation to their employee pension plans varies across countries, making international comparability difficult. Under the GFSM framework, unfunded government-sponsored retirement schemes are included in the debt components. In the 1993 SNA, only the funded component of the government employee pension plans is reflected in its liabilities. However, the 2008 SNA recognises the importance of the liabilities of employers' pension schemes, regardless of whether they are funded or unfunded. For information on the calculation of government debt per capita, see "general government revenues" under 2.4. Public revenues.

### *Further reading*

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/8f2a6ecb-en*.

IMF (2025), Singapore: 2025 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 2025/192, *https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229017930.002*.

### *Figure notes*

Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9. Data for 2023 for Viet Nam refer to forecasts. For more information on country-specific notes, see *https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/April*.

Figure 2.7. The IMF assessed in 2025 that Singapore's public debt is sustainable and that the overall risk of sovereign stress is low.

Figure 2.9. Data for Korea refer to 2022.

Figure D.1.1 (Annual growth rate of real government gross debt per capita) is available online in Annex D.

**Figure 2.7. General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/q2ypkc

**Figure 2.8. General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP in SEA, OECD and the largest SEA economies, 2007-2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/zq1b09

**Figure 2.9. General government gross debt per capita, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/b2g3ze

Governments raise revenues to pay for goods and public services, repay public debt and associated interest, and redistribute income across society. Public revenues are raised through taxes and non-tax sources (such as grants, interest income, fees and fines). Public revenue levels are determined by factors such as government policies, tax rates, the structure and size of the economy, current economic conditions, and the effectiveness of revenue collection. Public revenue levels in SEA countries dipped significantly during COVID-19. While they have now largely recovered, a focus on revenue mobilisation would support governments in the region in shifting public finances to a more sustainable basis for the longer term.

In 2023, general government revenues across SEA countries averaged 17.8% of GDP (Figure 2.10), nearly matching the pre-COVID-19 level of 17.9% recorded in 2019. Public revenues increased slightly in Lao PDR (from 15.4% of GDP to 16.4%) and Singapore (from 17.8% to 18.3%). Revenue levels remained steady in Thailand (20.9%) and the Philippines (20.3%). Brunei Darussalam recorded a fall in revenues from 28.8% of GDP to 18.5%. Unlike other countries in the region, Brunei Darussalam generates more than 70% of its revenue from oil and gas sales, so revenues are affected by market prices (ADB, 2024). Revenues in the SEA region remain below the average of 38.0% in OECD Member countries in 2023 and have declined from a peak of 20.1% in 2008 (Online Figure D.1.2). Countries in the region for which estimates are available have historically tended to increase revenues at a pace roughly equal to, or slightly faster than, GDP growth (OECD, 2024a). Reforms to improve domestic revenue mobilisation capacity across the region would support governments in managing their public debt and increasing the amounts of funding available to implement their policy priorities and investment plans.

General government revenue per capita compares the absolute amount of resources governments in different countries have to meet the needs of each citizen. In 2023, revenue per capita averaged USD 3 170 PPP across SEA countries (Figure 2.11). This was a substantial increase from approximately USD 2 530 PPP in 2019. Revenues per capita increased in seven of the nine SEA countries, with the largest increase in Singapore, rising from around USD 18 750 PPP in 2019 to USD 26 750 PPP in 2023. The increase has been driven by the region's rising GDP. However, revenues per capita in the region remain substantially below those of OECD countries. Six SEA countries collected less than USD 5 000 PPP per capita in 2023, compared to an average of nearly USD 22 800 PPP in OECD countries, reflecting the substantially lower levels of income in several SEA countries than in many OECD countries.

General government revenues per capita in both SEA countries and OECD countries were substantially affected by COVID-19 during 2019-2020 and in some cases 2020-2022 (Figure 2.12). As governments worldwide introduced restrictions on business and social activities to curb the spread of the virus, economic activity declined, along with tax revenue. On average, revenues per capita fell by 10.9% across SEA countries in 2019-2020, a decline greater than in OECD countries, where revenues fell 3.3% per capita over the same period. However, six of the nine countries in the region have since experienced a rebound in revenues, with positive growth in 2022 and 2023.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for OECD countries are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics database, which is based on the SNA framework. Data for SEA countries are from the IMF WEO database (April 2025), which is based on the GFSM. The GFSM is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, including the overarching SNA. Differences between the GFSM and SNA frameworks are addressed via correspondence criteria between the two systems. Figures may differ from nationally reported data due to differences in definition, coverage, time period or accounting basis.

General government consists of the central government, state government, local government and social security funds. Revenues encompass taxes, net social contributions, grants and other revenues. Government revenues per capita are calculated by converting total revenues to USD using the implied IMF PPP conversion rates and then dividing by the population. PPP is the number of units of a country's currency needed to purchase the same quantity of goods and services in another country.

## *Further reading*

ADB (2024), *Asian Development Outlook: Brunei Darussalam*, Asian Development Bank, Manila, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/957856/bru-ado-april-2024.pdf*.

OECD (2024a), *Revenue Statistics in Asia and the Pacific 2024: Tax Revenue Buoyancy in Asia*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/e4681bfa-en*.

OECD (2024b), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12. Data for 2023 for Viet Nam refer to forecasts. For more information on country-specific notes, see *https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/April*.

Figure D.1.2 (General government revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2007-2024) is available online in Annex D.

**Figure 2.10. General government revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/uplxbt

**Figure 2.11. General government revenues per capita, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/nerw5h

**Figure 2.12. Annual growth rate of real government revenues per capita, 2019-2020, 2020-2022, 2022-2023 and 2023-2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/z043xu

In most countries, the bulk of public revenues is raised through taxes. Governments levy taxes on a range of activities across the economy and make different policy choices on both their tax rates and their tax base, i.e. the mix of activities, actors and income sources subject to taxation. Governments typically aim to spread taxes across a broad base to help limit the impacts and disincentive effects they may generate in any one area of the economy or society.

General government tax revenues in SEA countries averaged 14.3% of GDP in 2023 (Figure 2.13). This accounts for 80% of the total government revenue in the region (17.8% of GDP; see Figure 2.10). In four of eight SEA countries, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP declined between 2019 and 2023, remaining slightly below the 2019 average of 14.8%. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP in SEA countries also remain significantly below the OECD average (34.0% of GDP in 2022). Further tax policy and administration reforms will be necessary in the future if SEA governments aim to collect a greater proportion of GDP and enhance the provision of public services, public investment and/or income redistribution. This may involve revising tax policy to remove unnecessary tax exemptions and taxing new activities effectively as their economies continue to grow and develop. It may also involve improving the capacity of their revenue authorities.

Tax structures vary across the SEA region, in line with the differing economies of the SEA countries (Figure 2.14). Lao PDR and Cambodia, both lower-middle-income economies, derive a greater proportion of tax revenue from taxes on goods and services. These are often administratively simpler to implement than other types of taxation, though they can also be more regressive. Both countries have made progress in lessening the proportion of tax revenue raised from this source since 2019, with Lao PDR cutting it from 76% to 72% in 2022, and Cambodia from 72% to 64%. Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, most of which are upper-middle-income economies, collect a greater proportion of revenue from taxes on income and profits, which are more administratively complex but also generally more progressive. Thailand slightly increased the proportion of revenue from this source from 36% of taxation in 2019 to 37% in 2022. Taxes on income and profits accounted for 33% of revenues in the Philippines in 2022, and 42% in Indonesia. This is similar to the OECD average of 37%. Malaysia has a distinct tax structure compared to others in the region, with 67% of tax revenues from taxes on income and profits. Recent or ongoing measures to expand the tax base have included expanding the scope of taxable services, introducing a capital gains tax on unlisted shares and exploring a high-value goods tax (ADB, 2024). Singapore, as a geographically small and highly urbanised country, raises 13% of its revenue from property taxes (including stamp duties). This is above the OECD average of 5%. Brunei Darussalam generates most public revenues from non-tax sources (oil and gas sales) and is not shown.

Social security contributions average only 7% of tax revenue in SEA countries, compared to 25% across the OECD. This may reflect differing policy choices. A contributing factor may also be the higher levels of informal employment and economic activity in SEA countries. This limits the extent to which social benefits such as unemployment insurance can be made available by governments in SEA countries.

### Methodology and definitions

Data are drawn from the OECD Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries database, whose classification of tax revenue is almost identical to that of the GFSM issued by the IMF. The GFSM provides a comprehensive conceptual and accounting framework suitable for analysing and evaluating fiscal policy. It is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, such as the overarching SNA. However, there are some differences between the definitions of tax revenues used in the OECD Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries database and the SNA. Figures may differ from nationally reported data due to differences in definition, coverage, time period or accounting basis.

In the SNA, taxes are compulsory payments, in cash or in kind, made by institutional units to the general government. Social contributions are actual or imputed payments made to social insurance schemes to provide for social insurance benefits that may be compulsory or voluntary. The OECD Revenue Statistics database treats compulsory social security contributions as taxes, whereas the SNA considers them social contributions because the receipt of social security benefits typically depends on appropriate contributions having been made.

### *Further reading*

ADB (2024), *Asian Development Outlook: Malaysia*, Asian Development Bank, Manila, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/957856/mal-ado-april-2024.pdf*.

OECD (2024a), *Revenue Statistics in Asia and the Pacific 2024: Tax Revenue Buoyancy in Asia*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/e4681bfa-en*.

OECD (2024b), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

### *Figure notes*

Figures 2.13, 2.14. Data for Brunei Darussalam are not available. OECD and SEA averages are unweighted.

**Figure 2.13. General government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2022 and 2023**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: OECD Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries (database). Data for OECD countries: OECD Revenue Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/u7i0lb

**Figure 2.14. Tax revenues as a percentage of total taxation, 2019 and 2022**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: OECD Revenue Statistics in Asian Countries (database). Data for OECD countries: OECD Revenue Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/2xpto8

Governments spend money to provide goods and services for residents, redistribute income across different groups in society, and fund objectives such as investments in public infrastructure. The amount of public expenditure provides an indication of the size of the public sector, although higher spending does not necessarily indicate better overall results. The scale of public expenditures is influenced by various factors, including the amount of resources governments raise as revenues and the accumulated effects of past policy decisions. However, total government expenditures often evolve relatively slowly. One reason is that public expenditures tend to increase during economic downturns, as spending on benefits to shelter citizens from economic impacts tends to rise. Another reason is that altering past policy decisions, particularly lowering the level of existing benefits to the public, can be a slow process. Nonetheless, governments across the SEA region increased public expenditures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP provide a measure of the size of the public sector compared to the economy as a whole. Government expenditures across SEA countries were 19.9% of GDP on average in 2023 (Figure 2.15), increasing slightly from 18.9% in 2019. There is significant variation around this average, however, with Brunei Darussalam having the highest public expenditures (29.4% of GDP). Public expenditures in SEA countries are significantly lower than in OECD Member countries, where they average 43% of GDP. OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region have public expenditures exceeding 35% of their GDP. There has been little change in the relative size of public expenditure levels in SEA since 2007, when they averaged 19.3% of GDP (Online Figure D.1.3).

General government expenditures per capita provide a measure of the resources governments can allocate to meet the needs of people living in their countries. As GDP and tax revenue have grown across the region, public expenditures per capita have also increased, from around USD 2 650 PPP in 2019 to around USD 3 550 PPP in 2023 (Figure 2.15). Increased expenditure can be used to provide goods and services to the public, increase wages for public sector workers, or to service the national debt. However, expenditures remain below the OECD average of around USD 22 800 PPP per capita. The two wealthiest countries in the SEA region, Brunei Darussalam (around USD 25 500 PPP) and Singapore (around USD 21 700 PPP), have public expenditures per person similar to those in OECD countries. Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Viet Nam all have public expenditures of less than USD 3 000 PPP per capita.

Data on the scale of increases in public expenditure during the COVID-19 pandemic are shown in Figure 2.17. The response included increased funding for healthcare and a range of support to help the public and businesses manage the effects of restrictions on economic activity. The average increase in real public expenditure per capita in 2019-2020 was 11% across SEA, and 13% across the OECD. Singapore notably increased public expenditure by 70% during this period. As surges in COVID-19 cases affected some SEA countries later than other regions of the world, some further increased public expenditures during 2020-2022, notably the Philippines, which increased public expenditure by 6% during this period. Most SEA countries have since either cut public expenditures per capita or limited their growth.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for OECD countries are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics database, which is based on the SNA framework. Data for SEA countries are sourced from the IMF's WEO database (April 2025), which is based on the GFSM. The GFSM is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, including the overarching SNA. Differences between the GFSM and SNA frameworks are addressed via correspondence criteria between the two systems. Figures may differ from nationally reported data due to differences in definition, coverage, time period or accounting basis.

General government consists of central government, state government, local government and social security funds. Expenditures encompass intermediate consumption, employee compensation, subsidies, property income (including interest spending), social benefits, grants and other expenses, and investments.

Purchasing power parity (PPP) is the number of units of Country B's currency needed to purchase the same quantity of goods and services in Country A. For information on the calculation of government expenditures per capita, see "general government revenues" under Indicator 2.4. Public revenues.

## *Further reading*

ADB (2024), *Asian Development Outlook*, Asian Development Bank, Manila *http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/FLS240452-3*.

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 2.15, 2.16 and 2.17. Data for 2023 for Viet Nam refer to forecasts. For more information on country-specific notes, see *https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2025/April*.

Figure D.1.3 (General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2007-2024) is available online in Annex D.

**Figure 2.15. General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/s8kzdx

**Figure 2.16. General government expenditures per capita, 2019, 2023 and 2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF (2025), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/npcqbd

**Figure 2.17. Annual growth rate of real government expenditures per capita, 2019-2020, 2020-2022, 2022-2023 and 2023-2024**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF, World Economic Outlook database (IMF WEO) (April 2025). Data for the OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/0qe8tw

This section provides more detail on the scale and content of public expenditure responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments made a range of exceptional expenditures to address the urgent needs that arose from COVID-19. Additional and unplanned expenditures were needed to fund the extra equipment and capacity needed to mount a medical response. In addition, lockdowns required many business activities that required person-to-person contact (e.g. manufacturing, and in-person purchases of goods and services) to close to limit the spread of the virus. Public expenditures helped to directly support households and businesses that had lost income as a result. Many governments also cut taxes and other charges in order to provide economic support, resulting in revenue foregone. This special section provides additional details on these responses in SEA countries. This section captures the fiscal response through the earlier stages of the pandemic (via detailed data for 2020 and 2021), but not continuing support in the later stages (2022 and 2023), as data is not easily available.

Among SEA countries for which data are available, on-budget measures announced to support the COVID-19 response as of October 2021 averaged 9.7% of GDP (Figure 2.18). This ranged from 1.8% of GDP in Viet Nam to 18.3% of GDP in Singapore. In most cases, expenditure on non-health measures (e.g. income support for workers whose businesses were closed due to lockdowns) was significantly larger than that on health. For example, in Indonesia, 2% of GDP was directed to the health response, and 7.3% to non-health responses. Similar patterns were seen in OECD Member countries in Asia. These additional spending measures directly contributed to the sharp increase in public spending in the region. In addition, many governments also responded through "liquidity support" measures such as loan guarantees or non-commercial activity by public corporations on behalf of the government. Liquidity support measures do not alter public revenues or expenditures and are not graphed. However, they may create liabilities that affect public finances in the future.

All governments in the SEA region provided some form of income support to households during the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 2.19). The average number of days of direct economic support to households in the SEA region was 669 days. This was slightly lower than the OECD average of 735 days. It is estimated that more than two-thirds of the workforce in SEA countries for which data are available is employed in the informal sector (ILO, 2024). Singapore and Malaysia provided 1 005 and 979 days of income support to all workers, in both the informal and formal sectors (Figure 2.20). Some other SEA countries provided financial aid principally to workers in the formal sector, including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia and Lao PDR. The allocation of direct economic support to workers in the formal and informal sectors is similar between the SEA region and OECD countries. Both SEA countries and OECD countries, at times, limited economic support to workers inside the formal economy. On average, SEA countries offered 406 days of support to all workers, while OECD countries provided about 456 days. Similarly, OECD countries provided, on average, 279 days of support limited to workers in the formal sector, compared to the SEA average of 263 days of support.

### Methodology and definitions

Data are from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), which documents daily policy data from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2022 across 185 countries.

## *Further reading*

IMF (2021), *Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic*, *https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Fiscal-Policies-Database-in-Response-to-COVID-19*.

Hale, T. et al. (2021), "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)", *Nature Human Behaviour*.

International Labour Organization (2024), *Labour Force Statistics* (LFS, STLFS, RURBAN databases), *https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/informality/*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 2.18. Data show on-budget COVID-19-related measures from January 2020 onwards, covering measures for implementation in 2020, 2021, and beyond. No separate data are available for health and other categories in Thailand. The OECD average is not available. Data are as of October 2021. Graph excludes off-budget responses.

Figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20. A full list of the indicators in the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker dataset is at *https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker/blob/master/documentation/codebook.md*.

**Figure 2.18. Additional spending and revenue foregone in response to COVID-19 as a percentage of GDP, as of October 2021**




*Source:* IMF (2021), Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, *https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Fiscal-Policies-Database-in-Response-to-COVID-19*.

StatLink https://stat.link/1h4dsc

**Figure 2.19. Depth of direct economic support during COVID-19**




*Source:* Blavatnik School of Government and University of Oxford (n.d.), Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, *https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/covid-19-government-response-tracker*.

StatLink https://stat.link/aclzwb

**Figure 2.20. Breadth of direct economic support during COVID-19**




*Source:* Blavatnik School of Government and University of Oxford (n.d.), Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, *https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/covid-19-government-response-tracker*.

StatLink https://stat.link/8pdc20

Data on public expenditure by economic transaction (referred to below as "by type") provides information on the size of government expenditures in areas such as public investment, provision of benefits to the public, and spending to service public debt. Some caution should be applied in interpreting these data for the SEA region. Data on public expenditures by type are available for only five countries; therefore, the findings may not accurately reflect developments in other countries. Moreover, the most recent data are from 2022, which may partially reflect the temporary changes in the composition of public expenditure made in order to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, discussed in the previous indicator.

Total public expenditures by SEA countries for which data are available average 19% of GDP (Figure 2.21). This ranges from 15% of GDP in Lao PDR to 26% in the Philippines. All SEA countries spend a substantially smaller proportion of GDP than OECD Member countries, which on average spend 43% of GDP. The most substantive difference in expenditure patterns is in social benefits. These average 17% of GDP in OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and 2% of GDP across SEA countries. In some cases, differences in expenditure composition also reflect domestic policy priorities. Notably, Cambodia currently allocates 6% of its GDP to public investments, and Lao PDR 4%, both figures higher than the average of 3.5% in OECD countries. In Cambodia, this reflects a significant public infrastructure programme.

In most SEA countries for which data are available, the largest category of public expenditures was compensation of employees (Figure 2.22). These are wages paid to public sector workers, including both civil servants and people employed in public bodies, such as public schools and hospitals. However, spending on compensation of employees fell from an average of 29% of public expenditures in 2019 to 24% in 2023. Other areas have seen growth in spending in some countries. Grants and other expenses increased from 5% to 18% of public expenditure in Singapore. This partly reflects temporary grants made to support businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, Singapore allocated SGD 500 million (Singaporean dollars) (USD 390 million) in grants to support workers and businesses in segments of the economy facing slower recoveries (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 2022). In Cambodia, spending on social benefits increased from 3% to 11% of public expenditure, while spending on grants fell from 6.8% to 1% of spending. Social benefits are transfers of cash or benefits-in-kind that help protect certain parts of the population from social risks, such as unemployment benefits. Indonesia increased spending on subsidies from 7.9% to 13.9% of spending. Other types of public expenditure altered little between 2019 and 2023. SEA countries allocate a proportionally smaller share of public expenditure to social benefits (10% on average) compared to OECD countries (39% on average) and a substantially larger proportion of public expenditure to investment (17%) compared to OECD countries (8%).

### Methodology and definitions

Data for OECD countries are derived from the OECD National Accounts Statistics database, which is based on the SNA framework. Data for SEA countries are sourced from the IMF's WEO database (April 2025), which is based on the GFSM. The GFSM is harmonised with other macroeconomic statistical frameworks, including the overarching SNA. Differences between the GFSM and SNA frameworks are addressed via correspondence criteria between the two systems. Figures may differ from nationally reported data due to differences in definition, coverage, time period or accounting basis.

Expenditures encompass intermediate consumption, employee compensation, subsidies, property income (mainly interest payments), social benefits, grants and other expenses, and investments. All transactions at the general government level are recorded on a consolidated basis, i.e. transactions between levels of government are netted out.

### *Further reading*

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*.

OECD (2024), *Multi-dimensional Review of Lao PDR: Financing Sustainable Development*, OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/756b6663-en*.

Singapore Ministry of Finance (2022), *Charting Our New Way Forward Together: Budget 2022*, *https://www.mof.gov.sg/docs/librariesprovider3/budget2022/download/pdf/fy2022_budget_booklet_english.pdf*.

### *Figure notes*

Figures 2.21, 2.22. Data for Lao PDR, Philippines and Singapore are recorded on a cash basis. Data for the Lao PDR refer to the government sector of budgetary central government. Data for Cambodia's investment do not include the consumption of fixed capital. Data for Singapore's investment refer to fixed investment, and data for other expenses include acquisitions minus disposals of non-produced, non-financial assets. Data for Lao PDR and the Philippines refer to 2022 rather than 2023.

Figure 2.21. The differences in total expenditures between Figure 2.21 and Figure 2.15 are due to the use of a different IMF reporting database.

**Figure 2.21. Government expenditures by economic transaction as a percentage of GDP, 2023**




*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF Government Finance Statistics (IMF GFS) database. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/p1zl0o

**Figure 2.22. Structure of general government expenditures by economic transaction, 2019 and 2023**


*Source:* Data for SEA countries: IMF Government Finance Statistics (IMF GFS) database. Data for OECD countries: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/7ocwj9

*Chapter 3*

# Budgeting

Well-designed fiscal rules and objectives can support sustainable fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability. Fiscal rules are legally binding constraints on fiscal policy that establish numerical limits on budgetary aggregates through legislation, providing a long-term anchor for public finances. Fiscal objectives are politically mandated targets without legal enforcement (Moretti, Keller and Majercak, 2023). Clear fiscal rules and objectives can help achieve fiscal goals, reinforce fiscal discipline, and anchor quality budget institutions within the government (OECD, 2023). By signalling fiscal intentions, they also provide a benchmark for accountability and enhance market confidence.

The design and legal foundations of fiscal rules and objectives vary, reflecting differences in economic conditions, institutions and policy priorities. Simpler rules that are easier to calculate may enhance public understanding and transparency. In 2024, six out of the seven Southeast Asia (SEA) countries for which data are available had fiscal rules or objectives in place (Table 3.1). The most common are limits on public debt, adopted by six out of seven countries, and a balanced budget, applied in five out of seven countries. This is similar to OECD Member countries, where the most common objectives are a balanced budget (34 of 36 countries), and limits on public debt (30 of 36 countries). Among SEA countries, only the Philippines sets a revenue target, defining a minimum level of revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Similarly, in OECD countries, only 15 of 36 apply revenue targets or constraints. In 2024, of the seven SEA countries for which data are available, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand had embedded their fiscal rules in the constitution or legislation. Similarly, most OECD countries (29 out of 36) have legally binding national fiscal rules (Table 3.1. Types and legal foundation of national fiscal rules and objectives, 2024).

To balance between fiscal discipline and flexibility, many countries incorporate escape clauses into their fiscal rules. These allow temporary deviations from fiscal rules in crises. The four SEA countries that have fiscal rules embedded in their constitutions and legislation have escape clauses. In contrast, only 23 out of 29 OECD countries (79%) with fiscal rules have escape clauses. Cambodia and the Philippines have placed their fiscal objectives in a strategic policy document, and/or in a political commitment, so they do not require escape clauses to deviate from them.

Deviations from fiscal rules and objectives should be allowed only in exceptional circumstances. Political commitment and strong enforcement mechanisms are both important in avoiding unjustified deviations. Of the four SEA countries that have embedded fiscal rules in their constitutions or legislation, both Thailand and Malaysia require an explanation to the legislature in cases of deviation (Table 3.2). Malaysia also requires that corrective measures be proposed to the legislature, and Thailand also has further measures in place. Singapore has constitutional arrangements to help ensure the implementation of fiscal rules (see the table notes). Indonesia and Cambodia lack specific enforcement mechanisms for their fiscal rules and objectives, although they have demonstrated a strong political commitment and compliance. However, many OECD countries still implement more stringent enforcement mechanisms, such as automatic correction mechanisms (12 out of 36 countries) and automatic sanctions (6 out of 36 countries).

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries are drawn from the 2024 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries, with responses from eight SEA countries. Data for OECD countries are drawn from the 2023 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, with responses from 36 OECD countries. For both surveys, the data refer only to central/federal government practices. Responses represent the countries' self-assessments of current practices and procedures.

## *Further reading*

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, *https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en*.

OECD (2025), *Quality Budget Institutions: Developments in OECD countries*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/8e811202-en*.

OECD (2023), *OECD Spending Better Framework*, OECD Publishing, Paris, GOV/SBO(2022)6/REV1.

## *Figure notes*

Tables 3.1, 3.2. Data are not available for the Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter "Lao PDR"), Viet Nam, Lithuania or Mexico.

Table 3.1. Countries may have several national fiscal rules and objectives for the same type of fiscal rule/objective.

Table 3.2. Data only cover countries with national fiscal rules and/or objectives. "Other" Singapore: Under the Constitution, the president safeguards past reserves through a "two-key system". The government (first key) passes the Supply Bill through parliament and is expected to balance the budget within its term. The president (second key) has discretionary power to use past reserves. More information on Australia, and Thailand is available in the statlink.

**Table 3.1. Types and legal foundation of national fiscal rules and objectives, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2023)**

| | Budget balance (deficit/surplus) | Debt | Expenditure | Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | x | x | x | x |
| Cambodia | □ | □ | x | x |
| Indonesia | ⭘ | ⭘ | x | x |
| Malaysia | ⭘ | ⭘ | ⭘ | x |
| Philippines | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Singapore | ● | ⭘ | ● | x |
| Thailand | x | ⭘ | ⭘ | x |
| **SEA total (yes)** | **5 of 7** | **6 of 7** | **4 of 7** | **1 of 7** |
| Australia | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| Japan | ⭘□ | ⭘ | □ | x |
| Korea | □ | □ | x | x |
| New Zealand | □ | □ | □ | □ |
| **OECD total (yes)** | **34 of 36** | **30 of 36** | **30 of 36** | **15 of 36** |

*Key:*
● Constitution
⭘ Law
⊙ Subordinate regulation / Government rules
□ Strategic policy document / Political commitment
x No / Not applicable

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2023), *Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks*.

StatLink https://stat.link/28p0uz

**Table 3.2. Enforcement mechanisms for national fiscal rules and objectives, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2023)**

| | Automatic correction mechanisms | Automatic sanctions | Entity must implement corrective measures | Requirement to propose corrective measures to the legislature | Requirement to explain reasons for non-compliance to the legislature | No legal procedure defined *ex ante*, but a proven record of strong political commitment and implementation | None | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Cambodia | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| Indonesia | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| Malaysia | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Philippines | | | ✓ | | | | | |
| Singapore | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Thailand | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| **SEA total (yes)** | **0** | **0** | **1 of 6** | **1 of 6** | **2 of 6** | **2 of 6** | **0** | **2 of 6** |
| Australia | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Japan | | | | | | | ✓ | |
| Korea | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| New Zealand | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| **OECD total (yes)** | **12 of 36** | **6 of 36** | **10 of 36** | **12 of 36** | **12 of 36** | **5 of 36** | **3 of 36** | **8 of 36** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2023), *Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks*.

StatLink https://stat.link/li6sah

Medium-term and top-down budgeting are key elements of medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF). A medium-term perspective enables policymakers to assess the fiscal impact of current decisions over time, ensuring greater predictability in resource availability and allocation. Top-down budgeting reinforces fiscal discipline by setting spending limits that align budgets with the government's financial strategy and policy priorities. Effective implementation of these approaches requires key budgetary mechanisms, such as top-down expenditure ceilings. Ideally, top-down expenditure ceilings should be binding for at least two years and assigned to ministries to strengthen ownership and accountability. Beyond this period, ceilings can become more flexible and indicative. They should either align with the government's term or be updated annually on a rolling basis (OECD, 2023).

In 2024, all eight SEA countries for which data are available used top-down expenditure ceilings (Table 3.3). Malaysia uses top-down expenditure ceilings only for the upcoming year, whereas the other seven countries have multi-year top-down expenditure ceilings in place. This is similar to OECD Member countries, of whom 33 out of 36 use top-down expenditure ceilings, and 26 out of 36 use them on a multi-year basis. While approaches to setting expenditure ceilings vary across countries, many SEA countries and OECD countries follow similar patterns. Most countries set ceilings for a period of three to four years (SEA: 6 out of 8, OECD: 22 out of 36); establish binding ceilings for at least the upcoming budget year (SEA: 6 out of 8; OECD: 25 out of 36); and assign them at the organisational level, such as line ministries or agencies (SEA: 7 out of 8; OECD: 23 out of 36). Most countries with multi-year expenditure ceilings use a rolling medium-term framework (SEA: 5 out of 7; OECD: 20 out of 26 countries), meaning that each year the ceiling is extended by one year to incorporate an additional outer year. A smaller proportion of countries apply a fixed-period framework, where new ceilings are set only after the initial period ends (SEA: 2 out of 7; OECD: 6 out of 26).

Revisions to multi-year expenditure ceilings occur at varying frequencies. Most of the SEA countries that use multi-year ceilings revise them annually (four out of seven) (Figure 3.1). The Philippines and Thailand make adjustments more frequently in response to new macroeconomic and revenue forecasts. Similarly, in OECD countries, 12 out of 26 revise their out-year ceilings once per year, while 4 countries adjust them more than once annually.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries are drawn from the 2024 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries, with responses from eight SEA countries. Data for OECD countries are drawn from the 2023 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, with responses from 36 OECD countries. For both surveys, the data refer only to central/federal government practices. Responses represent the countries' self-assessments of current practices and procedures.

Medium-term budgeting refers to budgeting for a period of multiple years. Top-down budgeting refers to defining spending limits based on the economic forecast, estimates of future spending on current policies (baselines) and the government's fiscal objectives, before considering bottom-up budget requests.

Top-down expenditure ceilings refer to setting an upper limit on the level of government expenditure, whether for multiple years or the annual budget. Ceilings can be set for different areas of expenditure, for organisations and/or other levels.

## *Further reading*

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, *https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en*.

OECD (2023), *OECD Spending Better Framework*, OECD Publishing, Paris, GOV/SBO(2022)6/REV1.

## *Figure notes*

Table 3.3, Figure 3.1. Data are not available for Viet Nam, Lithuania or Mexico. Australia, Belgium and Italy do not use top-down expenditure ceilings. Australia publishes multi-year expenditure forecasts that are not ceilings in nature.

Table 3.3. T1 is the upcoming budget year. The table shows up to which year either binding or indicative ceilings are used. Further explanations on country-specific details (letters a to c) are available in the statlink.

Figure 3.1. Data are only available for countries that have multi-year top-down expenditure ceilings (beyond the upcoming budget year). "Other" for Singapore: Usually revised every five years, matching the fixed-period framework. Each year, a ministry's ceiling increases based on smoothed GDP growth, known as the budget growth factor (BGF). If GDP growth changes, the BGF adjusts, which in turn affects future ceilings. The Ministry of Finance can also modify ceilings if significant factors beyond the ministries' control arise. "Other" for OECD countries includes, but is not limited to, specific reasons for revisions that are typically done once a year (or more in exceptional cases).

## Table 3.3. Types, length and level of top-down expenditure ceilings, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2023)

| Country | Time period | | | | | | Level of ceilings (granularity) | | | | Operationalisation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Duration | Upcoming budget year | 2 yrs | 3 yrs | 4 yrs | ≥ 5 yrs | Total expenditure level | Organisational level | Programme level | Other | |
| Brunei Darussalam | 3 years | | | | | | T1+2 | T1+2 | | | Rolling |
| Cambodia | 3 years | | | | | | | T1+2 | | | Rolling |
| Indonesia | 4 years | | | | | | T1+3 | T1+3 (a) | T1 | | Rolling |
| Lao PDR | 3 years | | | | | | T1+2 | T1+2 | | | Rolling |
| Malaysia | Upcoming budget year | | | | | | T1 | T1 | T1 | | N/A |
| Philippines | 4 years | | | | | | T1+3 | T1+2 | T1 | | Fixed period |
| Singapore | 5 years | | | | | | T1+4 | T1+4 | T1+4 | | Fixed period |
| Thailand | 3 years | | | | | | T1+3 | | | | Rolling |
| **SEA total** | | 1 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 0 | **SEA total** |
| | | | **7 of 8** countries have multi-annual top-down expenditure ceilings | | | | | | | | Rolling: 5 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fixed period: 2 |
| Japan | Upcoming budget year | | | | | | | T1 | | | N/A |
| Korea | Upcoming budget year | | | | | | | T1 | | | N/A |
| New Zealand (b) | 4 years | | | | | | | | | T1+3 (c) | Rolling |
| **OECD total** | | 7 | 0 | 8 | 14 | 4 | 22 | 23 | 13 | 7 | **OECD total** |
| | | | **26 of 36** countries have multi-annual top-down expenditure ceilings | | | | | | | | Rolling: 20 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fixed period: 6 |

Binding
Indicative

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2023), *Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks*.

StatLink https://stat.link/ayms5e

## Figure 3.1. Frequency of multi-year top-down expenditure revisions, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2023)




*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2023), *Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks*.

StatLink https://stat.link/xt1apy

SEA faces significant environmental challenges and vulnerabilities from the long-term rise in temperatures and increased frequency of extreme weather events. This makes it essential to integrate environmental dimensions into public budgets. Green budgeting helps integrate environmental considerations and risks into the budgetary process and decision making. This helps governments to enhance their understanding of the environmental impact of spending choices, improve resource allocation, advance both national and international sustainability commitments, and be better prepared to respond to extreme weather events. Green budgeting involves the use of special initiatives, processes and analytical tools with a view to promoting policies and investments that help achieve environmental goals and commitments.

Green budgeting is gaining momentum in SEA. In 2024, four out of eight SEA countries for which data are available implemented green budgeting practices (Figure 3.2). This includes countries with long-standing practices, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, both of which introduced green budgeting over a decade ago. The more recent adopters, Singapore and Thailand, have implemented such practices within the past five years. Brunei Darussalam and Lao PDR have plans to introduce green budgeting, while Cambodia and Malaysia are considering implementation. A similar trend has been observed among OECD Member countries, where the adoption of green budgeting accelerated in the early 2020s. In 2022, two-thirds of OECD countries (24 out of 36) had implemented green budgeting practices.

In SEA, the legal basis or authority for green budgeting is primarily based on administrative practices, such as budget circulars and guidelines, as well as specific legislation. Both approaches are applied by three out of four SEA countries implementing green budgeting (Table 3.4). Most OECD countries have also developed a green budgeting framework through administrative practices (21 out of 24). Most countries report on the implementation of green budgeting (SEA: 3 out of 4; OECD: 16 out of 24). Reporting formats vary, with some countries integrating green budgeting information into broader financial reports, while others issue standalone documents. In SEA, only the Philippines publishes a green budget statement, which details how fiscal decisions contribute to environmental objectives, alongside the draft budget.

The most common tools in both SEA countries and OECD countries for implementing green budgeting include environmental impact assessments, which ensure that all policy proposals take into account the possible environmental externalities (SEA: 3 out of 4; OECD: 18 out of 24) (Table 3.5). Another widely used approach is green budget tagging, which enables governments to estimate public spending in relation to environmental goals, but does not provide information on the actual impact of these expenditures (SEA: 3 out of 4; OECD: 13 out of 24). Integrating an environmental dimension into fiscal risk analysis remains an emerging practice among OECD countries (3 out of 24) but is practised by 3 out of 4 SEA countries. This practice can help assess the impact of risks associated with the long-term rise in temperatures and extreme weather events, as well as the effectiveness of mitigation policies, on public finances, including increases in disaster-related spending.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries are drawn from the 2024 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries, with responses from eight SEA countries. Data for OECD countries are drawn from the 2022 OECD Survey on Green Budgeting, with responses from 36 OECD countries. For both surveys, the data refer only to central/federal government practices. Responses represent the countries' self-assessments of current practices and procedures.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2024), *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9aea61f0-en*.

OECD (2024), "Beyond green tagging: How can public budgeting support climate goals?", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2024/06, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/b154d49b-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 3.2, Table 3.4, Table 3.5. Data are not available for Viet Nam, Costa Rica or Slovenia.

Tables 3.4, 3.5. Data only cover countries that implement green budgeting.

Figure 3.2. Brunei Darussalam has formed a project team to develop a framework for environmental impact assessments, cost-benefit analysis, and to explore the introduction of green budget tagging. Malaysia is not yet implementing green budgeting but is implementing *ex post* Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) budget tagging and assessing the value of the information produced.

Table 3.5. Selection of green budgeting methods and tools used directly in budgeting. Countries also implement other green instruments, such as sovereign green bonds (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), sustainability loans (Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and carbon budget and carbon pricing instruments (Singapore).

**Figure 3.2. Existence of green budgeting, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Green Budgeting*.
StatLink https://stat.link/kzsp8l

**Table 3.4. Legal basis and accountability and transparency mechanisms for green budgeting, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**

| | Legal basis | | | Accountability and transparency | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Administrative practice | Other legislation | Budget law | Government reporting on green budgeting implementation | Publicly available information on green budgeting |
| Indonesia | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Philippines | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Singapore | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Thailand | ✓ | | | | |
| **SEA total (yes)** | **3 of 4** | **3 of 4** | **0 of 4** | **3 of 4** | **3 of 4** |
| Korea | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| New Zealand | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| **OECD total (yes)** | **21 of 24** | **14 of 24** | **11 of 24** | **16 of 24** | **15 of 24** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Green Budgeting*.
StatLink https://stat.link/g6y4ru

**Table 3.5. Green budgeting methods and tools, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**

| | Environmental impact assessments | Green budget tagging | Green dimension in performance budgeting | Green dimension in risk analysis | Carbon assessment of budget measures | Green dimension in macro-fiscal projections | Review of harmful tax expenditures | Environmental cost benefit analysis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indonesia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| Philippines | | ● | | ● | | | | |
| Singapore | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | | ● |
| Thailand | ● | ○ | ● | | | | | |
| **SEA total** | | | | | | | | |
| **● Yes** | **3 of 4** | **3 of 4** | **3 of 4** | **3 of 4** | **2 of 4** | **2 of 4** | **1 of 4** | **1 of 4** |
| **○ Plan to introduce** | **0 of 4** | **1 of 4** | **0 of 4** | **0 of 4** | **0 of 4** | **0 of 4** | **0 of 4** | **0 of 4** |
| Korea | ● | ● | | | ● | | | |
| New Zealand | ● | | ● | | ● | | | ● |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | | | |
| **● Yes** | **18 of 24** | **13 of 24** | **11 of 24** | **3 of 24** | **11 of 24** | **4 of 24** | **12 of 24** | **11 of 24** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Green Budgeting*.
StatLink https://stat.link/i6gvmn

Differences in outcomes between men and women can impose significant economic and fiscal costs. Gaps in employment between men and women undermine a country's growth, productivity, competitiveness and long-term fiscal sustainability. Addressing such gaps can yield substantial economic benefits (OECD, 2022). Gender budgeting systematically integrates considerations of such differences into budget decision making. It promotes policies and investments that help close gaps between men and women through practices and procedures employed in the budget cycle. Effective gender budgeting frameworks require strong institutional and strategic foundations, appropriate methods and tools, an enabling environment within an administration and robust accountability and transparency measures to ensure impact and sustainability (OECD, 2023a).

Two out of eight SEA countries for which data are available, Indonesia and the Philippines, are currently implementing gender budgeting. In addition, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand are planning to implement gender budgeting. Gender budgeting is significantly less prevalent than in OECD Member countries, where 23 of 38 countries are currently implementing it (Figure 3.3).

The two SEA countries implementing gender budgeting both have a specific legal foundation for gender budgeting, Indonesia's National Development Planning Framework and the Philippines' Magna Carta of Women (Table 3.6). This is a notable strength and can safeguard implementation by insulating gender budgeting practices from political and economic fluctuations (OECD, 2023b). In OECD countries, 14 out of 23 countries implementing gender budgeting have a legal basis for doing so.

Another important success factor for gender budgeting is institutional leadership. Assigning responsibility to the Central Budget Authority (CBA), typically within the Ministry of Finance, can reinforce gender budgeting through its central role in resource allocation and policy co-ordination (OECD, 2023b). This is the case in 14 out of 23 OECD countries. In contrast, Indonesia shares responsibility between the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection and the CBA, while in the Philippines, the lead role lies with the Philippine Commission on Women, the national gender equality institution. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the methods and tools used to implement gender budgeting. Both SEA countries and OECD countries tailor their methods and tools to national budgeting systems. Indonesia and the Philippines both apply a gender dimension in performance setting and require gender information to accompany budget proposals (Table 3.7). These methods are also used by around half of OECD countries (12 out of 23).

Gender impact assessments, conducted either *ex ante* or *ex post*, are another common tool for evaluating the impact of gender. Indonesia plans to introduce *ex ante* and *ex post* assessments, whereas the Philippines conducts *ex post* assessments. OECD countries exhibit similar levels of use for *ex ante* and *ex post* assessments: 11 out of 23 countries use *ex ante* assessments, and 10 out of 23 countries use *ex post* assessments. Among the two SEA countries implementing gender budgeting, only the Philippines publishes gender budgeting information through an annual gender budgeting analysis in the form of an *ex post* gender budget statement, providing data on allocations and expenditures related to gender mainstreaming objectives at both the national and local levels.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries are drawn from the 2024 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries, with responses from eight SEA countries. Data for OECD countries are drawn from the 2022 OECD Survey on Gender Budgeting, with responses from all 38 OECD countries. For both surveys, the data refer only to central/federal government practices. Responses represent the countries' self-assessments of current practices and procedures.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2023a), *Gender Budgeting in OECD Countries 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/647d546b-en*.

OECD (2023b), "OECD Best Practices for Gender Budgeting", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/1, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9574ed6f-en*.

OECD (2022), "Gender budgeting: The economic and fiscal rationale", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 22/3, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/dedebeca-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 3.3, Table 3.6, Table 3.7. Data are not available for Viet Nam.

Tables 3.6, 3.7. Data only cover countries that implement gender budgeting.

Figure 3.3. Australia and New Zealand initially introduced gender budgeting on a pilot basis. While Australia has since formally embedded gender budgeting within its overall budget framework, the New Zealand pilot has been discontinued. Malaysia has implemented Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB), though its adoption is partial and varies across level of government.

Table 3.6. "Other lead institution" includes countries where leadership for gender budgeting is shared between the CBA and another part of government. More information on Indonesia and Japan in StatLink.

Table 3.7. Selection of gender budgeting methods and tools. The Philippines' Performance Audit Report covers the period from 2009 to 2018. Australia did not, at this time, systematically use any tools and methods, as it had recently reintroduced gender budgeting.

**Figure 3.3. Existence of gender budgeting, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Gender Budgeting*.
StatLink https://stat.link/abeswl

**Table 3.6. Legal basis and lead institution for gender budgeting, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**

| | Legal basis | | | | Lead institution | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Ordinances / Regulations | Organic budget law or other legislation | Constitution | Other | Central Budget Authority | Gender equality institution | Other |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | ✓ |
| Philippines | ✓ | ✓ | | | | ✓ | |
| **SEA total (yes)** | **2 of 2** | **2 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **1 of 2** | **1 of 2** |
| Australia | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Japan | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Korea | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | |
| New Zealand | | | | | | | ✓ |
| **OECD total (yes)** | **8 of 23** | **12 of 23** | **2 of 23** | **4 of 23** | **14 of 23** | **0 of 23** | **9 of 23** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Gender Budgeting*.
StatLink https://stat.link/i9hzx8

**Table 3.7. Gender budgeting methods and tools, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022)**

| | Gender dimension in performance setting/ performance budgeting | Requirement for gender information to accompany budget proposals | Gender budget tagging | *Ex ante* gender impact assessment of budget measures | *Ex post* gender impact assessment of budget measures | Distributional assessment of tax and welfare measures by gender | Gender dimension to evaluation and/or performance audit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indonesia | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | | |
| Philippines | ● | ● | ○ | | ● | | ● |
| **SEA total** | | | | | | | |
| **● Yes** | **2 of 2** | **2 of 2** | **1 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **1 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **1 of 2** |
| **○ Plan to introduce** | **0 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **1 of 2** | **1 of 2** | **1 of 2** | **0 of 2** | **0 of 2** |
| Australia | | | | | | | |
| Japan | | | ● | | | | |
| Korea | ● | | ● | | ● | | ● |
| New Zealand | | ● | | ● | | | |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | | |
| **● Yes** | **12 of 23** | **12 of 23** | **10 of 23** | **11 of 23** | **10 of 23** | **8 of 23** | **7 of 23** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2022), *OECD Survey on Gender Budgeting*.
StatLink https://stat.link/f8g7kh

Budget transparency refers to the public disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner, enabling citizens and stakeholders to understand and effectively scrutinise government budgeting and spending practices. It strengthens public trust by promoting open and accountable governance. Key budgetary information should be disclosed throughout the budget process, and budget information should be tailored to user needs and available in an accessible format. The use of machine-readable and open-source formats, combined with more sophisticated tools such as digital fiscal platforms, enhances accessibility, facilitates analysis, and improves public understanding (OECD, 2023).

The majority of SEA countries for which data are available publish core budget reports, including the executive's budget proposal and the approved budget (six out of seven countries), as well as key reporting documents such as the year-end budget execution reports and year-end financial statements (five out of seven countries) (Table 3.8). All OECD Member countries publish the executive's budget proposal and the approved budget, as well as year-end financial statements. However, among SEA countries, only the Philippines systematically releases budgetary information in an open and machine-readable data format across its core budget and reporting documents. Publishing budgetary data in an open and machine-readable format makes it easier for civil society and the public to analyse and understand. Four of seven SEA countries publish a report on fiscal risks, which strengthens their ability to plan and respond to risks. This practice is more common than among OECD countries, of which only 13 of 35 publish such reports. However, while 29 out of 35 OECD countries publish long-term fiscal sustainability reports to identify future expenditures based on demographic and economic projections, only Indonesia does so among SEA countries.

Various initiatives can be used to promote greater budget understanding among key stakeholders and the public. Citizens' guides to the budget aim to provide accessible summaries of annual budget decisions, presented in a clear and comprehensible format. Among SEA countries, six of eight publish citizens' budgets, the same proportion as among OECD countries (Table 3.9). However, SEA countries lag in the implementation of digital and interactive fiscal reporting (DIFR) platforms. Its main application is online platforms that offer comprehensive open data access to fiscal data, and/or include tools like interactive visuals and plain-language explanations. They complement traditional reporting methods to enhance public understanding and engagement (OECD, 2025). While 27 out of 36 OECD countries, including Korea, have developed DIFRs, among SEA countries, only Singapore has currently done so. Singapore also publishes budget infographics, offering a suite of products such as budget highlights, visual summaries and digital displays to convey key messages on budget initiatives and policy objectives.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries are drawn from the 2024 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries, with responses from eight SEA countries. Data for OECD countries are drawn from the 2023 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, which received responses from 36 OECD countries, and the 2022 OECD Survey on Financial Management and Reporting, which received responses from 34 OECD countries. For all surveys, the data refer only to central/federal government practices. Responses represent the countries' self-assessments of current practices and procedures.

Open and machine-readable data refer to digital data available with the technical and legal characteristics necessary for free use, re-use, and redistribution by anyone, anytime, anywhere. Its format enables automatic reading, processing and manipulation by a computer.

DIFR platforms use a multi-layered digital approach to financial reporting, combining comprehensive data access with targeted communication strategies. DIFR's main application is fiscal platforms, which are online platforms that offer comprehensive open data access, and/or data communication strategies, such as interactive visuals and plain-language explanations.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), "Empowering fiscal reporting with digital and interactive approaches", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2025/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/82070ddb-en*.

OECD (2023), *OECD Spending Better Framework*, OECD Publishing, Paris, GOV/SBO(2022)6/REV1.

OECD (2017), *OECD Budget Transparency Toolkit*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264282070-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Tables 3.8, 3.9. Data are not available for Viet Nam, Colombia or Mexico.

Table 3.8. Data are not available for Lao PDR. OECD data for year-end execution reports and year-end financial statements are only available for 34 countries. OECD data for all other budgetary information are available for 35 countries.

Table 3.9. Approaches to DIFR vary across OECD countries. Indonesia implements a "budget goes to campus" initiative to promote budget understanding.

**Table 3.8. Budgetary information made publicly available, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2022-2023)**

| | Pre-budget fiscal policy statement | Executive's budget proposal | Approved budget | Supplementary budget | Mid-year implementation report | Year-end budget execution reports | Year-end financial statements | Report on fiscal risks | Long-term fiscal sustainability report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | | | | ● | | | | | |
| Cambodia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| Indonesia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Malaysia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| Philippines | ● | ●□ | ●□ | | ●□ | ●□ | | ● | |
| Singapore | | ●□ | ● | ● | ● | | ● | | |
| Thailand | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| **SEA total** | | | | | | | | | |
| **● Main standard document** | **5 of 7** | **6 of 7** | **6 of 7** | **6 of 7** | **6 of 7** | **5 of 7** | **5 of 7** | **4 of 7** | **1 of 7** |
| **□ Open and machine-readable data format** | **0 of 7** | **2 of 7** | **1 of 7** | **0 of 7** | **1 of 7** | **1 of 7** | **0 of 7** | **0 of 7** | **0 of 7** |
| Australia | | ●□ | ●□ | | ●□ | ● | ● | ● | ●□ |
| Japan | ● | ●□ | ●□ | ●□ | | ● | ● | | ●□ |
| Korea | ●□ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| New Zealand | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ●□ |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | | | | |
| **● Main standard document** | **20 of 35** | **35 of 35** | **35 of 35** | **31 of 35** | **25 of 35** | **33 of 34** | **34 of 34** | **13 of 35** | **29 of 35** |
| **□ Open and machine-readable data format** | **5 of 35** | **17 of 35** | **21 of 35** | **15 of 35** | **7 of 35** | **no data available** | **17 of 34** | **2 of 35** | **7 of 35** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD (2023), *Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks*; OECD (2022), *Financial Management and Reporting Survey*.

StatLink https://stat.link/b73kds

**Table 3.9. Promotion of budget understanding by key stakeholders and the public, SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2023)**

| | | Publication of citizens' budget | Digital and interactive fiscal platforms | Social media activities | Outreach campaign to citizens | Education campaign at schools |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | | | | | | |
| Cambodia | | ● | | ● | | |
| Indonesia | | ● | | | | |
| Malaysia | | ● | | ● | ● | |
| Philippines | | ● | | ● | ● | |
| Singapore | | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Thailand | | ● | | ● | | |
| **SEA total** | **● Yes** | **6 of 7** | **1 of 7** | **5 of 7** | **3 of 7** | **1 of 7** |
| Australia | | ● | | ● | ● | |
| Japan | | ● | | ● | ● | ● |
| Korea | | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| New Zealand | | | | | | |
| **OECD total** | **● Yes** | **27 of 36** | **27 of 36** | **19 of 36** | **13 of 36** | **4 of 36** |

*Source:* For SEA average: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD average: OECD (2023), *Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks*.

StatLink https://stat.link/k89v3a

To engage meaningfully in the budget process, legislatures require reliable, unbiased information to support evidence-based policymaking. Parliamentary budget offices (PBOs) are independent public institutions established under the statutory authority of the legislature to provide objective analysis of public finances. Analysis provided by these institutions supports and strengthens parliamentary budget oversight, helping to address the capacity asymmetry between the legislature and the executive. They undertake tasks such as conducting independent analyses of government spending proposals and of underlying macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions, thereby contributing to fiscal transparency and accountability. PBOs can also promote fiscal transparency and public understanding by making fiscal data more accessible for both the legislature and the public.

PBOs are a type of independent fiscal institution (IFI). PBOs are the predominant IFI model in SEA countries, whereas in OECD countries, fiscal councils – typically focused on monitoring fiscal policy, assessing compliance with fiscal rules, and promoting fiscal sustainability and transparency – are more common. In 2024, four out of eight SEA countries for which data are available had a PBO, and the remaining four SEA countries had no plans to establish one. Only one of these, Cambodia, has established a PBO since 2020. In contrast, the number of IFIs in OECD countries has grown markedly since the global financial crisis, with 35 national institutions now operating in 29 of the 38 Member countries. Among these, ten operate as PBOs. Of the four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and Korea have established PBOs (Figure 3.4).

The three SEA PBOs for which data are available (Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand) fulfil some of the core functions of a PBO, in that they provide budget analysis to the legislature and respond to parliamentary requests (Table 3.10). However, only two of the three SEA PBOs independently initiate and publish analysis, as recommended in the OECD Principles for IFIs (OECD, 2014). In contrast, all OECD IFIs fulfil this requirement. Two out of three SEA PBOs for which data are available contribute to forecasting accuracy by assessing macroeconomic and fiscal projections and providing non-binding public opinions. This role is also more widespread among OECD IFIs, of whom 33 out of 35 IFIs have a role in relation to macroeconomic forecasts, and 31 out of 35 IFIs have a role in relation to fiscal forecasts. Moreover, no SEA PBO conducts long-term fiscal sustainability analysis. This function is carried out by 25 out of 35 OECD IFIs, including Australia and Korea. This indicates room to expand the analytical capacity of SEA PBOs to support budget oversight.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries are drawn from the 2024 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries, with responses from eight SEA countries. The data refer only to national institutions. Responses represent the countries' self-assessments of current practices and procedures. Data for OECD countries are drawn from the 2021 OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database and refer only to national institutions in OECD Member countries. The database comprises 35 national-level institutions in 29 OECD countries. Six countries have two independent fiscal institutions (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal).

Independent fiscal institution (IFI): A publicly funded, independent body under the statutory authority of the executive or the legislature that provides non-partisan oversight and analysis of the budget and fiscal policy. This may typically take the form of a fiscal council or an independent PBO.

## *Further reading*

OECD (forthcoming), *From Fiscal Watchdogs to Fiscal Advocates: Creating Champions of Fiscal Sustainability*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions*, OECD/LEGAL/0401, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 3.4, Table 3.10. Data are not available for Viet Nam. Data for SEA countries refer to PBOs. Data for OECD countries refer to IFIs, including PBOs. PBOs in OECD countries are shown with an asterisk. Data for the Philippines refer to the Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department (CPBRD). Four offices in the Philippine Congress perform the functions of a PBO: the CPBRD in the House of Representatives; and the Senate Economic Planning Office, the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office, and the Senate Tax Research Office in the Senate. Cambodia's National Assembly (lower house of parliament) does not have a PBO, but the Senate (upper house) has a PBO, the Budget Research Department. The Parliamentary Expertise Agency of Indonesia (Badan Keahlian DPR R) serves as a PBO in Indonesia. It is the research and analysis arm of the Indonesian House of Representatives.

Table 3.10. Data are not available for Indonesia. Data only cover countries that have a PBO or IFI. Australia is marked as "not applicable" because no fiscal rules were in place at the time.

**Figure 3.4. Existence of independent fiscal institutions, including parliamentary budget offices, in SEA countries (2024) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries: OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database (2021).

StatLink https://stat.link/v0mbkp

**Table 3.10. PBO and IFI analytical activities and functions, SEA PBOs (2024) and OECD IFIs (2021)**

| | Cambodia BRD | Philippines CPBRD | Thailand PBO | **SEA PBO total (yes)** | Australia PBO* | Korea NABO* | **OECD IFI total (yes)** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fulfils requests from parliamentary stakeholder on economic and fiscal issues | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | **3 of 3** | ✓ | ✓ | **17 of 35** |
| Provides analysis of the executive's budget bill to the legislature | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | **3 of 3** | ✓ | ✓ | **29 of 35** |
| Able to undertake and publish analysis at its own initiative | | ✓ | ✓ | **2 of 3** | ✓ | ✓ | **35 of 35** |
| Role in relation to macroeconomic forecasts | | ✓ | ✓ | **2 of 3** | | ✓ | **33 of 35** |
| Role in relation to fiscal forecasts | | ✓ | ✓ | **2 of 3** | | ✓ | **31 of 35** |
| Role in monitoring compliance with fiscal rules / fiscal objectives | | | ✓ | **1 of 3** | n/a | ✓ | **24 of 35** |
| Produce fiscal risk report | | | ✓ | **1 of 3** | | | **6 of 35** |
| Role in government policy costing (outside of elections) | | ✓ | | **1 of 3** | | | **3 of 35** |
| Produce long-term fiscal sustainability analysis | | | | **0 of 3** | ✓ | ✓ | **25 of 35** |
| Role in costing election platform | | | | **0 of 3** | ✓ | | **5 of 35** |

*Source:* For SEA countries: OECD (2024), *Senior Budget Officials Survey for Asian Countries*. For OECD countries, *OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Database* (2021).

StatLink https://stat.link/dvaf84

*Chapter 4*

# Infrastructure planning and delivery

Effective infrastructure investment requires a long-term vision and a credible roadmap to achieve it. This requires governments to establish an adequate institutional framework, implement clear governance arrangements, define needs and targets, co-ordinate across stakeholders, and develop reliable action plans. Transparency and predictability of government intentions are also prerequisites for enabling long-term investment decisions, especially from private investors. Long-term infrastructure strategies that align with complementary medium-term action plans play a crucial role in guiding investment decisions from both public and private actors (Aguilar Jaber et al., 2020).

Of the four Southeast Asia (SEA) countries for which data are available, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand each have a cross-sectoral infrastructure plan that covers more than ten years, and the Philippines has a plan that covers five years (Figure 4.1). This is similar to the four OECD Member countries in the Asia-Pacific region, of whom three have cross-sectoral infrastructure plans that cover more than ten years (Australia, Korea and New Zealand). For example, Indonesia's infrastructure planning framework includes a 20-year long-term development plan, divided into four 5-year medium-term plans to implement the long-term plan. Indonesia's new long-term plan covering the period 2025-2045 includes the development of quality infrastructure as a key component of its development agenda. At the sector level, all four SEA countries for which data are available have strategic plans within sectors that cover ten years or more. Only two of four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Korea and New Zealand) have this in place. Factors such as urbanisation pressures and economic growth may influence the extent of sectoral planning use in SEA countries.

All four SEA countries for which data are available promote sustainable infrastructure by setting goals or targets to invest in sustainability initiatives in their infrastructure plans (Table 4.1). These can include circular economy systems, sustainable mobility and addressing environmental risks. Three of four SEA countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore) work to identify cross-sector synergies to reduce negative environmental impacts. However, only two of the four (the Philippines and Singapore) have goals to adapt existing infrastructure to ensure resource efficiency or otherwise improve environmental performance in infrastructure construction and operation. For example, the Philippines' strategic framework for expanding and upgrading infrastructure commits to mainstreaming resilience to environmental risks throughout the infrastructure life cycle. Some forms of targets for investment in sustainability initiatives are also underutilised across OECD countries. Only 11 of 31 OECD countries have targets for supporting research and development, and only 13 of 31 have targets for resource efficiency in infrastructure construction and operation.

Monitoring the implementation of infrastructure plans is essential for evidence-based decision making and accountability, and could be developed further in both SEA countries and OECD countries. All four SEA countries for which data are available monitor the achievement of defined policy outcomes (Table 4.2). In addition, Indonesia and the Philippines have also established other non-project-related objectives, such as institutional reform and capacity building. However, only the Philippines and Singapore use project-specific benchmarks, such as timelines or cost estimations for priority projects. Project-specific benchmarks are crucial in enabling citizens and stakeholders to scrutinise the implementation of priority projects and assess their effectiveness in supporting broader policy objectives.

### Methodology and definitions

For SEA countries, data come from the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure conducted in 2024-2025, with responses from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. For OECD countries, data are drawn from the 2020 OECD Survey of Infrastructure Governance, with responses from 32 countries.

A long-term national infrastructure plan refers to a document approved by the government that outlines specific actions for infrastructure services to society over the long term.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2020), *Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure*, OECD/LEGAL/0460, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*.

Aguilar Jaberi, A., et al. (2020), "Long-term low emissions development strategies: Cross-country experience", *OECD Environment Working Papers*, Vol. 160, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1c1d8005-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 4.1. OECD total shown for 32 countries.

Tables 4.1, 4.2. OECD total shown for 31 countries.

**Figure 4.1. Existence of long-term national infrastructure plans in SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**




*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/avz1p2

**Table 4.1. Goals and targets for sustainable infrastructure in the national infrastructure plan, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**

| Country | Investment in infrastructure projects that promote environmental sustainability | Cross-sector synergies to avoid duplications and minimise environmental impacts | R&D to promote environmentally-friendly infrastructure | Resource efficiency in the construction and operation of infrastructure | Management of existing infrastructure to improve its environmental performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
| Philippines | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Singapore | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Thailand | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
| **OECD** | | | | | |
| Australia | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
| Japan | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Korea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| New Zealand | × | × | × | × | × |
| **OECD total** | | | | | |
| ✓ Yes | 22 | 19 | 11 | 13 | 18 |
| × No | 9 | 12 | 20 | 18 | 13 |

Source: *OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/e1gx5m

**Table 4.2. Benchmarks in national infrastructure plans to facilitate implementation monitoring, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**

| Country | Achievement of defined policy outcomes | Other non-project-related objectives | Project timeline | Cost estimations | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
| Philippines | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| Singapore | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
| Thailand | ✓ | × | × | × | × |
| **OECD** | | | | | |
| Australia | ✓ | × | × | × | × |
| Japan | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| Korea | × | × | × | × | × |
| New Zealand | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
| **OECD total** | | | | | |
| ✓ Yes | 15 | 8 | 15 | 16 | 2 |
| × No | 16 | 23 | 16 | 15 | 29 |

Source: *OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/0nsbr6

Infrastructure projects need to be cost-effective and affordable for both the government and users. When deciding which public infrastructure projects to undertake, governments should consider their value for money, examining the quality, features and costs of each project, calculated over its lifetime. To ensure this, many countries have criteria and methodologies for assessing projects' value for money. The OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure highlights several good practices, including ensuring decision making is informed by the need for value for money, ensuring the affordability of new infrastructure projects, disclosing total costs over the entire asset life cycle, and providing a transparent, independent and impartial expert assessment to test project costing and fiscal sustainability.

The four SEA countries for which data are available generally estimate the costs associated with construction, operation and maintenance to assess the affordability of new infrastructure projects (Table 4.3). However, only the Philippines and Singapore estimate costs related to adaptations and renovations. The Philippines and Thailand estimate the costs of possible decommissioning. A similar situation is observed in OECD Member countries: 30 of 31 estimate construction costs, 29 of 31 estimate operational costs, and 27 of 31 estimate maintenance costs; however, only 18 of 31 estimate adaptation and renovation costs, and 13 of 31 estimate decommissioning costs. It is important that countries accurately estimate the costs associated with adaptations and renovations to assess the affordability of projects and ensure the efficient allocation of their budget, which in turn ensures that assets perform optimally throughout their lifespan. This is important, for example, to take account of possible impacts of damaging weather events, which result in higher costs due to infrastructure damage and failure.

A requirement that the Ministry of Finance approve projects before they can proceed can help to ensure that projects undergo proper appraisal. Among SEA countries, the Philippines and Singapore both subject projects above a certain threshold to formal approval by the finance ministry (Figure 4.2). Thailand's Ministry of Finance approval is required for public-private partnership projects. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance does not play a formal gatekeeping role but is involved in formal meetings with other related ministries to assess the alignment of projects with national priorities. Approval from the finance ministry is required for all new infrastructure projects in 9 of 32 OECD countries, and for projects exceeding a defined threshold in a further 14 of 32 countries. The criteria used by finance ministries for approving infrastructure projects generally focus on the projects' affordability for both the national budget and users, as well as their value for money.

To ensure value for money and quality, it is crucial that the decision-making process for large infrastructure projects is impartial and free from political influence. Independent experts can aid this by monitoring the selection and prioritisation of projects and supporting clear and transparent decision making. Of the SEA countries, only Singapore implements an independent and impartial review of new infrastructure projects (Table 4.3), where projects above SGD 600 million (Singaporean dollars) (~USD 466 million) are subject to review by the Development Projects Advisory Panel, comprising senior public officers, academia, and industry practitioners. This is an area in which further development of governance processes would be beneficial in SEA countries. Six of 31 OECD countries require an independent assessment for all new infrastructure projects, 9 of 31 countries for projects above a defined threshold, and 8 of 31 countries for projects of "special significance".

### Methodology and definitions

For SEA countries, data are sourced from the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, conducted in 2024-2025, with responses from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For OECD countries, data are drawn from the 2020 OECD Survey of Infrastructure Governance, with responses from 32 countries.

From the government's perspective, affordability means that projects can be accommodated within current and future budget constraints. From the end users' perspective, it refers to their ability and willingness to pay the tariffs or other user charges associated with accessing and using the infrastructure asset.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2020), *Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure*, OECD/LEGAL/0460, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*.

## *Figure notes*

Table 4.3, Figure 4.3. OECD total is shown for 31 countries.

Figure 4.2. OECD total is shown for 32 countries.

Figure 4.3. In Austria, data refer to both projects above a certain threshold and projects of special relevance. Those projects are subject to an independent and impartial expert assessment.

**Table 4.3. Costs that are generally estimated to assess the affordability of new infrastructure projects, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**

| Country | Construction | Operation | Maintenance | Adaptations and renovations | Decommissioning |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| Philippines | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Singapore | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| Thailand | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| **OECD** | | | | | |
| Australia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| Japan | ✓ | × | × | × | × |
| Korea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| New Zealand | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| **OECD total** | | | | | |
| ✓ Yes | 30 | 29 | 27 | 18 | 13 |
| × No | 1 | 2 | 4 | 13 | 18 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/5uh08q

**Figure 4.2. The role of finance ministries in approving infrastructure projects, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**




*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/4an8rc

**Figure 4.3. Independent and impartial expert assessment of infrastructure projects, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**




*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/mb1pul

The complexity, scale, timespan and risks in infrastructure projects call for specialised delivery and procurement strategies that enable decision makers to maximise the value generated for society throughout the assets' life cycle. An important consideration is selecting contractors based on criteria that combine financial and qualitative elements (e.g. sustainability criteria such as environmental impact). To this end, when procuring new infrastructure, it is essential that governments have mechanisms in place to ensure the procurement process is open to as wide a range of bidders as possible, thereby ensuring competitive costs and high quality.

Among SEA countries, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand employ a combination of financial and qualitative criteria to select proposals (Table 4.4). They also assess proposals using a life cycle perspective. While the Philippines does not employ either of these approaches, it does have mechanisms to manage abnormally high and low tenders. The application of these procurement criteria is also common in OECD Member countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Across OECD countries as a whole, 30 countries (100%) use a mix of financial and qualitative criteria to select proposals, and 21 of these 30 countries have mechanisms in place to manage abnormally high and low tenders. However, only 13 of 30 countries assess from a life cycle perspective.

During procurement of infrastructure, open, neutral and transparent processes can increase inclusiveness and boost competitiveness. The four SEA countries for which data are available provide tools to support the design of tender documents and specifications (Table 4.5). This can help to avoid risks that tenders are restrictive or tailored. All four SEA countries also publish future procurement opportunities and allow firms from other countries or other regions within their own countries to participate. This can help to deter bid-rigging. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have e-procurement systems that span the entire procurement cycle. This increases transparency and competition by providing information about tender opportunities. However, the integrity of procurement officials could be further promoted. Due to the large sums involved, the multiple stakeholders, and the complexity of transactions, infrastructure procurement has a high risk of integrity failures. Except for Singapore, no SEA country provides adequate incentives for procurement officials to prevent and detect bid-rigging, such as explicitly including the prevention and detection of bid-rigging among their duties and training and rewarding the successful detection of anti-competitive practices in performance evaluations of procurement officials. Singapore provides detailed guidance, including a checklist, to assist procurement officials in better detection and prevention of bid-rigging. Similarly, only Singapore provides platforms for regular dialogues with suppliers and business associations on upcoming tender opportunities.

Mechanisms to enable smaller companies to participate in public contracts can help to improve value. All four SEA countries have one or more mechanisms to facilitate the participation of smaller firms in procurement (Table 4.6). Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have simplified administrative procedures to reduce the burdens of participating. Indonesia also favours subcontracting and joint bidding, and allows smaller firms to participate, even if they cannot bid for the entire contract. Singapore and Thailand have eased bond requirements to facilitate access to smaller companies that may face difficulties in obtaining financial guarantees. However, there is scope for most SEA countries and OECD countries to expand the range of mechanisms they use to facilitate the participation of smaller firms.

### Methodology and definitions

For SEA countries, data come from the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure conducted in 2024-2025, with responses from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. For OECD countries, data are drawn from the 2020 and 2022 OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure, with responses from 32 and 29 OECD countries, respectively.

The life cycle of public assets encompasses all stages during the lifetime of a public infrastructure asset, ranging from planning, prioritisation, and funding, to design, procurement, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning.

### *Further reading*

OECD (2020), *Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure*, OECD/LEGAL/0460, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*.

OECD (2015), *Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement*, OECD/LEGAL/0411, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411*.

### *Figure notes*

Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6. OECD total is shown for 30 countries.

**Table 4.4. Mechanisms used to help identify proposals offering the best value for money, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**

| Country | Combination of financial and qualitative criteria | Mechanisms to manage abnormally low or high tenders | Assessment from a life cycle perspective |
|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Philippines | × | ✓ | × |
| Singapore | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Thailand | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| **OECD** | | | |
| Australia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Japan | ✓ | × | × |
| Korea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| New Zealand | ✓ | × | × |
| **OECD total** | | | |
| ✓ Yes | 30 | 21 | 13 |
| × No | 0 | 9 | 17 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/qbzuhv

**Table 4.5. Mechanisms used to ensure open, neutral and transparent procurement processes for infrastructure, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**

| Country | Support tools for the design of tender documents and specifications | Publication of future procurement opportunities | Allow firms from other countries or other regions within the country to participate | E-procurement systems spanning the full procurement cycle | Mandatory market analysis | Platforms for regular dialogues with suppliers and business associations | Adequate incentives for procurement officials to prevent and detect bid-rigging |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | | | |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| Philippines | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| Singapore | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | ✓ | ✓ |
| Thailand | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × |
| **OECD** | | | | | | | |
| Australia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Japan | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| Korea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| New Zealand | ✓ | ✓ | × | × | × | × | × |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | | |
| ✓ Yes | 29 | 25 | 26 | 24 | 11 | 15 | 10 |
| × No | 1 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 19 | 15 | 20 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/2adwp1

**Table 4.6. Mechanisms to facilitate access to procurement opportunities for competitors for small companies, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**

| Country | Simplification of administrative processes | Favouring subcontracting and joint bidding arrangements | Allowing smaller firms to participate, even if they cannot bid for the entire contract | Reduced use of bonds | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | |
| Indonesia | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × | × |
| Philippines | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ |
| Singapore | ✓ | × | × | ✓ | × |
| Thailand | × | × | × | ✓ | ✓ |
| **OECD** | | | | | |
| Australia | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
| Japan | × | ✓ | × | × | × |
| Korea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| New Zealand | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ |
| **OECD total** | | | | | |
| ✓ Yes | 20 | 24 | 16 | 3 | 2 |
| × No | 10 | 6 | 14 | 27 | 28 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/1filuj

Governments continue to face pressure to achieve multiple policy goals, underscoring the need to effectively translate these objectives into suitable infrastructure procurement strategies, while managing trade-offs between economic efficiency, competition, and broader policy aims. Broader policy objectives can be integrated at different stages of the infrastructure procurement cycle, e.g. during the early stages of the specification of requirements, in the bidder selection phase to integrate policy outcomes into award criteria and contractual performance objectives, and at the contract management stage to include specific clauses related to policy objectives in the contracts. Moreover, performance measurement frameworks in infrastructure procurement can help governments assess whether their procurement systems are achieving their intended objectives, while supporting them in continuously developing, implementing, and revising their policies, processes, and tools (OECD, 2025).

SEA countries have taken steps to integrate environmental considerations into procurement processes for infrastructure. The four SEA countries for which data are available provide guidance on purchasing products and services with lower environmental impacts throughout their entire life cycle, as do Japan, Korea and New Zealand (Table 4.7). Notably, Singapore provides infrastructure-specific guidance on this topic. Only 3 of 29 OECD Member countries have guidance of this sort in place. Monitoring of broad objectives is typically conducted through tangible obligations assigned to public procurers. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore require the inclusion of environmental requirements in the technical specifications of infrastructure projects. Eighteen of 27 OECD countries have similar requirements in place. Indonesia and Singapore also require that environmental objectives be included in the framework used to evaluate bids. Currently, only 14 of 27 OECD countries have similar requirements in place. Indonesia and the Philippines also require that suppliers who are awarded a contract follow relevant international standards and codes (i.e. International Organization for Standardization [ISO], International Federation of Consulting Engineers [FIDIC]) through contract clauses.

The four SEA countries utilise strategic public procurement to advance policy objectives, including innovation and responsible business conduct. However, none have established standardised frameworks to measure progress and success against these objectives (Figure 4.4). This is a significant gap that impedes evidence-based decision making. Similarly, only two of four OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region have frameworks for regular monitoring. Countries could improve governance practices in this area by more regularly and consistently assessing the results of procurement processes based on up-to-date and reliable data. Relevant indicators to assess include measures of performance, effectiveness, duration of procurement processes and financial savings.

Evaluating the impact of procurement strategies helps ensure accountability in advancing government objectives. None of the four SEA countries currently measures the environmental benefits of infrastructure procurement, either during contract award or during construction (Figure 4.5). These practices are also underdeveloped among OECD countries, with only 12 of 27 (44%) measuring environmental impacts at the award stage, and only 6 of 27 measuring at construction stage. Countries often do not have sufficient data to fully analyse the environmental and other impacts of goods and services they procure. Relevant practices that governments may consider implementing include placing reporting obligations on suppliers and using appropriate impact assessment methodologies to measure the effectiveness of procurement in achieving environmental and other objectives.

### Methodology and definitions

For SEA countries, data come from the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure conducted in 2024-2025, with responses from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. For OECD countries, data are drawn from the 2020 and 2022 OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure, with responses from 32 and 29 OECD countries, respectively.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), *Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en*.

OECD (2020), *Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure*, OECD/LEGAL/0460, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*.

OECD (2015), *Recommendation of the Council on Public Procurement*, OECD/LEGAL/0411, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0411*.

## *Figure notes*

Table 4.7. OECD total is shown for 29 countries in the column on guidance to procurement officers on integrating environmental considerations into infrastructure procurement. For the other columns, data are shown for 27 countries. Data for Australia are not available. In Singapore, environmental objectives are part of the evaluation framework of bids for larger construction projects. More details in StatLink.

Figure 4.4. OECD total is shown for 30 countries.

Figure 4.5. OECD total is shown for 27 countries.

**Table 4.7. Environmental considerations integrated in public procurement of infrastructure, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**

| Country | Guidance to procurement officers on integrating environmental considerations in infrastructure procurement | Mandatory inclusion of environmental requirements in technical specifications | Inclusion of environmental objectives in the evaluation framework of bids | Requirement to follow relevant international standards and codes (e.g. ISO, FIDIC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | |
| Indonesia | ▲ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Philippines | ▲ | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Singapore | ● | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| Thailand | ▲ | × | × | × |
| **OECD** | | | | |
| Japan | ▲ | .. | .. | .. |
| Korea | ▲ | ✓ | ✓ | × |
| New Zealand | ▲ | ✓ | × | × |
| **OECD total** | | | | |
| ● Infrastructure-specific guidance on GPP | 3 | | | |
| ■ Dedicated tools to guide the integration of environmental considerations in infrastructure procurement | 3 | | | |
| ▲ General guidance on GPP | 20 | | | |
| ✓ Yes | | 18 | 14 | 5 |
| × No | 3 | 9 | 13 | 22 |
| .. Not available | | 1 | 1 | 1 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/20pt43

**Figure 4.4. Frameworks to measure the success of procurement against strategic objectives, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**




*Notes:* **Inner ring:** Promotion of strategic objectives through infrastructure procurement. **Outer ring:** Frameworks to measure success of procurement against strategic objectives

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/yr1af7

**Figure 4.5. Measurement of results on green objectives of public infrastructure procurement, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Notes:* **Inner ring:** Measurement of environmental benefits of infrastructure procurement during contract awarding. **Outer ring:** Measurement of performance during construction to evaluate practices related to green reporting obligations on suppliers

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/2wr5i7

Infrastructure management faces multiple risks due to its long-term nature, the large sums involved, the complexity of transactions – especially those requiring complex financial schemes, such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) or concessions, and procurement methods – and the multiplicity of stakeholders. These risks include cost overruns, delays and failed procurements, among others. Issues with the design, utility and construction of infrastructure projects are not always simple to rectify once they are completed. Therefore, it is essential to adopt a comprehensive approach to risk management from the outset, covering the entire infrastructure life cycle. This entails ensuring adequate risk allocation through the procurement strategy, early involvement of affected stakeholders, and the use of quality data to support evidence-informed decision making, among others.

Infrastructure assets have long lifespans and are particularly prone to risks, including inefficiency, poor quality, cost overruns, economic and financial uncertainty, and integrity breaches. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have processes in place to identify, allocate and mitigate risks during the investment life cycle (Figure 4.6), as do several OECD Member countries in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, Indonesia has established the Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund to safeguard the creditworthiness of PPP projects by providing government guarantees. This aims to support infrastructure financing by attracting private sector investment. Twenty of 31 OECD countries have similar processes in place.

Stakeholder participation can help to ensure that infrastructure projects are more predictable and have fewer delays, and that their benefits are distributed more evenly. Early-stage participation means involving stakeholders and the public in infrastructure decision making during planning, appraisal, funding, design and procurement, that is, when key decisions can still be influenced. The four SEA countries for which data are available mandate stakeholder consultation on the environmental impacts of infrastructure investments at early stages (Figure 4.7). Singapore, for example, conducted extensive stakeholder and citizen engagement during its Long-Term Plan Review, including through public polls, workshops and dialogues. Early-stage participation is also common across OECD countries, with 27 of 29 countries undertaking it. Late-stage participation involves stakeholders and the public during the construction, operations, maintenance and decommissioning of infrastructure. This practice is less developed. No SEA country currently mandates late-stage consultation, and among OECD countries, only 13 of 29 mandate it.

Evidence-informed decision making in infrastructure development is crucial for delivering quality infrastructure and for effectively and efficiently managing assets. It is important that governments systematically collect, store and manage data throughout the infrastructure life cycle, and use this to inform decisions such as project appraisal and procurement. Such data can help better understand the specific infrastructure needs, challenges and opportunities, enabling more targeted and effective investments. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore collect, analyse, disclose and use data on exposure/vulnerability to environmental and weather risks to inform their infrastructure decision making (Table 4.8). Indonesia and the Philippines also cover data related to damages and economic loss of weather events. Indonesia additionally covers data on losses due to weather events. Singapore covers data related to the impact on biodiversity, and the Philippines covers both of these categories, in addition to data on the depletion of natural resources.

### Methodology and definitions

For SEA countries, data come from the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure conducted in 2024-2025, with responses from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. For OECD countries, data are drawn from the 2020 and 2022 OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure, with responses from 32 and 29 OECD countries, respectively.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2022), *OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f765caf6-en*.

OECD (2020), *Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure*, OECD/LEGAL/0460, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*.

OECD (2017), *Recommendation of the Council on Open Government*, OECD/LEGAL/0438, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 4.6. OECD total is shown for 31 countries.

Figure 4.7. OECD total is shown for 29 countries. No data are available for Thailand.

Table 4.8. OECD total is shown for 27 countries.

**Figure 4.6. Risk management activities covering the entire infrastructure procurement life cycle, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2020)**




*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2020 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/vpge6z

**Figure 4.7. Mandatory consultation with stakeholders on the environment-related impacts of infrastructure investments through the infrastructure life cycle, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**




**Inner ring:** Early state consultation
**Outer ring:** Late stage consultation

**Inner ring:** Early state consultation
**Outer ring:** Late stage consultation

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/71q0ep

**Table 4.8. Environment and climate data for infrastructure projects, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**

| Country | Greenhouse gas emissions | Exposure/vulnerability to climate risks and hazards | Damages and economic loss of extreme weather events | Depletion of natural resources | Impact on biodiversity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | |
| Indonesia | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ | × | × |
| Philippines | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ |
| Singapore | ●■▲♦ | ●■▲♦ | × | × | ●■▲♦ |
| **OECD** | | | | | |
| Korea | ▲ | ▲ | ▲ | ▲ | ▲ |
| New Zealand | ● | × | ● | × | ● |
| **OECD total** | | | | | |
| ● Collection | 19 | 20 | 18 | 15 | 18 |
| ■ Analysis | 17 | 18 | 15 | 15 | 17 |
| ▲ Use | 17 | 15 | 9 | 13 | 15 |
| ♦ Disclosure | 13 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 14 |
| × No | 1 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 5 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/bus0rk

Achieving net-zero emissions in 2050 will require global annual investment in the energy sector to rise from USD 2.3 trillion in recent years to USD 5 trillion by 2030 (IEA, 2021). For transport-related clean energy, the estimated rise needs to be from USD 75 billion per year to over USD 570 billion by 2030 (IEA, 2021). At the same time, infrastructure assets and operations will be increasingly exposed to the effects of damaging weather events. This will require an integrated approach to building resilience. It is important that governments strengthen their approaches to delivering sustainable and resilient infrastructure.

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicator (IGI) on environmentally sustainable and resilient infrastructure provides an overview of the various governance elements that support environmentally sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including enabling conditions, planning, project appraisal, capital budgeting and financing, and monitoring. Overall scores on this indicator are shown in Figure . On a scale of 0 to 1, OECD country indicator values range from 0.19 to 0.93, with an average of 0.52. Indonesia (0.60), the Philippines (0.61), and Singapore (0.66) all score higher than the OECD average value.

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore have all developed infrastructure guidelines to address environmental risks (Figure 4.9). The Philippines and Singapore also provide guidelines on integrating biodiversity considerations into infrastructure planning. Singapore additionally provides policy guidance on integrating nature-based solutions (NbS) into infrastructure design. Such guidelines are key to developing infrastructure systems that are resilient to weather and environmental events. They can also increase the integration of environmental considerations into infrastructure planning and delivery.

SEA countries also use methodological tools such as cost-benefit analysis and multi-criteria analysis to integrate environmental considerations into the project appraisal process. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore require environmental impact assessments to evaluate the possible impacts of transport infrastructure projects and also systematically use the assessment results to inform project selection and prioritisation (Table 4.9). They also require climate change adaptation measures to be integrated into the design of transport infrastructure projects and systematically use climate resilience criteria to inform project selection and prioritisation. In addition, Indonesia and Singapore require a climate impact assessment to estimate the potential emissions of transport infrastructure projects and systematically use the results to select or prioritise projects.

### Methodology and definitions

For SEA countries, data come from the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure conducted in 2024-2025, with responses from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. For OECD countries, data are drawn from the 2022 OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure, conducted in May 2022, with responses from 29 OECD countries. Respondents are predominantly senior officials in central/federal ministries of infrastructure, public works and finance, as well as in infrastructure agencies and other line ministries.

Environmental sustainability and resilience are a cross-cutting dimension of infrastructure governance throughout the infrastructure life cycle. Other sections of this chapter present relevant data on practices for the governance of infrastructure across SEA countries at different stages of the life cycle. Several of the data points used to construct the index on environmental sustainability and climate resilience in Figure 4.8 are presented in earlier sections. However, the index is based on a larger set of information within the OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure. The overall index ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). For further information about the index see Annex A.

NbS are actions to protect, conserve, restore, sustainably use and manage natural or modified terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems, which address social, economic and environmental challenges effectively and adaptively, while simultaneously providing human well-being, ecosystem services and resilience and biodiversity benefits (United Nations Environment Assembly).

## *Further reading*

IEA (2021), *World Energy Outlook 2021*, International Energy Agency, *www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2021*.

OECD (2020), Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure, OECD/LEGAL/0460, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 4.8. No data are available for Thailand. Complete data for Belgium (Flanders) and Japan are not available for the index. Data for Belgium are limited to Flanders only. Only the sub-pillars with complete data are included (scores for Belgium, Flanders, are not included in the OECD average).

Figure 4.9. OECD total shown for 29 countries for NbS and 27 countries for biodiversity considerations. No data are available for Thailand.

Table 4.9. OECD total shown for 28 countries for environmental impact assessment, 27 for climate impact assessment and climate vulnerability and risk assessment, and 26 for adaptation measures. Data are not available for Thailand.

**Figure 4.8. Delivering environmentally sustainable and resilient infrastructure, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/6f28is

**Figure 4.9. Guidelines for integrating nature-based solutions and biodiversity into infrastructure design and planning, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* **Inner ring:** Integrating NbS into infrastructure design. **Outer ring:** Integrating biodiversity considerations into infrastructure planning

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/qf2e9l

**Table 4.9. Environmental considerations integrated into transport project selection and prioritisation, SEA countries (2024-2025) and OECD countries (2022)**

| Country | Environmental impact assessment | Climate impact assessment | Integration of adaptation measures into infrastructure design |
|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | |
| Indonesia | ● | ● | ● |
| Philippines | ● | × | ● |
| Singapore | ● | ● | ● |
| **OECD** | | | |
| Korea | ● | ● | × |
| New Zealand | ○ | × | × |
| **OECD total** | | | |
| ● Required and used for project selection and prioritisation | 19 | 12 | 9 |
| ○ Required, but not used for project selection and prioritisation | 9 | 5 | 3 |
| × Not required | 0 | 10 | 14 |

*Source: OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure*, 2024-2025 (SEA) and 2022 (OECD).

StatLink https://stat.link/fglsay

*Chapter 5*

# Digital government

Governments can improve their agility and policy impact by putting digital transformation at the heart of modernisation efforts. The OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) benchmarks digital government policies and their implementation. It includes six dimensions: 1) digital by design; 2) data-driven public sector; 3) government as a platform; 4) open by default; 5) user-driven; and 6) proactiveness.

The average DGI score for Southeast Asia (SEA) countries was 0.37 out of 1 at the end of 2023 (Figure 5.1). This is somewhat below the average across OECD Member countries of 0.61. The SEA countries with the highest scores on the DGI are Singapore (0.62), Indonesia (0.61), Thailand (0.48) and Viet Nam (0.43), which score above the SEA average. These countries show more balanced efforts across dimensions, except in proactiveness and open by default. By contrast, OECD countries with higher DGI scores generally take a more comprehensive approach, ensuring strong foundations for digital government across the six dimensions of the index. Notably, Singapore's and Indonesia's DGI scores are slightly above the OECD average and some OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Conversely, SEA countries that scored below the SEA regional average generally have a more unbalanced performance across dimensions, scoring substantially higher on some dimensions than others.

Across the six dimensions of the DGI, SEA countries obtained the highest average score in digital by design (0.60) (Figure 5.2). This assesses governments" capacity to use digital technologies and data to re-engineer public sector processes, simplify procedures and create new channels to engage with stakeholders. The higher regional performance on this dimension underlines the priority given by SEA countries to digital government initiatives, alongside strengthening digital investments, skills, talent and service delivery. In this dimension, Indonesia (0.96), Singapore (0.76), Viet Nam (0.72), and Thailand (0.71) performed higher than the regional average. This was due in part to the maturity of their strategic frameworks, such as Singapore's Digital Government Blueprint, Indonesia's Master Plan for Digital Government (SPBE) 2018-2025, Thailand's Digital Government Development Plan 2023-2027, and Viet Nam's Strategy for Development of E-Government Towards Digital Government 2021-2025.

The lowest average scores across SEA countries were in two dimensions: proactiveness (0.23) and open by default (0.30). Proactiveness (Figure 5.3) assesses governments' capacity to anticipate user needs, including the provision of services. Indonesia (0.63) had the highest score in this dimension. Lower scores suggest a need to focus on improving use of data and artificial intelligence (AI) to deliver public policies and services more proactively. Open by default (Online Figure D.2.1) assesses the availability of policies, tools and mechanisms for transparency, accessibility and sharing of information to foster public engagement in policymaking and service design. Thailand (0.48), Singapore (0.46), Indonesia (0.37) and Viet Nam (0.35) had the highest scores among SEA countries on this dimension. Scores in this dimension indicate room for improvement in the SEA region, supporting access, security, availability and re-use of open government data for more transparent and participatory government practices (Online Figure D.2.1; see also the sections on the OURdata Index).

### Methodology and definitions

Data collection for SEA countries ran from September 2024 to February 2025, yielding responses from eight countries. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. Data for OECD countries was gathered from November 2022 to January 2023 for the 2023 edition of the OECD DGI (OECD, 2024), with 33 countries responding. Data are based on practices in place as of October 2022. Survey lead respondents were senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations. Data were collected using the OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

The DGI measures six equally weighted dimensions of digital government, based on the OECD Digital Government Policy Framework (OECD, 2020). Each dimension is scored from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum) based on predefined criteria. The composite score is determined by averaging the scores of all dimensions. For further details on the index see Annex B.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*.

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 2023 OECD averages do not include Germany, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland or the United States. Since the reference period of the survey, the Philippines enacted new legislation to strengthen its governance of digital government. This is not reflected in the data shown. More details are available via the StatLink for Figure 5.2.

Figure D.2.1 (Open by default scores by country, SEA countries, 2023, and OECD countries, 2022) is available online in Annex D.

**Figure 5.1. Digital Government Index scores by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/0eyvd9

**Figure 5.2. Digital by design scores by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/wq58i3

**Figure 5.3. Proactiveness scores by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/a3xof4

Digital by design is the principle by which digital technologies and data are leveraged to rethink and re-engineer public processes, simplify procedures and create new channels of communication and engagement with public stakeholders (OECD, 2020). A digital-by-design approach is fundamental for the public sector to fully benefit from digital transformation and can support improved policymaking and public service delivery (OECD, 2020). Setting a strategic vision and clear mandate for digital government is a prerequisite to steer digital government initiatives, and for facilitating more effective and inclusive cross-sector collaboration. It is the dimension of the Digital Government Index on which SEA countries scored highest on average (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).

The development and implementation of a National Digital Government Strategy (NDGS) is an important aspect of digital by design and can support a comprehensive mandate and strategic vision for digital government (OECD, 2014). Although all eight SEA countries and all 33 OECD Member countries for which data are available have an NDGS in place, not all these strategies incorporate a complete set of enablers to support their implementation in a consistent and well-supported manner. In the SEA region, all NDGS in place as of 2023 among the eight assessed countries specify a vision and outline, as well as overall objectives and priorities. However, only six strategies (75%) across the region specify timeframes for implementation and seven (88%) identify the actors responsible for executing the activities. Additionally, four strategies (50%) include key performance indicators, and three (38%) provide a funding framework for digital and data initiatives. Indonesia is the only SEA country with an NDGS that considers all evaluated enablers (Figure 5.4).

Organisational leadership and cross-government co-ordination are important in delivering digital government policies across the public sector, and dismantling silos that hamper digital transformation at the whole-of-government level. SEA countries have made progress in establishing appropriate institutional structures for the governance of digital government (Table 5.1). Regarding organisational leadership, all eight SEA countries for which data are available have mandated a public sector institution responsible for leading decisions on digital government at the central/federal level and co-ordinating their implementation. Across the OECD, all 33 countries for which data are available have a leading government institution in place, including all 4 OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Regarding cross-government co-ordination, all eight SEA countries have established a formal co-ordination body responsible for steering digital government policies and initiatives in the public sector, such as a council of Chief Information Officers. Thirty of 33 OECD countries have a formal co-ordination body in place, including all 4 OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Digital by design also assesses the involvement of relevant stakeholders, including academia, the private sector and civil society, in designing and delivering digital policies and projects (OECD, 2021). Four out of eight SEA countries for which data are available have established an external advisory/consultation body for digital projects in the public sector (Table 5.1). Thailand and Indonesia have established formal external consultation bodies: the National Digital Economy and Society Council and the National ICT Council, respectively. Singapore and Viet Nam engage with external actors as part of the government's existing co-ordination body. Overall, 15 of 33 OECD countries have either a formal external consultation body in place or engage with external actors as part of the government's existing co-ordination body.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries ran from September 2024 to February 2025, with responses from eight countries. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. Data for OECD countries were collected from November 2022 to January 2023 for the 2023 edition of the OECD Digital Government Index (OECD, 2024), with a response from 33 countries. Data are based on practices in place as of October 2022. Survey lead respondents were senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations. Data were collected using the OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*.

OECD (2021), *The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en*.

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a digital government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*.

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies*, *OECD/LEGAL/0406*, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0406*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 5.4, Table 5.1. OECD averages do not include Germany, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland or the United States.

**Figure 5.4. Enablers of the National Digital Government Strategy, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government in Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/obq0dx

**Table 5.1. Institutions for governance of digital government, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**

| Country | Leading DG institutions | Formal co-ordination body | External (non-governmental) advisory/consultation body | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | External actors part of a co-ordination body | Formal external consultation body | Informal external consultation | No external consultation body |
| **SEA** | | | | | | |
| Brunei Darussalam | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Cambodia | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Indonesia | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ |
| Lao PDR | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Philippines | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Singapore | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Thailand | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ |
| Viet Nam | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Total | | | | | | |
| Yes ● | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| No ○ | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
| **OECD** | | | | | | |
| Australia | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ |
| Korea | ● | ● | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ |
| New Zealand | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | |
| Yes ● | 33 | 30 | 4 | 11 | 4 | 14 |
| No ○ | 0 | 3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government in Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/t5y7vj

A proactive government can anticipate the needs of citizens and businesses, and respond to them promptly, using technologies such as AI. Proactiveness is the dimension of the Digital Government Index on which SEA countries scored second lowest on average (Figure 5.1, Figure 5.3), with substantial room for improvement. The adoption of AI can help governments become more proactive. Used strategically and responsibly, governments can leverage AI to enhance public sector productivity (in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness), responsiveness and accountability (OECD, 2025).

Comprehensive governance frameworks are important for enabling responsible and effective use of AI in government. Whole-of-government strategies can help oversee the use and advancement of AI in government, in accordance with overarching principles and objectives. Only three of the eight SEA countries for which data are available have a dedicated national plan for AI that includes objectives or actions to use AI in the public sector (Figure 5.5). Compared to OECD Member countries, 29 out of 33 have a national plan for AI in the public sector. Governance frameworks for the use of AI in the public sector are an area that SEA countries may wish to strengthen over the medium term.

Guardrails, including rules, policies, guidance and frameworks that align with shared values and principles for algorithm management, are essential for ensuring the responsible and trustworthy use of AI within the public sector. Six out of eight surveyed SEA countries do not have instruments in place to support the responsible use of AI in the public sector (Figure 5.6). Two out of eight surveyed SEA countries have non-binding policy initiatives, such as guidelines, standards or principles. For example, Thailand has adopted the Ethical Guidelines for AI, and Indonesia has issued Circular Letter No. 9 of 2023 on AI Ethical Guidelines. This is also an area where SEA countries may wish to advance their practices in the coming years. By comparison, 28 of 33 OECD countries have instruments in place to support the responsible use of AI, with 13 of 33 (40%) having non-binding policy approaches in place, and 15 out of 33 (45%) having already established formal requirements.

Governments' use of AI can facilitate automated and tailored internal processes and public services; foster better decision making and forecasting; improve fraud detection; and improve public servants' job quality and learning (OECD, 2025). However, in SEA countries, its use is still limited among governments. Most surveyed SEA countries (six out of eight, or 75%) have no AI initiatives in their public sectors and are yet to develop use cases (Table 5.2). Only Indonesia and Singapore reported the use of AI in the public sector. Singapore has deployed AI within the public sector's internal processes, service design and delivery, and policymaking processes, similar to OECD countries like Korea and New Zealand. Moreover, Indonesia demonstrates an early-stage use of AI to improve the design and delivery of services.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries ran from September 2024 to February 2025, with responses from eight countries, using the OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. Data for OECD countries were collected from November 2022 to January 2023 for the 2023 edition of the OECD Digital Government Index (OECD, 2024), with a response from 33 countries. Data are based on practices in place as of October 2022. Survey lead respondents were senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations.

AI refers to a machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments. Different AI systems vary in their levels of autonomy and adaptiveness after deployment.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), *Governing with Artificial Intelligence: The State of Play and Way Forward in Core Government Functions*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/795de142-en*.

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*.

OECD (2019), *Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence*, *OECD/LEGAL/0449*, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/oecd-legal-0449*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 5.5, 5.6, Table 5.2. OECD averages do not include Germany, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland or the United States.

Figure 5.6. Since the reference period of the survey, Singapore released an instrument on responsible use of algorithms in the public sector, which addresses responsible AI governance protocols for public sector AI deployment. This is not reflected in the data shown.

Table 5.2. Since the reference period of the survey, the Philippines has implemented several digital government initiatives. These are not reflected in the data shown. More details are available via the StatLink.

**Figure 5.5. Availability of national strategy, agenda, or plan for AI in the public sector, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/vfc2jx

**Figure 5.6. Highest level of available instruments for ensuring responsible use of algorithms in the public sector, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/kas81w

**Table 5.2. Use of AI in the public sector, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**

Existence of at least one AI use case per category and per country

| Country | Public sector internal processes | Service design and delivery | Improve policymaking | No initiative in place |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | |
| Brunei Darussalam | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Cambodia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Indonesia | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ |
| Lao PDR | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Philippines | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Singapore | ● | ● | ● | ○ |
| Thailand | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Viet Nam | ○ | ○ | ○ | ● |
| Total | | | | |
| ● Yes | 1 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
| ○ No | 7 | 6 | 7 | 2 |
| **OECD** | | | | |
| Australia | ● | ● | ○ | ○ |
| Korea | ● | ● | ● | ○ |
| New Zealand | ● | ● | ● | ○ |
| **OECD total** | | | | |
| ● Yes | 23 | 22 | 11 | 7 |
| ○ No | 10 | 11 | 22 | 26 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/g1deri

The user-driven dimension of the Digital Government Index measures how governments award a central role to people's needs and convenience in the shaping of processes, services and policies (OECD, 2020). Delivery of human-centred and user-driven public services is an important part of this dimension, with a focus on how digital technology can support equitable service access and personalised service delivery to the public. Putting users at the centre of the design and delivery of public services can positively affect satisfaction and trust in governments. On average, SEA countries scored 0.33 out of 1 on this dimension, indicating scope to strengthen practice.

Service standards are high-level principles that guide public service teams in designing, iterating and improving services to address the needs of users of public services. Only three out of eight SEA countries for which information is available have implemented a whole-of-government service standard. By comparison, 28 of 33 OECD Member countries have such standards in place, including all 4 OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Figure 5.7). SEA countries can establish whole-of-government service standards to ensure consistency, accessibility and reliability across public services by setting common expectations for service design and delivery. This approach provides users with a unified experience when accessing public services through different channels.

Including standards on digital services design and delivery within whole-of-government service standards can help to ensure a similar experience for service users when they interact with different governance agencies. Among the three SEA countries with whole-of-government service standards in place (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and Singapore), all three include understanding user needs or expectations, using digital technology and data to transform services, and encouraging a consistent methodology for delivering services in their digital service design standards (Table 5.3). However, more broadly, SEA countries have substantial scope to strengthen their design standards for digital public services. No SEA country currently has standards for facilitating cross-border digital public services, encouraging greening efforts in the public sector, or implementing an omnichannel strategy.

Complementing service standards, countries can employ human-centred service design and user research methods to more effectively involve users while designing digital public services. Two out of eight SEA countries, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, test the usability of digital public services with users or providers before launching the service (Table 5.4). Additionally, Singapore also applies a range of other testing methods, including design thinking sessions, focus groups, public consultation websites, A/B testing, first-click testing, and tree testing. Six out of eight countries in the region do not yet perform any testing of digital public services. This gap makes it more challenging to ensure that digital public services are aligned with user needs and can adapt to evolving changes.

### Methodology and definitions

Data for SEA countries ran from September 2024 to February 2025, with responses from eight countries. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. Data for OECD countries were collected from November 2022 to January 2023 for the 2023 edition of the OECD Digital Government Index (OECD, 2024), with a response from 33 countries. Data are based on practices in place as of October 2022. Survey lead respondents were senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations. Data were collected using the OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0.

A service standard is a set of principles that provide a shared definition for the quality and behaviours associated with public service design and delivery. Such principles will usually provide the basis for setting expectations with delivery partners and, in some cases, may also be the criteria against which formal assessments of performance are carried out.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*.

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en*.

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 5.7, Tables 5.3, 5.4. OECD averages do not include Germany, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland or the United States.

**Figure 5.7. Existence of whole-of-government digital service standards, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government in Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/uao8e6

**Table 5.3. Requirements of common standards on digital service design and delivery, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**

| Country | Understand user needs | Use digital tech and data to transform services | Build consistent methods for service delivery | Transparent design and delivery of services | Interact with users in service design and delivery | Use data to transform services | Equip teams to design and deliver high-quality services | Scalable tools, practices and resources | Omni-channel strategy | Greening efforts | Facilitate cross-border services |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Brunei Darussalam | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Cambodia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Indonesia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Lao PDR | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Philippines | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Singapore | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Thailand | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Viet Nam | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| **Total** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ● Yes | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ○ No | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| **OECD** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ● |
| Korea | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ |
| New Zealand | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ● Yes | 25 | 22 | 23 | 21 | 23 | 18 | 23 | 17 | 15 | 11 | 10 |
| ○ No | 8 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 15 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 22 | 23 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government in Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/ep4dm2

**Table 5.4. Methods used to test digital services with user involvement, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**

| Country | Usability testing | Other | Design thinking sessions | Focus groups | Public consultation websites | A/B testing | Tree testing | First-click testing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEA** | | | | | | | | |
| Brunei Darussalam | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Cambodia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Indonesia | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Lao PDR | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Philippines | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Singapore | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Thailand | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Viet Nam | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Total | | | | | | | | |
| ● Yes | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| ○ No | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| **OECD** | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ● | ● | ● | ○ |
| Korea | ○ | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| New Zealand | ● | ○ | ○ | ● | ● | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| **OECD total** | | | | | | | | |
| ● Yes | 20 | 9 | 14 | 16 | 12 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| ○ No | 13 | 24 | 19 | 17 | 21 | 27 | 30 | 30 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government in Southeast Asia.*

StatLink https://stat.link/abzxwu

The government as a platform dimension of the Digital Government Index measures how governments provide clear and transparent guidelines, tools, data, and software that equip them to deliver user-driven, consistent, seamless, and integrated services (OECD, 2020). Contributing to this dimension, digital public infrastructure (DPI) is a set of shared, secure, and interoperable digital systems designed to support broad access to public and private services. DPI is foundational for public service delivery, efficiency and the broader digital economy. DPI components include digital identity, digital payments, data-sharing systems, digital post, notifications and base registries. Governments play a pivotal role in designing, implementing and overseeing DPI, as well as DPI enablers. These comprise frameworks for interoperability, including open-source solutions, metadata management standards, and application programming interfaces (APIs).

Among DPI components, data-sharing systems are the most widely adopted in SEA countries, available in five out of eight countries, followed by digital payments, which are available in four out of eight surveyed countries (Figure 5.8). These two DPI components are also relatively commonly adopted in OECD Member countries, having been adopted by 85% and 55% of OECD countries, respectively. Among other DPI components, digital identity, digital notifications, digital post and base registry frameworks each has been adopted by only two of the eight SEA countries, although the countries adopting them vary. SEA's adoption rates of these DPI components remain lower compared to OECD averages of 42%, 55%, 58%, and 64%, respectively. Among DPI enablers, SEA has an adoption rate of 25% (two out of eight countries) for all items. This is significantly lower than the adoption rate in OECD countries, where interoperability frameworks have been adopted by 91% of countries, followed by API standards (67%), metadata standards (61%) and open-source frameworks (55%).

Singapore is the country in the region that has adopted the most DPI components and enablers, with a total of nine (Figure 5.9). Indonesia follows with seven out of ten components and enablers in place. To move forward in their adoption, SEA countries could consider adopting a strategic and human-centred approach to DPI governance through management and investment frameworks, along with multi-stakeholder collaboration and international digital co-operation, to enhance peer learning (OECD, 2024a).

### Methodology and definitions

Data collection for SEA countries took place from September 2024 to February 2025, yielding responses from eight countries. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. Data for OECD countries were collected from November 2022 to January 2023 for the 2023 edition of the OECD Digital Government Index (OECD, 2024a), with a response from 33 countries. Data are based on practices in place as of October 2022. Survey lead respondents were senior officials from central and federal governments responsible for leading and/or executing digital government transformations.

The existence of digital identity in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 is defined as having at least 50% of a country's public services that can be accessed through a two-factor authentication (2FA) digital identity solution using email, SMS, or an app.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*.

OECD (2024a), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en*.

OECD (2024b), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*.

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a digital government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 5.8, 5.9. SEA average for eight countries. OECD average for 33 countries. OECD averages do not include Germany, Greece, the Slovak Republic, Switzerland or the United States. Since the reference period of the survey data presented here, the Philippines has implemented several digital government initiatives. These are not reflected in the data shown. More details are available via the StatLink.

**Figure 5.8. Digital public infrastructure components and enablers, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/hrv63d

**Figure 5.9. Digital public infrastructure components and enablers by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/24jr0q

Data are a strategic asset for governments, forming the foundation for evidence-based policymaking, high-quality public services, and transparent, accountable governance. When made openly available, data empower the public, strengthen public trust, and fuel innovation, including as an input for AI systems. The Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index assesses how effectively governments develop and implement open data strategies, engage stakeholders in data sharing and re-use, and ensure that key datasets are publicly available (OECD, 2023). Data used in the OURdata Index also contributes to the open-by-default and data-driven public sector dimensions of the Digital Government Index.

The OURdata Index for SEA shows varying levels of open data maturity across the eight participating countries. The regional average score was 0.22, on a scale of 0 to 1, which is somewhat below the OECD average of 0.48 (Figure 5.10). The SEA countries with the highest scores for open data are Indonesia and Thailand, both with scores of 0.43, followed by Singapore at 0.34. Korea is the best-performing country globally on the OURdata Index, with a score of 0.91. The OURdata Index evaluates performance across three pillars:

- **Data availability** measures the extent to which governments have established robust open data frameworks and publish high-value datasets. Among SEA countries, this pillar records the highest average score at 0.28, compared to an average of 0.48 in OECD Member countries (Figure 5.11). Thailand leads the region with a score of 0.64, significantly above the OECD average, followed by Indonesia (0.43), Singapore (0.40), and the Philippines (0.24). These countries have adopted clear strategies, supported by sound governance mechanisms and requirements for data publication that support the availability of these data for public access and re-use.
- **Data accessibility** refers to the ease with which users can find, access and understand open data. The SEA regional average for this pillar is 0.25, compared to an average of 0.59 for OECD countries (Figure 5.12). Indonesia (0.46) performs the highest, followed by Singapore and the Philippines, both with a score of 0.41. These results reflect early progress on data accessibility in the SEA region, although room for improvement remains in terms of more user-friendly platforms, improved metadata, and accessible open formats.
- **Government support for data re-use** assesses actions taken to promote the use of open data, including awareness-raising, public-private partnerships, data literacy initiatives and mechanisms for impact evaluation. The average score for this pillar in the SEA region, at 0.13, is lower than the OECD average of 0.36 (Online Figure D.2.2). Indonesia (0.39) and Thailand (0.34) are the regional leaders on support for data re-use. This is the pillar with the lowest average in the SEA region. These results highlight the importance of initiatives to encourage meaningful use and innovation based on public data.

These findings underscore the opportunity for governments in SEA to strengthen their open data ecosystems, treating data as a strategic resource that can drive innovation, foster transparency and support development. To achieve this, governments can continue to invest in governance frameworks, promote data literacy and foster cross-sector collaboration, while also safeguarding privacy and ensuring data security.

### Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through a regional edition of the OECD Survey on Open Government Data (v5.0) in 2024. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. This survey is designed to monitor progress in implementing the OECD Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies and the OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data. The primary respondents were government officials from central or federal administrations responsible for leading or co-ordinating digital government reforms.

The OURdata composite score is the unweighted average of the three pillar scores, which each range from 0 to 1. Each pillar score is derived, in turn, as the unweighted average of its sub-pillar scores. For further details on the index see Annex C.

The OECD defines open data as non-discriminatory data access and sharing arrangements where data are machine-readable and can be accessed and shared free of charge and used by anyone for any purpose, subject at most to requirements that preserve integrity, provenance, attribution and openness.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*.

OECD (2021), *Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data*, *OECD/LEGAL/0463*, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12. Data for OECD countries were collected in 2022 and reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2021.

Figure D.2.2 (Government support for data re-use, SEA countries, 2023, and OECD countries, 2021) is available online in Annex D.

**Figure 5.10. OURdata Index, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0 - Southeast Asia edition*; OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*.

StatLink https://stat.link/r0e1od

**Figure 5.11. Data availability, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0 - Southeast Asia edition*.

StatLink https://stat.link/j1e3vg

**Figure 5.12. Data accessibility, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0 - Southeast Asia edition*.

StatLink https://stat.link/x5at9f

To support meaningful international comparisons of open data implementation, the OECD has identified 82 high-value datasets (HVD) of significant public interest across ten categories. This non-exhaustive list builds on the original G8 Open Data Charter and reflects more recent global frameworks, such as the European Union's Open Data Directive. The ten categories are: companies and company ownership; earth observation and environment; geospatial; mobility; meteorology; statistics; government finances and accountability; crime and justice; education; and health and social welfare. Open access to these datasets can enable more effective use of public resources, support informed decision making and foster innovation. As governments confront complex challenges, timely, high-quality data are essential for designing responsive policies and delivering impactful public services. HVD are also fundamental to enabling AI. Reliable datasets form the basis for training AI systems and scaling data-driven solutions in areas such as urbanisation, environment and health.

Overall, only 23% of HVD in SEA are available as open data (Figure 5.13). This is below the OECD average of 47%. Statistics data are the most available (48% of datasets available as open data), followed by company data (25%), crime and justice datasets (25%), meteorology data (23%), health and social welfare data (23%), and education-related data (20%). In all other categories, less than 20% of relevant government datasets across the region are available as open data. These include earth observation and environment (19%), geospatial data (17%), mobility data (17%), and data related to government finances and accountability (13%). Further information on budget transparency is presented in Chapter 3.

Data accessibility also remains a challenge. On average, 35% of published HVD in SEA are easily accessible, compared to the OECD average of 66% (Figure 5.14). There are a number of barriers to access. Currently, only 44% of HVD in SEA are published via a central portal (compared to a 66% OECD average), and only 44% are available in open formats (compared to an 88% OECD average). Only 43% of HVD are up to date (79% OECD average), and just 25% feature high-quality metadata (47% OECD average). Importantly, only 18% of HVD datasets are accessible via standard APIs (compared to a 47% OECD average), which are vital for integrating data into applications, services, and AI systems.

Country-level performance varies across SEA. Thailand and Singapore have made 72% and 56% of HVD available as open data, respectively (Online Figure D.2.3). This is above the OECD and SEA averages (47% and 23%). In some SEA countries, including Indonesia, low levels of availability can be attributed to challenges in aggregating nationwide datasets from local and regional jurisdictions. Most countries perform better on the accessibility of HVD, led by Singapore and Thailand, which provide 88% and 67% of HVD in accessible formats, respectively (Figure 5.15), which is above the OECD average (66%). Notably, except for Korea, all OECD countries in the Asia-Pacific region also perform below the OECD average on both the availability and accessibility of HVD.

SEA still faces significant barriers to unlocking the full value of its data assets. Closing these gaps will require co-ordinated policy action. Governments can prioritise making HVD widely available through centralised portals, adopting open formats and ensuring regular updates. Equally important is enhancing the quality and interoperability of data through robust metadata standards and API access. These actions are not just technical; they are foundational investments in a modern, agile and innovation-ready public sector.

### Methodology and definitions

Data were collected through a regional edition of the OECD Survey on Open Government Data (version 5.0) in 2024. Results reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2023. This survey is designed to monitor progress in implementing the OECD Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies and the OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data.

The OECD evaluates whether each HVD is available as open data (machine-readable, free of charge and provided with an open licence). Available HVD are then further assessed on accessibility, based on factors including whether they can be found on a central open data portal, have standardised and complete metadata, are provided in open formats, are up to date, and have API access.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*.

OECD (2021), *Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data*, *OECD/LEGAL/0463*, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15. Data for OECD countries were collected in 2022 and reflect policies and initiatives in place as of December 2021.

Figure D.2.3 (Availability of high-value datasets, selected categories, by country, SEA countries, 2023, and OECD countries, 2021) is available online in Annex D.

**Figure 5.13. Availability of high-value datasets, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0 - Southeast Asia edition.*

StatLink https://stat.link/axfiw2

**Figure 5.14. Accessibility of high-value datasets, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0 - Southeast Asia edition.*

StatLink https://stat.link/bvckup

**Figure 5.15. Accessibility of high-value datasets by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Open Government Data 5.0 - Southeast Asia edition.*

StatLink https://stat.link/0ipen1

*Chapter 6*

# Public services

Public services are vital touchpoints between citizens and their governments, shaping everyday experiences and perceptions of public institutions. High satisfaction with services can strengthen citizens' trust in government and reinforce the legitimacy of public institutions (OECD, 2024). Satisfaction reflects a range of service qualities, including accessibility, responsiveness and quality (Baredes, 2022). As such, satisfaction with public services can also help provide a useful diagnostic of citizens' perceptions of, and experience with, public services. Satisfaction may also be affected by expectations of service quality, past experiences and personal characteristics.

On average, satisfaction with healthcare services in Southeast Asia (SEA) countries was reported at 87% in 2024. This was higher than the average in OECD Member countries in the same survey, which was reported at 64% (Figure 6.1). In 2024, high satisfaction levels were reported in all countries within the SEA region, with the highest in Singapore (92%), Viet Nam (90%), and Cambodia (90%). Since 2014, the regional average for SEA has risen by 9 percentage points (p.p.) from 78%, whereas the OECD average has decreased by 5 p.p. from 69% to 64% over the same period. Among individual countries, the largest improvements in satisfaction with healthcare services were observed in Viet Nam (+18 p.p.), Lao People's Democratic Republic (hereafter "Lao PDR") (+14 p.p.) and Cambodia (+11 p.p.).

On average, satisfaction with education services in SEA countries was reported at 89% in 2024. This was higher than the average in OECD Member countries in the same survey, reported at 66% (Figure 6.2). In 2024, the highest satisfaction levels in SEA were reported in Viet Nam (96%), Cambodia (94%), and Thailand (92%). The Philippines (89%) and Indonesia (88%) also reported strong satisfaction levels. Since 2014, the regional average has increased by 6 p.p. from 83%, while the OECD average remained stable over the same period. The largest improvements in satisfaction were observed in Viet Nam and Indonesia (+12 p.p. and +10 p.p., respectively).

On average, confidence in the judicial system in SEA countries was reported at 71% in 2024, compared to the average of 57% across OECD countries in the same survey (Figure 6.3). The highest levels of confidence in the judicial system were reported in Singapore (85%), Indonesia (75%), and Lao PDR (72%). Since 2014, the average in the SEA region has increased by 5 p.p. from 66%, while the OECD average rose by 6 p.p. over the same period (from 51% in 2014). The most substantial improvements were observed in Cambodia (+27 p.p.), Indonesia (+21 p.p.), and the Philippines (+6 p.p.).

### Methodology and definitions

Data from the Gallup World Poll, generally based on a representative sample of 1 000 citizens in each country. More information at *https://www.gallup.com/analytics/318875/global-research.aspx*.

## *Further reading*

Baredes, B. (2022), "Serving citizens: Measuring the performance of services for a better user experience", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 52, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/65223af7-en*.

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*.

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3. SEA and OECD present the unweighted average across SEA and OECD countries for which data are available..

Figure 6.1, 6.2. Baseline year for Lao PDR is 2012.

Figure 6.3. For Cambodia and Lao PDR, baseline year is 2007 and most recent year is 2017. Baseline year for Viet Nam is 2013, no data beyond this.

**Figure 6.1. Percentage of the public satisfied with healthcare, 2014 and 2024**




*Source: Gallup World Poll* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/ys6kui

**Figure 6.2. Percentage of the public satisfied with education services, 2014 and 2024**




*Source: Gallup World Poll* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/b5sxhl

**Figure 6.3. Percentage of the public with confidence in the judicial system, 2014 and 2024**




*Source: Gallup World Poll* (database).

StatLink https://stat.link/e5yo4a

Three dimensions of service delivery can help compare the performance of public services across different countries and sectors: 1) accessibility refers to people's ability to obtain appropriate services; 2) responsiveness refers to how quickly and well public organisations respond to people's needs; and 3) quality is the degree to which services meet desired outcomes. The accessibility, responsiveness and quality of healthcare systems are crucial for ensuring the well-being of citizens. Among many other factors, human-centric health services must ensure the availability of skilled professionals, manageable out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses, and high-quality delivery.

Accessibility encompasses people's ability to obtain timely, appropriate and affordable healthcare services when needed. Accessibility means that geographical, financial or systemic barriers do not prevent individuals from receiving necessary care. The availability of doctors is a critical component in the accessibility of healthcare, as shortages can mean longer waiting times or patients having to travel for care. Seven of eight SEA countries have increased physician-population ratios since 2010 (Figure 6.4). The largest improvements occurred in Singapore (+0.8 p.p.) and Thailand (+0.6 p.p.). However, SEA countries may still have scope for improvement in access to physicians. On average, the number of doctors is 1 per 1 000 people in SEA countries, with wide regional variation. This is below the average ratio of 3.8 doctors per 1 000 people in OECD countries. As of 2021, Singapore had the most physicians per person among SEA countries (2.6 per 1 000 people).

OOP healthcare spending refers to payments made by households for healthcare goods and services. High OOP expenditures may also be a barrier to access to health services, whereas lower OOP costs can help ensure that individuals are able to seek and obtain the care they need without financial hardship. OOP expenses are a significant portion of health expenditures in SEA countries (Figure 6.5). In the most recent years for which data are available, average OOP expenditure in SEA was 31% of total healthcare spending. This was higher than the average OOP expenditure across OECD countries in 2022, which was 19%. However, progress has been made in reducing OOP across the region. Between 2012 and 2022, seven of eight SEA countries reduced OOP expenditures. The largest reductions were in Indonesia (-22 p.p.), Lao PDR (-20 p.p.) and Singapore (-13 p.p.). Brunei Darussalam (8%) and Thailand (9%) have the lowest proportion of OOP expenses in the region.

The maternal mortality rate (MMR) can help to examine the quality of care. Within the SEA region, the average MMR has improved, falling from 107 per 100 000 births in 2013 to 75 in 2023 (Figure 6.6). However, there is wide variation between SEA countries. Encouragingly, every country in the SEA region improved their MMR between 2013 and 2023. The largest improvement was in Lao PDR, where the rate decreased from 215 in 2013 to 112 in 2023. Substantial decreases were seen in Indonesia (down by 68, from 208 in 2013 to 140 in 2023) and in Cambodia (down by 45, from 182 to 137). Public services contribute to this. For example, Cambodia's success is partly due to improved access to antenatal care and skilled birth attendance, driven by the increased number of midwives and facilities offering emergency obstetric care (WHO, 2015). A major achievement is the nationwide scale-up of the Early Essential Newborn Care programme, supported by the World Health Organization (WHO).

### Methodology and definitions

Practising physicians are defined as the number of doctors providing care directly to patients, actively practising medicine during the year in public and private institutions.

OOP payments are those made directly by a patient where neither public nor private insurance covers the full cost of the goods or service. They include cost-sharing and other expenditures paid directly by private households and should also ideally include estimations of informal payments to health providers. For countries that do not report spending on dental care, this is typically reported under outpatient care, which can affect the coverage rate.

MMR is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100 000 live births. Data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15-49.

## *Further reading*

OECD/WHO (2022), *Health at a Glance: Asia/Pacific 2022: Measuring Progress Towards Universal Health Coverage*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/c7467f62-en*.

WHO (2015), *Success Factors for Women's and Children's Health: Cambodia*, World Health Organization, Geneva, *https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254481*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 6.4. Most recent data available are from 2022 for Indonesia and New Zealand; 2020 for Japan and Thailand; 2019 for Cambodia; 2016 for Viet Nam. Comparison year: 2012 for New Zealand; 2010 for Lao PDR; 2008 for Brunei Darussalam; 2006 for Thailand; 2003 for Indonesia; 2002 for Viet Nam; 2000 for Japan; 1994 for Cambodia.

Figure 6.5. Most recent data available are from 2023 for the Philippines, Korea. Comparison year: 2013 for the Philippines and Korea.

**Figure 6.4. Access to healthcare services: Number of physicians per 1 000 people, 2011 and 2021**




*Source:* WHO (2025), *National Health Workforce Accounts Data Portal*, *https://apps.who.int/nhwaportal/*.

StatLink https://stat.link/v9pbzs

**Figure 6.5. Access to healthcare services: Out-of-pocket health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure, 2012 and 2022**




*Source:* WHO (2025), *Global Health Expenditure Database*, *https://apps.who.int/nha/database*.

StatLink https://stat.link/aq3yun

**Figure 6.6. Quality of healthcare services: Maternal mortality rate per 100 000 births, 2013 and 2023**




*Source:* WHO (2023), *Trends in Maternal Mortality 2000 to 2020: Estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and UNDESA/Population Division*, *https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240068759*.

StatLink https://stat.link/7ztexa

Primary school completion rates are an important indicator of the **accessibility** of education services. In 2022, the average primary completion rate in SEA countries was 97% (Figure 6.7). Viet Nam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore have all achieved universal primary school enrolment rates, and Brunei Darussalam (96%) is close to reaching this benchmark. With strong progress across the region in primary enrolment, it will be helpful for governments to assess a wider range of accessibility indicators, such as enrolment rates in early childhood education.

Supply of educational materials is key to improving the **responsiveness** of education systems. The index of shortage of educational materials is based on school principals' opinions and shows how much they feel their schools lack resources or infrastructure. Positive scores indicate shortages. The average index score in SEA countries in 2022 was 0.2, compared to the OECD average score of -0.17 (Figure 6.8). Among SEA countries, Cambodia (0.85), the Philippines (0.71) and Indonesia (0.41) faced the largest reported shortfalls of educational resources. Singapore had the highest availability (-1.13), outperforming all SEA countries and OECD countries in the Asia Pacific region. All SEA countries for which data are available showed improvements or were stable between 2018 and 2022. The largest improvements were in Indonesia and Viet Nam, which reduced their index scores by 0.52 and 0.28, respectively, indicating an increase in the availability of educational materials (Figure 6.8).

Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores are one indicator of the **quality** of education systems, reflecting how well they equip students with analytical and problem-solving skills. In 2022, students in SEA countries scored an average of 418 points in mathematics on the OECD PISA assessment. This was somewhat below the OECD average of 472. Among SEA countries, Singapore achieved the highest performance with an average of 575 points, significantly surpassing the OECD average. Viet Nam (469 points) and Brunei Darussalam (442 points) followed, both scoring similarly to the OECD average (Figure 6.9).

Another measure of the **quality** of an education system is the extent to which socio-economic status (SES) affects academic performance. A measure of SES is derived from three indicators: highest parental occupational status, highest parental education in years and home possessions. Across SEA countries, socio-economic factors accounted for an average of 10.9% of the variance in mathematics performance. SEA countries outperform OECD Member countries, where socio-economic factors account for 15.5% of performance on average. Cambodia (17%), Indonesia (5.5%) and the Philippines (4.8%) were the best performers on this measure across the region, with students' SES having the most limited influence on their mathematics achievement (Figure 6.9).

### Methodology and definitions

PISA evaluates how well 15-year-old students can apply their knowledge and skills to real-life challenges. PISA uses proficiency levels to summarise and compare student performance in mathematics. Results are scaled, with a mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. For more information, see *https://doi.org/10.1787/01820d6d-en*.

The index of shortage of educational material is based on feedback from school principals, who evaluate how much a lack of physical infrastructure and educational materials hinders their school's ability to teach. It covers school buildings, heating/cooling systems, instructional spaces, textbooks, laboratory equipment, computers, and other items. Rankings are on a scale from "not at all" to "a lot". The index is standardised across OECD countries, with an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Positive values indicate a greater hindrance from material shortages compared to the OECD average. Negative values suggest a lesser hindrance.

The primary completion rate is the number of new entrants in the final grade of primary education (total enrolment minus repeaters) divided by the population at the official entrance age for that grade, multiplied by 100.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2024), *Education at a Glance 2024: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/c00cad36-en*.

OECD (2023), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume I): The State of Learning and Equity in Education*, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en*.

OECD (2023), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume II): Learning During – and From – Disruption*, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a97db61c-en*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 6.7. Most recent data available are from 2022 for Korea, Singapore and Viet Nam. Comparison year: 2012 for Korea; 2011 for Brunei Darussalam; 2007 for the Philippines; 2003 for Viet Nam. OECD average excludes Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, the Republic of Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States, due to data unavailability.

Figure 6.8 Cambodia participated in PISA for the first time in 2022; therefore, no comparison data are available.

Figure 6.9. Cambodia participated in PISA for the first time in 2022; therefore, no comparison data are available. Previous scores are from 2018, except for Viet Nam, where the previous score is from 2015.

**Figure 6.7. Access to education services: Primary school completion rates, 2013 and 2023**




*Source:* UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

StatLink https://stat.link/xo9zn7

**Figure 6.8. Responsiveness of education systems: Index of shortage of education materials, 2018 and 2022**




*Source:* OECD (2023), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume I): The State of Learning and Equity in Education*, https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/f9il74

**Figure 6.9. Quality of education systems: Mean score in mathematics and percentage of variance explained by socio-economic status, 2022**




*Source:* OECD (2023), *PISA 2022 Results (Volume I): The State of Learning and Equity in Education*, https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en.

StatLink https://stat.link/8hgau1

Access to justice refers to the capacity of individuals and enterprises to prevent conflicts and obtain effective, affordable, fair, equitable and timely resolution of their legal and justice-related needs (OECD, 2021). Ensuring access to justice is essential for protecting rights, enabling people to resolve disputes, participate fully in society and the economy, and hold institutions accountable. On average, SEA countries scored 0.52 out of a maximum score of 1 on the accessibility and affordability of civil justice in the 2023 World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index (Figure 6.10). Singapore (0.63), and Thailand (0.60) were assessed as having the highest scores in the SEA region. The regional average on this index has increased by 0.06 points since 2014, when the SEA average was 0.46. In five out of six SEA countries, performance on this measure has improved since 2014. The largest improvements were observed in Thailand (+0.13 points), and Viet Nam (+0.12 points).

Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRs) are more flexible justice services than a court. They can increase access to justice, as not everyone can afford formal court or legal fees. The integrity of ADRs is essential. These mechanisms must be accessible and free from undue influence, ensuring fair outcomes for all parties involved. In 2024, the average score for SEA countries on the accessibility, impartiality and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution was 0.58 out of a maximum score of 1 (Figure 6.11). This is an increase from 2014 (0.50). Singapore (0.75) had the highest score among SEA countries in 2024. The largest improvements were in Thailand (+0.21), the Philippines (+0.18) and Indonesia (+0.11).

An independent justice system is important for the fair resolution of legal disputes and for maintaining public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of judicial processes. Independence of the judicial system ensures that decisions are made based on the law rather than external pressures, which is essential for upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights. On average, the SEA region scored 0.42 out of 1 on freedom of the civil justice system from improper government influence in 2024 (Figure 6.12). This is similar to the 2014 average score of 0.40. Among SEA countries in 2024, Singapore had the highest score (0.71), followed by Indonesia (0.48) and Thailand (0.47). The largest improvement occurred in Viet Nam, with an increase from 0.20 in 2014 to 0.33 in 2024. Thailand also increased between 2014 and 2024, from 0.35 to 0.47.

### Methodology and definitions

The WJP Rule of Law Index is based on a general population survey of 1 000 respondents in each country and a survey of experts who frequently interact with their national state institutions. Each dimension is scored from 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating better performance. For more information, see *https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index*.

Accessibility and affordability are gauged by asking about people's awareness of available remedies and the affordability of legal advice and representation. The evaluation of ADRs in terms of their accessibility, neutrality, efficiency, and enforceability is conducted by soliciting the views of individuals and experts on these aspects of ADRs. Freedom from improper influence is estimated by asking about factors such as how likely a litigant is to win a case against the state and whether it would respect such a decision.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*.

OECD (2021), *OECD Framework and Good Practice Principles for People-Centred Justice*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/cdc3bde7-en*.

World Justice Project (2024), *WJP Rule of Law Index 2024*, World Justice Project, Washington, DC, *https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2024.pdf*.

## *Figure notes*

Figures 6.10, 6.11, 6.12. Data for Brunei Darussalam are not available.

Figure 6.12. Data shown is for WJP sub-factor 7.4 on "Civil justice is free of improper government influence". For the OECD average, data is not available for Switzerland, Iceland, Israel for 2014 and 2024, or for Ireland, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Costa Rica, Slovakia for 2014.

**Figure 6.10. Access to justice: The extent to which people can access and afford civil justice, 2014 and 2024**




*Source:* World Justice Project (n.d.), *WJP Rule of Law Index 2024*, *https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/wcpb89

**Figure 6.11. Access to justice: The extent to which alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, impartial and effective, 2014 and 2024**




*Source:* World Justice Project (n.d.), *WJP Rule of Law Index 2024*, *https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/na1gfk

**Figure 6.12. Quality of judicial services: Freedom of civil justice from improper government influence, 2014 and 2024**




*Source:* World Justice Project (n.d.), *WJP Rule of Law Index 2024*, *https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2024*.

StatLink https://stat.link/nh41oi

High-quality public administrative services are essential for achieving governments' objectives, including economic growth, well-being, and upholding the rule of law. To effectively deliver these outcomes and respond to citizens' needs and expectations, administrative services must be designed and delivered to be responsive, reliable, and agile in the face of changes. Transforming administrative services to be more human-centred is an ongoing priority for governments, which requires consideration of user convenience and expectations ahead of internal processes, existing policies, and legacy systems (OECD, 2024a).

Birth registration is an essential administrative service, and often a precondition for accessing other public services and legal rights, such as enrolling in public education and accessing public healthcare. As of the latest available years, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, and Thailand all had near-universal birth registration rates (Figure 6.13). Other countries in the region have not yet attained universal birth registration. There is the largest scope for improvement in Cambodia (73%), Lao PDR (73%) and Indonesia (77%). Administrative services can often be more difficult to attain in rural areas, where government offices may be far away from where people live, and/or Internet access may be limited. The gap between urban and rural birth registration offers insight into how access to administrative services varies across a country. Thailand performs best on this measure among SEA countries, with an urban-rural gap in birth registration of only 0.4 p.p., indicating similar access to birth registration across urban and rural areas. Other countries have larger gaps, indicating challenges in rural areas, such as accessibility, awareness and availability of registration facilities. The measure is not applicable in Brunei Darussalam and Singapore.

Digital identity facilitates secure access to public administrative services by allowing individuals to verify their identity online in a reliable and efficient manner. It reduces the need for in-person visits and paper-based processes, thereby helping to streamline service delivery and enhance the user experience. Digital identity adoption levels are measured by the percentage of the eligible population actively using it. Among SEA countries, only Singapore has made at least 75% of public services accessible through secure and user-friendly digital identity solutions, such as SMS, e-mail, or an authenticator app (Figure 6.14). Other countries in the region have made less than 50% of public services accessible in this manner.

Moreover, in seven out of eight SEA countries, less than 25% of the population eligible to create a digital identity to access public services have done so, indicating substantial room for further adoption (Figure 6.15). Singapore is the only country in the region where at least 90% of the eligible population is using digital identity solutions to access public services. By comparison, 10 of 32 OECD Member countries have access rates of more than 75%, including Korea. Gaps in digital adoption indicate that expanding availability and usage is an area for SEA countries to strengthen. Governments may also need to consider broader factors that affect digital adoption rates, beyond the quality of the digital service provided. These can include legal or regulatory requirements to complete some transactions in person; complex or bureaucratic processes that encourage users to seek in-person support from public officials; and issues of connectivity and digital literacy.

### Methodology and definitions

Completeness of birth registration is the percentage of children under age five whose births were registered at the time of the survey. The numerator of completeness of birth registration includes children whose birth certificate was seen by the interviewer or whose mother or caretaker says the birth has been registered. Birth registration estimates are primarily drawn from nationally representative household surveys such as the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and Demographic and Health Surveys. Other data sources include other national surveys, censuses and vital statistics from civil registration systems, and estimated coverage of birth registration within national civil registration systems from the United Nations Statistics Division.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2024a), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*.

OECD (2024b), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*.

WHO (2021), *Progress Report on Covering Every Birth and Death: Improving Civil Registration and Vital Statistics in the WHO South-East Asia Region: 2021 Update*, World Health Organization, Geneva, *https://iris.who.int/server/api/core/bitstreams/a6c1be87-9ff5-4fec-be42-ac150d881364/content*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 6.13. Most recent data are used for all countries: 2021 for Indonesia, 2020 for Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, 2019 for Thailand, 2017 for the Philippines and Lao PDR, 2014 for Cambodia and Viet Nam. This measure does not apply in Brunei Darussalam or Singapore, where almost all persons live in urban areas.

**Figure 6.13. Percentage of children under age five whose births are registered, 2021 or latest available year**




*Source:* World Bank (2025), *World Bank Open Data*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.REG.BRTH.ZS*.

StatLink https://stat.link/tj8qyl

**Figure 6.14. Percentage of online public services accessible through secure and user-friendly digital identity solutions (SMS, app, e-mail, 2FA), SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/hfbwye

**Figure 6.15. Percentage of the eligible population using a secure and user-friendly digital identity solution (SMS, e-mail, authenticator app) to access public services, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022)**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Digital Government Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/kp5f63

Effective administrative services require a strategic vision for a whole-of-government approach to continuously improving service design and delivery, grounded in a human-centred approach. Implementing whole-of-government and comprehensive strategies for the design and delivery of public services is a key principle of the OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services (OECD, 2024). Equally, governments should uphold the rights and legitimate interests of people using public administrative services.

Every surveyed country in the SEA region has designated an agency responsible for improving public administrative services. Countries vary in how they organise the delivery of administrative services, reflecting diverse traditions, institutional set-ups and the roles of different levels of government. In Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, and Viet Nam, this function is housed within the prime minister's or president's office, placing service reform within the centre of government. In the Philippines, this function is the responsibility of the Department of Budget and Management (under the Office of the President). Singapore's institutional set-up for public service delivery is centred around ServiceSG, a department under the Prime Minister's Office that leads a whole-of-government approach by co-ordinating agencies and leveraging innovation to ensure integrated services. In Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Cambodia, the ministry of public administration or interior is responsible for improving public administrative services, such as the Ministry of Civil Service in Cambodia (Figure 6.16).

Government-wide strategies for public services are comprehensive plans adopted by the central government on how to improve public administrative services. They serve as the blueprint for aligning administrative actions with broader national priorities, ensuring that reforms are both coherent and sustainable. Seven of eight SEA countries have published a government-wide strategy for improving public administrative services. All three countries in which the ministry of public administration or interior is responsible for improving public administrative services have published both standalone strategies and integrated service improvements into other government strategies. Elsewhere, in the five SEA countries where responsibility for service improvement sits within the centre of government (prime minister's or president's office), only one has published a standalone strategy (Singapore), while three have integrated service improvement as part of a broader government strategy (the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam) (Figure 6.17).

The OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services emphasises safeguarding procedural guarantees and providing effective administrative and judicial review mechanisms (OECD, 2024). Ensuring the protection of service users' rights is fundamental to delivering human-centred administrative services. User rights include the right to be informed of administrative actions affecting them; the right to access their personal files and information; and the right to receive clear and reasoned decisions, protections for their personal data, and accessible mechanisms for redress and accountability. Across the SEA region, all eight surveyed countries have implemented legislation, regulations, and/or policies that secure the rights of public service users. Five of the eight countries secure user rights through primary legislation (legislation passed by parliament), which provides the strongest statutory basis for these protections. Four of the eight countries utilise secondary legislation (regulations created by executive branch agencies) to define user rights, and four of the eight countries provide some user rights under government policy. While this provides less legal security of rights, three of these four countries use policy in addition to primary or secondary legislation. Brunei Darussalam is the only country in the region to set service user rights exclusively through government policies (Table 6.1).

### Methodology and definitions

Data are from the 2024 OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia. This was carried out in 2024, with responses from eight countries in the SEA region. Answers refer only to central/ federal government practices as of December 2024. Respondents were predominantly public service officials within central agencies responsible for government-wide service policy.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*.

OECD (2024), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*.

## *Figure notes*

Figure 6.16. Refers to the question "Is a central government agency responsible for improving public administrative services?"

Figure 6.17. Refers to the question "Has a government-wide strategy for improving public administrative services been published? Please select all that apply."

Table 6.1. Refers to the question "Has your government published any documents that outline the rights of service users (e.g. privacy, non-discrimination) and/or standards for public administrative services (e.g. timely responses)? Please select all that apply."

**Figure 6.16. Central government agencies responsible for improving public administrative services, SEA countries, 2024**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/frb9xe

**Figure 6.17. Government-wide strategies for improving public administrative services, SEA countries, 2024**




*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/76wuoj

**Table 6.1. Sources setting out the rights of service users, SEA countries, 2024**

| | | Primary legislation | Secondary legislation | Government policy | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | | | | ● | |
| Cambodia | | | ● | | |
| Indonesia | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Lao PDR | | ● | | | |
| Philippines | | ● | | | ● |
| Singapore | | ● | | ● | |
| Thailand | | ● | ● | | |
| Viet Nam | | | ● | ● | |
| **SEA total** | ● Yes | 5 of 8 | 4 of 8 | 4 of 8 | 2 of 8 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/w0p4do

A core principle of the OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services is that public services aim to meet user expectations. This is essential to ensuring that services are both functional and build trust in public institutions. The recommendation encourages countries to measure performance, gather feedback from users and engage with stakeholders to drive continuous service improvement (OECD, 2024). By regularly assessing user experiences and perceptions, public administrations can identify improvements in service design and delivery, enhance transparency and support participation, leading to more responsive and inclusive public services (OECD, 2024).

Surveys of citizens' experiences and satisfaction with public services help governments understand how services can be improved. User feedback can be used to compare services with one another, or to diagnose problems experienced by the public. Seven of eight SEA countries for which data are available undertake some form of user survey. Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Thailand have run national user satisfaction surveys covering services from multiple agencies. Five out of eight countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) conduct agency-level surveys, which are managed by individual agencies that deliver public services. Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines and Thailand run both national user surveys, as well as agency-level surveys. For example, the Philippines Citizen Satisfaction (CitSat) and Business Satisfaction (BizSat) surveys ask users about interactions with public services. They help to identify drivers of satisfaction and measurable service quality indicators (Table 6.2).

Feedback and complaint mechanisms are helpful for continuous improvement, as they offer channels that empower citizens to report issues, provide constructive feedback and hold service providers accountable. All eight SEA countries for which data are available have adopted some kind of feedback or complaint mechanism. In seven of the eight surveyed countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam), citizens can submit their feedback through national online portals. This approach centralises the process and can make it easier by allowing service users to voice their opinions or concerns in a single location. Lao PDR primarily relies on a public hotline to collect feedback (Table 6.3). Data received via feedback channels can provide a useful view of common or significant problems users face. It is important that feedback data can be analysed systematically.

Transparency and accountability are important to a human-centred approach in public service delivery. Performance reporting can support governments to understand the performance of public services against desired standards and help to identify areas requiring improvement or additional resources. Six out of eight SEA countries for which data are available publish reports on the performance of public administrative services. Data on performance against established standards are published in four out of eight countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore), offering measurable benchmarks on service delivery. User survey reports, which capture user feedback on user satisfaction and service experiences, have been published in five out of eight countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam). Annual performance reports by individual agencies delivering public services are published in three out of eight countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore). Publishing such reports is important for enhancing transparency, enabling accountability and supporting evidence-based service improvement. Independent evaluations, such as reports from ombudsperson offices or other government bodies, are also employed in Indonesia and the Philippines. Singapore also engages with civil society through evaluations of non-governmental organisations (Table 6.4).

### Methodology and definitions

Data are from the 2024 OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia. This was carried out in 2024, with responses from eight countries in the SEA region. Answers refer only to central/ federal government practices as of December 2024. Respondents were predominantly public service officials within central agencies responsible for government-wide service policy.

## *Further reading*

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*.

OECD (2024), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*.

## *Figure notes*

Table 6.2. Refers to the question "Does your government run any survey which asks service users about their experiences with public administrative services? Select all that apply."

Table 6.3. Refers to the question "Does your government allow service users to report feedback and/or complaints about public administrative services? Select all that apply."

Table 6.4. Refers to the question "Does your government publish any reports on public administrative services performance? Select all that apply."

### Table 6.2. Existence of service user surveys in SEA countries, 2024

| | | National survey by a central government agency | Surveys of users by service delivery agencies | Survey by other government agency | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | | ● | ● | ● | |
| Cambodia | | | | | |
| Indonesia | | | ● | ● | |
| Lao PDR | | ● | | | |
| Philippines | | ● | ● | | ● |
| Singapore | | | ● | ● | |
| Thailand | | ● | ● | ● | |
| Viet Nam | | | | ● | |
| **SEA total** | ● Yes | 4 of 8 | 5 of 8 | 5 of 8 | 1 of 8 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/if6om8

### Table 6.3. Channels for service users to report feedback and/or complaints about public administrative services in SEA countries, 2024

| | | Via the agency providing the service | National online portal | Ombudsperson | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | | ● | ● | ● | |
| Cambodia | | ● | ● | ● | |
| Indonesia | | | ● | ● | ● |
| Lao PDR | | | | | ● |
| Philippines | | ● | ● | | ● |
| Singapore | | ● | ● | | |
| Thailand | | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Viet Nam | | ● | ● | | |
| **SEA total** | ● Yes | 6 of 8 | 7 of 8 | 4 of 8 | 4 of 8 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/s8mewa

### Table 6.4. Availability of reports on public administrative services performance in SEA countries, 2024

| | | Data on performance against standards / targets | Report on user survey findings | Performance reports from agencies delivering public services | Performance report from independent body (e.g. Ombudsperson, regulator) | Performance evaluation from non-government body | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei Darussalam | | ● | ● | | | | |
| Cambodia | | | | | | | |
| Indonesia | | ● | ● | ● | ● | | |
| Lao PDR | | | | | | | |
| Philippines | | ● | ● | ● | ● | | ● |
| Singapore | | ● | | ● | | ● | |
| Thailand | | | ● | | | | ● |
| Viet Nam | | | ● | | | | |
| **SEA total** | ● Yes | 4 of 8 | 5 of 8 | 3 of 8 | 2 of 8 | 1 of 8 | 2 of 8 |

*Source:* OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Public Services Performance in Southeast Asia*.

StatLink https://stat.link/ohsut9

ANNEX A

# *Methodology for the Infrastructure Governance Indicators*

The OECD Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGIs) are intended to support and monitor the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Infrastructure (hereafter "the Recommendation"), adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2020 (OECD, 2020[34]). The Recommendation is based on 10 pillars that relate to how governments plan, prioritise, fund, budget, deliver, operate and monitor infrastructure assets. It presents a whole-of-government approach, covering the entire life cycle of infrastructure projects and placing special emphasis on regional, social, resilience, environmental perspectives and the gender perspective. The overarching nature of the Recommendation's pillars allows for exhaustive analysis of the multiple governance dimensions that are at play in infrastructure planning, decision making and delivery. They therefore provide a robust conceptual framework for the development of the IGIs. The pillars represent both conceptual categories and functional areas of work. As such, the pillars are not standalone entities and interact with one another to support a comprehensive overview of infrastructure governance.

The IGIs serve as a diagnostic tool to help countries assess their current stage of development and identify the dimensions that may require more attention. In particular, the IGIs aim to achieve the following goals:

- map OECD countries' state of play regarding infrastructure governance, identifying strengths and weaknesses
- provide tools for countries to self-assess their performance in each of the infrastructure governance pillars highlighted in the Recommendation
- provide a comprehensive view and deeper understanding of the different pillars that compose the infrastructure governance framework
- allow countries to identify changes in their performance on infrastructure governance through time
- draw attention to how much data are available and needed to measure infrastructure governance, as well as the benefits of building a comprehensive database in the field
- contribute to the discussion on the relationship between infrastructure governance and infrastructure outcomes.

In addition to a general assessment, the IGIs also serve to pinpoint specific areas within each pillar that may require further development from each country. Results at a more granular level (i.e. performance on the sub-components of each dimension) allow for a more in-depth assessment.

The methodology used for building the IGIs is based on the Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (OECD/European Union/EC-JRC, 2008[35]). It has also been shared and discussed with experts and public officials from the Network of Senior Infrastructure and PPP Officials (SIP) and the Working Party of the Leading Practitioners on Public Procurement (LPP).

## Structure of the IGIs

The IGIs are measured and presented in composite indicators, one for each of the pillars arising from the Recommendation, plus the cross-cutting pillar on environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure. Each pillar can be disaggregated into groups of variables, called sub-pillars. These sub-pillars reflect countries' performance at a more granular level. The nested structure helps countries understand the driving forces behind each of the composite indicators. An overview of the sub-pillars under each of the four pillars implemented in Southeast Asia (SEA) is shown below in Figure A.1.

**Figure A.1. Infrastructure Governance Indicators: Pillars implemented in Southeast Asia and their sub-pillars**




## Implementation of the IGIs

The IGIs were implemented in OECD countries using ten composite indicators covering each of nine pillars of the Recommendation and the cross-cutting pillar on environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure. The development of a composite indicator to measure the remaining pillar on coordination across levels of government is currently being discussed with the OECD Regional Development Policy Committee (RDPC). The results for the full set of indicators will provide an overarching analysis of countries' performance across all dimensions of the Recommendation and on the cross-cutting pillar on environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure. Results of the IGIs for OECD countries are available in the OECD Infrastructure Toolkit (OECD, n.d.[36]).

The IGIs were implemented in four SEA: Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Data was collected during 2023-2025, covering four pillars: long-term strategic vision, value for money, public procurement, and environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure.

## Data collection and validation

The IGIs were built using data collected via OECD survey instruments, namely the Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure and other relevant data collected from OECD policy communities. Data presented in this publication is drawn from the 2023-2025 OECD Survey on the Governance of Infrastructure in SEA. The survey was designed based on inputs from relevant divisions/directorates of the OECD and in consultation with the SIP and the LPP. Relevant institutions to coordinate the data

collection exercise in each of the SEA countries were identified. Invitations to participate in the project were sent out to relevant institutions. Respondents were predominantly senior officials in the central/federal ministries of infrastructure, public works and finance, as well as in infrastructure agencies and other line ministries.

Various steps were undertaken to ensure the highest standards in data quality and accuracy. Workshops were organised in Indonesia and the Philippines to help respondents in answering the survey, introducing the IGIs, its methodology, and results from OECD countries, sharing experiences from OECD countries on the implementation, presenting the questionnaire used for data collection, the key terms used, and sharing caveats to keep in mind and tips on how to answer the survey. Additionally, the OECD Secretariat provided further clarification and instructions on how to answer the survey to respondents in the four SEA countries. A data validation process was used to check for internal and external consistency in the survey responses, comparing the answers to data from other sources and verifying that supporting evidence was systematically provided before validating the responses.

## Selection of variables and re-coding

The sub-pillars were constructed from a set of variables that aim to measure the adoption and adequacy of governance practices in line with the Recommendation. The variables were selected in order to measure countries' performance in infrastructure governance in terms of inputs and processes (e.g. policy tools, norms of interaction, decision-making methodologies and monitoring strategies). The proposed composite indicators did not include variables related to outputs or outcomes (e.g. levels of investment, quality of infrastructure services, or amounts of capital stock and achievement of policy objectives). It is important to note that the selection of variables and re-coding, and thus the structure of the composite indicators, could be subject to change in future editions of the IGIs to account for changes in institutional, political and economic settings across OECD countries.

The OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure were designed to collect qualitative data. Therefore, the responses to the survey questions were re-coded using numerical values between 0 and 1, where 1 is the maximum value and indicates complete alignment with the best practices highlighted in the Recommendation, and 0 is the minimum value indicating the absence of such practices in the country.

## Missing data

Due to the cross-cutting nature of the concept of infrastructure governance, the OECD Surveys on the Governance of Infrastructure require respondents from different institutions to provide information on the infrastructure governance frameworks and practices in a country. The composite indicator for each pillar was not calculated for countries that reported not having the information to answer two or more survey questions for any one of its sub-pillars. Consequently, those countries were not included in the OECD average indicator value for that pillar. As the data used to build the composite indicators are qualitative, data imputation was not used to deal with missing data. However, it should be noted that where country responses were only based on practices applicable in a certain sector or sectors, these were retained and important caveats provided in relation to those.

## Weighting and aggregation

To build the composite indicators, all the sub-pillars within each pillar were given equal weight. However, the variables within a sub-pillar were weighted differently depending on: 1) the number of variables that make up each sub-pillar, as the larger the number of variables within a sub-pillar the lower the weight each variable will have; and 2) the relevance of each variable, where greater weight was given to variables that are more relevant in measuring a specific sub-pillar. The weights assigned to the variables in each sub-pillar add up to 1. The weighted scores of all the variables are totalled to arrive at a sub-pillar score that ranges from 0 to 1. The linear aggregation method was used to first

aggregate the variables into a sub-pillar (i.e. weighted arithmetic mean), and then the sub-pillars into a composite indicator (i.e. arithmetic mean). Experts and public officials from the SIP and the LPP were consulted over the assignment of weights and the aggregation type before the final set of weights was confirmed.

## Multivariate analysis

Multivariate analysis was employed to study the overall structure of the data collected in OECD countries. The analysis was used to further help guide methodological choices with respect to variable grouping and aggregation. As such, the analysis was used in OECD countries where the methodology was first developed and not in SEA countries where the existing methodology was applied. The techniques used in the multivariate analysis are detailed below.

## Factor analysis

Factor analysis was used to check the structure of the data along the variable dimension, to help identify groups of variables that are statistically similar and that could be regrouped under a sub-pillar where such grouping is conceptually relevant. The analysis was run separately for each pillar. Principal component factor analysis was used to extract the principal components and consider them as factors (groups of variables). The groups of variables offered by the factor analysis were interpreted together with the conceptual framework underpinning the composite indicators exercise.

The results were reviewed to look for any set of variables that measure the same underlying dimension and that could be regrouped to avoid double-counting. The results offered several cases where the factors matched well the conceptual groupings (sub-pillars). In the case of variables with high levels of covariance but belonging to different initial conceptual groupings, the results were discussed with experts to determine if the variables needed to be regrouped. Following this consultation with experts, the sub-pillars were either maintained or restructured to align with the conceptual framework.

## Cronbach coefficient alpha

The Cronbach coefficient alpha (c-alpha) was used as a measure of internal consistency and scale reliability. The coefficient shows how related variables are as a group and to what extent they measure the same underlying concept. A c-alpha of 0.7 is usually recommended as an acceptable reliability threshold (Lafortune and Ubaldi, 2018[37]). The c-alpha test was used to measure internal consistency for each pillar.

## Sensitivity analysis

To assess the robustness of the composite indicators, Monte Carlo simulations were used to study how uncertainty in the weighting schemes affects the composite indicator values. This technique uses 1 000 sets of randomly generated simulated weights to calculate possible composite indicator scores for each country under different weighting schemes.

## Measuring balance in sub-pillar scores

Good infrastructure governance requires improvements across multiple dimensions. Ideally, countries should make progress in all sub-pillars, and low scores in some should not be compensated with high scores in others (i.e. sub-pillars for a country should not show a wide range of values). For each pillar, a rating scale based on the coefficient of variation was used to rate country profiles from balanced (low variability in country sub-pillar scores under a pillar) to unbalanced (high variability in country sub-pillar scores under a pillar). For each pillar, this analysis shows how balanced country profiles are with respect to sub-pillar scores and helps identify countries with relatively high indicator values but with great variability in sub-pillar scores. Analysis for each OECD country is in the OECD Infrastructure Toolkit. (OECD, n.d.[36])

## *References*


ADB (2025), *Asian Development Outlook (ADO) April 2025*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/FLS250135-3*. [2]

ADB (2024), *Striving to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals: Next Steps for Policymakers and Practitioners*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.56506/ACFH4829*. [16]

ADB (2022), *Building Resilience of the Urban Poor in Indonesia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/TCS210404-2*. [18]

ADB (2022), *COVID-19 Pushed 4.7 Million More People in Southeast Asia Into Extreme Poverty in 2021, But Countries are Well Positioned to Bounce Back — ADB*, *https://www.adb.org/news/covid-19-pushed-4-7-million-more-people-southeast-asia-extreme-poverty-2021-countries-are-well*. [9]

ADB (2022), *Strengthening Domestic Resource Mobilization in Southeast Asia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/tcs220185*. [15]

Aguilar Jaber, A. et al. (2020), "Long-term low emissions development strategies: Cross-country experience", *OECD Environment Working Papers*, No. 160, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1c1d8005-en*. [50]

Borak, M. (2024), *Vietnam integrates national digital ID and tax system*, *https://www.biometricupdate.com/202410/vietnam-integrates-national-digital-id-and-tax-system*. [32]

Development Academy of the Philippines (2023), *2021 e-BizSat reveals 10 key drivers of business satisfaction in frontline government services*, *https://dap.edu.ph/2021-e-bizsat-reveals-10-key-drivers-of-business-satisfaction-in-frontline-government-services/*. [27]

Hale, T. et al. (2021), "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)", *Nature Human Behaviour*, Vol. 5/4, pp. 529-538, *https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01079-8*. [12]

IISD (2024), *Green Public Procurement in Indonesia: Policies, Practices and Ways Forward*, International Institute for Sustainable Development, *https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2024-11/green-public-procurement-indonesia.pdf*. [23]

Lafortune, G. and B. Ubaldi (2018), "OECD 2017 OURdata Index: Methodology and results", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 30, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2807d3c8-en*. [37]

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, *https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en*. [13]

OECD (2025), "Empowering fiscal reporting with digital and interactive approaches", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2025/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/82070ddb-en*. [25]

OECD (2025), "Governing for the green transition", *OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers*, No. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/5b0aa7d0-en*. [19]

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*. [29]

OECD (2025), *Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en*. [51]

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*. [48]

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en*. [43]

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*. [1]

OECD (2024), *Enabling Digital Innovation in Government: The OECD GovTech Policy Framework*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a51eb9b2-en*. [45]

OECD (2024), "Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?", *OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers*, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en*. [46]

OECD (2024), *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9aea61f0-en*. [20]

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en*. [24]

OECD (2024), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*. [28]

OECD (2023), *2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings*, OECD Publishing, Paris. [52]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [22]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [47]

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/8f2a6ecb-en*. [11]

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en*. [41]

OECD (2021), "Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD/LEGAL/0463, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463*. [49]

OECD (2021), *The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en*. [39]

OECD (2021), "The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/4e7c3f58-en*. [40]

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*. [34]

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*. [31]

OECD (2019), *The Path to Becoming a Data-Driven Public Sector*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/059814a7-en*. [42]

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies", *Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate*, Vol. July. [38]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies*, OECD/LEGAL/0406, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0406*. [30]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions*, OECD/LEGAL/0401, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401*. [14]

OECD (forthcoming), *Effectively Managing Investments in Digital Government: OECD Digital Government Investments Framework*. [44]

OECD (n.d.), *Infrastructure Toolkit*, OECD, Paris, *https://infrastructure-toolkit.oecd.org/*. [36]

OECD/European Union/EC-JRC (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264043466-en*. [35]

Productivity and Development Center (n.d.), *Citizen Satisfaction e-Survey (e-CitSat)*, *https://pdc.dap.edu.ph/index.php/citizen-satisfaction-e-survey-e-citsat/* (accessed on 3 October 2025). [26]

Thirumalai, K. et al. (2017), "Extreme temperatures in Southeast Asia caused by El Niño and worsened by global warming", *Nature Communications*, Vol. 8, *https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15531*. [17]

UN ESCAP (2024), *New UN report: Along with gender, where people live is a key factor in determining levels of poverty and inequality in Asia and the Pacific*, *https://www.unescap.org/news/new-un-report-along-gender-where-people-live-key-factor-determining-levels-poverty-and*. [10]

UN ESCAP (2023), *Seizing the Moment: Targeting Transformative Disaster Risk Resilience*, United Nations, *https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12870/6258*. [21]

UNDP (2025), *Human Development Index (HDI)*, *https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI*. [4]

Vengadeshvaran, S., P. Saumik and W. Guanghua (2017), "Structural transformation, growth and inequality: Evidence from Viet Nam", *ADBI Working Paper Series*, Vol. 681, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/231546/adbi-wp681.pdf*. [8]

VietnamPlus (2025), *Millions contribute to Constitution amendment via VNeID*, *https://en.vietnamplus.vn/millions-contribute-to-constitution-amendment-via-vneid-post319996.vnp*. [33]

World Bank (2025), *GDP growth (annual %)*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG*. [3]

World Bank (2025), *Gini index*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ID-TH-VN*. [7]

World Bank (2020), *Lao PDR Poverty Profile and Poverty Assessment 2020*, *https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/publication/lao-pdr-poverty-profile-and-poverty-assessment-2020*. [6]

World Bank (2015), *Drivers of Poverty Reduction in Lao PDR*, *http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/590861467722637341/pdf/101567-REPLACENENT-PUBLIC-Lao-PDR-Poverty-Policy-Notes-Drivers-of-Poverty-Reduction-in-Lao-PDR.pdf*. [5]

ANNEX B

# *Methodology for the OECD Digital Government Index*

The OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) assesses the efforts made by governments to establish the foundations necessary for a coherent and human-centred digital transformation of the public sector. It monitors the implementation of the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies (OECD, 2014[38]) and draws upon the long-standing work of the OECD advising governments to strategise with digital technologies and data for improved and joined-up public services and operations, as well as increased trust in public institutions, as outlined in the OECD Digital Government Policy Framework (DGPF) (OECD, 2020[31]). The framework frames the methodology and survey for the DGI across the six dimensions for digital maturity in the public sector:

- *Digital by design:* when a government establishes clear organisational leadership, paired with effective co-ordination and enforcement mechanisms where "digital" is considered not only as a technical topic, but as a mandatory transformative element to be embedded throughout policy processes.
- *Data-driven public sector:* when a government recognises and takes steps to govern data as a key strategic asset in generating public value through their application in the planning, delivering and monitoring of public policies, and adopts rules and ethical principles for their trustworthy and safe reuse.
- *Government as a platform:* when a government provides clear and transparent sources of guidelines, tools, data and software that equip teams to deliver user-driven, consistent, seamless, integrated, proactive and cross-sectoral service delivery.
- *Open by default:* when a government makes government data and policy-making processes (including algorithms) available for the public to engage with, within the limits of existing legislation and in balance with the national and public interest.
- *User-driven:* when a government becomes more user-driven by awarding a central role to people' needs and convenience in the shaping of processes, services and policies; and by adopting inclusive mechanisms for this to happen.
- *Proactiveness:* when a government anticipates people's needs and respond to them rapidly, avoiding the need for cumbersome data and service delivery processes.

## Data collection and validation

The *OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0* serves as the data collection instrument of the DGI for Southeast Asia (SEA). It is composed of 94 questions covering each of the six dimensions of the DGPF together with four transversal facets that reflect the different stages of the policy cycle (*Strategic approach, Policy levers, Implementation*, and *Monitoring*). It includes questions designed to capture the evolving landscape of digital government, aligning this instrument with the priorities of the OECD Working Party of Senior Digital Government Officials (E-Leaders) and the conceptual policy work advanced by the Secretariat. These developments encompass governance of digital government (OECD,

2021[39]), digital talent and skills in the public sector (OECD, 2021[40]), service design and delivery in the digital age (OECD, 2022[41]), data-driven public sector (OECD, 2019[42]), digital public infrastructure and digital identity (OECD, 2024[43]), digital government investments (OECD, forthcoming[44]), impact measurement, GovTech (OECD, 2024[45]), AI in the public sector (OECD, 2024[46]), and open government data, based on the data collected through the *OECD Survey on Open Government Data* 5.0 (OECD, 2023[47]).

The Survey reflects evidence in place as of December 2023 at the central/federal level of government, covering all ministries and agencies. Survey respondents comprised high-level digital government officials of 8 SEA countries, including 2 OECD accession countries. The Survey was launched in September 2024 and closed in February 2025. A glossary of terms was sent to respondents to provide guidance on specific terminology.

Once the period of data collection was completed, country responses underwent a detailed data validation process designed to ensure the highest standards in data quality and accuracy. Country responses were reviewed to ensure internal consistency and to verify systematically that responses and supporting evidence corresponded to the respective question. A second round of data validation was conducted to ensure transversal consistency across survey sections and themes. For non-validated answers, countries were asked to provide clarification and further evidence, if applicable. The OECD Secretariat assessed the updated responses and evidence, validating or amending the responses with the underlying rationale and explanation. After this final round, each country officially approved their final responses for calculation.

## Weighting and aggregation

The DGI is a composite index consisting of six equally weighted dimensions, corresponding to the six dimensions of the DGPF. Data points from the Survey (i.e., response options to specific questions) are used to populate these dimensions based on their thematic alignment with each dimension's definition. The distribution of data points also ensures coverage across four transversal facets that reflect the stages of the policy cycle.

Each data point contributes a maximum number of points according to predefined maturity benchmarks, which are grounded in the OECD's thematic conceptual frameworks. Dimension scores are calculated as the weighted average of all relevant data points within each dimension. The DGI composite score, representing overall digital government performance, is calculated by averaging the scores of all six dimensions. Figure B.1 shows the weights of each dimension and their associated transversal facets.

**Figure B.1. OECD Digital Government Index: Dimensions, transversal facets and their corresponding weights**




*Source:* Authors, based on OECD (2024[48]).

## Statistical validation

The OECD DGI methodology has been calibrated based on a comprehensive statistical validation, encompassing correlation analysis, principal component analysis (PCA), Cronbach's Alpha coefficient, and sensitivity analysis (OECD, 2024[48]). The results of this validation have demonstrated the robustness and validity of the Index.

## More information

Refer to OECD (2024[48]) for a more detailed analysis and methodology of the 2023 edition of the OECD Digital Government Index, as applied to SEA participating countries.

### *References*

ADB (2025), *Asian Development Outlook (ADO) April 2025*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/FLS250135-3*. [2]

ADB (2024), *Striving to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals: Next Steps for Policymakers and Practitioners*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.56506/ACFH4829*. [16]

ADB (2022), *Building Resilience of the Urban Poor in Indonesia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/TCS210404-2*. [18]

ADB (2022), *COVID-19 Pushed 4.7 Million More People in Southeast Asia Into Extreme Poverty in 2021, But Countries are Well Positioned to Bounce Back — ADB*, *https://www.adb.org/news/covid-19-pushed-4-7-million-more-people-southeast-asia-extreme-poverty-2021-countries-are-well*. [9]

ADB (2022), *Strengthening Domestic Resource Mobilization in Southeast Asia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/tcs220185*. [15]

Aguilar Jaber, A. et al. (2020), "Long-term low emissions development strategies: Cross-country experience", *OECD Environment Working Papers*, No. 160, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1c1d8005-en*. [50]

Borak, M. (2024), *Vietnam integrates national digital ID and tax system*, *https://www.biometricupdate.com/202410/vietnam-integrates-national-digital-id-and-tax-system*. [32]

Development Academy of the Philippines (2023), *2021 e-BizSat reveals 10 key drivers of business satisfaction in frontline government services*, *https://dap.edu.ph/2021-e-bizsat-reveals-10-key-drivers-of-business-satisfaction-in-frontline-government-services/*. [27]

Hale, T. et al. (2021), "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)", *Nature Human Behaviour*, Vol. 5/4, pp. 529-538, *https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01079-8*. [12]

IISD (2024), *Green Public Procurement in Indonesia: Policies, Practices and Ways Forward*, International Institute for Sustainable Development, *https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2024-11/green-public-procurement-indonesia.pdf*. [23]

Lafortune, G. and B. Ubaldi (2018), "OECD 2017 OURdata Index: Methodology and results", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 30, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2807d3c8-en*. [37]

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, *https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en*. [13]

OECD (2025), "Empowering fiscal reporting with digital and interactive approaches", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2025/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/82070ddb-en*. [25]

OECD (2025), "Governing for the green transition", *OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers*, No. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/5b0aa7d0-en*. [19]

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*. [29]

OECD (2025), *Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en*. [51]

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*. [48]

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en*. [43]

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*. [1]

OECD (2024), *Enabling Digital Innovation in Government: The OECD GovTech Policy Framework*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a51eb9b2-en*. [45]

OECD (2024), "Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?", *OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers*, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en*. [46]

OECD (2024), *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9aea61f0-en*.[20]

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en*. [24]

OECD (2024), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*. [28]

OECD (2023), *2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings*, OECD Publishing, Paris. [52]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [22]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [47]

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/8f2a6ecb-en*. [11]

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en*. [41]

OECD (2021), "Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD/LEGAL/0463, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463*. [49]

OECD (2021), *The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en*. [39]

OECD (2021), "The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/4e7c3f58-en*. [40]

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*. [34]

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*. [31]

OECD (2019), *The Path to Becoming a Data-Driven Public Sector*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/059814a7-en*. [42]

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies", *Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate*, Vol. July. [38]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies*, OECD/LEGAL/0406, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0406*. [30]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions*, OECD/LEGAL/0401, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401*. [14]

OECD (forthcoming), *Effectively Managing Investments in Digital Government: OECD Digital Government Investments Framework*. [44]

OECD (n.d.), *Infrastructure Toolkit*, OECD, Paris, *https://infrastructure-toolkit.oecd.org/*. [36]

OECD/European Union/EC-JRC (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264043466-en*. [35]

Productivity and Development Center (n.d.), *Citizen Satisfaction e-Survey (e-CitSat)*, *https://pdc.dap.edu.ph/index.php/citizen-satisfaction-e-survey-e-citsat/* (accessed on 3 October 2025). [26]

Thirumalai, K. et al. (2017), "Extreme temperatures in Southeast Asia caused by El Niño and worsened by global warming", *Nature Communications*, Vol. 8, *https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15531*. [17]

UN ESCAP (2024), *New UN report: Along with gender, where people live is a key factor in determining levels of poverty and inequality in Asia and the Pacific*, *https://www.unescap.org/news/new-un-report-along-gender-where-people-live-key-factor-determining-levels-poverty-and*. [10]

UN ESCAP (2023), *Seizing the Moment: Targeting Transformative Disaster Risk Resilience*, United Nations, *https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12870/6258*. [21]

UNDP (2025), *Human Development Index (HDI)*, *https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI*. [4]

Vengadeshvaran, S., P. Saumik and W. Guanghua (2017), "Structural transformation, growth and inequality: Evidence from Viet Nam", *ADBI Working Paper Series*, Vol. 681, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/231546/adbi-wp681.pdf*. [8]

VietnamPlus (2025), *Millions contribute to Constitution amendment via VNeID*, *https://en.vietnamplus.vn/millions-contribute-to-constitution-amendment-via-vneid-post319996.vnp*. [33]

World Bank (2025), *GDP growth (annual %)*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG*. [3]

World Bank (2025), *Gini index*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ID-TH-VN*. [7]

World Bank (2020), *Lao PDR Poverty Profile and Poverty Assessment 2020*, *https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/publication/lao-pdr-poverty-profile-and-poverty-assessment-2020*. [6]

World Bank (2015), *Drivers of Poverty Reduction in Lao PDR*, *http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/590861467722637341/pdf/101567-REPLACENENT-PUBLIC-Lao-PDR-Poverty-Policy-Notes-Drivers-of-Poverty-Reduction-in-Lao-PDR.pdf*. [5]

ANNEX C

# *OURdata Index*

Launched in 2015, the Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index benchmarks governments' efforts to design and implement national open government data policies. With subsequent editions released in 2017, 2019 and 2023, the Index has remained a valuable resource for policymakers and serves as a key public governance indicator, assessing the progress governments have made in ensuring open data to support policy reform.

The OECD definition of open data is "non-discriminatory data access and sharing arrangements where data is machine-readable and can be accessed and shared free of charge and used by anyone for any purpose, subject at most to requirements that preserve integrity, provenance, attribution and openness" (OECD, 2021[49]). The OURdata Index assesses policies for open government data, i.e. government data made available as open data. Government data refers to any data produced and held by public bodies at the central/federal level of government, and in some cases, depending on national context, data aggregated by and collected from local and regional levels, for example mobility data. The OURdata index does not measure the impact of open government data, but rather focuses on assessing governments' efforts to create the conditions necessary for making open data available and enable and encourage its reuse.

The composite OURdata Index consists of three pillars and nine sub-pillars. The three main pillars of the OURdata Index are:

- **Pillar 1:** Data availability: Measures the extent to which governments have adopted and implemented formal requirements to publish open government data. It also assesses stakeholder engagement for identifying data demand and the availability of high-value datasets as open data. For example, this pillar assesses if a country has an open data strategy.
- **Pillar 2:** Data accessibility: Measures the availability of requirements to provide open data in reusable formats, and the extent to which high-value government datasets are provided in open, timely and reusable formats, with good metadata quality, and through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). It also assesses stakeholder engagement on the central open data portal and to improve data quality. For example, the pillar measures the percentage of high-value open datasets that are accessible through a central open data portal.
- **Pillar 3:** Government support to data reuse: Measures the extent to which governments play a proactive role in promoting the re-use of open government data inside and outside government. For example, it looks at events and partnerships with civil society and business actors to raise awareness about open government data and encourage re-use.

## Variable and weights

The OURdata composite score, which represents the overall open government data performance, is the unweighted average of the scores of all three pillars, which ranges from 0 to 1. Each pillar score is calculated as an unweighted average of all corresponding sub-pillars. The score for each sub-pillar is calculated by averaging the corresponding parameter and variable scores. The relative weight of each variable and parameter is determined by the number of variables and parameters within a sub-pillar. A complete account of all sub-pillars, variables and their respective weights can be found in (OECD, 2023[47]).

**Table C.1. OURdata Index**

| 3 pillars | 1. Data availability | 2. Data Accessibility | 3. Government support to data-reuse |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 sub-pillars | 1.1 Content of the open by default policy | 2.1 Content of the free and open access to data policy | 3.1 Data promotion initiatives and partnerships |
| | 1.2 Stakeholder engagement for data release | 2.2 Stakeholder engagement for data quality and completeness | 3.2 Data literacy programmes in government |
| | 1.3. Implementation (availability of high-value datasets) | 2.3 Implementation (accessibility of high value datasets) | 3.3 Monitoring impact |

## Statistical validation

Several statistical tests have been executed to test the robustness and validity of the updated OURdata Index methodology (2023). These tests aim to demonstrate how reliable the OURdata Index is in measuring one underlying, unobservable concept (open government data maturity), as well as the validity of the choice of individual parameters and variables. Details on the statistical validation can be found in (OECD, 2023[47]).

### *References*


ADB (2025), *Asian Development Outlook (ADO) April 2025*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/FLS250135-3*. [2]

ADB (2024), *Striving to Meet the Sustainable Development Goals: Next Steps for Policymakers and Practitioners*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.56506/ACFH4829*. [16]

ADB (2022), *Building Resilience of the Urban Poor in Indonesia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/TCS210404-2*. [18]

ADB (2022), *COVID-19 Pushed 4.7 Million More People in Southeast Asia Into Extreme Poverty in 2021, But Countries are Well Positioned to Bounce Back — ADB*, *https://www.adb.org/news/covid-19-pushed-4-7-million-more-people-southeast-asia-extreme-poverty-2021-countries-are-well*. [9]

ADB (2022), *Strengthening Domestic Resource Mobilization in Southeast Asia*, Asian Development Bank, *https://doi.org/10.22617/tcs220185*. [15]

Aguilar Jaber, A. et al. (2020), "Long-term low emissions development strategies: Cross-country experience", *OECD Environment Working Papers*, No. 160, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1c1d8005-en*. [50]

Borak, M. (2024), *Vietnam integrates national digital ID and tax system*, *https://www.biometricupdate.com/202410/vietnam-integrates-national-digital-id-and-tax-system*. [32]

Development Academy of the Philippines (2023), *2021 e-BizSat reveals 10 key drivers of business satisfaction in frontline government services*, *https://dap.edu.ph/2021-e-bizsat-reveals-10-key-drivers-of-business-satisfaction-in-frontline-government-services/*. [27]

Hale, T. et al. (2021), "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker)", *Nature Human Behaviour*, Vol. 5/4, pp. 529-538, *https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01079-8*. [12]

IISD (2024), *Green Public Procurement in Indonesia: Policies, Practices and Ways Forward*, International Institute for Sustainable Development, *https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2024-11/green-public-procurement-indonesia.pdf*. [23]

Lafortune, G. and B. Ubaldi (2018), "OECD 2017 OURdata Index: Methodology and results", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 30, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2807d3c8-en*. [37]

Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), "Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries", *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, Vol. 23/3, *https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en*. [13]

OECD (2025), "Empowering fiscal reporting with digital and interactive approaches", *OECD Papers on Budgeting*, No. 2025/02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/82070ddb-en*. [25]

OECD (2025), "Governing for the green transition", *OECD Net Zero+ Policy Papers*, No. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/5b0aa7d0-en*. [19]

OECD (2025), *Government at a Glance 2025*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/0efd0bcd-en*. [29]

OECD (2025), *Implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Procurement in OECD and Partner Countries: 2020-2024 Report*, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/02a46a58-en*. [51]

OECD (2024), "2023 OECD Digital Government Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 44, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en*. [48]

OECD (2024), "Digital public infrastructure for digital governments", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 68, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ff525dc8-en*. [43]

OECD (2024), *Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2024: Developing amid Disaster Risks*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/3bbe7dfe-en*. [1]

OECD (2024), *Enabling Digital Innovation in Government: The OECD GovTech Policy Framework*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a51eb9b2-en*. [45]

OECD (2024), "Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?", *OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers*, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en*. [46]

OECD (2024), *Green Budgeting in OECD Countries 2024*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9aea61f0-en*.[20]

OECD (2024), *OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en*. [24]

OECD (2024), *Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services*, OECD/LEGAL/0503, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503*. [28]

OECD (2023), *2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings*, OECD Publishing, Paris. [52]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [22]

OECD (2023), "2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en*. [47]

OECD (2023), *OECD Economic Surveys: Viet Nam 2023*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/8f2a6ecb-en*. [11]

OECD (2022), "OECD Good Practice Principles for Public Service Design and Delivery in the Digital Age", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/2ade500b-en*. [41]

OECD (2021), "Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD/LEGAL/0463, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463*. [49]

OECD (2021), *The E-Leaders Handbook on the Governance of Digital Government*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/ac7f2531-en*. [39]

OECD (2021), "The OECD Framework for digital talent and skills in the public sector", *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 45, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/4e7c3f58-en*. [40]

OECD (2020), "Recommendation of the Council on the Governance of Infrastructure", *OECD Legal Instruments*, OECD, Paris, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0460*. [34]

OECD (2020), "The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework: Six dimensions of a Digital Government", *OECD Public Governance Policy Papers*, No. 02, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/f64fed2a-en*. [31]

OECD (2019), *The Path to Becoming a Data-Driven Public Sector*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/059814a7-en*. [42]

OECD (2014), "Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies", *Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate*, Vol. July. [38]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies*, OECD/LEGAL/0406, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0406*. [30]

OECD (2014), *Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions*, OECD/LEGAL/0401, *https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0401*. [14]

OECD (forthcoming), *Effectively Managing Investments in Digital Government: OECD Digital Government Investments Framework*. [44]

OECD (n.d.), *Infrastructure Toolkit*, OECD, Paris, *https://infrastructure-toolkit.oecd.org/*. [36]

OECD/European Union/EC-JRC (2008), *Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264043466-en*. [35]

Productivity and Development Center (n.d.), *Citizen Satisfaction e-Survey (e-CitSat)*, *https://pdc.dap.edu.ph/index.php/citizen-satisfaction-e-survey-e-citsat/* (accessed on 3 October 2025). [26]

Thirumalai, K. et al. (2017), "Extreme temperatures in Southeast Asia caused by El Niño and worsened by global warming", *Nature Communications*, Vol. 8, *https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15531*. [17]

UN ESCAP (2024), *New UN report: Along with gender, where people live is a key factor in determining levels of poverty and inequality in Asia and the Pacific*, *https://www.unescap.org/news/new-un-report-along-gender-where-people-live-key-factor-determining-levels-poverty-and*. [10]

UN ESCAP (2023), *Seizing the Moment: Targeting Transformative Disaster Risk Resilience*, United Nations, *https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12870/6258*. [21]

UNDP (2025), *Human Development Index (HDI)*, *https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI*. [4]

Vengadeshvaran, S., P. Saumik and W. Guanghua (2017), "Structural transformation, growth and inequality: Evidence from Viet Nam", *ADBI Working Paper Series*, Vol. 681, *https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/231546/adbi-wp681.pdf*. [8]

VietnamPlus (2025), *Millions contribute to Constitution amendment via VNeID*, *https://en.vietnamplus.vn/millions-contribute-to-constitution-amendment-via-vneid-post319996.vnp*. [33]

World Bank (2025), *GDP growth (annual %)*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG*. [3]

World Bank (2025), *Gini index*, *https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ID-TH-VN*. [7]

World Bank (2020), *Lao PDR Poverty Profile and Poverty Assessment 2020*, *https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/publication/lao-pdr-poverty-profile-and-poverty-assessment-2020*. [6]

World Bank (2015), *Drivers of Poverty Reduction in Lao PDR*, *http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/590861467722637341/pdf/101567-REPLACENENT-PUBLIC-Lao-PDR-Poverty-Policy-Notes-Drivers-of-Poverty-Reduction-in-Lao-PDR.pdf*. [5]

# ANNEX D

# *Additional figures accessible online*

## D.1. Chapter 2. Public finances

| | |
|---|---|
| Figure D.1.1 | Annual growth rate of real government gross debt per capita, 2019-2020, 2020 2022, 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 |
| Figure D.1.2 | General government revenues as a percentage of GDP, 2007-2024 |
| Figure D.1.3 | General government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2007-2024 |

StatLink https://stat.link/3rdq9n

## D.2. Chapter 5. Digital government

| | |
|---|---|
| Figure D.2.1 | Open by default scores by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2022) |
| Figure D.2.2 | Government support for data re-use, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021) |
| Figure D.2.3 | Availability of high-value datasets (selected categories) by country, SEA countries (2023) and OECD countries (2021) |

StatLink https://stat.link/a437o2

# Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025

Government at a Glance: Southeast Asia 2025 provides the latest available evidence on public administration in the Southeast Asia (SEA) region and how it compares to OECD countries. It includes data on governance practices in budgeting, infrastructure planning and delivery, digital government and public services. It also provides information on public finances in the region. Government at a Glance allows cross country comparison of governance practices and helps identify trends and areas for improvement in the public sector. Each indicator in the publication is presented in a user-friendly format, consisting of graphs and/or charts illustrating variations across countries and over time, brief descriptive analyses highlighting the major findings of the data, and a methodological section on the definition of the indicators and any limitations in data comparability.

KOREA e-Asia Fund

Public Governance Programme
OECD Korea Policy Centre

PRINT ISBN 978-92-64-46614-2
PDF ISBN 978-92-64-31534-1