



Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the  
United Nations

African  
Union



World Food  
Programme



United Nations  
Economic Commission for Africa

2025

AFRICA  
**REGIONAL OVERVIEW  
OF FOOD SECURITY  
AND NUTRITION**

**FINANCING TOWARDS AGRIFOOD SYSTEMS  
TRANSFORMATION FOR FOOD SECURITY  
AND IMPROVED NUTRITION**

**Required citation:**

FAO, ECA, WFP and AU. 2026. *Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2025 – Financing towards agrifood systems transformation for food security and improved nutrition*. Accra. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cd7981en>

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the World Food Programme (WFP) or the African Union Commission (AU) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO, ECA, WFP or AU in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

**ISBN: 978-92-5-140399-0****© FAO, 2026**

Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution- 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.en>).

Under the terms of this licence, this work may be copied, redistributed and adapted, provided that the work is appropriately cited. In any use of this work, there should be no suggestion that FAO, ECA, WFP and AU endorses any specific organization, products or services. The use of the FAO, ECA, WFP and AU logo is not permitted. If a translation or adaptation of this work is created, it must include the following disclaimer along with the required citation: “This translation [or adaptation] was not created by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the World Food Programme (WFP) or the African Union Commission (AU). FAO, ECA, WFP and AU are not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation [or adaptation]. The original [Language] edition shall be the authoritative edition.”

Any dispute arising under this licence that cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The parties shall be bound by any arbitration award rendered as a result of such arbitration as the final adjudication of such a dispute.

Third-party materials. This Creative Commons licence CC BY 4.0 does not apply to non-FAO copyright materials included in this publication. Users wishing to reuse material from this work that is attributed to a third party, such as tables, figures or images, are responsible for determining whether permission is needed for that reuse and for obtaining permission from the copyright holder. The risk of claims resulting from infringement of any third-party-owned component in the work rests solely with the user.

FAO photographs. FAO photographs that may appear in this work are not subject to the above-mentioned Creative Commons licence. Queries for the use of any FAO photographs should be submitted to: [photo-library@fao.org](mailto:photo-library@fao.org).

Sales, rights and licensing. FAO information products are available on the FAO website ([www.fao.org/publications](http://www.fao.org/publications)) and print copies can be purchased through the distributors listed there. For general enquiries about FAO publications please contact: [publications@fao.org](mailto:publications@fao.org). Queries regarding rights and licensing of publications should be submitted to: [copyright@fao.org](mailto:copyright@fao.org).

**COVER PHOTOGRAPH** ©FAO/Jean Baptiste Nkurunziza

---

**RWANDA.** A factory worker processes just-picked tea leaves.

**2025**  
**AFRICA**

# **REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION**

**FINANCING TOWARDS AGRIFOOD SYSTEMS  
TRANSFORMATION FOR FOOD SECURITY  
AND IMPROVED NUTRITION**

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
World Food Programme  
African Union Commission  
**Accra, 2026**

# CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
FOREWORD	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	x
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	xi
<b>PART 1</b>	
<b>STATISTICS AND TRENDS</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>TARGET 2.1 OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: UNDERNOURISHMENT AND FOOD INSECURITY</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1 Prevalence of undernourishment	2
1.2 Prevalence of food insecurity based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale	8
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>TARGET 2.2 OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: MALNUTRITION</b>	<b>14</b>
2.1 Stunting among children under 5 years of age	14
2.2 Wasting among children under 5 years of age	18
2.3 Overweight among children under 5 years of age	20
2.4 Anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years	23
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>ADDITIONAL WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY NUTRITION INDICATORS</b>	<b>26</b>
3.1 Adult obesity	26
3.2 Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of life	30
3.3 Prevalence of low birthweight	31
<b>CHAPTER 4</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>THE COST AND AFFORDABILITY OF A HEALTHY DIET</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>PART 2</b>	
<b>FINANCING TOWARDS AGRIFOOD SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION FOR FOOD SECURITY AND IMPROVED NUTRITION IN AFRICA</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>CHAPTER 5</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>42</b>
5.1 Background	42
5.2 Defining financing for food security and nutrition	48
5.3 Rationale of financing for food security and nutrition	49

<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE OF FINANCE FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN AFRICA</b>	<b>52</b>
6.1 Demand for financing	53
6.2 Supply of finance – financial service providers	55
6.3 Sources of financing for food security and nutrition	61
6.4 Financing gaps	80
6.5 Final considerations	86
<b>CHAPTER 7</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN FINANCING FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN AFRICA</b>	<b>88</b>
7.1 Costs of inaction	89
7.2 Key challenges related to public policies and strategies	90
7.3 Creating an enabling environment	93
<b>CHAPTER 8</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCING FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN AFRICA</b>	<b>97</b>
8.1 Key challenges in securing private financing	98
8.2 Opportunities to support financing for food security and nutrition	100
<b>CHAPTER 9</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>BLENDED FINANCE</b>	<b>110</b>
9.1 Definition of blended finance	111
9.2 Blended finance instruments and mechanisms	115
9.3 Relevance of blended finance for food security and nutrition	117
<b>CHAPTER 10</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>NOTES</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>GLOSSARY</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>APPENDIX 1</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>DATA TABLES</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>APPENDIX 2</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>INDICATOR DEFINITIONS</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>APPENDIX 3</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>NOTES</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>APPENDIX 4</b>	<b>167</b>
<b>COUNTRY GROUPINGS</b>	<b>167</b>
<b>APPENDIX 5</b>	<b>168</b>
<b>INTERVIEW PROTOCOL</b>	<b>168</b>

## FIGURES

1	Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and Africa, and the number of undernourished in Africa	3
2	Prevalence of undernourishment in Africa by subregion	4
3	Number of people undernourished in Africa by subregion	6
4	Prevalence of undernourishment in Africa by country and subregion	7
5	Prevalence of food insecurity in Africa by subregion	9
6	Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa by country and subregion	11
7	Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa by subregion and by sex (2024)	12
8	Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age in Africa by subregion	15
9	Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age in Africa by country and subregion	17
10	Prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years of age in Africa by country and subregion (latest year available from 2017 to 2024)	19
11	Prevalence of overweight among children under 5 years of age in Africa by country and subregion	22
12	Prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years in Africa by subregion	23
13	Prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years in Africa by country and subregion	25
14	Prevalence of obesity among adults in Africa by subregion	27
15	Prevalence of obesity among adults in Africa by country and subregion	29
16	Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding among infants 0–5 months of age in Africa by subregion	30
17	Prevalence of low birthweight in Africa by country and subregion	33
18	Cost of a healthy diet in Africa by subregion	35
19	Number of people unable to afford a healthy diet in Africa by subregion	37
20	Proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet in Africa by country and subregion	39
21	PoU by major drivers of food insecurity in Africa	43
22	Difference in the PoU between 2019 and 2023 by combination of drivers	44
23	Conceptual diagram of the new definition of financing for food security and nutrition for ending hunger and food insecurity (SDG target 2.1) and all forms of malnutrition (SDG target 2.2)	49
24	Addressing the major drivers and underlying structural factors of food insecurity and malnutrition	50
25	Overview of demand of finance per type of agrifood enterprise	54
26	Overview of cost structures matched with type of agrifood-system actor	55
27	Public spending on agriculture and on food security and nutrition in Benin	62
28	Public spending on agriculture and on food security and nutrition in Uganda	62
29	Domestic public expenditure in agriculture, forestry and fishing in Africa (in 2015 prices)	65
30	Total domestic public expenditure in agriculture, forestry and fishing by subregion (USD billion, 2015 prices)	66
31	Total government expenditure (left axis, USD billion, 2015 prices) and agriculture expenditure as a share of total expenditure (percentage)	67
32	Food security and nutrition's share in ODA and OOF to Africa for all aid sectors	69
33	Composition of ODA and OOF to Africa for food security and nutrition over time	70
34	Total bank credit and credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing (stock of loans; 2015 prices)	72
35	Total bank credit and share of credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing in Africa (2015 prices)	73
36	Credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing (total amount of loans outstanding in 2022, USD billion, 2015 prices)	74
37	Net banking loans to agriculture, forestry and fishing (USD billion, 2015 prices)	75
38	Total FDI inflows to Africa (USD billion, 2015 prices)	76
39	FDI inflows for capital investments into the African food and beverages cluster 2003–2017 (excluding fertilizer investments)	77

## FIGURES

40	Food and agriculture FDI inflows into the different Africa subregions (excluding fertilizer investments)	78
41	Estimated distribution of financing flows to Agri-SMEs in Africa	84
42	Blended finance	111
43	Blended deals with derisking and with return enhancement	113

## TABLES

1	Prevalence of undernourishment (percent)	5
2	Number of people undernourished (millions)	5
3	Number of severely food-insecure people (millions)	10
4	Number of moderately or severely food-insecure people (millions)	10
5	Prevalence of food insecurity in Africa by subregion and by sex (percent)	13
6	Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age (percent)	16
7	Prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years of age (percent)	18
8	Prevalence of overweight among children under 5 years of age (percent)	20
9	Prevalence of obesity among adults (percent)	28
10	Prevalence of low birthweight (percent)	31
11	Cost of a healthy diet (PPP international dollars)	36
12	Proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet (percent)	36
13	Number of people unable to afford a healthy diet (millions)	38
14	Composition of public spending on food security and nutrition in selected African countries (annual average)	63
15	ODA and OOF for all aid sectors and for food security and nutrition in Africa (constant 2021 USD billion and percentage)	68
16	Destination of ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition by subregion in Africa	71
17	Overview of studies that estimate financing gaps	81
18	AVCF categories and financial instruments	108
19	Overview of blended finance supported by examples	112
20	Overview of blended finance instruments with definitions and value propositions	116
A1	Prevalence of undernourishment (percent)	133
A2	Number of undernourished people (millions)	135
A3	Prevalence of food insecurity (percent)	137
A4	Number of food-insecure people (millions)	139
A5	Prevalence of food insecurity by sex (percent)	141
A6	Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age (percent)	143
A7	Prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years of age (percent)	145
A8	Prevalence of overweight among children under 5 years of age (percent)	147
A9	Prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years (percent)	149
A10	Prevalence of obesity among adults (percent)	151
A11	Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding among infants 0–5 months of age (percent)	153
A12	Prevalence of low birthweight (percent)	155
A13	Affordability of a healthy diet	157
A14	Cost of a healthy diet (PPP international dollars per person per day)	159

## BOXES

1	Empowering women active in the agrifood system is crucial for ending hunger and poverty	46
2	The untapped potential of climate finance for food security and nutrition	56
3	IFIs, DFIs and MDBs operate within stringent mandates and therefore cannot fulfil much-needed roles	57
4	Pay-as-you-go tractor finance “Uber for tractors” for increased agricultural productivity:	59
5	Growth capital that scales up small African agrifood businesses to national scale:	60
6	Diaspora communities can be a powerful force in financing in their countries of origin, spurring economic diversification and job creation	79
7	Finance agri-SMEs by strengthening existing local financial infrastructure	85
8	A test-and-learn approach between government and corporates can foster innovation: Example of M-PESA	94
9	Providing smallholders in deeply rural areas with input loans and training: Example of One Acre Fund	101
10	Integrating business advisory services with financing is important in the agrifood system: Example of USAID’s Financing Ghanaian Agriculture Project (activities occurred before 24 January 2025)	103
11	Investors who have set up multiple companies adopting regenerative approaches and improving livelihoods through profit sharing: Example of Grounded Investment Company	105
12	Sharing the benefits of an improved landscape through a trust fund: Example of Shea Nut Business Development and Trust Fund	107
13	Trader in organic vegetables and fruits sets up trade financing fund, improving own liquidity and offering other traders to partner: Example of Organic Development Fund	109
14	A unique coalition to boost smallholder farmer access finance, services, and markets: Example of IDH Farmfit Fund	119

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report has been jointly prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Regional Office for Africa, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the African Union Commission (AUC), and the World Food Programme (WFP), in close collaboration with the FAO Statistics Division (ESS), and the FAO Agrifood Economics and Policy Division (ESA). The report was produced under the overall leadership of Abebe Haile-Gabriel, FAO Assistant Director-General and Regional Representative for Africa; Hanan Morsy, ECA Deputy Executive Secretary and Chief Economist; Stanlake Samkange, WFP Senior Director for Strategic Partnerships; and H.E. Moses Vilakati, AUC Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, the Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment. Mark Fynn and Eise van Maanen (FAO), Medhat El-Helepi and Sonia Essobmadje (ECA), Catherine Mfitilodze and Zewdie Adane, (WFP) and Janet Edeme and Laila Lokosang (AUC), coordinated technical contributions of the respective co-publishers.

At FAO, Koffi Amegbeto, supervised production by Mark Fynn, with inputs from Mphumuzi Sukati, Francesca Distefano, Prince Opong and Bethel Gebremedhin. Zoie Jones supported and coordinated the publishing process with the FAO Office for Communications (OCC).

Máximo Torero Cullen, José Rosero Moncayo, David Laborde and Marco V. Sánchez Cantillo from FAO headquarters provided guidance in terms of structure and content of the report. Olivier Lavagne d'Ortigue provided support for data visualization. Cindy Holleman, Giovanni Carrasco Azzini, Lucia Latino and Eduardo Nakasone Uechi from the Agrifood Economics and Policy Division (ESA), Vaishali Bansi, Valentina Conti, Juan Feng, Anne Kepple, Olivier Lavagne d'Ortigue, Talent Manyani and Sara Viviani of the Statistics Division (ESS), Siobhan Kelly from the Agrifood Systems and Food Safety Division (ESF), Erdgin Mane, Tacko Ndiaye, Clara Park, Silvia Rizzotto and Johanna Schmidt from the Rural Transformation and Gender Equality Division (ESP), Jonathan Pound from the Markets and Trade Division (EST), and Diana Carter, Israel Klug and Trudy Wijnhoven of the Food and Nutrition Division (ESN) provided valuable comments and inputs.

# FOREWORD

African countries are striving to combat hunger and food insecurity, but millions remain at risk. The war in Ukraine and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbate the impacts of the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition in the region – conflicts, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns and downturns – while increasing social and gender inequalities, particularly impacting women and girls. Despite efforts, Africa is off track to meet the Sustainable Development Goal 2 on Zero Hunger by 2030 and the Malabo targets by 2025. In 2024, Africa had 307 million hungry people, over 45 percent of the global total. Since the pandemic, an additional 73 million people in Africa have faced hunger. Going beyond hunger, in 2024, over 59 percent of Africa's population were experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity, equivalent to about 893 million people.

Additionally, progress towards the global nutrition targets by 2030 is slow. The latest estimates indicate that the prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years in Africa is rising, and the prevalence of adult obesity is rising as well. In 2024, about 67 percent of Africa's population could not afford a healthy diet, compared to about 32 percent globally. The average cost of a healthy diet in Africa was USD 4.41 per person per day, well above the extreme poverty threshold of USD 2.15, making healthy diets unaffordable even for some individuals who are classified as non-poor.

This report highlights the latest data on undernourishment, food insecurity and malnutrition, as well as the cost and affordability of a healthy diet, reflecting people's economic access to nutritious food. The worsening food security and slow progress towards global nutrition targets demand increased efforts to achieve a world without hunger and malnutrition by 2030. Given the projected lower economic growth, high inflation, and rising borrowing costs since 2022, greater action is necessary.

Financing for agrifood systems transformation in Africa should provide the financial resources that contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms. The recent setbacks in achieving these objectives have exposed the vulnerability of agrifood systems in Africa and underscored the urgent need for greater financing towards a resilient agrifood system in the continent, the focus of this year's report. The findings call for urgent actions and increased financing for a sustainable transformation of agrifood systems in Africa for ending hunger, food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition.

**Abebe Haile-Gabriel**  
**Assistant Director-General and Regional Representative for Africa**  
**Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**

**Hanan Morsy**  
**Deputy Executive Secretary and Chief Economist**  
**United Nations Economic Commission for Africa**

**H.E. Moses Vilakati**  
**Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment**  
**African Union Commission**

**Rania Dagash Kamara**  
**Assistant Executive Director**  
**World Food Programme**

# ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AfCFTA</b>	African Continental Free Trade Area
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AFF</b>	agriculture, forestry and fishing
<b>AgFiF</b>	agricultural finance facility
<b>agri-SME</b>	agricultural small and medium enterprise
<b>AVCF</b>	agricultural value chain finance
<b>BMI</b>	body mass index
<b>CAADP</b>	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
<b>DFI</b>	development finance institution
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
<b>FDI</b>	foreign direct investment
<b>FIES</b>	Food Insecurity Experience Scale
<b>FSN</b>	food security and nutrition
<b>GDP</b>	gross domestic product
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>IFI</b>	international finance institution
<b>LFI</b>	local financial institution
<b>MFI</b>	microfinance institution
<b>NAIP</b>	national agricultural investment plan
<b>NBFI</b>	non-bank financial institution
<b>NCD</b>	non-communicable disease
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>ODA</b>	official development assistance
<b>OOF</b>	other official flows
<b>PoU</b>	prevalence of undernourishment
<b>PPP</b>	purchasing power parity
<b>R&amp;D</b>	research and development
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>SME</b>	small and medium enterprise
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHA</b>	World Health Assembly
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Africa continues to face worsening hunger and a deterioration in food security. The prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) in Africa presents a stark contrast to global trends, highlighting the disproportionate impact of food insecurity on the African continent. In 2024, Africa's PoU stood at 20.2 percent (meaning that there were 306.5 million hungry people in Africa), while the global average was at 8.2 percent. Similarly, in 2024, almost 59 percent of Africa's population (or 892.7 million people) faced moderate or severe food insecurity. This is more than two times the global average of 28 percent. For severe food insecurity, more than a fifth of Africa's population (22.2 percent, representing almost 337 million people) were affected in 2024.

Malnutrition remains a challenge. The prevalence of stunting among children under five years of age was over 30 percent in 2024, which is high despite the substantial improvement achieved during the past two decades. The prevalence of wasting in children under five years of age in the region was 5.4 percent in 2024, just below the global estimate of 6.6 percent, and was relatively high in all subregions except Southern Africa. The overall prevalence of overweight in children under 5 years of age in Africa was 4.5 percent in 2024, which was below the global estimate. The prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years was 35.9 percent in 2023, which was above the global estimate, and was especially high in Western Africa and Central Africa. The prevalence of adult obesity in Africa (16.2 percent in 2022) has been rising in the last two decades and in 2022 was slightly above the global estimate. The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding of 45.2 percent in Africa in 2023 was slightly lower than the global estimate, with only Eastern Africa on track to meet the 2030 World Health Assembly target for this indicator. Despite modest progress in Africa in the reduction of the prevalence of low birthweight during the last two decades, the prevalence of 13.9 percent was still high on the continent in 2020 compared to the global estimate. The average cost of a healthy diet in Africa is rising. In 2024, the average cost of a healthy diet in Africa was 4.41 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars per person per day, an increase of 5.5 percent from its 2023 level. The cost of a healthy diet was much higher than the extreme poverty threshold of 2.15 PPP dollars per person per day, suggesting that not only the poor but also a proportion of people defined as non-poor could not afford a healthy diet. Over 1 billion people in Africa were unable to afford a healthy diet in 2024, an increase of over 29 million from the 2023 estimate, and about 145 million more people since the COVID-19 pandemic. The steady increase in the cost of a healthy diet in Africa and in all the subregions is compromising food security and nutrition. The number of people unable to afford a healthy diet is on the rise.

The major drivers behind the worsening trends in food insecurity are conflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns and downturns, observed jointly with high and persisting inequalities. To prevent recurring incidence of food insecurity and malnutrition, the main determinants of food security and nutrition should be addressed, as well as the major drivers and underlying structural factors behind the recent hunger and malnutrition trends.

To improve food security and nutrition in Africa, a substantial increase in financing for transforming agrifood systems for food security and nutrition is required. The use of these resources should address the main determinants of food security and nutrition, as well as the major drivers and underlying structural factors, ensuring that the African people, at all times, have stable, physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious foods that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

The main sources of financing for food security and nutrition in African countries are from the public and private sectors sourced either domestically or externally, categorized as domestic public expenditure, international development funding, credit from the domestic banking system, foreign direct investments, and foreign remittances.

Domestic public expenditure in the agriculture, forestry and fishing (AFF) sectors in the Africa region was about USD 16 billion in 2022, up from USD 12.6 billion and 14.6 billion in 2020 and 2021, respectively. A number of sub-Saharan Africa countries rely strongly on donor-funding for the agriculture sector, given the generally limited domestic tax revenues in these countries. Overall, there has been a general upward trend in government expenditure to AFF since 2018. For the countries for which data for analysing flows to food security and nutrition was available, it was observed that there were significant increases in total public spending on food security and nutrition, with priority to financing the key determinants of food security and nutrition. However, the recent funding squeeze, which has hit hard in sub-Saharan Africa, makes it difficult for African governments to support the financing for meeting the SDG2 targets.

International development funding consists of two main types of flows: official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). ODA grants to agriculture and food security are a key component of development finance to achieve SDG 2. ODA and OOF for all aid sectors and for food security and nutrition in Africa has been growing at about an average of 6 percent and 2 percent per annum, respectively, between 2017 and 2021, implying that flows to food security and nutrition have been less of a priority to donors. Less than 27 percent of the total of flows were allocated to food security and nutrition in Africa over the period. The composition of the flows for food security and nutrition is, by and large, very stable over time, with food consumption routinely accounting for more than 50 percent of the flows from ODA and OOF.

Financial flows from the private sector (bank credit and foreign direct investment) are particularly low and more needs to be done to increase them. While the stock of loans to AFF has shown an increasing trend since 2005, net banking loans to AFF showed a declining trend on average between 2017 to 2022. On average, credit to AFF as a percentage of total credit from 2001 to 2022 was less than 4 percent, even though it has stayed above 4 percent in the last four years of this period.

Africa's share of global foreign direct investment (FDI) to all sectors has been low historically. Total FDI inflows into Africa averaged 3 percent of the global total between 2014 and 2018 and with significant subregional variations in the volume of flows. For the period 2000 to 2022, the highest annual flow was USD 70 billion in 2021, with the lowest being USD 17.6 billion in 2000. For most of the years within the period, the figure exceeded USD 40 billion per year. The trend in FDI flows for capital investments in the African food and beverages sector for the period 2003 to 2017 shows that, except for 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2014, these flows have been less than USD 2 billion per year. These inflows are not evenly distributed and there are significant country and subregional differences.

Remittance flows have been growing rapidly in the past few years and now represent the largest source of foreign income for many low- and middle-income economies. As such, remittances may also contribute to enhancing food security and improving nutrition in Africa by enabling increased household food consumption. Remittance flows to Africa reached an estimated USD 100.1 billion in 2022, benefitting at least 200 million people. Despite the relevance and magnitude of this financial flow, the costs for migrants to send remittances are high.

To improve food security and nutrition in Africa, a substantial increase in financing from all the aforementioned sources for the agrifood system is required. A robust policy, regulatory and institutional framework is essential to mobilize the necessary resources. Public policy plays a pivotal role in shaping the financial landscape by creating an enabling environment for investment, improving access to credit, and reducing financial risks. Key initiatives by the African Union – including the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – and other institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), have been at the forefront of driving policies, and regulatory and institutional arrangements aimed at enhancing financial access for agriculture.

However, challenges remain, among which are inadequate policies and regulatory and institutional frameworks for financing food security and nutrition, persistent perceptions of risk in financing agrifood markets, as well as high transaction costs of financial services for financiers. As a consequence, there is limited access to finance to the agrifood system, and in particular to small and medium agricultural enterprises (agri-SMEs). For finance providers, the missing middle agri-SME segment forms a challenging sector to serve. The lack of capital for missing middle agri-SMEs in Africa is a significant economic development issue, as the very SMEs that might be poised for growth, and thus represent critical job-creating engines with potential for contributing to food security and nutrition, are stuck with funding their own growth from internally generated cash flows.

Opportunities for addressing these risks include improving the policy, regulatory and institutional architecture for financing food security and nutrition, providing derisking services to financial institutions, and providing business advisory services to the agrifood system actors to improve the bankability of agribusinesses. Blended finance is particularly important in this regard as it helps mitigate some of the risks faced by financial service providers. One approach to maximize the impact of limited public financial resources is to blend development funding (including both public and philanthropic funding) with private financing. This structuring approach makes strategic use of development funding to attract private capital into emerging and frontier markets. Blended finance going to African agrifood systems had a total deal volume of USD 3 billion spread across 99 deals between 2020 and 2023, with an average deal size of USD 29 million. Most blended finance transactions are still of relatively high-ticket sizes. These higher ticket sizes go to larger and more downstream companies, where it is unclear to what extent this financing supports food security and nutrition. At lower ticket sizes, the direct impact on food security and nutrition is generally higher, when, for example, a fund finances smallholder farmers through a cooperative.

Another opportunity for increasing financing for food security and nutrition is through climate finance. Despite the growing pool of climate finance, its deployment often falls short in addressing the specific needs of agriculture and food systems. In Africa, climate finance flows have grown by 48 percent to USD 44 billion in 2021/2022, up from USD 30 billion in 2019/2020. However, this still represents 18 percent of the estimated USD 250 billion required annually to meet the continent's 2030 climate goals. To bridge this gap, it is essential to develop targeted strategies that integrate climate finance expertise with in-depth knowledge of food security and nutrition. This includes designing innovative financial instruments that align with the needs of farmers, agribusinesses and value chain actors, while channelling large volumes of climate capital into scalable, impactful solutions. Leveraging public-private partnerships, enhancing access to credit, and investing in technologies for climate-smart agriculture can help mobilize climate finance and transform agrifood systems into drivers of resilience and sustainability for attaining food security and nutrition objectives.

To catalyse progress towards agrifood systems transformation for food security and improved nutrition in Africa, governments and development partners should work together to scale-up public funding in the short and long term to address the main determinants of food security and nutrition, as well as the major drivers and underlying structural factors. They should also realize the potential of the private sector and maximize the impact of existing investments.



**PART 1**  
**STATISTICS**  
**AND**  
**TRENDS**



# CHAPTER 1

## TARGET 2.1 OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: UNDERNOURISHMENT AND FOOD INSECURITY

### Key messages

- Africa continues to face worsening hunger and a deterioration in food security.
- In 2024, over 306 million people in Africa were undernourished, an increase of about 10 million people over the 2023 estimates and of 73 million people since the COVID-19 pandemic.
- All the subregions in Africa recorded a deterioration in food security between 2023 and 2024.
- Slightly more women than men in Africa were affected by moderate or severe food insecurity in 2024, with prevalence rates of 58.2 percent and 57.1 percent, respectively.

### ■ 1.1 PREVALENCE OF UNDERNOURISHMENT

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' (FAO) prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) is an indicator of chronic energy deprivation that is derived from official country data on food supply, food consumption and dietary energy needs in the population considering demographic characteristics such as age, sex and levels of physical activity. FAO strives always to improve the accuracy of the PoU estimates by taking into account new information; the entire historical series is updated for each report. For this reason, only the current series of estimates should be used, including for values in past years.<sup>1</sup>

As a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator, the PoU allows for cross-country comparison, providing a standardized measure to evaluate the progress and challenges of different nations in combating hunger. This comparative analysis is crucial for identifying best practices, areas needing improvement, and regional disparities.


The burden of hunger, measured by the PoU, has significantly worsened in Africa since 2010 after a decade of improvement from 2000 to 2010 (FIGURE 1). In 2024, 20.2 percent of the population was undernourished, marking an increase of 4.3 percentage points since 2010.

The PoU in Africa presents a stark contrast to global trends, highlighting the disproportionate impact of food insecurity on the African continent. In 2000, Africa's PoU stood at 22.1 percent, significantly higher than the global average of 12.7 percent. By 2015, Africa had made notable progress, reducing its PoU to 15.9 percent, yet it remained well above the global average of 7.7 percent. The disparity became even more pronounced in 2019 when Africa's PoU rose to 17.4 percent against a global average of 7.5 percent. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated these disparities, with Africa's PoU jumping to 18.5 percent in 2020, compared to a global increase to 8.5 percent. In 2024, Africa's PoU stood at 20.2 percent, while the global average was at 8.2 percent, underscoring the persistent and worsening food security challenges in Africa.

These statistics illustrate the urgent need for targeted interventions and sustained efforts to address the underlying causes of undernourishment in Africa.

**FIGURE 1**

Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and Africa, and the number of undernourished in Africa



NOTE: The values for 2024 are projections based on nowcasts.


SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

The prevalence of undernourishment in Africa in 2024 ranged from 10.7 percent in Northern Africa to 30.2 percent in Central Africa. These figures show a continuation of the worsening hunger situation in all the subregions since the COVID-19 pandemic, except for Eastern Africa, which remained the same between 2023 and 2024 (TABLE 1 and FIGURE 2).

Central Africa faces the most severe hunger challenges, with the highest PoU at 30.2 percent in 2024. This region has seen a significant increase in the PoU from 25.4 percent in 2019 to 29.7 percent in 2023, and further to 30.2 percent in 2024, indicating a worsening food security situation. Eastern Africa has seen a 1.1 percentage point improvement from 27.0 percent in 2019 to 25.9 percent in 2024. Western Africa has seen a rapid deterioration in food security, with the PoU increasing from 11.9 percent in 2019 to 16.3 percent in 2023, and further to 16.5 percent in 2024. Northern Africa had the lowest PoU at 10.7 percent in 2024 but has seen a steady increase from 5.9 percent in 2019. Southern Africa has also seen an increase in the PoU from 8.0 percent in 2019 to 11.1 percent in 2023, and further to 11.4 percent in 2024.

**FIGURE 2**

Prevalence of undernourishment in Africa by subregion



NOTE: The values for 2024 are projections based on nowcasts.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

**TABLE 1**

Prevalence of undernourishment (percent)

	2000	2010	2015	2019	2020	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.2</b>
Africa	22.1	15.9	15.9	17.4	18.5	20.0	20.2
Central Africa	34.6	23.1	23.8	25.4	28.3	29.7	30.2
Eastern Africa	38.0	24.6	23.9	27.0	26.6	25.9	25.9
Northern Africa	7.5	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.6	10.5	10.7
Southern Africa	5.1	6.9	8.5	8.0	9.5	11.1	11.4
Western Africa	14.5	11.8	11.5	11.9	14.1	16.3	16.5

NOTE: The values for 2024 are projections based on nowcasts.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>.

Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

Regarding the absolute number of undernourished, Africa has consistently been a significant portion of the global total (TABLE 2). In 2000, Africa accounted for 23.5 percent of the global undernourished population. By 2024, this proportion had increased to 45.5 percent, underscoring the disproportionate impact of hunger on the continent. While the global number of undernourished people decreased from 781.1 million in 2000 to 673.2 million in 2024, Africa's share of this burden has grown substantially, from 183.8 million to 306.5 million over the same period.

The number of undernourished people in Africa has shown a concerning trend over the past two decades, with significant regional disparities. In 2000, Africa had 183.8 million undernourished people, which decreased to 170.1 million by 2010, indicating some progress in combating hunger. However, this number began to rise again, reaching 193.7 million in 2015 and 233.9 million in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the situation, with the number of undernourished people increasing sharply to 255.2 million in 2020. By 2022, this number had risen to 296.2 million, and it reached 306.5 million in 2024, highlighting a sustained and significant increase in hunger across the continent. Eastern Africa has the highest number of undernourished people in the region, with the number rising steadily from 98.5 million in 2000 to 118.7 million in 2019, and further to 126.1 million in 2023 and 129.7 million in 2024. In 2024, Western Africa recorded 75.1 million undernourished people, the second highest in the region, after an increase of 2.4 million people in just one year.

**TABLE 2**

Number of people undernourished (millions)


	2000	2010	2015	2019	2020	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>781.1</b>	<b>612.7</b>	<b>577.4</b>	<b>584.1</b>	<b>670.1</b>	<b>688.4</b>	<b>673.2</b>
Africa	183.8	170.1	193.7	233.9	255.2	296.2	306.5
Central Africa	34.4	31.4	38.0	46.4	53.2	61.2	64.3
Eastern Africa	98.5	85.1	94.3	118.7	119.9	126.1	129.7
Northern Africa	13.1	11.8	13.5	15.0	16.8	28.1	29.1
Southern Africa	2.7	4.1	5.5	5.4	6.5	8.0	8.3
Western Africa	35.1	37.7	42.4	48.4	58.6	72.7	75.1

NOTE: The values for 2024 are projections based on nowcasts.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

FIGURE 3

Number of people undernourished in Africa by subregion



NOTE: The values for 2024 are projections based on nowcasts.


SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

Central Africa has also faced severe challenges, with the number of undernourished people increasing from 34.4 million in 2000 to 64.3 million in 2024. This region has seen a significant and consistent rise in the number of undernourished people, from 38.0 million in 2015 to 46.4 million in 2019, and further to 53.2 million in 2020. The increase to 64.3 million in 2024 underscores the severe and worsening food security situation in Central Africa.

Southern Africa has likewise witnessed a rise in the number of undernourished individuals, increasing from 2.7 million in 2000 to 8.3 million in 2024. Although this region has the lowest total of undernourished people among African subregions, the increase – from 5.4 million in 2019 to 8.0 million in 2023, and up to 8.3 million in 2024 – underscores the persistent hunger challenges in Southern Africa.

Based on the estimated average values for the 2022–2024 period, compared with the average values for 2014–2016, the prevalence of undernourishment improved in 19 countries across Africa over the period (FIGURE 4 and TABLE A-1). Mozambique stands out as the country with the most significant improvement in PoU, with a reduction of 18.1 percentage points in the periods 2014–2016 and 2022–2024. Notable progress was also made in this period in Zimbabwe and Rwanda, where the PoU fell by 14.6 and 11.4 percentage points, respectively.

**FIGURE 4**  
Prevalence of undernourishment in Africa by country and subregion



NOTE: The 2022–2024 average values reflect 2024 projections that are based on nowcasts. The PoU was less than 2.5 percent for Algeria and Seychelles in 2022–2024. The PoU for the Sudan in 2022–2024, for South Sudan in 2014–2016, and for Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Lesotho (not shown) in both periods is not available.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

In Central Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had PoU levels above 35 percent. In Eastern Africa, the situation worsened in Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius and Zambia between 2014–2016 and 2022–2024. More than one third of the populations of Kenya, Madagascar and Zambia faced hunger in 2022–2024, and more than 50 percent of the population of Somalia. In Western Africa, Benin, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria all experienced increases in PoU levels between 2014–2016 and 2022–2024. Liberia had the highest PoU in 2022–2024 (35.5 percent) followed by Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (24.1 percent and 22.1 percent respectively).


## ■ 1.2 PREVALENCE OF FOOD INSECURITY BASED ON THE FOOD INSECURITY EXPERIENCE SCALE

The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) is an estimate of the proportion of the population facing moderate or severe constraints on their ability to obtain sufficient food over the course of a year. People face moderate food insecurity when they are uncertain of their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times over the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. Severe food insecurity means that individuals have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, have gone for days without eating, putting their health and well-being at serious risk.

Recent estimates indicate that in 2024, 58.9 percent of Africa's population faced moderate or severe food insecurity. This is more than two times the global average of 28 percent. For severe food insecurity, more than a fifth of Africa's population (22.2 percent) were affected in 2024 (FIGURE 5 and TABLE 3).

**FIGURE 5**

Prevalence of food insecurity in Africa by subregion



NOTE: Estimates are not available for Central Africa prior to 2020.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

In 2024, Central Africa had the highest prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity at 77.3 percent, followed by Eastern Africa at 64.9 percent, and Western Africa at 63.2 percent. Central Africa and Eastern Africa also had the highest prevalence of severe food insecurity, 37 percent and 24.8 percent respectively (FIGURE 5).

In 2024, an estimated 337 million people in Africa experienced severe food insecurity (TABLE 3). Adding the number of moderately food-insecure people in Africa shows that an estimated 893 million people were moderately or severely food insecure in 2024 – equivalent to 39 percent of the moderately or severely food-insecure people in the world (TABLE 4).

**TABLE 3**

Number of severely food-insecure people (millions)

	2015	2017	2019	2020	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>553.2</b>	<b>611.5</b>	<b>705.3</b>	<b>827.6</b>	<b>841.4</b>	<b>828.0</b>
Africa	202.4	244.7	256.1	285.3	315.6	336.9
Central Africa	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	66.6	75.8	78.8
Eastern Africa	82.1	103.1	103.4	118.5	116.1	124.1
Northern Africa	20.9	25.0	22.1	24.4	32.0	33.8
Southern Africa	5.9	6.2	6.3	7.4	7.8	7.9
Western Africa	40.4	51.3	59.1	68.3	83.8	92.3

NOTE: n.a. = not available.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

Eastern Africa had the highest number of moderately or severely food-insecure people in 2024, with figures rising from 222.4 million in 2015 to 325.1 million in 2024, the overall trend showing a substantial increase. Western Africa showed a considerable increase, from 144.1 million in 2015 to 288.1 million in 2024, while in Northern Africa the number of moderately or severely food-insecure people has been relatively lower but still shows an increasing trend from 61.2 million in 2015 to 95.5 million in 2024 (**TABLE 4**).

A comparison of the three-year average estimates for 2014–2016 and 2022–2024 shows that the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa has worsened in most countries, with only some countries – Algeria, Chad, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Zambia – showing improvements in food security over the eight-year period (**FIGURE 6**).

**TABLE 4**


Number of moderately or severely food-insecure people (millions)

	2015	2017	2019	2020	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>1602.2</b>	<b>1800.4</b>	<b>1949.4</b>	<b>2268.7</b>	<b>2295.0</b>	<b>2284.8</b>
Africa	548.6	650.2	689.3	745.2	852.1	892.7
Central Africa	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	131.6	158.6	164.6
Eastern Africa	222.4	266.4	275.8	293.7	309.6	325.1
Northern Africa	61.2	79.0	73.0	77.7	91.2	95.5
Southern Africa	13.9	14.4	14.9	16.9	19.1	19.4
Western Africa	144.1	173.1	197.9	225.3	273.7	288.1

NOTE: n.a. = not available.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

**FIGURE 6**  
Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa by country and subregion




NOTES: Values for several countries in the region are either not available or not reported, and for some countries shown in the figure, they are available only for 2014–2016 or 2022–2024.  
SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

Slightly more women than men in Africa were affected by moderate or severe food insecurity in 2024, with prevalence of 58.2 percent and 57.1 percent, respectively. At the subregional levels, a similar pattern of women being more food insecure than men was observed, with the exception of Northern Africa where slightly more men (35.2 percent) than women (33.7 percent) were food insecure in 2024 (FIGURE 7 and TABLE 5), although the difference is within the margins of error.

**FIGURE 7**

Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa by subregion and by sex (2024)



SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

**TABLE 5**

Prevalence of food insecurity in Africa by subregion and by sex (percent)

	Severe food insecurity						Moderate or severe food insecurity					
	Men			Women			Men			Women		
	2019	2020	2024	2019	2020	2024	2019	2020	2024	2019	2020	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>27.2</b>	<b>26.1</b>
Africa	17.9	19.6	21.0	18.8	20.5	22.3	48.7	51.8	57.1	50.9	53.4	58.2
Central Africa	n.a.	36.0	35.1	n.a.	34.8	38.6	n.a.	69.5	75.4	n.a.	70.4	78.9
Eastern Africa	22.5	25.2	24.2	24.2	27.0	25.3	62.4	64.5	63.9	62.9	65.3	66.1
Northern Africa	8.0	8.9	11.6	9.1	9.7	12.8	26.2	29.5	35.2	30.5	30.0	33.7
Southern Africa	8.1	9.4	10.5	9.8	11.5	10.5	19.9	22.2	25.8	23.0	25.7	26.2
Western Africa	14.4	16.2	20.1	14.8	16.6	20.5	47.4	52.7	63.1	50.0	55.6	63.4

NOTE: n.a. = not available.

SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Suite of Food Security Indicators. [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>.

Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

## CHAPTER 2

# TARGET 2.2 OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: MALNUTRITION

### Key messages

- In Africa, the prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age was over 30 percent in 2024, which is high despite the substantial improvement achieved during the past two decades.
- The prevalence of wasting in children under 5 years of age in the region was 5.4 percent in 2024, just below the global estimate of 6.6 percent. Across the subregions, a lower level was notably observed in Southern Africa.
- The overall prevalence of overweight in children under 5 years of age in Africa was 4.5 percent in 2024, which was below the global estimate. Higher levels though were observed in Northern Africa and Southern Africa. Since 2015, overweight levels have increased in 3 of the subregions in Africa and decreased marginally in the other two.
- The prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years was 35.9 percent in 2023, which was above the global estimate, and was especially high in Western Africa and Central Africa. This section reports on four global nutrition indicators: *stunting*, *wasting* and *overweight* in children under 5 years of age, and *anaemia* in women aged 15 to 49 years.


### 2.1 STUNTING AMONG CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE

Stunting is defined as low height-for-age. It is a largely irreversible outcome and is the result of poor maternal health and nutrition, inadequate infant and young child feeding practices, and repeated infections interacting with a variety of other factors over a sustained period. Stunting before the age of 2 years predicts poorer cognitive and educational outcomes in later childhood and adolescence and higher susceptibility to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in adulthood. This can affect labour productivity, income-earning potential and social skills later in life. Stunted children have an increased risk of becoming overweight or obese later in life.<sup>2,3</sup>

In 2024, the prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age in Africa was 30.3 percent, significantly higher than the global average of 23.2 percent. The prevalence in Northern Africa (18.1 percent) was lower than the global average, the one in Southern Africa was close to the global estimate, but other subregions had much higher values. Central Africa was the worst affected, with a prevalence of 40.1 percent (TABLE 6). Despite these high values, there have been noticeable improvements in reducing stunting at both continental and subregional levels since 2000 (FIGURE 8). The prevalence of stunting has gradually decreased across Africa, although there have been marginal increases between 2022 and 2024 in Central, Northern, Southern and Western Africa. Eastern Africa saw the greatest reduction from 2000 to 2024, with a 17.7 percentage point decrease. However, the continent and all subregions are not on track to meet the 2030 World Health Assembly (WHA) target for reducing the number of children under five years of age who are stunted by 40 percent.<sup>4</sup>

**FIGURE 8**

Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age in Africa by subregion



SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition: UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition*. New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>

**TABLE 6**

Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age (percent)


	2000	2010	2012	2015	2020	2022	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>33.1</b>	<b>27.9</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>22.6</b>	<b>23.2</b>
Africa	40.8	35.6	34.0	32.2	29.9	29.9	30.3
Central Africa	44.0	38.5	37.8	37.8	38.2	39.2	40.1
Eastern Africa	48.9	40.9	38.7	36.0	31.9	31.4	31.2
Northern Africa	27.4	24.6	23.1	20.6	18.0	17.9	18.1
Southern Africa	27.8	24.1	23.2	22.8	22.6	23.3	24.1
Western Africa	39.2	35.1	33.8	32.3	29.6	29.5	29.7

Source: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. Levels and trends in child malnutrition: *UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition*. New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>

The prevalence of stunting was particularly high (35 percent or more) in ten countries in Africa, even exceeding 50 percent in Burundi in 2024, while seven countries – Algeria, Cabo Verde, Libya, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Tunisia – had values of 10 percent or less. From 2012 to 2024, most countries saw substantial improvements in reducing stunting. Libya recorded the largest improvement between 2012 and 2024, with a 16.6 percentage point decrease in the prevalence of stunting. However, the prevalence increased in five countries over this period, with a notably large increase of about 16 percentage points in Angola (FIGURE 9).

**FIGURE 9**

Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age in Africa by country and subregion



SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition: UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition*. New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>.

## 2.2 WASTING AMONG CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE

Wasting refers to a form of malnutrition in which a child is too thin for his or her height. Wasting is the result of recent rapid weight loss or the failure to gain weight. It is a life-threatening condition caused by insufficient intake or malabsorption of energy and nutrients and/or frequent or prolonged illness. A child who is moderately or severely wasted has an increased risk of death, but treatment is possible. Children suffering from wasting have weakened immunity, increasing their risk of death due to greater frequency and severity of common infection, particularly when severe.<sup>5,6</sup>

The prevalence of wasting in Africa in 2024 was 5.4 percent, lower than the global estimate of 6.6 percent. It was particularly low in Southern Africa, while Western and Central Africa had values above the continental average, and Eastern Africa had a prevalence of less than 5 percent. All subregions, except Southern Africa (at 3 percent) and Eastern Africa were off track to meet the 2030 WHA target for reducing and maintaining childhood wasting to less than 5 percent (TABLE 7).

The prevalence of child wasting varies significantly across countries. Based on the latest available estimates covering the 2017–2024 period, thirteen countries had a child wasting prevalence above the global estimate of 6.8 percent, eight of which were in Western Africa. Djibouti, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal had the highest prevalence, exceeding 10 percent. In contrast, 16 countries had prevalence of wasting below 4 percent, with Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Rwanda and Tunisia below 2.5 percent (FIGURE 10).

**TABLE 7**


Prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years of age (percent)

	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>6.6</b>
Africa	5.4
Central Africa	5.5
Eastern Africa	4.8
Northern Africa	5.2
Southern Africa	3.0
Western Africa	6.5

SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. Levels and trends in child malnutrition: *UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition*. New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>

**FIGURE 10**

Prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years of age in Africa by country and subregion (latest year available from 2017 to 2024)



SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition: UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition.* New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>

## 2.3 OVERWEIGHT AMONG CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE

Although genetics may make certain individuals more prone to being overweight, it does not account for the rise in prevalence across populations over time. Early influences such as intrauterine growth, infant feeding practices and eating habits during preschool years play a key role in the development of childhood overweight, which raises the likelihood of obesity in adulthood. This type of malnutrition occurs when there is an imbalance between energy intake and energy expenditure (including physical activity). Children who are overweight face a higher risk of developing NCDs later in life.<sup>7</sup>

In 2024, the prevalence of overweight among children under five years of age in Africa was 4.5 percent, lower than the global estimate of 5.5 percent. Northern and Southern Africa had considerably higher prevalence values compared to other subregions, 8.5 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively. Since 2015, the prevalence of overweight has increased in Central, Eastern and Western Africa, indicating a worsening trend, while it has decreased in Northern Africa, and decreased marginally in Southern Africa. The African continent as a whole, and all the subregions (except Eastern Africa and Western Africa), are not on track to meet the 2030 WHA target for reducing and maintaining childhood overweight to less than 5 percent due to lack of any progress (TABLE 8).<sup>4</sup>

**TABLE 8**


Prevalence of overweight among children under 5 years of age (percent)

	2000	2010	2012	2015	2020	2022	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>5.5</b>
Africa	6.3	5.3	4.9	4.3	3.9	4.1	4.5
Central Africa	5.8	5.1	4.7	4.1	4.0	4.4	5.2
Eastern Africa	5.2	4.4	3.9	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.9
Northern Africa	10.7	12.0	11.3	10.3	8.6	8.4	8.5
Southern Africa	10.8	12.1	12.3	12.4	12.3	12.2	12.1
Western Africa	4.9	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.9	2.2

SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition: UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition*. New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>

The prevalence of overweight among children under five years of age in 2024 varies notably. The highest prevalence with values above 12 percent were found in Algeria, Cameroon, South Africa and Tunisia. Sixteen countries had a prevalence below 3 percent, with Ghana, Mali and Nigeria with a prevalence below 2 percent. The countries that made significant progress in reducing the prevalence of childhood overweight between 2012 and 2024 were Libya, with a 18.3 percentage-point improvement over the period, Comoros (6.7 percentage points) and Morocco (6.0 percentage points). Overall, many countries have seen an increase in the prevalence of overweight among children under five years of age between 2012 and 2024 (FIGURE 11).

**FIGURE 11**  
Prevalence of overweight among children under 5 years of age in Africa by country and subregion



SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2025. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition: UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates. Key findings of the 2025 edition.* New York, USA, Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC. [Cited 4 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/JME>


## 2.4 ANAEMIA AMONG WOMEN AGED 15 TO 49 YEARS

Anaemia refers to low levels of haemoglobin in the blood. It is a complex condition with a wide variety of causes that includes iron deficiency as well as other nutritional deficiencies, infections, inflammation, gynaecological and obstetric conditions, and inherited red blood cell disorders. Failure to reduce anaemia may result in millions of women experiencing impaired health and quality of life. Among pregnant women, iron-deficiency anaemia is also associated with adverse reproductive outcomes such as preterm delivery, low-birth-weight infants, and decreased iron stores for the baby, which may lead to impaired development.<sup>8</sup>

The latest estimates indicate that in 2023, the prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years in Africa was 35.9 percent, higher than the global estimate of 30.7 percent. The prevalence of anaemia was particularly high in Western Africa (41.9 percent) and Central Africa (41.7 percent). Globally, anaemia prevalence has worsened between 2011 and 2023, reversing the downward trend since 2000. A worsening trend has also been observed in Africa, particularly between 2016 and 2023. (FIGURE 12).

**FIGURE 12**

Prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years in Africa by subregion




NOTE: The estimates refer to women aged 15 to 49 years, including pregnant, non-pregnant women and lactating women and were adjusted for altitude and smoking. WHO defines anaemia in pregnant women as a haemoglobin concentration <110 g/L at sea level, and anaemia in non-pregnant women and lactating women as a haemoglobin concentration <120 g/L.

SOURCE: WHO. 2025. *WHO Global Anaemia estimates, 2025 edition*. [Cited 8 May 2025]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia\\_in\\_women\\_and\\_children](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia_in_women_and_children)

**FIGURE 13** shows that the prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years increased in many African countries between 2012 to 2023 with Burundi, Lesotho, Mauritius and Namibia showing particularly a high increase. As of 2023, anaemia remained either a moderate public health issue (prevalence between 20.0 percent and 39.9 percent) or a severe one (prevalence of 40.0 percent or higher)<sup>9</sup> in all countries except Rwanda.

**FIGURE 13**

Prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years in Africa by country and subregion



NOTE: The estimates refer to women aged 15 to 49 years, including pregnant, non-pregnant women and lactating women and were adjusted for altitude and smoking. WHO defines anaemia in pregnant women as a haemoglobin concentration <110 g/L at sea level, and anaemia in non-pregnant women and lactating women as a haemoglobin concentration <120 g/L.  
 SOURCE: WHO. 2025. *WHO Global Anaemia estimates, 2025 edition*. [Cited 8 May 2025]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia\\_in\\_women\\_and\\_children](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia_in_women_and_children)

## CHAPTER 3

# ADDITIONAL WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY NUTRITION INDICATORS

### Key messages

- The prevalence of adult obesity in Africa (16.2 percent in 2022) has been rising the last two decades and in 2022 was slightly above the global estimate. The highest prevalence was observed in Northern Africa and Southern Africa with a prevalence about twice the global estimate.
- The prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding of 45.2 percent in Africa in 2023 was slightly lower than the global estimate, with only Eastern Africa on track to meet the 2030 WHA target for this indicator.
- Despite modest progress in Africa in the reduction of the prevalence of low birthweight during the last two decades, the prevalence of 13.9 percent was still high on the continent in 2020 compared to the global estimate.


This section assesses progress towards three additional WHA-endorsed global nutrition targets – *exclusive breastfeeding, low birthweight and adult obesity*.

#### ■ 3.1 ADULT OBESITY

The latest data show that in 2022 the prevalence of adult obesity was 16.2 percent in Africa, slightly higher than the global estimate of 15.8 percent (FIGURE 14).

**FIGURE 14**

Prevalence of obesity among adults in Africa by subregion



SOURCE: WHO. 2024. Global Health Observatory: Prevalence of obesity among adults, BMI  $\geq$  30 (age-standardized estimate) (%). Estimates by country. [Accessed on 24 July 2024]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi-30-\(age-standardized-estimate\)-](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi-30-(age-standardized-estimate)-). Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

The prevalence of adult obesity in Southern Africa and Northern Africa in 2022 (29.7 percent and 31.7 percent, respectively) was significantly higher than the prevalence in the other subregions (9.3 percent in Central Africa, 8.1 percent in Eastern Africa, and 11.6 percent in Western Africa). While the prevalence rose in all subregions between 2000 and 2022, the absolute difference was highest in Northern Africa and Southern Africa (12.9 percentage points and 8.2 percentage points, respectively) compared to the other subregions (5.5 percentage points in Central and Eastern Africa and, 7.2 percentage points in Western Africa) (TABLE 9).

**TABLE 9**


Prevalence of obesity among adults (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2020	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>15.8</b>
Africa	8.7	10.5	12.2	12.8	13.7	15.4	16.2
Central Africa	3.8	5.0	6.2	6.6	7.3	8.6	9.3
Eastern Africa	2.6	3.5	4.5	4.9	5.7	7.3	8.1
Northern Africa	18.8	21.9	24.8	25.9	27.7	30.5	31.7
Southern Africa	21.5	24.6	26.8	27.3	27.9	29.1	29.7
Western Africa	4.4	6.1	7.6	8.1	8.9	10.7	11.6

Source: WHO. 2024. Global Health Observatory: Prevalence of obesity among adults, BMI  $\geq$  30 (age-standardized estimate) (%). Estimates by country. [Accessed on 24 July 2024]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi-30-\(age-standardized-estimate\)-](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi-30-(age-standardized-estimate)-). Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

The highest prevalence of adult obesity was observed in Egypt (44.3 percent), Libya (36.7 percent), Eswatini (30.1 percent), South Africa (29.7 percent), Tunisia (26.8 percent), and Algeria (23.8 percent) (FIGURE 15).

**FIGURE 15**  
Prevalence of obesity among adults in Africa by country and subregion




SOURCE: WHO. 2024. Global Health Observatory: Prevalence of obesity among adults, BMI  $\geq$  30 (age-standardized estimate) (%). Estimates by country. [Accessed on 24 July 2024]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi-30-\(age-standardized-estimate\)-](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi-30-(age-standardized-estimate)-). Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

### 3.2 PREVALENCE OF EXCLUSIVE BREASTFEEDING DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF LIFE

In 2023, the prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding in Africa was 45.2 percent, slightly lower than the global estimate of 47.8 percent, with significant variations among subregions. Eastern Africa had the highest prevalence at 59.2 percent, while Western Africa had the lowest at 35.1 percent. Only Eastern Africa is on track to meet the 2030 WHA target of increasing the rate of exclusive breastfeeding in the first 6 months up to at least 60 percent by 2030 (FIGURE 16).

**FIGURE 16**

Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding among infants 0–5 months of age in Africa by subregion



NOTE: Data for Southern Africa are not available.

SOURCE: UNICEF, 2024. Infant and young child feeding. In: *UNICEF*. [Cited 30 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/infant-and-young-child-feeding>

A review of data for this indicator since 2000 shows that most countries and subregions have improved, though there is significant variation among countries. Notably, Northern Africa recorded a decrease in the prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding between 2012 (40.9 percent) and 2023 (35.7 percent). In 2022, Chad had the lowest prevalence (7.4 percent) and Burundi had the highest (85 percent). In 2024, Zambia (64.1 percent) had the highest prevalence, and Nigeria (28.8 percent) the lowest (APPENDIX 1, TABLE A-11).

### 3.3 PREVALENCE OF LOW BIRTHWEIGHT

Low birthweight is defined by WHO as weight at birth of less than 2 500 g (5.51 lbs) and can be caused by intrauterine growth restriction, prematurity, or both. Low birthweight continues to be a significant public health problem globally and is associated with a range of both short- and long-term consequences such as foetal and neonatal mortality and morbidity, impaired growth and cognitive development, as well as an increased risk of NCDs later in life. Affordable, accessible, and suitable healthcare, as well as adequate maternal nutrition, is essential for the prevention and treatment of low birth weight.<sup>10</sup>

In 2020, the prevalence of low birthweight in Africa was 13.9 percent, slightly lower than the global estimate. Over the past two decades, all subregions made some progress in reducing the prevalence of low birthweight, except in Northern Africa where the prevalence remained unchanged. However, despite these improvements, the prevalence of low birthweight remains high across the continent. Although Western Africa, Central Africa and Eastern Africa showed some progress between 2010 and 2020, all the subregions are far from achieving the WHA 2030 target of a 30 percent reduction in low birth weight, compared to the 2012 baseline (TABLE 10).

**TABLE 10**


Prevalence of low birthweight (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020
<b>World</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>14.7</b>
Africa	15.5	15.0	14.6	14.2	13.9	13.9
Central Africa	14.0	13.5	13.0	12.5	12.3	12.2
Eastern Africa	15.5	15.2	14.9	14.5	14.1	14.0
Northern Africa	14.2	14.1	13.9	14.0	14.0	14.1
Southern Africa	16.9	16.7	16.5	16.4	16.4	16.4
Western Africa	16.4	15.7	15.2	14.6	14.3	14.3

SOURCE: UNICEF & WHO. 2023. *Low birthweight joint estimates 2023 edition*. [Cited 28 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/low-birthweight>

Over the past two decades, most countries in Africa, (with the exception of Algeria, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Tunisia), made some progress in reducing the prevalence of low birthweight. In 2020, the prevalence of low birthweight exceeded 10 percent in most African countries, with 16 countries reporting prevalence values above 15 percent, and the Comoros recording the highest at 23 percent. Eight countries (Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania) had a prevalence of low birthweight of 10 percent or less (FIGURE 17).

**FIGURE 17**  
Prevalence of low birthweight in Africa by country and subregion



SOURCE: UNICEF & WHO. 2023. *Low birthweight joint estimates 2023 edition*. [Cited 28 April 2025]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/low-birthweight>

## CHAPTER 4

# THE COST AND AFFORDABILITY OF A HEALTHY DIET


### Key messages

- The average cost of a healthy diet in Africa is rising. In 2024, the average cost of a healthy diet in Africa was 4.41 purchasing power parity dollars per person per day, an increase of 5.5 percent from its 2023 level.
- The cost of a healthy diet was much higher than the extreme poverty threshold of 2.15 PPP dollars per person per day, suggesting that not only the poor but also a proportion of people defined as non-poor could not afford a healthy diet.
- In 2024, over 1 billion people in Africa were unable to afford a healthy diet, an increase of more than 29 million from the 2023 estimate, and about 145 million more people since the COVID-19 pandemic.
- The steady increase in the cost of a healthy diet in Africa and in all the subregions is compromising food security and nutrition. The number of people unable to afford a healthy diet is on the rise.

The average of cost of a healthy diet per person per day in Africa was 4.41 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars in 2024, slightly lower than the global average estimate of 4.46 PPP dollars. Across the subregions, Northern Africa had the highest cost (4.76 PPP dollars) and the lowest in Western Africa at 4.21 PPP dollars ([FIGURE 18](#) and [TABLE 11](#)).

**FIGURE 18**

Cost of a healthy diet in Africa by subregion



SOURCE: FAO, 2025. FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD). [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

The average cost of a healthy diet in Africa increased by 13.3 percent between 2022 and 2024, which is much more than the increase in the global level (11.2 percent) over the same period. All subregions experienced rising costs (FIGURE 18 and TABLE 11).

**TABLE 11**

Cost of a healthy diet (PPP international dollars)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>3.30</b>	<b>3.43</b>	<b>3.60</b>	<b>4.01</b>	<b>4.30</b>	<b>4.46</b>
Africa	3.21	3.32	3.52	3.89	4.18	4.41
Central Africa	3.25	3.40	3.64	4.02	4.24	4.39
Eastern Africa	3.23	3.33	3.51	3.88	4.18	4.48
Northern Africa	3.46	3.44	3.65	3.99	4.51	4.76
Southern Africa	3.28	3.43	3.64	3.96	4.27	4.44
Western Africa	3.06	3.19	3.39	3.77	4.01	4.21

Source: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD). [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

The proportion of the population in Africa unable to afford a healthy diet was 66.6 percent in 2024, more than twice the global estimate of 31.9 (TABLE 12). This translates to 1008.9 million people in Africa unable to afford a healthy diet in 2024, up from 864.0 million in 2019. Compared to the pre-COVID-19 levels, there has been an additional 144.9 million people unable to afford a healthy diet (TABLE 13). Across the subregions, there were marginal changes in the proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet, except in Northern Africa and Western Africa where it increased significantly from 37.6 percent and 66.5 percent respectively in 2019 to 41.3 percent and 70.0 percent respectively in 2024 (TABLE 12).

**TABLE 12**


Proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet (percent)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>35.4</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>34.5</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>31.9</b>
Africa	64.1	65.2	64.7	64.8	66.2	66.6
Central Africa	76.6	78.2	78.2	78.2	78.1	78.0
Eastern Africa	72.4	73.4	73.8	73.9	73.2	73.0
Northern Africa	37.6	36.6	32.6	31.9	39.4	41.3
Southern Africa	60.7	62.4	61.6	61.4	62.0	62.0
Western Africa	66.5	68.5	68.9	69.3	69.7	70.0

Source: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD). [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

Of the 1008.9 million people unable to afford a healthy diet in 2024 in Africa, Eastern Africa alone accounted for more than a third (365.5 million), while Southern Africa, at 45.3 million, was the least (FIGURE 19 and TABLE 13). Compared to the pre-pandemic levels (2019), there were almost 145 million more people unable to afford a healthy diet in Africa, suggesting that the increased cost of a healthy diet has been a major contributing factor. Eastern and Western Africa recorded the largest cumulative increases in these numbers since 2019 – 47.5 million and 49.1 million people respectively, while Southern Africa recorded the lowest cumulative increase of 4.1 million people over the period (TABLE 13).

**FIGURE 19**  
Number of people unable to afford a healthy diet in Africa by subregion



SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD). [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

**TABLE 13**

Number of people unable to afford a healthy diet (millions)

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>World</b>	<b>2762.1</b>	<b>2911.4</b>	<b>2746.7</b>	<b>2683.7</b>	<b>2653.4</b>	<b>2604.6</b>
Africa	864.0	900.1	915.1	937.7	979.6	1008.9
Central Africa	139.6	146.9	151.6	156.1	161.0	166.1
Eastern Africa	318.0	331.4	341.9	351.1	357.1	365.5
Northern Africa	94.6	93.7	84.9	84.5	105.9	112.4
Southern Africa	41.2	43.1	43.2	43.7	44.8	45.3
Western Africa	270.5	285.0	293.4	302.3	310.8	319.6


SOURCE: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD). [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

At the country level, the proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet is varied across the continent. Nine countries (Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, the Niger, South Sudan and Zambia) had more than 80 percent of their populations unable to afford a healthy diet in 2024, a situation which is not conducive for achieving food security and improved nutrition. Northern African countries have the lowest prevalence, especially Tunisia and Morocco, at 8.2 percent and 13.6 percent, respectively (FIGURE 20).

Fourteen countries recorded improvements in the proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet between 2019 and 2024 (Benin, Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Liberia, Namibia, Senegal, the Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda). The remaining countries either deteriorated or stagnated. Benin recorded the largest improvement in the same period at 9.9 percentage points, while Angola, Chad, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone and South Sudan, showed the worst deterioration ranging from 5.7 percentage points (Sierra Leone) to 11.3 percentage points (Mali).

**FIGURE 20**

Proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet in Africa by country and subregion



NOTE: Values for several countries in the region are either not available or not reported.

Source: FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD). [Accessed on 28 July 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>.

Licence: CC-BY-4.0.



**PART 2**  
**FINANCING**  
**TOWARDS**  
**AGRIFOOD**  
**SYSTEMS**  
**TRANSFORMATION**  
**FOR FOOD**  
**SECURITY AND**  
**IMPROVED**  
**NUTRITION IN**  
**AFRICA**



## CHAPTER 5

# INTRODUCTION

### Key messages

- The major drivers behind the worsening trends in food insecurity are observed jointly with high and persisting inequalities.
- To reduce recurring incidence of food insecurity and malnutrition, the main determinants of food security and nutrition should be addressed as well as the major drivers and underlying structural factors behind recent hunger and malnutrition trends.

A substantial increase in financing, both in quantity and quality, for transforming the agrifood systems for food security and nutrition is required to address the main determinants of food security and nutrition as well as the major drivers and underlying structural factors.


#### ■ 5.1 BACKGROUND

Africa is far from meeting SDG targets 2.1 (end hunger and ensure universal access to safe and nutritious food) and 2.2 (ending all forms of malnutrition), as well as the other SDG-2 targets. The gains made in reducing hunger and food insecurity until 2019 have been eroded since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Several editions of *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World* have identified the major drivers and underlying structural factors behind the recent global trends of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition.<sup>1</sup> In Africa, these major drivers behind the worsening trends in food insecurity are observed as well: conflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns and downturns, observed jointly with high and persisting inequalities.

**FIGURE 21** shows the relationship between the PoU and the major drivers of food insecurity in Africa from 2013 to 2023. It illustrates how the worsening prevalence of undernutrition is linked with these major drivers and that hunger in Africa is higher and has increased the most in countries affected by the major drivers.

**FIGURE 21**

PoU by major drivers of food insecurity in Africa




NOTE: Categories are not mutually exclusive, as a country can be affected by more than one major driver and/or face high income inequality. Countries not affected by major drivers are those not affected by conflict, climate extremes or economic downturns. PoU estimates are unweighted. The analysis is shown for 49 countries of the continent with available PoU information. Methodology and data sources are in Table S3.5<sup>11</sup> of the supplementary material of the 2024 edition of *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024*.  
SOURCE: Authors' own elaboration.

**FIGURE 22** shows the difference in the PoU, measured in percentage points, from 2019 to 2023 for African countries affected by conflict, climate extremes and economic downturns, and for countries with high income inequality. The figure also shows the difference in the PoU by different combinations of drivers (no driver, single driver, multiple drivers), excluding high income inequality. It shows that the worsening of the PoU over the period was highest for countries affected by economic downturns, followed by those affected by conflict, high income inequality and climate extremes, in that order. The countries which either did not experience any of these drivers or experienced only one driver had much smaller deterioration in the PoU over the period. Thus, hunger increases in African countries are higher for countries affected by more than one major driver.

FIGURE 22

Difference in the PoU between 2019 and 2023 by combination of drivers



NOTE: Categories are not mutually exclusive, as a country can be affected by more than one driver and also face high income inequality. The number at the top of each bar refers to the number of countries in that category. The analysis is shown for 49 low- and middle-income countries in the continent with available PoU information. See Table S3.5<sup>11</sup> in the supplementary materials of *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024* for definitions and methodology. SOURCE: Authors own elaboration.

Violent conflict is intrinsically linked with food insecurity due to its destructive impact on food production, distribution, and marketing, with overall negative consequences on livelihoods. In the past ten years, conflicts severely affected food security conditions in 16 African countries. Of the 18 major food crisis countries, 14 were in Africa and 10 of them were affected by violent conflicts.<sup>1</sup>

Climate variability and extremes are also putting pressure on existing vulnerabilities of Africa's agrifood systems resulting from widespread extreme poverty and dependence on rain-fed agriculture, among other factors. From 2013 to 2022, 27 out of 68 countries in the world affected by climate variability and extremes were in Africa. The impacts of climate change also compound conflicts partly due to increasing competition for natural resources. Nine African countries were affected by both climate extremes and conflicts during the period 2013 to 2023.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, the war in Ukraine<sup>12</sup> also negatively affected sub-Saharan African countries, impeding their recovery efforts from the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia and Ukraine are key producers and among the top global exporters of key commodities such as wheat, maize, rapeseed and sunflower oil, as well as leading suppliers of fertilizers. The war, therefore, induced substantial disruptions in global supply chains, leading to soaring prices of food and agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers, at a time in which Africa, heavily dependent on wheat and fertilizer imports, was still grappling with the impacts of the pandemic.

More recently, economic downturns and soaring inflation due to causes such as weak African currencies (versus USD), elevated freight costs related to the conflict in the Red Sea, and the war in Ukraine have decreased the fiscal space for several African governments. This has restricted their ability to cushion the socioeconomic impacts on their vulnerable populations and to mobilize the financial resources needed to transform agrifood systems in the region for achieving food security and better nutrition.<sup>13</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic has been a cause of severe economic downturns in the recent period. The overwhelming majority of countries in Africa experienced economic downturns in 2020 (90 percent of countries) with an average contraction of 5 percent. As a consequence, of 30 low- and middle-income countries in the world affected by economic downturns in the period 2019–2023, 18 were African countries.<sup>1</sup>

Persisting inequalities between women and men exacerbate food insecurity in Africa by restricting women's access to finance, land, other resources and decision-making in agrifood systems, therefore limiting their potential contributions. Despite being key agricultural producers, women face systemic barriers that hinder productivity and food availability. Gender inequalities are further exacerbated by other intersecting socioeconomic factors, such as age, disability status, ethnicity, refugee or migration status, and indigeneity. Income inequality also remains high in the region – as measured by the Gini index. For the period 2018–2022, the Gini index for the Africa region was 38. Relative to 2013–2017 (when the Gini index was 43), there were some improvements. However, income inequality in Africa remains high.<sup>1</sup>

Addressing gender and income disparities is essential for improving food security and nutrition in the region as well as achieving SDG targets 2.1 and 2.2.

**BOX 1** describes the importance of targeting women and youth when allocating finance to agrifood systems in Africa.<sup>14</sup>

## BOX 1 EMPOWERING WOMEN ACTIVE IN THE AGRIFOOD SYSTEM IS CRUCIAL FOR ENDING HUNGER AND POVERTY

Agrifood systems are a more important source of livelihood for women than for men in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa: 66 percent of women's employment is in agrifood systems, compared with 60 percent of men's. Despite the importance of agrifood systems for women's livelihoods and the welfare of their families, women's roles tend to be marginalized, and their working conditions are likely to be worse than men's – irregular, informal, part-time, low-skilled, labour-intensive, and thus vulnerable. Women's access to land, inputs, services, and finance – which is key to working in agrifood systems – also continues to lag behind men's.<sup>i</sup>

The major constraints to women's access to financial products and services include lack of resources (e.g. income or assets) and discriminatory social norms and policies. Women are also less likely to have the identification documents required to, for example, open a bank account. Other reasons for a limited access to finance for women include distrust, low financial literacy and gendered exposure to specific risks. These constraints expose women to be more vulnerable to the major drivers of food insecurity.

Digitization of financial services offers innovative ways to ensure meaningful financial inclusion.

Gender barriers, such as limited mobility or distrust of formal institutions among women, could be addressed through the use of digital tools of the available at home to improve women's financial autonomy and privacy. Mobile money has facilitated changes in women's financial behaviour and increased their financial independence. As such, it has contributed to economic empowerment of women. For instance, a study in Kenya showed that access to the Kenyan mobile money system M-PESA lifted more than 185 000 households out of poverty, with a greater impact on female-headed households than on male-headed households.

Next to digitization of financial services, blended finance can also be an effective tool as it can derisk solutions that simultaneously address gender equality. Examples include the Land Degradation Neutrality Fund, which is supported by first-loss capital to invest in projects that reduce or reverse land degradation, while advancing gender equality from project design through to implementation.

SOURCES: <sup>i</sup>FAO. 2023. *The status of women in agrifood systems*. Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc5060en>; <sup>ii</sup> Matheson, R. Study: Mobile-money services lift Kenyans out of poverty. In: *MIT News*. [Cited 12 May 2025]. <https://news.mit.edu/2016/mobile-money-kenyans-out-poverty-1208>

The combined effects of these drivers are rising hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in the region. As shown in Part 1 of this report, the latest estimates indicate that there were more hungry people, particularly women and girls, in Africa in 2023 compared with 2022. Furthermore, the nutritional status is also deteriorating and the majority of Africa's population are unable to afford a healthy diet. This shows that the region faces an important food insecurity and malnutrition challenge, which should galvanize development actors into action.

African policymakers have long recognized that, beyond ensuring food security and improved nutrition, agricultural and broader agrifood systems transformation is essential for economic growth and poverty reduction. Thus, in July 2003, African heads of state and government adopted the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, marking the official launch of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Programme (CAADP). The CAADP initiative was developed in response to low productivity, food insecurity, and under-investment in Africa's agriculture. The

Maputo Declaration urged African Union Member States to allocate at least 10 percent of their national budgets to agriculture and rural development and to achieve at least 6 percent annual growth in agricultural gross domestic product (GDP). The Malabo Declaration,<sup>15</sup> adopted in 2014, broadened the CAADP framework by reaffirming its existing principles and targets while introducing ambitious new goals, including eradicating hunger and malnutrition, supporting and facilitating the entry of women and youths and participation in agribusiness, tripling intra-African trade, enhancing investment finance, enhancing resilience, and strengthening accountability for actions and results. The implementation of the CAADP agenda has chalked some successes, including raising agriculture’s political profile. However significant challenges remain and these have shaped the new Kampala CAADP Declaration on Building Resilient and Sustainable Agrifood Systems in Africa, and its 10-year CAADP Strategy and Action Plan (2026–2035).

Under the CAADP framework, in recent years, African countries introduced several policy measures. Some of the main measures adopted were the reduction of taxes on food and fuel, foregoing of import tariff revenues, export restrictions, and new food, fuel and fertilizer subsidies.<sup>16</sup> More broadly, the key policies and strategies which are used by African countries to tackle hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition include national agricultural investment plans (NAIPs) and national pathways for food systems transformation, as well as a portfolio of policies that are overseen by different government ministries and agencies. Countries develop and implement NAIPs to deliver on commitments under the 2014 Malabo Declaration. Progress on these commitments, including the commitment on zero hunger, are tracked through the Biennial Review Mechanism.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, as of 2023, 37 African countries had adopted national pathways for transforming their agrifood systems.<sup>18</sup> Voluntary country reports provided insights into the progress and efforts being made to transform agrifood systems for food security and nutrition. The implementation of these national policies and plans faces several challenges, among which is inadequate financing. As a result, many of these national documents are not fully implemented and thus fall short of the development outcomes specified in these documents. For example, over the course of the four CAADP Biennial Review (BR) cycles covering the period 2015– 2023, only a dozen countries showed consistent improvement in their performance on the Malabo targets. Indeed, the latest BR report of 2023, showed that none of the countries was on track to meet the Malabo Declaration targets by 2025.

Africa’s comparative advantages are its abundant natural resources coupled with a burgeoning youth population. These indicate that the region’s agrifood system has the potential to create wealth for its citizens if adequate financing and investments are made.<sup>19</sup> This potential can be harnessed to address food insecurity and malnutrition, create jobs, boost trade and improve the prosperity of its people. Then, the following question arises: how can this potential be harnessed? The agrifood system in Africa holds immense potential for wealth creation if it receives the necessary support and investments. However, to fully realize this potential, leaders and citizens must tackle the current challenges and commit to sustainable and innovative solutions. AGRA (2019)<sup>20</sup> notes that with the right trade and investment policies, countries can leverage investments of midstream actors in African food value chains to take advantage of these opportunities. Therefore, more needs to be done to attract further financing to move towards an efficient, inclusive, resilient and sustainable transformation of agrifood systems for food security and improved nutrition in Africa.

## ■ 5.2 DEFINING FINANCING FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

A definition of financing for food security and nutrition should encompass the interconnected nature, as well as the determinants, of food security and nutrition, together with the major drivers behind recent setbacks in achieving an end to hunger, food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition.

*The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 (p. 56) defines financing for food security and nutrition as:*


... the process of providing or obtaining financial resources to ensure that all people, at all times, have stable, physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious foods that meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life, and suitable food preparation and handling, feeding, caring, and health-seeking practices, and access to health, water and sanitation services to ensure a continued adequate nutritional status.<sup>1</sup>

It goes on to explain (p. 56) that the financial resources can come from public domestic, public foreign, private domestic and private foreign sources, utilizing various financial instruments for both short-term and long-term interventions, including grants and below-market-rate loans.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, it covers expenditures and investments that aim to ensure that all individuals are protected against short-term or long-term instability in food security and nutrition caused by various climatic, economic, social, commercial and political factors.

This definition of financing for food security and nutrition is composed of two elements: a core and an extended definition. The core definition of financing for food security and nutrition covers the funding needed to address all the food security dimensions (availability, access, utilization and stability), as well as the health status determinants of nutrition. The extended definition encompasses financing to build resilience against the disruptions in agrifood systems that the major drivers create, including addressing the persisting underlying structural factors which worsen the negative impact the major drivers already have on food security and nutrition. **FIGURE 23** is a conceptual diagram of this definition.

FIGURE 23

Conceptual diagram of the new definition of financing for food security and nutrition for ending hunger and food insecurity (SDG target 2.1) and all forms of malnutrition (SDG target 2.2)



SOURCE: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en>

### 5.3 RATIONALE OF FINANCING FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

Financing for food security and nutrition in Africa should provide the resources that contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition in all its forms. Recent setbacks in achieving these objective have exposed the vulnerability of agrifood systems in Africa and underscored the urgent need for greater financing, as well as optimizing the use of existing public financing (See Section 6.3) towards a resilient agrifood system in the continent.

To reduce the incidence of food insecurity and malnutrition, the main determinants of food security and nutrition should be addressed, as well as the major drivers and underlying structural factors behind the recent hunger and malnutrition trends.

FIGURE 24

Addressing the major drivers and underlying structural factors of food insecurity and malnutrition



SOURCE: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome.

As FIGURE 24 shows, addressing the major drivers and underlying structural factors of food insecurity and malnutrition requires the following investment actions spanning a wide variety of sectors:

1. Integrate humanitarian, development and peace-building policies in conflict-affected areas.
2. Scale-up climate resilience across agrifood systems.
3. Strengthen the economic resilience of the most vulnerable to economic adversity.
4. Intervene along the agrifood supply chains to lower the cost of nutritious foods.
5. Shift food environments towards dietary intake with positive impacts on human health.
6. Tackle structural inequalities, ensuring interventions are pro-poor and inclusive.

These are the transformation pathways to create resilience against the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition, ensuring that all individuals are protected against short-term or long-term instability in food security caused by climatic, economic, social, commercial and/or political factors, and enabling healthy diets for all.

Different categories of actors should benefit from these investment actions. These include the following:

- ▶ **Upstream actors, focusing on primary production:**
  - **Smallholder farmers:** They constitute the majority of farmers in Africa<sup>21</sup> and are often the most vulnerable. Investments can help them improve yields, access markets and adopt sustainable practices.
  - **Agricultural cooperatives:** Cooperatives can enhance the bargaining power of smallholder farmers, facilitate access to inputs and services, and improve market access.
  - **Women and youth in agricultural value chains:** These groups are crucial for the future of agriculture in Africa. Investments that target women and the youth can help improve equality and reduce vulnerability, ensure inclusivity and tap into a significant labour force.
- ▶ **Midstream actors focusing on logistics, processing, and wholesaling:**
  - **Local agribusinesses, including women-led and youth-led:** Supporting local agribusinesses, and taking into account the specific needs and constraints of women-led and youth-led agribusinesses, can help build a robust value chain from production to processing and marketing, thereby ensuring a constant supply of diverse agrifood products to the market, creating jobs and increasing incomes in a more inclusive manner.
- ▶ **Service providers:**
  - **Local financial institutions (LFIs):** To have a long-lasting impact on financing for the agrifood system, the capacity of LFIs must be strengthened. Therefore, it is important to both capitalize them and provide them with technical assistance.
  - **Agricultural research institutes:** Strengthening research and extension services can lead to the development and dissemination of innovative practices and technologies that improve productivity and sustainability.

## CHAPTER 6

# UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE OF FINANCE FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN AFRICA

### Key messages

- Different agrifood system actors demand different types of financing involving different financial instruments ranging from low-value and short-term to high-value and long-term. The different actors in the food value chain can handle different cost structures. Therefore, financing instruments should be tailored to suit the different categories of actors in the food value chain best.
- A variety of financial service providers supply finance to agrifood enterprises. The conditions under which finance is supplied, as well as the reach of these service providers, varies and may not cater to the needs of all the actors who demand finance.
- The main sources of financing for food security and nutrition in Africa are from the public and private sectors, sourced either domestically or externally. It can be categorized as domestic public expenditure, international development funding, credit from the domestic banking system, foreign direct investments, and foreign remittances.
- Overall, there has been a general upward trend in government expenditure to the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors since 2018. Significant increases in total public spending on food security and nutrition, with priority to financing the key determinants of food security and nutrition, are observed in some countries. However, the recent funding squeeze, which has hit hard in sub-Saharan Africa, makes it difficult for African governments to support the financing for meeting the SDG-2 targets.
- Financial flows from the private sector (bank credit and foreign direct investments) are particularly low.
- Foreign remittance flows have been growing rapidly in the past few years and may, through their potential positive effect on improving household food consumption, contribute to enhancing food security and improving nutrition in Africa.
- There is a significant financing gap for achieving food security and nutrition in Africa. Small and medium agricultural enterprises (Agri-SMEs), in particular, lack access to finance because they are too big for microfinance and too small for banks.

## 6.1 DEMAND FOR FINANCING

The demand for finance can be defined as the desired holding of money by investees and lenders to be provided by private and/or public investors and lenders. There are several actors in agrifood systems that demand financing, ranging from stakeholders in the food value chain through consumers, up to governments and other organizations, that implement policies and investments needed for ending hunger and malnutrition in all its forms. In Africa, beyond the importance that food production has for food security and nutrition, agrifood systems are a key component of national economies and of livelihoods of many African households. Therefore, while the importance of the demand for financing of all stakeholders is recognized, the focus here is placed on actors in the upstream and part of the midstream of the food value chain that have demand for funding and the type of funding they need.

The demand for finance in food value chains in Africa includes many different financial instruments, ranging from those low in value and short-term to those high in value and long-term. To provide insight in the type of financial instrument required, the financial instruments are categorized in types of activities. Typically, the types of financing change as companies move through early stages of growth to maturity. In **FIGURE 25**, the first column shows the different types of entities that can have a demand for finance. The entities include:<sup>4</sup>

- ▶ Traders/aggregators: Enterprises buying and selling agricultural products or acting as mediator between buyers and sellers of agricultural products.
- ▶ Agribusiness: The entire value chain of agricultural enterprises except for primary production, including storage, transport, trade, sale to consumers, and upstream and support enterprises. Value chain actors in this category have more than 250 employees and annual turnover of more than USD 5 million.
- ▶ Agri-SMEs: These are similar to agribusiness but they include primary production. They consist of entities with more than 10 but fewer than 250 employees<sup>d</sup> and an annual turnover of more than USD 100 000 but less than USD 5 million.
- ▶ Microenterprises: Similar to agri-SMEs but fewer than ten employees and annual turnover of less than USD 100 000. Enterprises in this category are also mostly informal.
- ▶ Smallholder farmers: Small-scale farmers, pastoralists, forest keepers, fishers who manage areas varying from less than one hectare to 10 hectares.

<sup>d</sup> In Africa, definitions of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), including those in the agricultural sector, vary across countries and organizations. A common criterion is the number of employees. For instance, the African Union categorizes them as micro enterprises (1–9 employees), small enterprises (10–49 employees) and medium enterprises (50–250 employees). This classification is detailed in the African Union's document on micro, small and medium (MSME) definitions.

**FIGURE 25**

Overview of demand of finance per type of agrifood enterprise

	Goods & services	Sales & trading	Productivity & cost efficiency	Expansion	New product / service / model	Building resilience
Traders/Aggregators	- Working capital (e.g. factoring)	- Trade finance (e.g. export credit)	- Short- to mid-term asset finance (e.g. equipment leasing, 3 year loan)	- Mid- to long-term asset finance (e.g. 7 year loan, mortgage)	- Venture capital (e.g. equity) - Growth capital (e.g. equity, mezzanine)	- Grants (e.g. extension services)
Agribusiness						- Concessional debt (e.g. 7 yr loan at below-market rates and 2 yr grace)
Agri-SMEs						- Equity (e.g. with aim to unlock private debt)
Microenterprises	- Small-ticket (>\$10k) long-term debt (e.g. mechanization, storage, irrigation)					
Smallholder farmers						

SOURCE: Adapted from ISF Advisors. 2022. *The state of the agri-SME sector – Bridging the finance gap*. CASA.

Due to limited data availability, the exact quantities of these different types of demand of finance are difficult to estimate. But the general consensus is that there is high demand for all types of finance by both primary producers and non-primary producers (FIGURE 25).

Primary producers (smallholder farmers, microenterprises and, partially, agri-SMEs) generally require (i) working capital for inputs such as fertilizers and seeds to increase yields, (ii) short- to mid-term asset finance for assets such as irrigation for security of production, and (iii) long-term asset finance for farm assets (tractors and farm equipment) and for storage and warehousing facilities.


Non-primary food value chain actors (partially agri-SMEs, agribusiness and traders/aggregators) generally have a need for (i) trade finance and working capital for sales and trading, (ii) short- to mid-term asset finance for the purchase of processing and distribution equipment, and (iii) mid- to long-term finance for industrial construction. As the consumption of processed and perishable foods increases,<sup>e</sup> there becomes a greater need for midstream (processors, wholesalers, cold chain and logistics providers) and downstream retail activities. This creates opportunities for finance across the entire value chain, including in upstream activities such as input supply.

The different actors in the food value chain can handle different cost structures.

FIGURE 26 presents an overview of the cost of capital that suits the different categories of actors in the food value chain best.

<sup>e</sup> Especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, there is a persistent view that households living in rural areas are subsistence farmers who produce their own food, yet the analysis in the SOFI 2023 report<sup>10</sup> indicates that this does not hold true. In rural areas in Africa, the average share of the value of “own production” represents only 37 percent and 33 percent of total consumption in high- and low-food-budget countries, respectively (\*FAO, IFAD, WFP & WHO. 2023. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 – Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum*. Rome, FAO.).

**FIGURE 26**  
Overview of cost structures matched with type of agrifood-system actor



SOURCE: Adapted from ISF Advisors. 2022. *The state of the agri-SME sector – bridging the finance gap*. CASA.

## 6.2 SUPPLY OF FINANCE – FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

The supply of finance to the agrifood system for food security and nutrition in Africa can be summarised as a marketplace where financing flows between capital providers and the agrifood enterprises (i.e. borrowers and investees). This section describes the most relevant financial service providers to the African agrifood system.

*Local commercial banks* focus mainly on larger entities and offer traditional debt products like working capital and asset finance. They typically favour borrowers with strong credit histories and collateral. These banks also extend their services to SMEs that have already established a financial track record through high-risk financing (e.g. equity) from other sources, which helps in building credibility.<sup>22</sup>

However, the reach of local commercial banks is mostly limited to urban areas, leaving gaps in financing for rural agrifood entrepreneurs. Despite being the main source of agricultural financing, the contribution of local commercial banks to the sector’s total financing in most African countries remains small. They mainly target mid- and large-sized processing, marketing, and trading companies due to lower perceived risks and higher cash turnover.

There are many differences in commercial banking in Africa but, in general, East Africa has a more mature sector of commercial banks with agri-specific divisions. These agri-focused banks are often able to provide innovative products not found at the more general commercial banks.

### Impact investors

Impact investors typically receive financing from concessional capital providers and aim to achieve both financial returns and positive social and environmental impact. They primarily invest in the agrifood system involved in export-oriented, cash crop value chains like coffee and cocoa. These investors are constrained by their sources of capital, often raising capital in hard currencies such as euros or US dollars from overseas investors ranging from philanthropic organizations to development finance institutions (DFIs). In general, the return requirement is to preserve capital and, sometimes, to generate competitive risk-adjusted returns. The foreign exchange risk is often passed on to the borrower or investee.<sup>22</sup>

**BOX 2** discusses the relevance of climate finance, often supplied by impact investors and/or international finance institutions (IFIs), DFIs and multilateral development banks (MDBs).

## BOX 2 THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF CLIMATE FINANCE FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

Agrifood systems are both contributors to and victims of climate change and biodiversity loss. Agriculture, forestry and land use changes account for a significant share of greenhouse gas emissions, exacerbating environmental degradation. Simultaneously, these systems are increasingly vulnerable to climate extremes such as droughts, floods and storms, which disrupt food production, threaten livelihoods and exacerbate food insecurity and malnutrition. Addressing these interconnected challenges demands urgent investment in resilient, sustainable agrifood systems.

Despite the growing pool of climate finance, its deployment often falls short in addressing the specific needs of agriculture and food systems. In Africa, climate finance flows grew by 48 percent to USD 44 billion in 2021/2022, up from USD 30 billion in 2019/2020. However, this still represents 18 percent of the estimated USD 250 billion required annually to

meet the continent's 2030 climate goals. To bridge this gap, it is essential to develop targeted strategies that integrate climate finance expertise with in-depth knowledge of food security and nutrition. This includes designing innovative financial instruments that align with the needs of farmers, agribusinesses and value-chain actors, while channelling large volumes of climate capital into scalable, impactful solutions. Leveraging public-private partnerships, enhancing access to credit, and investing in technologies for climate-smart agriculture can help mobilize climate finance and transform agrifood systems into drivers of resilience and sustainability.

SOURCES: Climate Policy Initiative. 2022. Climate finance needs of African countries. In: *Climate Policy Initiative*. [Cited 4 December 2024]. <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/climate-finance-needs-of-african-countries>; Climate Policy Initiative. 2024. Climate financing to Africa grows by 48%. In: *Climate Policy Initiative*. [Cited 4 December 2024]. <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/press-release/climate-finance-in-africa-2024-press-release>

### International finance institutions and development banks

International finance institutions and development banks – IFIs, DFIs and MDBs – are specialized banks or subsidiaries established to support governments (e.g. sovereign loans, grants, budget support, technical assistance and blended finance) and the private sector (e.g. loans, guarantees and risk mitigation, trade finance and technical assistance) in developing countries. These institutions are often financed by governments, multilateral organizations, private sector entities or other financial institutions.<sup>22</sup> DFIs and MDBs such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank play an important role in de-risking activities, for instance, increasing the allocation of official development assistance (ODA) oriented to mobilizing private investments through blended finance or other financing instruments. However, although DFIs play an important role in financing the agrifood system, their financing activities are also sometimes perceived as inflexible, slow and more inclined towards taking senior debt positions rather than offering much-needed first-loss financing.

**BOX 3** explains this further.

#### BOX 3

#### IFIS, DFIS AND MDBS OPERATE WITHIN STRINGENT MANDATES AND THEREFORE CANNOT FULFIL MUCH-NEEDED ROLES

IFIs, DFIs and MDBs are precisely the parties that should be able to shoulder the risks that private financiers are unable to take as they are capitalized with public money. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, one of the interviewees of the ISF Advisors (2022) clearly explained that “DFIs were instrumental in helping the first generation of impact-oriented funds to launch; however, it feels today, like there is a lot of positioning and communication in favour of blended finance which is contradictory to the actual support they lend as they keep investing and sponsoring the same established funds.”

Some other interviewees mentioned that DFIs tend to be relatively rigid, bureaucratic, and slow in their approach to investing in agri-SMEs. They typically invest in amounts exceeding USD 10 million, with targeted returns at commercial. This is largely influenced by their shareholders, who are usually national governments and sometimes private investors. Therefore, expecting DFIs to relax their risk and return criteria to attract private capital is unrealistic unless their primary supporters revise their mandates.

SOURCE: ISF Advisors. 2022. *The state of the agri-SME sector – bridging the finance gap*. CASA.

In 2023, the World Bank launched the Evolution Roadmap, in which it proposes a transformation of the World Bank to become bigger and better through a greater emphasis on the importance of partnerships within the World Bank Group, with other MDBs and with national development banks in achieving sustainable and inclusive development. This Evolution Roadmap includes measures to enable and mobilize private capital in operations such as guarantee schemes and the development of the Private to Sovereign Climate Finance Investment Fund.<sup>23</sup>

### **Non-bank financial institutions**

Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are typically smaller entities compared to banks or funds, specializing in specific financial products or serving particular borrower segments. Due to their size and product focus, NBFIs often provide smaller loan sizes and cater to a somewhat wider range of agri-SMEs than local commercial banks. NBFIs play a crucial role in filling the gaps left by commercial banks, particularly in rural and agricultural areas. As such, DFIs, philanthropies and ODA providers have begun to recognize the importance of NBFIs in serving currently underpenetrated rural markets and often provide them with guarantees and concessional capital.<sup>22</sup> Financial services typically involve specific products like machinery leasing, supply chain finance, or factoring, secured against tangible assets or receivables from value-chain participants.<sup>22</sup>

However, the financial products offered by NBFIs, such as factoring or leasing, come with stringent collateral requirements. Consequently, their financing tends to favour more established or larger agri-SMEs. Although no comprehensive global data is available, it is generally observed that these larger, more mature agri-SMEs make up a very small portion (less than 5 percent) of all agri-SMEs in the global market (African market is unknown).<sup>22</sup>

Corporate entities such as input providers, traders and processors often take on the role of NBFIs. They act as intermediaries, disbursing loans to smallholder farmers for inputs like seeds and fertilizer to ensure a steady supply of commodities such as cocoa, coffee and soy. While these corporate actors play a role in facilitating short-term investments, they often lack the capacity to provide medium- and long-term financial solutions as it falls outside their primary business focus and capabilities. Access to finance for transitioning to sustainable practices presents an even greater challenge due to the unproven business case, the adoption of new technologies and the need for financing non-cashflow activities to promote conservation efforts.<sup>24</sup>

**BOX 4** describes an example of an NBFI specializing in financing tractors active in multiple countries in Africa.

#### BOX 4 PAY-AS-YOU-GO TRACTOR FINANCE “UBER FOR TRACTORS” FOR INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY:

##### EXAMPLE OF HELLO TRACTOR

Smallholder farmers in Africa face difficulties in enhancing their agricultural output. One of the reasons behind this is limited access to mechanization. Traditional obstacles such as high expenses and lack of resources have made it challenging for them to increase their yields effectively. In response to this issue, Hello Tractor has developed a solution similar to the concept of Uber, enabling farmers to rent tractors as needed.

Through Hello Tractor’s platform, which can be accessed via mobile apps and websites, farmers can easily hire tractors remotely. By sending text messages, farmers can request tractors, which are then matched with available machines. This not only ensures efficient allocation of tractors but also allows for real-time monitoring of tractor usage.

The platform’s ability to track tractor usage proved useful in securing low-cost loans from financial institutions, fostering tractor ownership among

small-scale contractors. Therefore, Hello Tractor recently decided to support asset financing of tractors. In collaboration with Moody’s, they now also provide asset financing to individuals who traditionally lack access to capital. Under the scheme, tractors are underwritten with pre-booked servicing routes on the Hello Tractor marketplace and debt repayment is automatically captured at the time of servicing.

Hello Tractor started in Nigeria and expanded into Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania and Bangladesh.

---

SOURCE: UNSGSA. 2023. Hello Tractor is Revolutionizing Farming and Fueling Economic Empowerment Through Digital Financing for Smallholders in Kenya. In: *UNSGSA*. [Cited 13 May 2025]. <https://www.unsgsa.org/stories/hello-tractor-revolutionizing-farming-and-fueling-economic-empowerment-through-digital-financing-smallholders-kenya>

## Private equity and venture capital funds

These financing actors target private, unlisted companies with attractive risk-adjusted returns. However, the overall impact of these funds is quite limited compared to larger and more localized channels such as commercial banks. The main cause for this limitation arises from a mismatch between the return expectations, investment sizes and investment timelines of these funds, and the readiness, scale and willingness of agrifood system actors to involve external investors. In general, private equity and venture capital funds require rigorous management and governance standards. They also tend to prefer sizable deals with significant growth potential, resulting in investment sizes that often exceed what most agri-SMEs can accommodate.<sup>22</sup> **BOX 5** describes the example of Africa Eats, an investment company that takes a minority stake and is relatively flexible in its offering of financial services but which also differs in many aspects from regular private equity or venture capital funds.

## BOX 5 GROWTH CAPITAL THAT SCALES UP SMALL AFRICAN AGRIFOOD BUSINESSES TO NATIONAL SCALE:

### EXAMPLE OF AFRICA EATS

Africa Eats is an investment company (USD 25 million AuM at Q1 2024) with minority interests in 21 companies across eight countries in Africa. It has a unique structure that blends elements of venture capital funding, business accelerator and Berkshire Hathaway to create an investment holding company optimized to support fast-growing, mission-driven, for-profit African companies. Africa Eats focuses on financing and growing for-profit solutions to hunger and poverty across Africa.

Africa Eats originated from the business accelerator (boosting startups through mentorship, funding, networking) Fledge. The successful graduates of this accelerator were looking for financing, which convinced its founder to start a fund financing the African agrifood system. This improved the deal flow of Africa Eats as it had a filled pipeline from its launch.

Similar to a venture capital fund, Africa Eats owns a minority stake in each of these companies. Each company has its founding team in place, and Africa Eats helps them grow and succeed, letting them run their companies as founders who know their markets far better than investors. Because Africa Eats does not exit their portfolio companies, they can focus on scaling their businesses. They do this primarily through being fast and flexible: “You need to fill an order and are in need of USD 100k working capital? Let’s talk and we can arrange it within few days,” says Africa Eats’ founder.

Africa Eats tracks the total of all the revenues earned from customers across all of the companies. The compound annual growth rate of their aggregate portfolio revenues is 52 percent over the last decade, back to 2014.

Africa Eats has a different structure to regular venture capital funds. “The regular fund, a 10 year fund with a 2 and 20 fee arrangement, does not create the right incentives. Ten years is not enough; there are not enough exit opportunities in 10 years, and the 2 and 20 rewarding model does not create the right incentives.” The only aspect Africa Eats does the same as more regular venture capital funds is taking a minority stake, which they do because they believe the entrepreneurs know their business best. Africa Eats also stands out as a permanent capital vehicle that plans to exist in perpetuity.

Africa Eats focuses on financing African entrepreneurs active in the staple foods grown by smallholder farmers. An example company from Africa Eats’ portfolio is East Africa Foods (EAF), which was incubated by Fledge in 2014 when annual revenues were USD 100 000. Now, 10 years later, annual revenues are USD 14 million, which makes EAF the largest fruit and vegetable aggregator in the United Republic of Tanzania. EAF purchases directly from 7 000 larger farmers and then indirectly from tens of thousands of farmers.

---

Source: Africa Eats. How it works. In: *Africa Eats*. [Cited 5 May 2025.] <https://www.africaeats.com/how-it-works>

## 6.3 SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

The main sources of financing for food security and nutrition are from the public and private sectors sourced either domestically or externally. Public domestic and external financing flows are usually traceable, whereas the private flows are more difficult to track. As a result, a full analysis of financial flows for food security and nutrition (FSN) in Africa is constrained by data limitations. Therefore, this section provides an overview of the following types of financing for agriculture, forestry and fishing, which can be considered as the closest proxies to FSN areas:

- ▶ domestic public expenditure;
- ▶ international development funding;
- ▶ credit from the domestic banking system; and
- ▶ foreign direct investments and foreign remittances.

However, where data are available, an overview of financial flows for the broader objective of achieving food security and nutrition is provided.


### 6.3.1 Domestic public expenditure

#### ***Public spending for food security and nutrition in selected African countries***

This section draws heavily from the analysis presented in *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024*.<sup>1</sup> Analysis of available data from Benin and Uganda, using the financing for food security and nutrition definition presented in this report, indicates that public spending on food security and nutrition has been increasing. From 2017/18 to 2021, there was a significant increase in total public spending on food security and nutrition in both countries (FIGURE 27 and FIGURE 28). In Benin, there was notable growth in spending on food consumption and health status in 2020 and 2021, suggesting a high priority on financing the key determinants of food security and nutrition, such as domestic production, food access and health services during and after the COVID-19 pandemic (FIGURE 27). In Uganda, public spending on food security and nutrition saw substantial growth in 2021, but this increase was short-lived, as spending contracted in 2022. However, it remained above pre-pandemic levels (FIGURE 28).

FIGURE 27


Public spending on agriculture and on food security and nutrition in Benin



SOURCE: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. Based on World Bank. 2023. *World Bank Data Catalog: Benin BOOST platform: Public expenditure and revenue flows*. [Cited 5 May 2025.] <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0038083>.

FIGURE 28

Public spending on agriculture and on food security and nutrition in Uganda



SOURCE: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. Based on World Bank. 2023. *BOOST open budget portal: Uganda BOOST Public Expenditure Database*. [Cited 5 May 2025.] <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0038076>

**TABLE 14** expands the analysis shown above, as it provides data on the composition of public spending on food security and nutrition in Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. On average, 65 percent of public spending on food security and nutrition in Benin and 73 percent in Uganda have been allocated to food consumption and health. The remaining funds have been directed toward addressing the major drivers of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, such as conflict, climate variability, economic slowdowns and high inequality. In both countries, food consumption accounts for at least half of the spending, primarily targeting food availability and, to a lesser extent, food access. A significant portion of the spending (35 percent in Benin and 27 percent in Uganda) is allocated to addressing the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition. For the other three countries, Nigeria and South Africa allocated 55 percent of public spending on food security and nutrition to food consumption and health, while Kenya allocated 75 percent. The share of public spending on food security and nutrition that goes to the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition in Nigeria and South Africa is on average higher (45 percent) than in Benin and Uganda, but lower for Kenya (25 percent).

**TABLE 14**

Composition of public spending on food security and nutrition in selected African countries (annual average)

Composition of public spending on food security and nutrition in selected African countries (annual average)					
	Benin	Kenya	Nigeria	South Africa	Uganda
<b>Food consumption and health status (core definition)</b>	65	75	55	55	73
<b>Food consumption</b>	50	52	33	35	59
Food availability	23	21	23	10	28
Food access	19	31	8	18	25
Food utilization	9	0	2	7	6
<b>Health status</b>	14	23	21	19	14
Caring and feeding practices	0	1	0	0	1
Health services and environmental health	14	22	21	19	13
<b>Drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition (extended definition)</b>	35	25	45	45	27

NOTES: Annual average (percentage) is for the following periods: Benin, South Africa and Uganda: 2017–2021; Nigeria: 2018–2021; Kenya: 2018 – 2022.  
 SOURCES: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. Based on World Bank. 2023. *World Bank Data Catalog: Benin BOOST platform: Public expenditure and revenue flows*. [Cited 5 May 2025.] <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0038083>;  
 The National Treasury & Economic Planning, Republic of Kenya. 2021. *Sector budget proposal reports*. <https://www.treasury.go.ke/sector-budget-proposal-reports> for Kenya;  
 Government of Nigeria. 2024. *Open Treasury Portal*. <https://opentreasury.gov.ng> for Nigeria;  
 Republic of South Africa, National Treasury Department. 2024. National budget. In: *National Treasury*. <https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/default.aspx>.

Due to data limitations, an Africa-wide analysis of public spending for food security and nutrition is not possible. Therefore, domestic public expenditure for agriculture, fishing and forestry is provided below as a proxy.

**Domestic public expenditure** in the AFF sectors in the Africa region was about USD 16 billion in 2022, up from USD 12.6 billion and 14.6 billion in 2020 and 2021 respectively (FIGURE 29). Overall, there has been a general upward trend in government expenditure to AFF since 2018. However, according to the IMF,<sup>13</sup> a funding squeeze has hit hard in sub-Saharan Africa. Public debt and inflation are at levels not seen in decades. More than half of the low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa were assessed by the IMF to be at high risk or already in debt distress as of 2022.<sup>25</sup> The effects of the recent series of shocks including the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and increasingly frequent weather events have intensified longstanding economic and social challenges and worsened fiscal vulnerabilities and narrowing the fiscal space for African governments<sup>f</sup>,<sup>26</sup> to support the financing for food security and nutrition. Therefore, providing the required levels of public expenditure to end hunger will continue to be a challenge. This challenge is exacerbated by allocative inefficiencies in public expenditure in agriculture. Available evidence shows that there are potential efficiency gains to be made from optimizing budget allocations for food security and nutrition objectives.<sup>27</sup>

FIGURE 30 shows the trends in domestic public expenditure in AFF at the subregional level. In terms of total amounts allocated to AFF, Northern Africa spends the highest amount, with Middle Africa spending the least amount over the period. Since 2013, Western Africa has been spending more on AFF than Eastern and Southern Africa. As FIGURE 31 shows, domestic public expenditure on AFF constitute a small percentage of total government expenditure, and has been declining since 2008. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the declining trend appears to have been reversed, but agriculture expenditure as a share of total expenditure still falls short of the relative highs in the first dozen years of the millennium.

f Indicating that there has been a doubling of the average debt ratio in sub-Saharan Africa in just a decade, moving from 30 percent of GDP at the end of 2013 to almost 60 percent of GDP in 2022. It has also become much costlier to repay this debt, with the ratio of interest payments to revenue more than doubling since the early 2010s.

**FIGURE 29**

Domestic public expenditure in agriculture, forestry and fishing in Africa (in 2015 prices)



SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Government expenditure. In: *FAO*. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IG>


FIGURE 30

Total domestic public expenditure in agriculture, forestry and fishing by subregion (USD billion, 2015 prices)

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Government expenditure. In: *FAO*. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IG>

**FIGURE 31**

Total government expenditure (left axis, USD billion, 2015 prices) and agriculture expenditure as a share of total expenditure (percentage)



SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Government expenditure. In: FAO. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IG>

### 6.3.2 International development funding flows for food security and nutrition

International development funding consists of two main types of flows: official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). ODA is defined as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries.<sup>28</sup> It includes humanitarian and development aid from governments or multilateral organizations that meet a minimum grant element requirement.<sup>29</sup> ODA grants to agriculture and food security are a key component of development finance to achieve SDG 2.<sup>30</sup>

OOF refers to official sector transactions that do not qualify as ODA, excluding official export credits.<sup>31</sup> ODA and OOF for all aid sectors and for food security and nutrition in Africa has been growing at an average of around 6 percent and 2 percent per annum respectively between 2017 and 2021, implying that flows to food security and nutrition have been less of a priority to donors (TABLE 15). Less than 27 percent of the total of flows were allocated to food security and nutrition in Africa over the period.

TABLE 15

ODA and OOF for all aid sectors and for food security and nutrition in Africa (constant 2021 USD billion and percentage)


	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Average
<b>ODA and OOF for all aid sectors</b>	88	88	96	111	109	<b>98</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		0	8	16	-2	<b>6</b>
<b>ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition (core and extended definition)</b>	25	25	27	28	27	<b>26</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-2	11	4	-5	<b>2</b>
<b>ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition (core definition)</b>	18	18	20	20	19	<b>19</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-1	12	0	-6	<b>1</b>
<b>ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition – food consumption (core definition)</b>	14	14	16	15	14	<b>15</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-3	14	-1	-9	<b>0</b>
<b>ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition – health status (core definition)</b>	4	4	5	5	5	<b>5</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		9	7	4	3	<b>6</b>
<b>ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition – drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition (extended definition)</b>	7	6	7	8	8	<b>7</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-4	7	14	-2	<b>4</b>
<b>ODA for food security and nutrition (core and extended definition)</b>	23	22	24	25	24	<b>24</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-3	9	3	-3	<b>1</b>
<b>ODA for food security and nutrition (core definition)</b>	17	16	18	17	17	<b>17</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-4	10	-2	-4	<b>0</b>
<b>ODA for food security and nutrition – food consumption (core definition)</b>	13	12	14	13	12	<b>13</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-6	11	-3	-5	<b>-1</b>
<b>ODA for food security and nutrition – health status (core definition)</b>	4	4	4	4	4	<b>4</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		5	9	0	-1	<b>3</b>
<b>ODA for food security and nutrition – drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition (extended definition)</b>	6	6	6	7	7	<b>6</b>
<i>Growth rate (%)</i>		-3	5	18	1	<b>5</b>

SOURCE: Authors' own elaboration based on the application of the methodology in the supplementary material to Chapter 4 S4.3 of FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. It uses the amounts of flows in constant 2021 USD billion from OECD. 2024. OECD Data Explorer. In: OECD. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data-explorer.oecd.org>; William & Mary. 2024. *AidData: Data*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.aiddata.org/datasets>

FIGURE 32 shows that flows for food security and nutrition are mostly for the core definition of financing for FSN, while a little over a quarter of these flows were oriented to address the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition. The composition of the flows for food security and nutrition is, by and large, very stable over time (FIGURE 33), with food consumption being the largest share of the total of ODA and OOF for FSN, placed always above 50 percent.

**FIGURE 32**


Food security and nutrition's share in ODA and OOF to Africa for all aid sectors



SOURCE: Authors' own elaboration based on the application of the methodology in the supplementary material to Chapter 4 S4.3 of FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. It uses the amounts of flows in constant 2021 USD billion from OECD. 2024. OECD Data Explorer. In: OECD. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data-explorer.oecd.org>; William & Mary. 2024. *AidData: Data*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.aiddata.org/datasets>

**FIGURE 33**

Composition of ODA and OOF to Africa for food security and nutrition over time



SOURCE: Authors' own elaboration based on the application of the methodology in the supplementary material to Chapter 4 S4.3 of FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. It uses the amounts of flows in constant 2021 USD billion from OECD. 2024. OECD Data Explorer. In: OECD. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data-explorer.oecd.org>; William & Mary. 2024. *AidData: Data*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.aiddata.org/datasets>

In terms of subregional distribution of these flows over the period 2017–2021, Eastern Africa, on average, received the highest amount of financing flows on a per capita basis (USD 24), compared with Northern Africa (USD 17) and Western Africa (USD 16). While Middle Africa shows an average of USD 14 per capita, Southern Africa had the lowest per capita financing flows at USD 11 (TABLE 16).

**TABLE 16**

Destination of ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition by subregion in Africa

African Subregions	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Average
<b>Eastern Africa (USD billion)</b>	10	10	11	11	10	<b>11</b>
<b>Eastern Africa (USD per capita)</b>	25	23	25	26	22	<b>24</b>
<b>Middle Africa (USD billion)</b>	2	2	3	3	3	<b>2</b>
<b>Middle Africa (USD per capita)</b>	13	13	15	14	14	<b>14</b>
<b>Northern Africa (USD billion)</b>	4	4	4	4	4	<b>4</b>
<b>Northern Africa (USD per capita)</b>	17	16	18	16	16	<b>17</b>
<b>Southern Africa (USD billion)</b>	1	1	1	1	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Southern Africa (USD per capita)</b>	12	9	11	14	11	<b>11</b>
<b>Western Africa (USD billion)</b>	6	6	6	7	7	<b>6</b>
<b>Western Africa (USD per capita)</b>	15	15	16	17	16	<b>16</b>

SOURCE: Authors' own elaboration based on the application of the methodology in the supplementary material to Chapter 4 S4.3 of FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome. It uses the amounts of flows in constant 2021 USD billion from OECD. 2024. OECD Data Explorer. In: *OECD*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data-explorer.oecd.org>; William & Mary. 2024. *AidData: Data*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.aiddata.org/datasets>

On a per capita basis, Africa appears to receive more ODA and OOF flows than other regions of the world such as the Americas and Asia. In absolute terms, ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition also grew more in Africa. In terms of the composition of the ODA and OOF flows, the share for food consumption is higher in Africa than the global average of about 37 percent between 2017 and 2021.<sup>1</sup>


### 6.3.3 Domestic bank financing

Unlike the two categories of financing flows analysed above, there is not enough data for applying the financing for FSN definition to domestic bank financing. Nevertheless, the stock of loans from domestic bank financing to AFF in Africa reached almost USD 24 billion<sup>d</sup> in 2021, showing a 17 percent increase relative to 2020 when the stock was USD 21.3 billion, before dropping to USD 22.4 in 2022 (FIGURE 34). The stock of loans to AFF has shown an increasing trend since 2008. FIGURE 35 shows that, on average, credit to AFF as a percentage of total credit from 2001 to 2022 was less than 4 percent, even though it stayed above 4 percent in the last four years of this period. FIGURE 36 shows the subregional distribution of bank credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing (total amount of loans outstanding) in 2022.

<sup>d</sup> This refers to the amount of loans provided by the domestic commercial banking sector to producers in agriculture, forestry and fishing, including household producers, cooperatives, and agribusinesses.


FIGURE 34

Total bank credit and credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing (stock of loans; 2015 prices)

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Credit to agriculture. In: FAO. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IC>

**FIGURE 35**


Total bank credit and share of credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing in Africa (2015 prices)

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Credit to agriculture. In: FAO. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IC>

**FIGURE 37** shows the average annual change in the stock of loans to AFF, which provides an indication of annual net flows. The net banking loans to AFF for the period 2017 to 2021 was consistently declining (from about USD 1.46 billion in 2017 to about USD 390 million in 2020) until it increased to about USD 2.68 billion in 2021 following the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2022 figure is an estimate and shows a sharp drop pointing to the return to the previous declining trend.

**FIGURE 36**


Credit to agriculture, forestry and fishing (total amount of loans outstanding in 2022, USD billion, 2015 prices)



SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Credit to agriculture. In: *FAO*. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IC>

**FIGURE 37**

Net banking loans to agriculture, forestry and fishing (USD billion, 2015 prices)



SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: Credit to agriculture. In: FAO. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/IC>

### 6.3.4. Foreign direct investment


Africa's share of global foreign direct investment (FDI) to all sectors has been low historically. Total FDI inflows<sup>e</sup> into Africa averaged 3 percent of the global total between 2014 and 2018. **FIGURE 38** shows the levels of total FDI inflows into Africa. For the period 2000 to 2022, the highest annual flow was USD 70 billion in 2021, with the lowest being 17.6 billion in 2000. For most of the years within the period, the figure exceeded USD 40 billion per year.

In terms of flows to the African subregions, Northern and Southern Africa have historically been the major recipients of FDI (accounting for almost 80 percent of FDI flows into the region), but there has been an increasing trend in Eastern and Western Africa recently.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>e</sup> These flows are based on announced greenfield investments and do not cover mergers and acquisitions.

**FIGURE 38**

Total FDI inflows to Africa (USD billion, 2015 prices)




SOURCE: FAO. 2023. FAOSTAT: Foreign direct investment (FDI). In: *FAO*. [Cited 2 December 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FDI>

Although comprehensive disaggregated data on FDI inflows to FSN are not available, not even for AFF in Africa for the period, **FIGURE 39** shows the trend in FDI flows for capital investments in the African food and beverages sector for the period 2003 to 2017. Except for 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2014, these flows have been less than USD 2 billion per year. The peak in 2011 was caused by a major investment project in palm oil production in Cameroon. **FIGURE 40** shows the subregional distribution of African FDI inflows to the food and agriculture sector, with considerable differences. Eastern and Western Africa received more of these inflows than the other subregions. Another major investment in Ghana in 2003 accounted for the peak in 2003 in Western Africa. Thus, it can be seen that these inflows are not evenly distributed and there are significant country and subregional differences.

**FIGURE 39**


FDI inflows for capital investments into the African food and beverages cluster 2003–2017 (excluding fertilizer investments)



SOURCE: Husmann, C., and Kubik, Z. 2019. *Foreign direct investment in the African food and agriculture sector: Trends, determinants and impacts*. ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy, No. 274. Bonn, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).

FIGURE 40

Food and agriculture FDI inflows into the different Africa subregions (excluding fertilizer investments)



SOURCE: Husmann, C., and Kubik, Z. 2019. *Foreign direct investment in the African food and agriculture sector: Trends, determinants and impacts*. ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy, No. 274. Bonn, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).

### 6.3.5 Foreign remittances

When migrants send home part of their earnings in the form of cash or goods to support their families, these transfers are known as remittances. These financial flows have been growing rapidly in the past few years and now represent the largest source of foreign income for many low- and middle-income economies. As such, remittances, through their potentially positive effect on improving household food consumption, may also contribute to enhancing food security and improving nutrition in Africa.

Remittance flows to Africa reached an estimated USD 100.1 billion in 2022, benefitting at least 200 million people. Remittance flows are particularly relevant for Cape Verde, the Comoros, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho and Somalia. All of these countries received remittances representing more than 10 percent of their GDP. Nigeria is the largest remittance recipient country in the sub-Saharan African region and received more than USD 20 billion in remittances through formal channels by the end of 2023.<sup>33</sup>

Despite the relevance and magnitude of this financial flow, the costs for migrants to send remittances are high. The costs vary substantially across the region, ranging from 1.3– 4.5 percent of the remittance amount to 17–36 percent, depending on the destination country. This is far above the global average of 6.9 percent and the SDG 10.c target of 3 percent by 2030.<sup>34</sup>

**BOX 6** describes the potential of the diaspora in financing their countries of origin.

#### BOX 6

### DIASPORA COMMUNITIES CAN BE A POWERFUL FORCE IN FINANCING IN THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, SPURRING ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND JOB CREATION

Diaspora communities directly contribute not only through remittances and investments but also by transferring knowledge, technologies and skills and facilitating trade of local goods between countries of origin and destination.

However, the contribution of diaspora to agribusiness and to sustainable agriculture are less well known, and their potential remains untapped. Diaspora engagement in agribusiness is limited by a number of barriers, such as the remoteness of rural areas, poor infrastructure, limited information about investment opportunities in agribusiness, lack of trust in government institutions, and scarce interactions between diaspora associations and rural stakeholders in countries of origin.

To maximize the positive impact of diaspora on rural poverty reduction and food security, action is needed. It is critical to invest in mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of financial and non-financial resources from diaspora into agribusiness and green jobs. The following example from Tunisia illustrates the point.

Through support received from FAO's Rural Youth Migration project in Tunisia from 2015 to 2018, 49 Tunisian agroenterprises received tailored coaching and in-kind contributions, resulting in the creation of 89 full-time jobs and 83 occasional jobs, with indirect benefits for more than 400 rural workers and producers. More than 50 percent of the agricultural enterprises supported (e.g. animal production, aromatic and medicinal plants, tree nurseries) saw a financial and technical contribution from the diaspora, exceeding the initial target of 30 percent. This was thanks to an innovative diaspora engagement process, which included a widespread call to action, the formalization of diaspora engagement, the training of agricultural coaches on diaspora mobilization, tailored support to youth and the organization of diaspora days.

SOURCE: FAO. 2019. *Diaspora for agribusiness – Boosting jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities for youth through diaspora engagement*. [Cited 4 December 2024]. <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/bf108df7-81a8-436d-ad15-ba322e7ed412/content>.

## 6.4 FINANCING GAPS

All of the data on public and private financing needed to apply the new definition of financing for food security and nutrition is not yet available. Due to these data gaps, economic models are used to estimate how much additional financing is needed to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. This section reviews existing relevant studies, aiming to arrive at some indicative ranges of the financing gap that exists to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in Africa by 2030.

The studies provide different cost estimates for several reasons. To begin with, the geographic scopes are different. Some studies provide figures for the whole continent while others focus on sub-Saharan Africa or a selection of countries. Also, different economic models or estimation techniques are used. There are also differences in the questions asked and objectives targeted, in the investment strategies or set of interventions considered to meet targets, and in the period of analysis.

Most studies mentioned in **TABLE 17** estimate the costs (regardless of the source or type of this money) of reaching SDG targets 2.1 and 2.2. This does not mean that all of these costs are financeable. In fact, a large part of these costs will have to come from grants (money with no repayment or return expectations) since they will not be financeable. This is different from the demand of finance (studies 2 and 3 presented in the table) that goes unmet. In these studies, the demand for finance is estimated by looking at how much financing agri-SMEs would want to receive, not by looking at which SDGs need to be achieved.

Given the meagre amount of literature on calculating the financing gap of the agrifood system in Africa, the authors of this report included both the cost to achieve SDG 2.1 and 2.2 (studies 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7), and the unmet financing demand (studies 2 and 3) in **TABLE 17**. The reason is that both can provide a useful indication of the amount of financing needed to achieve the food security and nutrition goals. **TABLE 17** presents an overview of the studies that assessed the additional annual costs of reaching SDG 2.1 and 2.2 and the unmet financing demand of agri-SMEs.

TABLE 17

Overview of studies that estimate financing gaps

#	Study	Geography	Main question asked	Targets and time frame	Investments/interventions	Additional annual costs up to 2030 (unless otherwise indicated)
1	FAO, IFAD and WFP (2015)	Sub-Saharan Africa	What are the additional transfers and investments needed to end poverty and hunger in all countries by 2030?	No Poverty and Zero Hunger targets by 2030	Poverty gap transfers and pro-poor investments in irrigation, genetic resources, mechanization, primary agriculture and natural resources, agroprocessing operations, infrastructure, institutional framework, research and development (R&D), extension, social protection	USD 195 billion per year of which USD 168 for pro-poor investments (2016–2030)
2	Dalberg & KFW (2018)	Sub-Saharan Africa	How much agricultural finance demand goes unmet in sub-Saharan Africa annually?	N/A	All actors that demand finance which goes unmet	USD 180 billion per year (demand of finance by the agricultural sector that goes unmet)
3	ISF Advisors (2022)	Sub-Saharan Africa	How much agricultural finance demand goes unmet in sub-Saharan Africa annually?	N/A	All actors that demand finance which goes unmet	USD 74 billion per year (demand of finance by the agricultural sector that goes unmet)
4	Laborde <i>et al.</i> (2016)	Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia	What is the minimum cost to end hunger for vulnerable households in all countries by 2030?	Prevalence of undernourishment at 5 percent or less by 2030; bottom-up approach with household-level targeted interventions	Social safety nets (food subsidies); farm support (production subsidies, fertilizer subsidies, investment grants, R&D, extension); rural development and infrastructure (reduction of postharvest losses, irrigation, roads)	USD 1 billion per year
5	Laborde <i>et al.</i> (2020)	Africa	What will it cost governments to end hunger, double the incomes of small-scale producers, and protect the climate by 2030?	End hunger (saving 490 million people from hunger by 2030); double the incomes of 545 million small-scale producers; maintain greenhouse gas emissions below commitments made in Paris Agreement	Fourteen policy interventions categorized into three categories. “On the Farm” – aimed at directly assisting farmers, including provision of farm inputs, R&D, improved livestock feed, and irrigation infrastructure. “Food on the Move” – targeting the reduction of post-harvest losses through measures such as storage improvement, enhancing returns from sales, and supporting services offered by small and medium enterprises. “Empower the Excluded” – social protection and vocational training programmes.	USD 8.2 billion
6	Laborde and Torero (2023)	Africa	How much would it cost to reduce hunger to a 5 percent level by 2030?	Chronic hunger at 5 percent by 2030; cut the number of people in chronic hunger by 314 million; an additional 568 million people able to afford healthy diets by 2030	Eliminating hunger by implementing a major redistribution of income, massively subsidizing production, or investing massively in agricultural R&D	Countries would have to redistribute USD 420 billion per year (2020–2030)

**TABLE 17**  
Continued

#	Study	Geography	Main question asked	Targets and time frame	Investments/interventions	Additional annual costs up to 2030 (unless otherwise indicated)
7	Mason-D'Croz <i>et al.</i> (2019)	Eastern and Central Africa	How much would hunger decrease given investments to achieve target yield increases by 2030?	World hunger at 5% by 2030	Agricultural R&D, irrigation expansion, water-use efficiency, soil management, transport and infrastructure	USD 15 billion per year
8	World Bank (2024)	Sub-Saharan Africa	How much would it cost to address undernutrition?	Annually over the next 10 years	Scaling up evidence-based nutrition interventions, integrating nutrition services across sectors, implementing coherent policy actions, addressing gender and climate considerations, mobilizing additional financing	USD 34 billion per year

SOURCES: See the end of the Notes section.

The reviewed studies provide an idea of the additional financing that could be needed to support food security and nutrition in Africa to be on track to meet SDG Targets 2.1 and 2.2. This would require annual additional resources from now until 2030 ranging between USD 34 billion and USD 420 billion (excluding studies 4,5 & 7 which have a very different geographic scope).

While the most modest estimates indicate a financing gap of USD 34 billion per year, depending on the target, this gap can jump to USD 420 billion per year. Given the varying methodologies of the studies that determine the financing gap, it is better to use these ranges for determining the financing gap. But for the purpose of putting these gaps in perspective, one can use the average of USD 181 billion (again excluding studies 4,5 & 7 due to their geographic scope). Since this figure of USD 181 billion per year can be quite abstract, it has been put into perspective by comparing it to the following amounts. The annual financing gap to eradicate food insecurity and malnutrition of USD 181 billion is the same as:

- ▶ 3.1 times the Europe Union's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget of USD 58 billion per year (EU population of 448 million versus 1.52 billion in sub-Saharan Africa),<sup>35</sup> or
- ▶ 36 percent of total assets under management of the Dutch ABP pension fund for civil servants and teachers,<sup>36</sup> or
- ▶ the same as the USD trading volume of roughly 10 days on the New York Stock Exchange.<sup>37</sup>

## The missing middle: agri-SMEs are too big for microfinance and too small for banks

Agri-SMEs play an important role in the agrifood system for food security and nutrition. They are Africa's largest employer and economic engine – and the key to transforming a largely subsistence agriculture sector into a commercially sustainable industry that can feed the continent. Their strategic position within agrifood systems enables them to:<sup>38</sup>

- ▶ Bridge gaps in food security and nutrition value chains: SMEs connect smallholder farmers with markets, facilitating the flow of nutritious foods from production to consumption.
- ▶ Promote local food production: By sourcing and processing local agricultural products, SMEs support regional economies and ensure the availability of fresh, healthy foods.
- ▶ Innovate in food processing and distribution: They develop and implement technologies that enhance food preservation, reduce waste, and extend the shelf life of nutritious products. Up to 95 percent of smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa access processing through agri-SME processors or wholesalers.<sup>39</sup>
- ▶ Create employment opportunities: SMEs generate jobs in rural and urban areas, increasing household incomes and, consequently, the ability to afford healthy diets.

Therefore, agri-SMEs play a critical role in enhancing food security and improving nutrition.

In most emerging markets, missing middle SMEs with a convincing combination of collateral, track record, positive cash flow and/or net profit can generally obtain financing from local banks. However, the more this combination is lacking, the more SMEs will struggle to attract financing. There is a pervasive lack of providers of risk capital catering to these non-banked SMEs. The lack of financing options is particularly problematic for SMEs in the so-called missing middle<sup>f</sup>, which refers to entrepreneurs that are too big for microfinance and informal investors but that are too small or too risky for regular banks and private equity firms.

Limited access to finance for these SMEs is commonly seen as one of their main barriers to growth. For finance providers, the missing middle forms a challenging segment to serve. From their perspective, the missing middle SME segment is associated with high risks and low returns, caused by high transaction costs relative to transaction sizes, and high failure rates. The reason for high transaction costs are manifold, including lack of necessary information and management skills at the SME level. Furthermore, SMEs in rural areas bring additional challenges, which add to the transaction costs.

The lack of capital for missing middle agri-SMEs in Africa is a significant economic development issue, as the very SMEs that might be poised for growth, and thus represent critical job creating engines, are stuck with funding their own growth from internally generated cash flow.

---


<sup>f</sup> For the purposes of this report, the missing middle refers to the lack of access to financial capital needed for small and medium firms to grow. There is no standardised definition of medium-size enterprises. The IFC defines medium enterprises as having between 50–300 employees, and total assets and annual sales between USD 3–15 million. Source: *World Bank. 2019. World Bank Group support for small and medium enterprises: A synthesis of evaluative findings*. Washington DC, World Bank Group.

In search of solutions to address this problem, SME finance is high on the agendas of development institutions. Many institutions are stimulating the development of innovative models to provide risk capital, especially to growing and innovative SMEs that drive growth in emerging economies.

The distribution of agrifood system funding among financial service providers is not precisely known. However, the ISF Advisors<sup>22</sup> have estimated the amount of United States dollar funding flowing to agri-SMEs<sup>g</sup> in Sub-Saharan Africa. **FIGURE 41** shows these results, clearly demonstrating that local commercial banks take the lion's share of the financing.

**FIGURE 41**

Estimated distribution of financing flows to Agri-SMEs in Africa



SOURCE: Adapted from ISF Advisors. 2022. *The state of the agri-SME sector: Bridging the finance gap*. CASA.

<sup>g</sup> Their definition of agri-SMEs is 10 to 300 employees, assets worth USD 100 000 to 15 million, and annual sales of USD 100 000 to 15 million.

**BOX 7** describes Aceli Africa, an initiative focussing on mobilizing capital for this missing middle.

## BOX 7 FINANCE AGRI-SMES BY STRENGTHENING EXISTING LOCAL FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

### EXAMPLE OF ACELI AFRICA

Aceli Africa is a market incentive facility launched in 2020 mobilizing private capital for SMEs in the agriculture sector. Aceli Africa's goal is to improve the financial attractiveness of lending to agricultural SMEs by increasing the capital supply, providing technical assistance and generating data and learnings for policy changes benefitting agricultural SMEs. As of March 2024, Aceli has mobilized USD 163 million in capital via 1 719 loans by 30 lenders. Of these, 62 percent of loans are going to first-time borrowers. SMEs aggregate and provide market access and employment for more than 900 000 smallholder farmers and workers. The majority of loans are in local currency for food crops like staple grains and dairy and the majority also meet the 2X criteria for gender inclusion.

#### Increasing capital supply through financial incentives

Aceli offers qualifying lenders two types of financial incentives: portfolio first-loss cover, and an origination incentive. Portfolio first-loss cover is a risk mitigation tool for agri-SME loans of USD 15 000 to 1.7 million. Aceli will deposit 2–9 percent of the loan value into a reserve account that is available to cover the first losses across the lender's portfolio of qualifying loans. Loans to borrowers that meet criteria related to gender inclusion, food security and nutrition, and climate resilience will be rewarded with greater financial incentives (an impact bonus) to motivate lenders to serve these high-impact enterprises.

- ▶ **Gender inclusion:** Thirty percent or more of the loans supported by Aceli will meet the 2X Challenge criteria adopted by leading development finance institutions for gender inclusive investment.
- ▶ **Food security:** Fifty percent or more of the loans will go to SMEs that derive most of their revenues from food value chains serving African consumers.
- ▶ **Climate resilience:** Twenty percent or more of the loans will meet a higher standard for agricultural practices related to soil and water management, waste and energy.

Besides this first-loss coverage, Aceli also offers an origination incentive. Smaller loans to new borrowers tend to be unprofitable for lenders even when they repay given the high costs of serving agricultural SMEs located in remote areas and operating in less formal value chains. To mobilize increased lending for these businesses, Aceli will offer origination incentives that compensate lenders for the lower revenues and higher operating costs on loans ranging from USD 15 000 to USD 500 000. As with portfolio first-loss coverage, origination incentives will be higher for loans to new borrowers and those that meet impact standards related to gender inclusion, food security and nutrition, and climate resilience.

## BOX 7 FINANCE AGRI-SMES BY STRENGTHENING EXISTING LOCAL FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

### Expanding addressable demand through technical assistance for agricultural SMEs

To expand the addressable demand, Aceli facilitates technical assistance at both the pre- and post-investment stages. Technical assistance is offered in partnership with local service providers and based on a cost-share model with each enterprise. Aceli stands out by better and more directly combining technical assistance with finance, as this is usually offered quite separately.

### Building evidence to inform policy

Aceli collects all financial data from its qualifying lenders to assess the effects of financial incentives on lending activity, the impact of access to finance on credit-constrained businesses, and the flow-through benefits for farmer and worker

livelihoods. Each year, Aceli publishes a Financial Benchmarking Report. Some key insights are:

- ▶ Both first-loss cover and origination incentives increase the risk appetite of commercial lenders.
- ▶ Aceli's incentives elevates net profits for commercial banks from 3.2 percent to 6.5 percent. However, also with Aceli's support, Agri-SME yields for banks are still well below from other sectors and low-risk investments like government bonds.
- ▶ According to Aceli's data, commercial banks account for more than 90 percent of Agri-SME lending and are the key drivers of the growth of the overall market.

---

SOURCE: Husar, M. 2020. Aceli Africa case study by Convergence. In: *Aceli Africa*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://aceliafrica.org/convergence-aceli-afri-ca-case-study/>

## 6.5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In summary, there were positive trends in financial flows in some of the financing sources, while others stagnated or declined. Overall, there has been a general upward trend in government expenditure to AFF since 2018. For the countries for which data for analysing flows to food security and nutrition were available, it was observed that there were significant increases in total public spending on food security and nutrition, with priority to financing the key determinants of food security and nutrition.

The growth in ODA and OOF for food security and nutrition in Africa has been sluggish, averaging about 2 percent between 2017 and 2021, and with just a little over a quarter of the total of flows allocated to food security and nutrition in Africa over the period. The composition of the flows for food security and nutrition is, by and large, very stable over time with food consumption routinely accounting for more than 50 percent of the flows from ODA and OOF.

Financial flows from the private sector (bank credit and FDI) are particularly low and more needs to be done to increase them. Net banking loans to AFF showed a declining trend on average between 2017 to 2022. The increase between 2020 and 2021 following the COVID-19 pandemic was short-lived, as the downward trend continued in 2022. FDI flows have been low historically, with total inflows into Africa averaging 3 percent of the global total between 2014 and 2018, and with significant subregional variations in the volume of flows.

Remittance flows to Africa are increasing and could potentially become an important source of financing for food security and nutrition. However, the costs for migrants to send remittances to Africa are high, and significantly above the global average. Remittances have the potential to improve FSN through enhancing household food consumption. This positive effect could be amplified if governments channel them better towards productive uses through programmes such as matching grants.<sup>40</sup>

There are different cost estimates of the financing gap for food security and nutrition due to the use of different economic models or estimation techniques, as well as different geographic scope of the studies, which makes comparison of the estimates challenging. However, these studies show that meeting SDG Targets 2.1 and 2.2, in particular, will require additional annual resources from now until 2030 that could be up to USD 420 billion.

It is therefore evident that deliberate action is required to ensure that more resources to agrifood systems transformation, and in particular to address the major determinants of food security and nutrition and the major drivers of its current trends in Africa, are provided.

## CHAPTER 7

# RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN FINANCING FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN AFRICA

### Key messages

- Public policy plays a pivotal role in shaping the financial landscape by creating an enabling environment for investment, improving access to credit, and reducing financial risks. At the continental level, a number of initiatives have been developed aimed at enhancing financial access for agriculture. African governments have the responsibility to ensure that these initiatives are adopted and implemented at country level.
- The costs of inaction are high as there are substantial hidden costs in agrifood systems, including environmental and social hidden costs. This underscores the critical importance of incorporating these hidden costs into public policy and decision-making processes to reform agrifood systems.
- A number of challenges confront the policy making and implementation processes for financing food security and nutrition. These include siloed decision-making processes, lack of alignment of government support with long-term goals of food security and nutrition, and government budgets not allocated to support policies and sectors to secure the most value for money.
- Addressing these and other challenges related to public policies and strategies will help create an enabling environment for financing for food security and nutrition. The role of the government in helping to facilitate this enabling environment is extremely important but complex and multifaceted.

Key initiatives by the African Union, including the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and other institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), have been at the forefront of driving policies aimed at enhancing financial access for agriculture.

CAADP, established by the African Union (AU), focuses on increasing public investment in agriculture and creating an integrated policy framework to support sustainable agricultural growth across the continent. It emphasizes improving the business climate, attracting private sector investment, boosting trade and promoting agricultural transformation, all of which have significant implications for financial access.

The AfCFTA, as a transformative trade agreement, aims to create a single continental market for goods and services, which not only facilitates trade but also enhances investment opportunities in agriculture. By removing trade barriers and boosting regional economic integration, the AfCFTA encourages financial flows into the agricultural sector, fostering greater cross-border investment in agricultural value chains.

Additionally, the AfDB plays a critical role through its financial support and policy advocacy for agricultural development. Its programmes, such as the Feed Africa Strategy and African Financial Markets Initiative, directly contribute to increasing access to finance for agriculture by offering loans, guarantees and technical support to both governments and private sector actors in the agricultural value chain.

While these regional initiatives are important in shaping the financial landscape, it is the responsibility of governments to ensure that the regional frameworks are adopted at country level, and implementation modalities backed with concrete actions are rolled out for results and impact.

This chapter examines the relevance of effective public policy by presenting the costs of inaction (costs incurred by society if no action is taken) and key challenges related to public policies. It discusses several pathways to build a solid enabling environment stimulating financing for food security and nutrition.

## ■ 7.1 COSTS OF INACTION

The costs of inaction by both public and private entities are high. Although it is not possible to realistically and fully estimate the cost of inaction, the estimate of hidden costs of the agrifood system when not taking action provides a useful indication. FAO's *The State of Food and Agriculture in the World 2023* report found that Africa's quantified hidden costs of agrifood systems is close to USD 1 trillion at 2020 purchasing power parity (PPP).<sup>4</sup> This includes:

- ▶ environmental hidden costs from greenhouse gas and nitrogen emissions;
- ▶ water use and land-use change;
- ▶ hidden health costs from losses in productivity due to unhealthy dietary patterns; and
- ▶ hidden social costs from poverty and productivity losses associated with undernourishment.

This study highlights that the most significant hidden costs are linked to dietary patterns that elevate the risk of diseases and potentially reduce labour productivity. These findings underscore the critical importance of incorporating these hidden costs into decision-making processes to reform agrifood systems before these costs and their required funding become unmanageable for governments.

Nutrition International launched a tool in 2024 that allows one to focus particularly on the costs of inaction on nutrition. This tool estimates the total annual economic cost of the current level of undernutrition in Africa at USD 153 billion.<sup>41</sup> The lion's share (USD 129 billion) of this amount is caused by stunting. These high costs threaten fiscal stability, hamper economic growth and increase social unrest.<sup>42</sup>

## 7.2 KEY CHALLENGES RELATED TO PUBLIC POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

### Siloed decision-making processes

**Siloed decision-making processes might cause a lack of cohesive policy decisions, leading to missed opportunities for beneficial solutions.**

Ministries responsible for agriculture, health, environment and finance, among others, may have conflicting objectives (such as reducing public infrastructure spending versus increasing efficient transport of food) regarding nutrition and food security. Inadequate mechanisms to address these conflicting objectives and to collaborate on substantial reforms (such as redirecting public subsidies) or to develop a cohesive strategy may result in negative outcomes. For instance, opportunities for mutually beneficial solutions – such as reducing healthcare costs associated with non-communicable diseases through the promotion of healthy diets – may be missed.<sup>43</sup> This leads to a lack of focus on the challenges and the complexity of the interrelationship of the issues and the required policy responses, which results in a fragmentation of efforts (and uncertainty) in a critically important policy area.

### Government support misaligned with long-term food-security goals

**Government support is not always aligned with the long-term goals of food security and nutrition within planetary boundaries that policies aim to achieve.**

Global support to producers in the agricultural sector amounts to USD 540 billion per year, making up 15 percent of total agricultural production value. By 2030, this is projected to soar up more than three times to USD 1.759 trillion. Yet 87 percent of this support, approximately USD 470 billion, is price distorting and environmentally and socially harmful.<sup>44</sup> A FAO report finds that products like sugar and emission-intensive commodities (e.g. beef, milk and rice) receive the most support worldwide, despite the potentially negative impacts of diets high in sugar intake on health outcomes and the impact of emission-intensive commodities on climate change adaptation and mitigation.<sup>44</sup> Governments can redirect fiscal incentives away from activities that harm the environment or public health (such as carbon emissions and excessive intake of sugar or trans-fats) and instead support sustainable practices (such as managing river catchment areas for better water quality and reducing flood risks). Public funds allocated to natural capital should also establish mechanisms that encourage further investments in nature conservation.<sup>43</sup>

Another key challenge is that government budgets may not be allocated to support policies and sectors in the way that secures the most value for money. For example, a FAO assessment of the potential results from optimally reallocating government budgets for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda provides interesting evidence. When the current allocation of public budgets across support policies and sectors is optimized in these countries, it is found that, all together, they would have the opportunity to boost agrifood output growth, create almost 1 million off-farm jobs in rural areas, lift 2.8 million people out of poverty, and allow 16 million additional people to afford a least-cost healthy diet, all with the same budget. In other words, not optimally repurposing the budget allocated to the agriculture and livestock sectors in these six sub-Saharan African countries would have a substantial cost.<sup>27</sup>

Another example of this is that much of the public financial support for agriculture and fisheries contributes to the overexploitation of natural resources, often favouring wealthier, larger-scale farmers over smaller ones.<sup>44</sup> Public policies inadequately discourage the consumption of nutritious foods, and sometimes even encourage the production and consumption of highly processed foods of high energy density and minimal nutritional value that do not enable the consumption of healthy diets. As a result, the prices of foods and beverages high in fats, sugars, and/or salt, as well as carbon emissions and water usage, do not reflect the societal costs (also called externalities) associated with their consumption or production.<sup>43</sup>

### Strict legal and regulatory frameworks

**Unnecessarily strict legal and regulatory frameworks may hinder the development of agricultural financial services.**

Banking regulators and supervisors must properly assess the risks associated with agricultural loan portfolios and set good liquidity requirements. However, sometimes banking regulations can inadvertently hinder lending to agriculture, in particular to smallholder farmers.<sup>45</sup>

For instance, collateral requirements for accessing credit may be set too high for farmers to meet, strict provisioning rules for non-collateralized loans or unconventional forms of collateral like harvests may increase the cost of lending unnecessarily, and regulations regarding reporting may burden rural finance institutions with unnecessary expenses.<sup>45</sup> Overregulation often stems from regulators and supervisors lacking a deep understanding of the actual risks involved in agricultural finance. Such arrangements are at the detriment of women, in particular, as banks prefer to use immovable assets such as land as collateral and women have less of these assets.

An example of legislation hampering innovation was examined by a GIZ study. This revealed that legal and regulatory frameworks in some jurisdictions in Africa hold back innovation on agricultural insurance products.<sup>45</sup> Existing legislation does not allow for the introduction of innovative insurance products like weather-index insurance, and community-based or cooperative insurance schemes may not receive adequate recognition or oversight. Also, insurance oversight in some cases falls under agricultural ministries, which may not have the expertise to regulate these entities effectively from an institutional and governance perspective.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, various legal and regulatory factors, such as those concerning land tenure, land rights and registry, collateral registry, contract enforcement, and warehouse receipt systems, play crucial roles in agricultural finance and need to be carefully considered and addressed.<sup>45</sup>

## **Underperformance of governmental agricultural development banks and finance facilities**

### **Governmental agricultural development banks and agricultural finance facilities (AgFiFs) have often failed to perform to expectations.**

Many of these institutions and facilities have faced significant challenges, including political interference, lack of transparency, limited accountability to stakeholders, inadequate regulation and supervision, and lack of skilled management and proper incentives. These weaknesses have resulted in misallocation of credit, substantial losses, and the need for financial restructuring. In Africa, numerous AgFiFs have undergone various changes such as privatization (e.g. The United Republic of Tanzania's National Bank of Commerce), restructuring (e.g. Senegal's Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole), or closure (e.g. Lesotho's Agricultural Bank and Building Society).<sup>45</sup>

There is ongoing debate regarding the most appropriate strategy for addressing the issues associated with AgFiFs. The closure of these facilities has resulted in the loss of rural banking outlets, although there are successful instances of reform that have maintained rural outreach.

In response to the imperative to stimulate lending in the agricultural sector, some countries have opted to expand the role of existing AgFiFs and to establish new AgFiFs.<sup>45</sup> Since 2000, 20 new AgFiFs were founded world-wide; some in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Banque Agricole Du Faso in Burkina Faso). The positive trend is also reflected in the fact that governments and some donors, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the AfDB have increasingly used AgFiFs for agricultural financing and have also established some new facilities.<sup>45</sup>

## Gender inequality and a lack of access to finance for women

### Gender inequality and difficulty accessing finance for women in agriculture hampers progress on food security and nutrition.

Although most owners of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are women,<sup>46</sup> they are unable to obtain financial resources due to societal prejudices, social conventions and gendered cultural norms.<sup>47</sup> Requirements of land and other resources as collaterals have become a major obstacle for women in agrifood access to finance, surrounded by challenges due to social norms for access to productive resources.<sup>48</sup> For example, the World Bank<sup>49</sup> examined six countries and found that women's farm productivity per hectare was significantly lower than men's, with differences ranging from 13 percent in Uganda to 25 percent in Malawi. Despite women constituting a substantial portion of Africa's farming population, they often face barriers to land ownership, access to credit and essential farm inputs like fertilizers, pesticides and tools. They also lack support from extension services and access to markets, all of which are crucial for their productivity. Therefore, gender responsive public (and private) financing is crucial for advancing gender equality, which will not only contribute to social justice but will benefit all Africans.



## 7.3 CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

For financial solutions to succeed, providers require support from an enabling environment. Addressing the challenges related to public policies and strategies, as discussed above, will help create an enabling environment for financing for food security and nutrition. The role of the government in helping to facilitate this enabling environment is an extremely complex and multifaceted issue.

### Multilevel policy framework

**To have a sufficient enabling environment, a policy framework should look at the micro, meso and macro levels.**

Finance is frequently portrayed as mainly involving micro-level interactions between financial service providers and their clients. However, this perspective is too simplistic. Finance markets also depend on infrastructure, regulation, investment, and policies at the meso and macro levels. Therefore, to gain a comprehensive understanding of how governments can boost the development of agricultural finance in their countries, it is necessary to consider actions at all three levels.<sup>50</sup> An effective enabling environment operates at the following levels:

- ▶ Micro level: To directly influence private sector financing (e.g. introducing the use of socially organized sources of finance such as credit associations, which have proven to benefit smallholder farmers and women agricultural entrepreneurs in particular).
- ▶ Meso level: To indirectly enable private sector financing (e.g. the enactment of a law on licensed warehousing, allowing banks to use warehouse receipts as collateral in farmer credit applications).
- ▶ Macro level. To set a conducive overall policy and development agenda (e.g. Improving the AfCFTA to widen and deepen Africa's market and facilitate the availability of affordable fertilizer across Africa).

Going forward, donors, before launching programmes, should engage with governments on the macro, meso and micro enabling environment to support ongoing private sector involvement beyond the life of the programmes. This engagement could happen directly through existing platforms, such as the CAADP Partnership Platform, or through key development partners, such as the World Bank, IFAD or the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa.

### Robust financial infrastructure

**A robust financial infrastructure is the foundation of increased access to finance.**

Many African farmers and agribusinesses lack access to formal financial services, either due to geographical barriers or a lack of tailored products. Governments and development partners should focus on expanding financial services to rural areas through mobile banking, microfinance institutions, and community-based savings groups. Mobile financial platforms, such as M-PESA in Kenya, have proven successful in increasing financial inclusion in remote regions, and similar models should be scaled across the continent.<sup>51</sup>

**BOX 8** below gives an example of an approach that resulted in an improved enabling environment (in this case, a digital infrastructure) established through a collaboration between government and corporates.

#### BOX 8

#### A TEST-AND-LEARN APPROACH BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CORPORATES CAN FOSTER INNOVATION: EXAMPLE OF M-PESA

A good example of a government intervention at the meso level is the introduction of M-PESA in Kenya. The emergence of this mobile phone-based money transfer service over the past decade was a private sector innovation that went from launch to running annual transactions valued at 50 percent of the country's GDP in seven years. This development involved ongoing and collaborative discussions with the government to effectively support and regulate the new service as it progressed.

In many countries, digital currency and mobile money providers had to wait – sometimes for years – before the necessary government policies and legislation were established allowing them to legally launch services or build

delivery networks. However, in Kenya, M-PESA was regulated using a “test and learn” approach through a partnership between the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the Communications Authority. The CBK drafted guidelines for a national payments system to regulate the emerging retail electronic payments sector. These meso-level enablers provided the necessary framework for the service to develop, facilitated by close cooperation between Safaricom (the mobile network operator running M-PESA) and the government.

SOURCE: ISF Advisors. 2020. *Role of government in rural and agri-finance – Transitioning to private sector involvement*. Briefing note 17. Aceli Africa.

Additionally, enhancing the capacity of banks and financial institutions to understand the agricultural sector's specific risks – such as climate change, crop failure, or price volatility – will encourage them to lend more freely to farmers.<sup>52</sup> Financial products tailored to the agricultural sector, such as weather-indexed insurance or agricultural loans with flexible repayment terms, can help mitigate these risks and make lending more attractive to both banks and farmers.

### **Policies promoting access to credit**

**Governments must enact policies that promote access to credit for agricultural stakeholders.**

One critical area for reform is land tenure systems. In many African countries, insecure land rights prevent farmers from using their land as collateral for loans. Policies that provide clearer land titles and enforceable property rights can help smallholder farmers access credit more easily. Land reform initiatives that provide long-term and transferable land ownership can make it possible for farmers to leverage their assets to secure financing.<sup>53</sup>

Credit guarantee schemes can also be instrumental in improving access to finance. These schemes reduce the risk for financial institutions, which may be reluctant to lend to smallholder farmers due to perceived high risks. Public-private partnerships to create and sustain such guarantee schemes are vital, especially in low-income, high-risk areas.

### **Public-private partnerships**

**Public-private partnerships play a crucial role in mobilizing finance for the agricultural sector.** Governments can partner with development banks, commercial banks and private investors to channel funding into agriculture. Initiatives like the AfDB's Feed Africa Strategy encourage investments in value chains that improve food security, create jobs and boost nutrition. Similarly, promoting public-private partnerships in infrastructure – such as roads, storage facilities, and irrigation systems – can reduce the transaction costs for farmers and make them more attractive to investors.<sup>54</sup>

### **Agricultural insurance**

**Agricultural insurance is a critical tool for reducing the financial risks faced by farmers, particularly in the face of unpredictable climate events.**

Government policies that encourage the development of affordable and accessible insurance products, including crop and livestock insurance, are necessary to safeguard farmers against losses. The introduction of weather-indexed insurance, where payouts are triggered by specific weather patterns, can help smallholders in remote areas who are otherwise excluded from traditional insurance systems.<sup>55</sup>

Additionally, governments should create incentives for financial institutions to offer insurance products and integrate these with other financial services like credit. This can improve farmers' ability to access finance, as insurance mitigates the risk of loan defaults due to crop failures or extreme weather events.

### Effective use of financing

**Financial access is not just about providing loans – it's also about ensuring that farmers can use the financing effectively to increase production and contribute to food security and nutrition goals.**

Governments should increase investment in agricultural research and extension services to promote the adoption of best practices, technology and innovations that increase yields and nutritional quality. For example, the promotion of climate-resilient crops and sustainable farming techniques can increase farmers' productivity, enabling them to repay loans and improve food security.<sup>56</sup>

### Regional integration

**Regional integration can improve access to finance by expanding market opportunities for African farmers.**

The AfCFTA aims to create a single market for goods and services, making it easier for farmers to access larger markets beyond their local economies. This expansion of market opportunities can attract more private investment into agriculture, as financiers are more willing to invest when there is a larger, integrated market with higher demand for agricultural products.

Governments should ensure that policies related to trade, infrastructure, and logistics support regional integration by reducing tariffs, enhancing transport links, and improving cross-border trade processes. This will lower the costs of doing business for farmers, making agricultural investments more financially viable and reducing the risks for investors.<sup>57</sup>

## CHAPTER 8

# CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCING FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION IN AFRICA

### Key messages

- The perception of high risk among agricultural financing experts of financing agrifood markets remains a key challenge to financing for food security and nutrition in Africa. Coupled with high transaction costs of financial services for financiers, as well as other factors, this makes securing private financing for food security and nutrition a major challenge.
- In recent decades, efforts have been made to channel more and better financing to transform agrifood systems with the aim of improving food security and nutrition. These include providing derisking services to local financial institutions and promoting the use of blended finance as an investment structuring approach for the mobilization of increased private capital. It is time to bring these instruments and approaches to scale.

Financing for food security and nutrition is maturing and is now in the process of developing and testing new models. Parallels with the microfinance sector can be seen, where after many years of trying, testing, and refining new models and structures, mechanisms such as group-based and cash-flow-based mobile lending have been developed that make microfinance financially viable and therefore sustainable for microfinance institutions (MFIs). Moreover, many of the developed mechanisms and principles were proven to have a high degree of replicability across regions, making microfinance development programmes and policy interventions more effective and often successful. These models could only develop due to the support of private institutions willing to pioneer and take risk, but also thanks to government-funded programmes that were instrumental in developing the principles and practices behind these models.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the key challenges and opportunities in financing for food security and nutrition.

## 8.1 KEY CHALLENGES IN SECURING PRIVATE FINANCING

Based on an analysis of 51 studies and 14 interviews (refer to the interview protocol in Appendix 5) with experts on agricultural financing, a number of challenges have been identified that have relevance throughout financing for food security and nutrition in Africa.

### High transaction costs of financial services for financiers

Financing requirements in the agricultural value chain are generally small and require high transaction costs. These transactions costs can be related to factors such as geographical location (i.e. hard to reach areas) and incomplete financial records that complicate due diligence. As revenues of the financier scale with the ticket size, but costs do not, this creates a disincentive to provide smaller tickets. It is hard to put a number on this for the continent, but for illustrative purposes, most impact investors consider ticket sizes below USD 5 million too low to cover the transaction costs.

Aceli Africa substantiated this based on their database. A one-year USD 150 000 working capital loan made by a “more efficient bank”<sup>h</sup> generates USD 9 000 in revenues, but with costs of USD 15 000, revenue falls short of costs, creating a disincentive to serve borrowers.<sup>59</sup>

A Dalberg study looking into smallholder financing found that only one of the seven financial service providers examined in the study broke even without the use of subsidies or grants. Inadequate scale, small loan sizes, loan losses, high costs of funds and the inherent vulnerability of agriculture can paint a bleak picture to financial service providers. However, the study also found that all the financial service providers studied could turn a profit if they scaled up.<sup>60</sup>

In addition to this, local financial service providers often lack sufficient expertise on agriculture and are unable to adapt their credit products to the dynamics that underpin a specific crop (e.g. seasonality of production or exposure to specific risks). As such, they are unable to tailor their credit products to the profile of the farmer cultivating that crop. This inefficiency increases the costs and decreases the revenues for financial service providers.

### Low returns on high-risk profiles and competing priorities for financiers

Many local banks have experienced large losses on their agricultural portfolios due to high default rates combined with high costs. Despite specific mandates from their financiers such as development finance institutions (DFIs) and governments to increase portfolio allocation to the agricultural sector, local banks have focused on other sectors with better risk-return profiles, such as commerce, services and manufacturing. Without specific support (such as payment incentives or technical assistance), banks in many cases prefer to pay the penalty associated with not implementing the mandate rather than allocate the required capital to agriculture.

<sup>h</sup> For a bank at the 75th percentile of annualized operating costs in Aceli’s dataset of 31 lenders on 9 104 transactions totalling USD 3.7 billion in Africa’s agricultural sector.

### **High cost and lengthy financing application procedures for recipients**

Agricultural borrowers in Africa can face frighteningly high interest rates to access credit – higher than those paid by enterprises in other sectors. For instance, CSAF estimated the average at 10.5 percent in hard currency in 2020, but this can go as high as 40 percent in Ghana.<sup>61</sup> Smallholder farmers face other difficulties with access to finance, such as application procedures that can take a year for smallholders. One reason for this lengthy application procedure is rigid know-your-customer requirements imposed by financial regulatory authorities on banks, MFIs and other financial service providers.

### **Limited availability of long-term financing**

Most local banks and MFIs only offer short-term financing. As such, they cannot provide financing to, for example, agroforestry farms that generally require long-term (>5 yrs) capital. The three most important causes of this are lack of access to long-term capital for banks and MFIs, in-depth knowledge of lending to the agrifood system for food security and nutrition, and the preference of these entities to have their money tied up with a debtor for a shorter period rather than a longer one.

### **Lack of financial management skills and data**

Agri-SMEs are generally small, with a turnover below USD 100 000 and fewer than five employees. In these cases, staff often lack the managerial and financial skills to run the business in a professional manner. This results in a lack of bankable business plans, financial history and (systematic) data on historical production, making businesses ineligible for any type of formal lending. This lack of skills discourages agricultural micro, small and medium enterprises from approaching formal financial institutions and at the same time weakens the credit profile of a potential borrower, making them less attractive to finance.

### **Lack of specific nutrition objectives in financing agriculture in Africa**

Agricultural financing in Africa has traditionally focused on enhancing productivity and economic growth, often overlooking explicit nutritional objectives. This emphasis on increasing crop yields and expanding market access has led to investments primarily in staple crops like maize, rice and wheat, which, while important for food security, do not necessarily address the diverse nutritional needs of populations. The absence of targeted nutritional goals in agricultural financing has contributed to persistent malnutrition issues across the continent. However, without dedicated financial mechanisms that prioritize nutrition-sensitive agriculture – such as investments in diverse crop production, biofortification, and nutrition education – achieving these targets remains challenging.<sup>62</sup>

## 8.2 OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT FINANCING FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

In recent decades, many efforts have been made to channel more and better financing to transform agrifood systems with the aim of improving food security and nutrition. In this section, we present a selection of opportunities that have the potential to support finance flowing into the agrifood system.

### Provide derisking services to local financial institutions

As mentioned in the previous section, when the risks outweigh the returns, it can be difficult for LFIs to generate a commercial return. In these instances, derisking mechanisms can be crucial to increase private sector participation in investments that they otherwise would shy away from. Such mechanisms are typically provided by DFIs and governments. Two examples are highlighted:

- ▶ **Guarantees:** A risk-sharing agreement under which a guarantor agrees to pay part or the entire amount due on a loan, equity or other instrument to a lender/investor in the event of non-payment by the borrower or loss of value in the case of an investment. An example is a partial credit guarantee at loan-level provided by a DFI to a financial institution. This guarantee means that the DFI covers a percentage (e.g. 50 percent) of the unpaid part of the loan principal, plus interest payable at the moment the guarantee is called by the financial institution.
- ▶ **Technical assistance:** This may involve sending experts into the field to teach skills and to help solve problems in their areas of specialization, such as irrigation advice for farmers or underwriting skills for employees of banks. This can be provided both pre- and post-investment. For example, supply- and demand-side technical assistance can be provided to address various knowledge, operational and technical gaps so that financial institutions can lend sustainably to the agriculture sector to support farmers to adopt good agricultural practices, adopt technological advancements and upgrade their businesses to make them more bankable.

**BOX 9** describes the example of One Acre Fund, a social enterprise that developed a demand-driven model to provide financial services and technical assistance to smallholder farmers.

## BOX 9

## PROVIDING SMALLHOLDERS IN DEEPLY RURAL AREAS WITH INPUT LOANS AND TRAINING: EXAMPLE OF ONE ACRE FUND

This social enterprise supplies smallholder farmers in nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa with asset-based financing and agriculture training services to reduce hunger and poverty. The One Acre Fund (OAF) provides services in bundles to ensure farmers get consistent and good quality products. To be part of the programme, farmers are required to contract the basic service bundle. Additionally, farmers can choose from a range of optional packages for both agricultural and non-agricultural products. The standard package consists of:

- ▶ **Financing:** Farmers repay their loans throughout the season until shortly after harvest time. Within the repayment period, the repayment schedule (timing, payment size) is completely flexible, though OAF has established a “healthy path” that it uses to ensure farmers don’t fall behind. All of the farmer repayment is done through mobile banking.
- ▶ **Training:** Provision of weekly, in-field agronomic training for farmers during the season. They also incorporate financial training and administrative training to ensure farmers fully understand their relationship with OAF.
- ▶ **Agricultural products:** Provision of high-quality maize seeds, fertilizer and other products to farmers with the guarantee of on-time delivery

to a drop point within walking distance of every farmer’s home.

- ▶ **Crop insurance:** Insuring its farmers by purchasing an area yield-based insurance product that enables it to indemnify farmers in the event that yields are reduced by exogenous factors (e.g. drought, hail, disease, poor germination).
- ▶ **Funeral insurance:** Provision of funeral insurance as a standard part of the bundle of services. In addition, OAF’s policy is to cancel the family’s debt in the event of the contract holder’s death. (<https://www.idhsustainabletrade.com/uploaded/2018/11/180601-Case-Report-1AF-SHORT.pdf>)

On average, the farmers that OAF directly serve increase their farm income by 40 percent per year from the same plot of land and produce a surplus for the first time.

---

SOURCE: IDH. 2018. *SDM: Case report One Acre Fund*. [Cited 15 May 2025.] <https://www.idhsustainabletrade.com/uploaded/2018/11/180601-Case-Report-1AF-SHORT.pdf>

## Scale microfinance institutions active in Africa’s agricultural sector

MFIs play a pivotal role in enhancing access to financial services for smallholder farmers and agribusinesses in Africa, thereby contributing to improved food security and nutrition. By providing tailored financial products such as microloans, savings accounts and insurance, MFIs enable farmers to invest in quality seeds, fertilizers and irrigation systems, leading to increased agricultural productivity. This, in turn, enhances food availability and dietary diversity within communities. A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) highlights that access to microfinance services has a positive impact on agricultural productivity and household food security in developing countries, including those in Africa.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, MFIs often incorporate financial literacy and agricultural training programmes, equipping farmers

with the knowledge to make informed decisions about resource allocation and crop management. By mitigating financial constraints and promoting sustainable farming practices, MFIs contribute significantly to the resilience and nutritional well-being of African populations.

### **Promote the use of blended finance as an investment structuring approach for the mobilization of increased private capital**

Blended finance has the potential to leverage significant additional private investment mobilization for food security and nutrition. This topic is treated extensively in Chapter 9.

### **Involve local entities to improve risk allocation in blended finance**

Local investors such as sovereign wealth funds and local pension funds are better placed to understand, price and manage political risk in their country. They can also provide local currency finance to projects that generate revenues in local currency, thereby eliminating foreign exchange risk.<sup>64</sup>

### **Provide business advisory services to the agrifood system for food security and nutrition**

This type of technical assistance focusses on improving the bankability of agribusinesses and can be given pre- and post-financing. When given before financial contracts have been signed, the main aim is to help entrepreneurs build proposals that clearly outline how they will pay off. Post-financing business advisory services are also seen as a way of derisking a company. This form of technical assistance is increasingly being used by DFIs and impact investors. This is partly because many financiers are finding that sourcing financeable deals is challenging. Providing business advisory services also supports deal sourcing, as this technical assistance can then lift these entrepreneurs just over the edge of bankability.

**BOX 10** provides an example of a USAID programme focused on business advisory services. Activities occurred before 24 January 2025.

## BOX 10

## INTEGRATING BUSINESS ADVISORY SERVICES WITH FINANCING IS IMPORTANT IN THE AGRIFOOD SYSTEM: EXAMPLE OF USAID'S FINANCING GHANAIAN AGRICULTURE PROJECT

The USAID Financing Ghanaian Agriculture Project (USAID FinGAP) developed a network of business advisory service (BAS) providers and financial institutions servicing the agriculture sector, whose main aim was to unlock financing for three value chains critical for food security in Ghana – rice, maize and soy. These activities occurred before 24 January 2025.

The project provided capacity building support to 53 Ghanaian BAS providers, improving their ability to identify and develop agribusiness opportunities and close financing transactions for their clients. As a result, USAID FinGAP assisted 570 SMEs to obtain financial facilitation support from BAS providers. These BAS providers facilitated over USD 45 million in financing, predominately to producers, processors and traders. BAS providers were paid upon meeting targets for project identification, structuring and reaching financial closure.

USAID FinGap also provided capacity building support to 93 financial institutions to develop agriculture finance products. With the support of USAID FinGAP, financial institutions in the project network developed 31 new financial products. Several institutions, including Success for People and Zenith bank, launched new financial products

that utilize tripartite agreements between their bank, aggregators and lead off-takers. Using this model enabled the institutions to lend to smallholders indirectly, with the aggregators and off-taker sharing the risk. Builsa Community Bank developed a financial product specifically targeting women groups. Others developed products for equipment finance, inventory financing, asset-based lending products and value-chain-specific loans.

However, gaps still exist in the understanding of financial institutions in the financing needs of agribusinesses. While some financial institutions have fully embraced a value chain approach, recognizing they have convening power to connect the clients they serve at every stage of the value chain to reduce risk and improve loan performance, others continue to approach agricultural lending as they would a typical commercial loan. Those institutions need continued exposure and education on agricultural financing, educating them to the unique challenges that come with importing goods such as agricultural inputs (including trade financing), the seasonality of production, and loan timing.

---

Source: USAID. n.d. *Financing Ghanaian Agriculture Project* (USAID FinGAP). [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00TCMR.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00TCMR.pdf)

### **Focus on climate-smart agriculture to mitigate climate change risk and thereby reduce financial risk.**

Climate extremes and variability are escalating, posing significant threats to food security and nutrition. Implementing climate-smart agriculture policies is essential to mitigate these risks, as this approach aims to sustainably increase agricultural productivity, enhance resilience to climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>65</sup> Regenerative agriculture, for example, is based on farming principles that mimic nature. The aim is to ensure healthy soils to feed more people and increase resilience to climate change while creating thriving farming communities.<sup>66</sup> This kind of farming can adapt to the conditions faced by small-scale farmers, with the emphasis on local crop varieties and on harnessing traditional knowledge to sustain, rather than fight, natural ecosystem processes.

**BOX 11** presents the example of Grounded Investment Company, a fund set up in 2023 investing in companies that adopted a regenerative approach.

## BOX 11

## INVESTORS WHO HAVE SET UP MULTIPLE COMPANIES ADOPTING REGENERATIVE APPROACHES AND IMPROVING LIVELIHOODS THROUGH PROFIT SHARING: EXAMPLE OF GROUNDED INVESTMENT COMPANY

Grounded Investment Company (GIC) is an investment company with an evergreen fund structure, providing predominantly equity (and debt for existing portfolio companies) with ticket sizes ranging from EUR 150 000 to 500 000 to agriprocessing companies in Africa. These companies are typically SMEs started by entrepreneurs who purchase ingredients from farmers in the surrounding areas and process them to sell on international markets.

GIC stands out from other funds by its operational expertise (its fund manager, Grounded, has built three agri-businesses from scratch in Zambia and South Africa) and by its mission to make farming more profitable for producers and to facilitate their transition to regenerative farming systems. For GIC, investing is a means to an end, as their main goal is to work with producers on regenerative agriculture and quality improvements. The main reasons for this focus on quality is the increased willingness to pay a higher price by consumers.

An example where GIC's operational expertise is highlighted was when GIC and one of its investees, Trianon Spices, created a profit-sharing mechanism with the smallholder farmers who supply organic produce to Trianon.

GIC can be categorized as a very active investor that is operationally quite involved, especially in the first 12–18 months of investments. As a result, GIC also understands the needs of their investees, which makes for fast and effective communication.

From its own experience when setting up their companies, GIC has found that, within their niche, it is important to compete on quality. As soon as portfolio companies start competing on price, it becomes a race to the bottom. Therefore, high quality and access to a market willing to pay for it is important. One way to reach this quality is through the principles of regenerative agriculture.

GIC foresees challenges in trade between Europe and Africa due to the upcoming European Union's Regulation on deforestation-free products. This requires African food producers exporting to the European Union to ensure that their products are not linked to deforestation or forest degradation, necessitating compliance with strict traceability and sustainability standards to access European markets. GIC expects this could pose problems especially in the short term as it is still proving challenging to ensure this. But, in the long term, GIC expects that the increased regulation in Europe on more sustainable agriculture will increase demand for African imports, as this continent is largely based on organic farming (unlike other countries, such as India or China, where use of chemical inputs is more common).

---

Sources: Authors' elaboration based on i) the Grounded Investment Company website (<https://groundedinvestmentcompany.com>) and ii) *Transformational Investing in Food Systems. 2023. Food systems investing in East Africa: The roles of funds in financing food systems transformation.* [Cited 15 May 2025.] [https://www.tifsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/TIFS\\_Investing-in-East-Africa-Food-Systems-Aug2023-Final.pdf](https://www.tifsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/TIFS_Investing-in-East-Africa-Food-Systems-Aug2023-Final.pdf)

### **Don't look at isolated deals, look at the whole landscape**

Despite an increasing interest in impact investments, investors predominately pursue investments that focus on a single objective within a landscape, such as agricultural production or reforestation. The effects of these kinds of investments can be undone through the actions of other actors in the same landscape. Landscape financing takes a holistic approach to natural capital, in which all stakeholders agree, and investments are interlinked and strengthen each other. An example of the relevance of landscape finance in Africa can be seen in areas where agricultural expansion for cash crops, such as cocoa or palm oil, is encouraged through financing while simultaneously undermining ecosystem services vital for food security and nutrition. For instance, financing irrigation infrastructure for smallholder farmers to boost staple crop production may be negated by deforestation caused by another investment promoting commercial plantations nearby. The deforestation leads to soil erosion and disrupts water cycles, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of the irrigation system and harming overall agricultural productivity. Landscape finance addresses such conflicts by promoting integrated investments that consider the interdependencies within a landscape, ensuring sustainable outcomes for all stakeholders.

**BOX 12** describes an example of such a landscape finance approach in Ghana.

## BOX 12

## SHARING THE BENEFITS OF AN IMPROVED LANDSCAPE THROUGH A TRUST FUND: EXAMPLE OF SHEA NUT BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND TRUST FUND

This community-managed wildlife sanctuary consists of a 34-km stretch of riverine forest, floodplain and savannah woodland along the Black Volta River in northwestern Ghana. Created in 1998 in response to the decline of hippopotami in the region due to high levels of hunting, the sanctuary has used revenue from ecotourism to deliver infrastructure investments for the residents of its seventeen member communities. Through a balancing of ecological and social needs, the sanctuary has delivered substantial conservation and socioeconomic benefits: poaching has been eliminated and the hippo population has stabilized within the sanctuary's core zone, while investments in schools, health facilities, solar lighting and water infrastructure have improved the wellbeing of approximately 10 000 residents of the sanctuary's development zone. In 2009, the initiative was used as a model for the design of Ghana's Community Resource Management Area legislation.

In Northern Ghana, the conservation NGO Nature Conservation Resource Centre (NCRC) supported communities living near the Wechiau Hippo Sanctuary to set up a trust fund and shea businesses to boost their livelihoods and establish a self-sustaining financial mechanism for the Wechiau landscape.

Grant funding was initially used to enforce the capacity of community resource management areas for the protection of Wechiau's Hippo Sanctuary. After identifying the need for additional income streams aside revenue from ecotourism, NCRC partnered with the Calgary Zoological Society and concessionaries in the landscape to set up an autonomous sustainable financial mechanism in the form of a community trust fund.

This project has had a financial surplus for five years, and the trust fund is managed by a third-party financial institution which has helped grow the fund by 50 percent since 2016. This has allowed the community to build schools and health facilities, and invest in solar power and water infrastructure, improving the lives of some 10 000 residents. It is considering organic sourcing for other commodities such as groundnuts and shea honey that can provide additional benefits to communities through fair trade prices.

---

Source: United Nations Development Programme. 2012. *Wechiau Community Hippo Sanctuary, Ghana*. Equator Initiative Case Study Series. New York, USA, UNDP. [Cited 15 May 2025.] [https://www.equatorinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/case\\_1348261639.pdf](https://www.equatorinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/case_1348261639.pdf)

### Focus on integrating and financing multiple steps in the value chain

The liberalization of global trade has opened up opportunities for economies in sub-Saharan Africa to integrate into regional and global value chains, securing stable markets for their agricultural commodities and attracting much-needed private sector investment in the agriculture sector. This presents a significant potential for the economic transformation of the agrifood system by connecting local agriculture value chains to larger regional and global markets.<sup>67</sup>

Agricultural value chain finance (AVCF) in Africa has emerged as a significant trend for development agencies and academics over the past decade.<sup>68</sup> Although this is an interesting development, it is important to note that it has not yet reached the mainstream financial sector in Africa. This approach allows lenders to leverage the interconnectedness and relationships within agricultural value chains, which are already in place. This interconnection enables financiers to customize their financial products to different stages of the value chains. **TABLE 18** presents some examples of AVCF categories and instruments.

**TABLE 18**

AVCF categories and financial instruments

AVCF Category	Financial instruments
<b>Receivables-backed financing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Factoring</li> <li>▶ Trade receivables finance</li> </ul>
<b>Product-based financing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Inputs or supplier finance</li> <li>▶ Buyer/trader credit</li> </ul>
<b>Risk-mitigation instruments</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Insurance products</li> <li>▶ Forward contracts</li> </ul>
<b>Asset-collateralized financing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Warehouse receipts</li> <li>▶ Lease-purchase</li> </ul>

Source: IFAD. 2012. *Agricultural value chain finance strategy and design: Technical note*. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). [Cited 15 May 2025.] <https://www.ifad.org/documents/d/new-ifad.org/agricultural-value-chain-finance-strategy-and-design-pdf>

This AVCF approach can mitigate credit risk for lenders, reduce borrowing costs and overcome the challenge of lack of collateral among farmers, as well as make agriculture a viable activity and turn farmers into businesspeople. It has, therefore, generated significant interests from economic think-tanks, government agencies, development partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and various agricultural research institutes.<sup>69</sup>

**BOX 13** describes a fund that was founded by Tradin Organic, a trader sourcing ingredients from Africa. Tradin Organic was already providing AVCF to its suppliers but then decided to set up a separate entity for this so that more traders could join.

### BOX 13 TRADER IN ORGANIC VEGETABLES AND FRUITS SETS UP TRADE FINANCING FUND, IMPROVING OWN LIQUIDITY AND OFFERING OTHER TRADERS TO PARTNER: EXAMPLE OF ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT FUND

The Organic Development Fund (ODF) is a collaboration between Tradin Organic, West African Trade and Investment Hub and GIZ. It links producers and processors with selected global buyers to facilitate access to export markets for certified organic growers and producers. ODF provides trade finance (short-term loans with repayment through deliveries of final buyers) with ticket sizes between EUR 300 000 and EUR 800 000.

ODF was initiated by Tradin, a Dutch trader sourcing organic ingredients from Africa. Previously, Tradin provided this trade finance

themselves to their suppliers. By setting up ODF, Tradin improved its balance sheet, freeing up liquidity and offering other traders the opportunity to partner with ODF, making the transactions process for ODFs offering more efficient and cheaper. In the future, ODF also wants to offer additional financial instruments, such as equipment finance.

---

SOURCE: Garrido, P. 2023. Dutch foundation partners with impact investor Fount to launch organic agriculture fund. In: *Impact Investor*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://impact-investor.com/dutch-foundation-partners-with-impact-investor-fount-to-launch-organic-agriculture-fund/>

## CHAPTER 9

# BLENDED FINANCE

### Key messages

- Blended finance as an investment structuring approach for agrifood systems in Africa has potential to leverage increased private capital.
- Development agencies can provide development funding in the form of grant-like capital, for which there is no expected payback, and which can absorb lower returns or the first financial losses. This will incentivise private sector partners to finance investments in food security and nutrition which they would otherwise consider too risky.
- The existence of a set of blended finance instruments and mechanisms, with different value propositions and the potential risks for funders, offers options for use of development finance for specific objectives.
- Most blended finance transactions are still of relatively high ticket sizes, which tend to go to larger and more downstream companies where it is unclear to what extent this financing supports food security and nutrition. At lower ticket sizes, however, the direct impact on food security and nutrition is generally higher.
- It is now time for this investment structuring approach to prove itself in practice by increasing the number of transactions for financing food security and nutrition and lowering its ticket sizes.

As discussed in the previous chapters, agrifood systems are considered risky investments, so to increase financing flows towards agrifood systems for food security and nutrition, it is essential to implement innovative financing approaches to de-risk private financing flows. One of these approaches – to maximize the impact of limited public financial resources – is to blend development funding (including both public and philanthropic funding) with private financing. This structuring approach, known as blended finance, makes strategic use of development funding to attract private capital into emerging and frontier markets. Blended finance is particularly important in the context of the decreased fiscal space for several African governments, which restricts their ability to mobilize the public financial resources needed to transform agrifood systems in the region for achieving food security and better nutrition.

Blended finance going to African agrifood system had a total deal volume of USD 3 billion spread across 99 deals between 2020 and 2023 according to the Convergence Blended Finance database.<sup>70</sup> This is to date the most complete database collecting data on blended finance transactions. At the time of writing, 150 deals in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa are included in this database with an average deal size of USD 29 million.


This chapter provides a brief overview of blended finance as an investment structuring approach for agrifood systems in Africa.

## 9.1 DEFINITION OF BLENDED FINANCE

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines blended finance as,

“the use of development finance for the mobilization of additional finance towards sustainable development in developing countries. It attracts commercial capital towards projects that contribute to sustainable development, while providing financial returns to investors.”<sup>71</sup>

**FIGURE 42**  
Blended finance



SOURCE: Adapted from Convergence. n.d. Blended finance. In: *Convergence*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://www.convergence.finance/blended-finance>

Blended finance allows entities with different mandates to invest alongside each other while achieving their own objectives. These objectives can be financial return, environmental and social impact, or a combination of both. The main benefit of blended finance is the increase of capital supply by tackling investment barriers for private investors. Examples of lowering these investment barriers can be pre- and post-investment technical assistance lowering the (perceived and real) risk-level, or first-loss cover on a loan to improve the relatively low returns when compared to financing in other sectors. In short, blended finance creates investable opportunities in developing countries, which leads to more development impact. Because they draw in private capital, blended finance tools ultimately allow international development-focused organizations to make progress towards their objectives, far beyond what they could achieve with their own limited budgets.

**TABLE 19** provides an overview of blended finance as a structuring approach and the other types in which blended finance can be applied.

**TABLE 19**

Overview of blended finance supported by examples


Type	Definition	Example
<b>Structuring approach</b>	A specific combination of debt, equity or grant capital used to finance an investment, including the priority of investors and lenders in terms of absorbing losses and earning a return	Blended finance
<b>Investment approach</b>	A broad method of financial instruments and preferences that are permissible for a certain investment manager	Impact investing (often participating in blended finance structures)
<b>Financial instrument</b>	A legal agreement between individuals or parties involving any kind of monetary value.	Loan or first-loss cover
<b>End-solution</b>	A set of financial instruments selected through an investment approach using a structuring approach	First-loss cover of 20 percent at portfolio level to derisk loans issued by a local financial institution and technical assistance to entrepreneurs on financial management and governance

SOURCE: Convergence. 2021. *The state of blended finance 2021*. Toronto, Convergence. [Cited 15 May 2025.] [https://www.convergence.finance/reports/sobf2021/assets/The\\_State\\_of\\_Blended\\_Finance\\_2021.pdf](https://www.convergence.finance/reports/sobf2021/assets/The_State_of_Blended_Finance_2021.pdf)

For financing the transformation of African agrifood systems for food security and nutrition, development agencies can provide development funding in the form of grant-like capital, for which there is no expected payback. By contributing a new layer of capital into the structure, development agencies can absorb lower returns or the first financial losses, thereby protecting the returns of private sector partners if the investment does not turn out as expected. Ultimately, the presence of development funding can help derisk investments or enhance returns and, by doing so, create the appropriate risk/return ratio required to crowd in private sector investors. **FIGURE 43** shows the blue “market line” representing a risk/return ratio acceptable for private investors. Deals that can benefit from blended finance are typically not on this line, but can get on this line with the help of development funding.<sup>72</sup>

**FIGURE 43**

Blended deals with derisking and with return enhancement



SOURCE: Based on graphic attributed to Convergence in Davar, D., Michel, L., Schieck, V. & Wouters, S. 2024. *The power to scale impact: A primer on blended finance*. Zurich, UBS Group.

In addition to the short-term benefits of crowding in private capital, blended finance transactions also have a positive long-term impact on local financial ecosystems – an important stepping stone on a country’s path to self-reliance.

Blended finance can occur in many different structures, but Convergence Blended Finance<sup>1</sup> distinguishes four main types, which are described below.<sup>73</sup> These have diverse applications in the project life cycle.

1. **Concessional debt or equity:** Public or philanthropic investors provide funds on below-market terms within the capital structure to lower the overall cost of capital or to provide an additional layer of protection to private investors (referred to as concessional capital in this primer). Concessional debt or equity has been the most common archetype.
2. **Concessionally priced guarantees or insurance:** Public or philanthropic investors provide credit enhancement through guarantees or insurance on below-market terms.
3. **Technical assistance grant funding:** Transactions are associated with a grant-funded technical assistance facility that can be utilized pre- or post-investment to strengthen commercial viability and developmental impact.
4. **Project preparation or design-stage grant funding:** Transaction design or preparation is grant-funded (including project preparation or design-stage grants).

It is important to note that blended finance isn’t a one-size-fits-all remedy for all global development issues. Therefore, the decision to apply blended finance has to be considered carefully. The following three conditions for successful blended finance transactions can help in making this decision.

1. **Additionality:** Proof that the blended finance intervention (catalytic capital, insurance, technical assistance, etc.) generated meaningful private sector participation that wouldn’t have happened otherwise.
2. **Impact:** Ways in which the investee or investable project contributes to sustainable development in a developing country.
3. **Returns:** Demonstrate that the transaction is expected to generate a profit, the size of which varies depending on the private sector investors involved and whether they are primarily seeking profits or impact.<sup>74</sup>

---

1 A network and platform that brings together public and private investors for blended finance investments in emerging and frontier markets, based in Canada.

## ■ 9.2 BLENDED FINANCE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS

This subchapter provides an overview of a set of blended finance instruments and mechanisms in development finance. It provides a definition of each instrument and mechanism as well as its value proposition and the potential risks for funders.

The OECD identifies four types of blended finance mechanisms: funds, syndication, securitisation and public–private partnerships.<sup>75</sup>

- ▶ **Funds:** Investment vehicles that pool capital from multiple investors to finance a portfolio of projects or companies, often targeting specific sectors or regions to achieve development objectives.
- ▶ **Syndication:** A financing arrangement where multiple lenders collaborate to provide portions of a loan to a single borrower, distributing risk and enabling larger investments than individual lenders could manage alone.
- ▶ **Securitization:** The process of pooling various financial assets and issuing new securities backed by these assets, thereby transforming illiquid assets into tradable instruments to attract private investment.
- ▶ **Public–private partnerships:** Collaborative agreements between government entities and private sector companies to finance, build and operate projects, leveraging the strengths of both sectors to deliver public services or infrastructure.

In addition, the OECD has developed an evaluation of blended finance instruments categorizing these instruments into equity instruments, debt instruments, catalytic first-loss capital, guarantees and insurance, hedging, grants and technical assistance, and structured funds. **TABLE 20** provides an overview of this evaluation.<sup>76</sup>

TABLE 20

Overview of blended finance instruments with definitions and value propositions

Financial instrument	Definition of concessional use in blended finance	Value proposition
Equity	Share in the ownership of a corporation that gives the owner claims on the residual value of the corporation after creditors' claims have been met. These investments can be directly or indirectly (through e.g. a fund) in companies. Examples are junior equity and patient capital with a long time to exit.	Equity is risk-absorbing (in particular financial and reputational risk) and is a rather new instrument in development finance. It improves additionality but also requires enhanced assessment and governance to manage the investment.
Debt	Loans to businesses, directly or indirectly through financial institutions, obliging the borrower to repay the principal plus agreed-upon interest at either a fixed or variable rate. A loan may be secured by property or other assets, cash, inventory or receivables. Similarly, a line of credit, which is a flexible loan with an upper limit, enables the borrower to draw on it as needed and repay on flexible terms. A third debt instrument commonly used in blended finance is the bond, a fixed income instrument issued by governments, public utilities, banks or companies to raise capital for growth and development. Examples are subordinated debt and conditions such as longer grace periods or reduced collateral requirements.	Lenders often prefer to use loans, lines of credit or bonds in structuring blended finance deals as these instruments are relatively straightforward to design, negotiate and enforce legally and administratively in most jurisdictions. The market addresses the needs of larger borrowers, but, in general, these conditions are less attractive for smaller entities in the agrifood system. Small ticket sizes or favourable loan conditions can therefore lead to a high level of additionality.
First-loss coverage	A socially and environmentally driven credit enhancement provided by an investor or grant-maker who agrees to bear first losses in an investment in order to catalyse the participation of co-investors that otherwise would not have entered the deal. <sup>77</sup> This can be combined with equity (taking most junior position), grants (converted into debt or equity), guarantees (cover certain amount of losses) and subordinated debt (taking most junior position).	An effective tool to encourage lending and investing in new and underserved segments. By reducing potential loss from an investment, catalytic first-loss capital changes the risk-return profile of an opportunity enough to incentivise and/or enable borrowers and investors to lend or invest. A secondary benefit is that by financing with catalytic first-loss capital, recipients can acquire expertise in, and learn about, a new market, with the comfort of some downside protection. <sup>77</sup>
Guarantees and insurance	A guarantor agreeing to pay part of or the entire value of a loan, equity, or other instrument in the event of non-payment or loss of value. <sup>78</sup> In addressing credit, technical or political risk, the resources underlying guarantees are only disbursed when the intermediary or borrower suffers losses. This instrument can reduce specific types of risks (e.g. price risk or weather risks) in transactions by transferring the risk of loss to the provider. It can be combined with debt, equity or any other instrument. Examples are political risk insurance and (partial) currency risk mitigation.	Guarantees can be an attractive blended finance instrument because they optimise the use of public funds, as these funds are only disbursed in the case of actual losses. Guarantees do not involve cross-border flows unless the underlying investment fails and the guarantee is called upon. Therefore the foreign exchange risk is also lower. Insurances are generally more flexible than guarantees, as insurances can be designed as required. <sup>76</sup>
Currency hedging	A strategy designed to mitigate the impact of currency or foreign exchange risk on international investments returns.	Foreign exchange risk is one of the most significant barriers to sustainable development in developing countries. More than 90 percent of debt financing to developing countries is denominated in foreign currency, causing the most vulnerable and least-equipped borrowers to bear the risk of debt crises in times of local currency depreciation. Blended finance solutions can mitigate foreign exchange risk, shifting it from the most vulnerable parties to well-capitalized organizations that can best bear and manage the risk. Unfortunately, there is only a limited market for this risk mitigation.

**TABLE 20**  
Continued

Financial instrument	Definition of concessional use in blended finance	Value proposition
<b>Grants and technical assistance</b>	A financial resource that does not have to be paid back. Typically, a grant is provided to facilitate a purpose or promote performance. In some cases, a grant can also be repaid if it successfully catalyses a commercial activity. Examples are a grant for early-stage project preparation and performance-based grants.	Grants and technical assistance typically do not require the capital to be returned. However, there is a rising trend towards using returnable grants. Besides their conventional role in development, they now play a crucial role in innovative finance. This includes financing design funding, market studies, and market development before and during investments. Moreover, they are used in creating a pipeline of investment opportunities. Grants and technical assistance are frequently combined with other instruments to enhance their effectiveness in achieving impact objectives. <sup>79</sup>
<b>Structured funds</b>	A financial approach that combines different asset classes with distinct risk and return profiles (also known as a waterfall structure). <sup>76</sup> Public donors generally invest in the riskiest junior tranche, or Class C shares, which are tapped first if the fund experiences financial losses. DFIs typically invest in the mezzanine tranche, or Class B shares, which are drawn upon second. Private investors can buy Class A shares (the senior tranche), which are the least risky because they are protected from losses by the Class C and Class B shares.	By offering different asset classes, structured funds cater to the development objectives of public donors and DFIs, and to the investment objectives of private investors. Private investors benefit from the reduced risk that the waterfall structure provides, enabling them to invest in sectors and regions with high development potential and higher perceived risk. <sup>76</sup> Publicly funded donor agencies benefit from the revolving, or continuous, use of their funds for sustainable development. Further, pooling money and investing in different countries and parts of the agrifood system enables risk diversification allowing the funds to invest in a number of very risky countries or subsectors with high potential development impact.

SOURCE: Habel, V., Jackson, E., Orth, M., Richter, J. & Harten, S. 2021. *Evaluating blended finance instruments and mechanisms: Approaches and methods*. OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, No. 101. Paris, OECD Publishing.

### 9.3 RELEVANCE OF BLENDED FINANCE FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION

Blended finance can mitigate some of the risks faced by financial service providers, but it needs a collaborative partnership among financial-sector players, the food and agriculture sector, NGOs, multilateral organizations, donors, investors and the technology sector to establish a supportive environment. These partnerships should encourage open dialogue and promote a deeper understanding of each other's challenges and goals, ultimately resulting in increased blended finance reaching producers.<sup>24</sup> At the same time this collaboration should avoid adding additional complexity of coordinating these parties, which can lead to delays and inefficiencies. This can be due to a lack of common language or dialogue opportunities between actors in blending and governments, and because public and private actors may have different objectives for the partnerships.<sup>80</sup>

When looking at the need to increase finance for food security and nutrition, careful consideration needs to be given to the appropriate use of blended finance because of the following two reasons. First, donors using ODA for blending could mean less money available for other uses of ODA. There is also a risk that blending, when it relies on external private finance, may crowd out the domestic financial sector in the host country or could unnecessarily subsidise private investment in a way that causes long-term damage to domestic markets.<sup>80</sup> And second, most blended finance transactions are still of relatively high ticket sizes, with a median size of USD 34.1 million.<sup>81</sup> These higher ticket sizes go to larger and more downstream companies where it is unclear to what extent this financing supports food security and nutrition. At lower ticket sizes, the direct impact on food security and nutrition is generally higher, when, for example, a fund finances smallholder farmers through a cooperative.

Although blended finance is rightly welcomed in agrifood systems financing oriented to food security and nutrition, it is now time for this approach to prove itself in practice by increasing the number of transactions and lowering its ticket size.

**BOX 14** describes the IDH Farmfit Fund, a fund blending finance from diverse sources consisting of large corporates, commercial banks, DFIs and governments.

## BOX 14

A UNIQUE COALITION TO BOOST SMALLHOLDER FARMER ACCESS  
FINANCE, SERVICES, AND MARKETS: EXAMPLE OF IDH FARMFIT FUND

Launched in 2019, the EUR 100 million IDH Farmfit Fund is funded by three leading companies (Jacobs DE, Mondelez and Unilever), two financial institutions (Rabobank and FMO) and the Dutch government, with additional de-risking guarantees from the government of the United States of America. It takes high-risk positions in smallholder financial transactions, reducing the cost and risk of investing in smallholders.

It uses a range of instruments including guarantees, subordinated loans, and equity and mezzanine financing to invest in sustainable businesses. These businesses include agribusinesses, financial service providers and innovators that provide services, inputs and credit to smallholders. A US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) guarantee of up to USD 250 million covers senior lenders' losses up to 50 percent.

The IDH Farmfit Fund stands out for the sizeable amount of capital it has raised from corporates, supported by concessionary capital from both the Dutch and US governments. The fund aims to build a robust, farmer-centric investment portfolio to increase the availability of affordable, long-term financing to farmers. Through a rigorous learning approach and the sharing of insights, the fund will demonstrate that farmer financing can be done on a commercially viable basis.

Challenges the IDH Farmfit Fund faces are often related to the investment-readiness of companies. Insufficient corporate governance within agri-SMEs often stands out as a significant barrier to investment.

Although the impact criteria and business case of many pipeline companies meet the conditions, corporate governance such as segregation of duties, financial reporting, and internal auditing often do not. Working with agri-SMEs to overcome these barriers makes for a time-consuming process – and sometimes stands in the way of a financial close.

Therefore, IDH has decided to put more focus on providing technical assistance tailored towards investment-readiness of agri-SMEs. IDH is now developing a model based on investment development hubs, finding and preparing projects for both blended and private finance. Eventually, IDH envisions these hubs being supported by a seed capital fund to provide financing that is not readily available in the market.

An example investment of the IDH Farmfit Fund is a EUR 1.4 million investment into Chicoa Fish Farm, a smallholder tilapia farm in Mozambique. The investment – taking the form of a convertible loan – will enable Chicoa to train smallholder farmers in raising tilapia in cages and ponds and will allow Chicoa to expand its capacity to supply these new farmers with fingerlings and feed. At the same time, the investment will support Chicoa in strengthening its supply-chain, creating a blueprint for the African aquaculture industry, and provide direct job opportunities for at least 350 smallholder farmers.

---

Sources: i) Based on the interviews delivered as part of the analysis for this report; ii) IDH. 2020. *IDH Annual Report 2020 – Sustainable business models delivering impact*.

## CHAPTER 10

# CONCLUSION

To improve food security and nutrition in Africa, a substantial increase in financing for transforming agrifood systems is required. Meeting SDG Targets 2.1 and 2.2, in particular, will require additional annual resources from now until 2030 that, based on existing studies, could be up to USD 420 billion. A robust policy, regulatory and institutional framework is essential to mobilize the necessary resources. The following strategies represent key policy recommendations aimed at increasing financing for food security and nutrition across the continent. Three strategies have the potential to catalyse progress: maximising the impact of existing investment, scaling-up public funding in the short- and long-term, and realizing the potential of the private sector.<sup>82</sup>

### **Maximize the impact of existing investment**

Realign incentives to ensure financial service providers of the agrifood system take a longer-term view with better management of health, environmental and social risks, redirecting finance into more sustainable assets and activities.

Support the creation of new business models and products that support the agrifood systems transformation towards food security and improved nutrition and which can thrive in the transformed system.

Redirect funding from capital-intensive, environmentally harmful, high-input assets in linear value chains to knowledge-based, regenerative and circular business models. These new models should prioritize value over volume, be more resilient, operate on a human scale, promote diversity and be in balance with nature.

Scale productive and regenerative agriculture. Agricultural systems and techniques that enhance soil health, reduce the use of chemical fertilisers and improve crop resilience should become more widespread. Combining traditional techniques like crop rotation and agroforestry with deeper knowledge of local soil, water and weather conditions will be key.

Transition from short-term investment strategies that fail to price in climate, health, social, and environmental risks to long-term investment approaches that factor in the value of nature and recognize the trillions of dollars in hidden costs associated with climate change, biodiversity loss, human health and livelihoods. These shifts would enhance access to affordable financing for marginalized groups, including low-income households, subsistence farmers, women, youth, Indigenous Peoples, migrant workers and their families, who disproportionately contribute to sustaining the food system.<sup>43</sup>

Repurpose public agricultural support that distorts prices and is harmful to environmental and social goals. Governments should repurpose some of the USD 540 billion that are annually allocated to agricultural producer support, some of which is environmentally and socially harmful, to incentivize sustainable practices and the production of nutritious foods like fruits and vegetables. Currently, 87 percent of this support distorts prices and disproportionately benefits emission-intensive commodities such as beef, milk, rice and sugar, contributing to negative health and climate outcomes.<sup>44</sup>

Redirecting fiscal incentives toward nature-positive investments, such as improved water quality management and conservation efforts, can yield significant benefits. Moreover, some of the existing public support is not being spent in the most effective way for economies and societies. For instance, optimizing public budget allocation in countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Nigeria could create nearly 1 million rural off-farm jobs, lift 2.8 million people out of poverty and enable 16 million more to afford a healthy diet – all within existing budgets.<sup>27</sup> This highlights the substantial opportunity cost of maintaining inefficient agricultural subsidies and underscores the transformative potential of budget optimization for sustainable development.

The development community and private sector should collaborate on mapping the financial intermediation chain for agrifood systems and then boost investment through this chain. Development finance actors need to map the demand for capital by agriculture companies and projects, and the supply of investment capital to the agricultural sector. To date, there have been several studies on the demands of finance, but these are mostly based on secondary literature and still lack a level of detail. This information can then be used to form policies to encourage the right supply of finance.

Central banks should introduce assessments of negative externalities for financial institutions. Investing in agrifood systems for food security and nutrition come with external costs. These constitute the difference between private costs and the total cost to society and may include costs of environmental, health, and economic impacts. The external costs of food systems represent risks to investments in the private sector and to economic prosperity for all. A 2023 study from Transformational Investing in Food Systems estimated that only 48 percent of the analysed investment funds had a due diligence process that included well-defined methods for identifying both existing and potential externalities, and that a vast majority of impact-oriented funds (83 percent) had metrics only on their positive externalities in their public impact reports.<sup>83</sup>

Develop a sound enabling environment, looking at the micro, meso and macro levels for agricultural finance. Agricultural finance is frequently portrayed as mainly involving micro-level interactions between financial service providers and their clients. However, this perspective is too simplistic. Agricultural finance markets also depend on infrastructure, regulation, investment and policies at the meso and macro levels. Therefore, to gain a comprehensive understanding of how governments can boost the development of agricultural finance in their countries, it is necessary to consider actions at all three levels:<sup>50</sup>

- ▶ at the micro level, to directly influence private sector financing (e.g. decisions on legal frameworks impacting land ownership, which can serve as collateral);
- ▶ at the meso level, to indirectly enable private sector financing (e.g. construction of roads and utilities, a national agricultural research plan or input market regulations on seeds); and
- ▶ at the macro level, to set a conducive overall policy and development agenda (e.g. key macroeconomic decisions around the openness of the economy and trade, or political associations).

Sound policy, institutional and regulatory frameworks for governing public–private partnerships for risk sharing in agribusiness development are a must. Promoting effective policies, robust institutional and regulatory frameworks, a well-considered land governance system, clear criteria, and transparent budget processes for selecting public–private projects and private partners, along with fair risk-sharing, are crucial for successful partnerships. However, critical issues like risk-sharing mechanisms to protect small farmers and conflict resolution strategies are often neglected in partnership designs. It is important that mechanisms for risk sharing and mitigation are incorporated into the partnership design with the objective of transferring some of the risk away from the most vulnerable partners, who may be smallholder farmers and their organizations. These tools may include agricultural insurances, guarantee funds, technical assistance, and capacity building training in business management.<sup>84</sup>

Invest in financial sector infrastructure as a public good. Allocate public sector expenditures to establishing and strengthening financial infrastructure, such as credit information bureaus, collateral registries and training institutes for financial institutions. Specific attention should be paid to expanding financial infrastructure into rural areas. This type of public expenditure fits well into the CAADP objective of 10 percent public financing for agriculture. Another example of financial sector infrastructure worth investing in is weather reporting stations required for weather index-based insurance.<sup>45</sup>

### **Scale up public funding and increase the share used for private investment mobilization**

Set clear, realistic and measurable targets. These targets should be backed with concrete public spending commitments and actions.

Governments and donors should increase the share of public funding used for private investment mobilization for food security and nutrition. As discussed in Chapter 9, blended finance has the potential to leverage additional private investment for food security and nutrition.

### **Realize the potential of the private sector**

Harness the potential of climate finance. Agrifood systems are both causes and victims of the climate and biodiversity crisis we find ourselves in. In addition, climate extremes are one of the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition. There is quite some expertise on climate finance, yet few have the expertise to understand specific climate-related agrifinance needs, design appropriate products and channel the large volume of climate capital into viable financial offerings that, in particular, make sense to improve food security and nutrition.

Provide derisking services to LFI. When the risks outweigh the returns, it can be difficult for LFI to generate a commercial return. In these instances, derisking mechanisms (such as agricultural insurances, guarantee funds, technical assistance and capacity building training in business management) can be crucial to increase private sector participation in investments that they otherwise would shy away from. Such mechanisms are typically provided by DFIs and governments.

## NOTES

1. **FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO.** 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en>
2. **WHO.** 2014. *Global nutrition targets 2025: Stunting policy brief (WHO/NMH/NHD/14.3)*. Geneva, WHO.
3. **FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO.** 2020. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020*. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. <https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/ca9692en>
4. **FAO, IFAD, WFP & WHO.** 2023. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 – Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3017en>
5. **WHO, UNICEF & WFP.** 2014. *Global nutrition targets 2025: Wasting policy brief (WHO/NMH/NHD/14.8)*. Geneva, WHO.
6. **FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO.** 2018. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018 – Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition*. Rome, FAO.
7. **WHO.** 2014. *Global nutrition targets 2025: Childhood overweight policy brief (WHO/NMH/NHD/14.6)*. Geneva, WHO.
8. **WHO.** 2024. *Global nutrition targets 2025: Anaemia policy brief (WHO/NMH/NHD/14.4)*. Geneva.
9. **WHO.** 2023. *Accelerating anaemia reduction: A comprehensive framework for action*. Geneva.
10. **WHO.** 2014. *Global nutrition targets 2025: Low birth weight policy brief (WHO/NMH/NHD/14.5)*. Geneva, WHO.
11. **FAO.** undated. *Supplementary material to Chapter 3*. [Cited 21 May 2025]. [https://www.fao.org/3/cd1254en/online/state-food-security-and-nutrition-2024/supplementary\\_material\\_to\\_chapter\\_3.html](https://www.fao.org/3/cd1254en/online/state-food-security-and-nutrition-2024/supplementary_material_to_chapter_3.html)
12. **Raga, S., Lemma, A., Papadavid, P., Velde, D.W. te, Geda, A., Bohlmann, H., Bohlmann, J. et al.** 2024. Impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on Africa: policy implications for navigating shocks and building resilience. In: *ODI: Think change*. [Cited 4 December 2024]. <https://odi.org/en/publications/impact-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-on-africa-policy-implications-for-navigating-shocks-and-building-resilience/>
13. **IMF.** 2023. *Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: The big funding squeeze*. International Monetary Fund.
14. **Matheson, R.** 2016. Study: Mobile-money services lift Kenyans out of poverty. In: *MIT News*. [Cited 12 May 2025]. <https://news.mit.edu/2016/mobile-money-kenyans-out-poverty-1208>
15. **NEPAD.** 2014. *Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation*. NEPAD. [Cited 12 May 2025]. <https://www.nepad.org/caadp/publication/malabo-declaration-accelerated-agricultural-growth>
16. **IMF.** 2022. Building a more food-secure sub-Saharan Africa. In: *Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa – Living on the Edge*. Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund.
17. **African Union.** 2022. *Launch of the 3RD CAADP Biennial Review Report | African Union*. [Cited 12 May 2025]. <https://au.int/en/newsevents/20220310/launch-3rd-caadp-biennial-review-report>

18. United Nations Food Systems Hub. undated. Strengthening Africa's food systems: National Convenors unite for the UN Food Systems Summit. In: *UNFoodSystems*. [Cited 12 May 2025]. <https://www.unfoodsystemshub.org/latest-updates/news/detail/strengthening-africa's-food-systems-national-convenors-unite-for-the-2023-stocktaking-moment/en>
19. **AGRA**. 2022. *Empowering Africa's food systems for the future*. Issue 11. Nairobi.
20. **AGRA**. 2019. *Africa Agriculture Status Report: The Hidden Middle: A Quiet Revolution in the Private Sector Driving Agricultural Transformation*. Issue 7. Nairobi.
21. **Shirley, R.** 2021. Energy for food, livelihoods, and resilience: An integrated development agenda for Africa. *Science Direct*, 4(4): 478–481.
22. **ISF Advisors**. 2022. *The state of the agri-SME sector: Bridging the finance gap*. CASA. <https://www.casaprogramme.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/the-state-of-the-agri-sme-sector-bridging-the-finance-gap.pdf>
23. **Development Committee**. 2023. *Ending Poverty on a Livable Planet: Report to Governors on World Bank Evolution*. DC2023-0004. Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF. <https://www.devcommittee.org/content/dam/sites/devcommittee/doc/documents/2023/Final%20Updated%20Evolution%20Paper%20DC2023-0003.pdf>
24. **Apampa A, Clubb C, Cosgrove BE, Gambarelli G, Loth H, Newman R, Rodriguez Osuna V, Oudelaar J, Tasse A.** 2021. *Scaling up critical finance for sustainable food systems through blended finance*. CCAFS Discussion Paper. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).
25. **IMF**. 2025. *DSA list*. International Monetary Fund. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist.pdf>
26. **Comelli, F., David, A., Eyraud, L., Kovacs, P., Montoya, J. & Sode, A.** undated. How to Avoid a Debt Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: *IMF*. [Cited 13 May 2025]. <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/26/cf-how-to-avoid-a-debt-crisis-in-sub-saharan-africa>
27. **Sánchez, M.V., Cicowiez, M., Pernechele, V. & Battaglia, L.** 2024. *The opportunity cost of not repurposing public expenditure in food and agriculture in sub-Saharan African countries – Background paper for The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024*. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 24-07. Rome, FAO.
28. **OECD**. n.d. Official development assistance (ODA). In: *OECD*. [Cited 13 May 2025]. <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/official-development-assistance-oda.html>
29. **OECD**. n.d. Official development assistance – Definition and coverage. In: *OECD*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/oda-eligibility-and-conditions/official-development-assistance--definition-and-coverage.html>
30. **Perera, O., Smaller, C., El Harty, K. and Lefebvre, L.** 2024. **Unleashing the catalytic power of donor financing to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2**. Global Donor Platform for Rural Development and Shamba Centre for Food & Climate.
31. **OECD**. 2024. Official development assistance (ODA) – Frequently asked questions. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/insights/data-explainers/2024/07/frequently-asked-questions-on-official-development-assistance-oda.html>

32. **Morgan, S., Farris, J., and Johnson, M.E.** 2022. *Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Recent Trends Leading up to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)*. EIB-242. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
33. **World Bank.** 2024. Remittances. In: *World Bank Group*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migration/brief/remittances-knomad>
34. **IFAD.** 2023. *RemitScope – Africa*. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
35. **European Commission.** 2013. The common agricultural policy (CAP) and agriculture in Europe – Frequently asked questions. In: *European Commission*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo\\_13\\_631](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_13_631)
36. **ABP.** 2024. Year Report 2023. In: *ABP*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://www.abp.nl/english/press-releases/2024/january/year-report-2023>
37. **NYSE.** 2025. Trading & Data. In: *NYSE*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://www.nyse.com/trading-data>
38. **FAO.** n.d. Chapter 5: Policies and investments for healthy diets across the rural–urban continuum. In: *FAO*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/3/cc3017en/online/state-food-security-and-nutrition-2023/policies-and-investments.html>
39. **USAID.** 2023. *Bridging the gap – Financing Africa’s agricultural growth*. USAID. [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/Financing\\_Statement-of-Support-20230911\\_1.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/Financing_Statement-of-Support-20230911_1.pdf)
40. **Fallas Conejo, D. & Sánchez, M.V.** 2024. *Leveraging remittance-based matching grants for investing in agribusiness development*. FAO. <https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd2427en>
41. **Nutrition International.** 2024. The Cost of Inaction Tool. In: *Nutrition International*. [Cited 15 May 2025]. <https://www.nutritionintl.org/learning-resource/cost-inaction-tool/>
42. **Wellesley, L., Eis, J., Marijs, C., and Vexler, C.** 2020. *Chatham House Report: The Business Case for Investment in Nutrition*. Chatham House.
43. **World Bank.** 2021. *Food finance architecture: Financing a healthy, equitable, and sustainable food system*. Washington, DC, World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/879401632342154766>
44. **FAO, UNEP, and UNDP.** 2021. *A multi-billion-dollar opportunity – Repurposing agricultural support to transform food systems*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb6562en>
45. **AU, GIZ, BMZ, MFW4A.** 2012. *Policy brief on agricultural finance in Africa*. Tunis, Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A). [https://genderworks.giz.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Policy\\_Brief\\_on\\_Agricultural\\_Finance\\_in\\_Africa.pdf](https://genderworks.giz.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Policy_Brief_on_Agricultural_Finance_in_Africa.pdf)
46. **FAO.** 2021. *Seizing the opportunities of the African Continental Free Trade Area for the economic empowerment of women in agriculture*. Accra, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb6966en>
47. **Seema, N., Seyyed, F.J., & Shehzad, C.T.** n.d. Impact of gender on access to finance in developing countries. *Applied Economics*, 53(57): 6582–6610.
48. **Ankrah A.D., Freeman C.Y., & Afful A.A.** n.d. Gendered access to productive resources – Evidence from small holder farmers in Awutu Senya West District of Ghana. *Scientific African*, 10.
49. **Banerjee, R., Gulati, K., O’Sullivan, M.B., Rao, A.S. & Vinez, M.L.** 2014. *Levelling the field – Improving opportunities for women farmers in Africa (Vol 1. of 2) (English)*. Washington, DC, World Bank Group. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/579161468007198488>
50. **Husar, M.** 2020. How governments incentivize private sector involvement in agricultural finance. In: *ISF Advisors*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://isfadvisors.org/how-governments-incentivize-private-sector-involvement-in-agricultural-finance/>

51. **Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Klapper, L.** 2017. Measuring financial Inclusion and the fintech revolution. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1: 273–321.
52. **World Bank.** 2016. *Agricultural sector risk assessment: Methodological guidance for practitioners*. Agriculture global practice discussion paper 10. Washington, DC, World Bank Group. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/586561467994685817/pdf/100320-WP-P147595-Box394840B-PUBLIC-01132016.pdf>
53. **Buchenrieder, G., & Schmid, J.** 2017. Land tenure and agricultural finance: Exploring the Links to smallholder development in Africa. *Land Use Policy*, 63: 123–132.
54. **Munyua, H., & Wambugu, S.** 2018. Public-private partnerships in agriculture: Enhancing financial access for farmers. *African Journal of Agricultural Research*, 13(7): 364–371.
55. **Giné, X., & Yang, D.** 2018. Insurance, credit, and technology adoption: The impact of weather index insurance on agricultural productivity in Malawi. *American Economic Review*, 108(7): 2218–2255.
56. **Badiane, O., & Lynam, J.** 2019. Investing in agricultural innovation and extension services for Improved food security in Africa. *Global Food Security*, 20: 142–150.
57. **Lederman, D., & Maloney, W.F.** 2021. *The African Continental Free Trade Area: An assessment of the potential impact on trade and agriculture*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9543
58. **Okou, C., Spray, J., & D. Filiz Unsal.** 2022. Africa food prices are soaring amid high import reliance. In: *IMF*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/09/26/africa-food-prices-are-soaring-amid-high-import-reliance>
59. **Aceli Africa.** 2020. *Bridging the financing gap: Unlocking the impact potential of agricultural SMEs in Africa*. Aceli Africa. [https://aceli africa.ams3.digitaloceanspaces.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/08173725/Aceli-Africa\\_Full-Benchmarking-Report.pdf](https://aceli africa.ams3.digitaloceanspaces.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/08173725/Aceli-Africa_Full-Benchmarking-Report.pdf)
60. **Berg, L.** undated. Towards market transparency in smallholder finance. In: *Dalberg*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://dalberg.com/our-ideas/towards-market-transparency-in-smallholder-finance/>
61. **Dalberg.** 2018. *The economics of agri-SME lending in East Africa: Summary document*. Dalberg. [https://smallfoundation.ie/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/the\\_economics\\_of\\_agri\\_sme\\_lending\\_in\\_east\\_africa\\_summary\\_report.pdf](https://smallfoundation.ie/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/the_economics_of_agri_sme_lending_in_east_africa_summary_report.pdf)
62. **African Union.** 2022. *Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy 2015–2025*. African Union. <https://au.int/en/documents/20220401/africa-regional-nutrition-strategy-2015-2025>
63. **Hamlin, P.** n.d. *Exploring the linkages between food security and microfinance: A study by FINCA in Zambia and Guatemala*. Field Brief No. 11. FINCA. [https://www.fhi360.org/wp-content/uploads/drupal/documents/FIELD\\_Brief%20No%2011\\_FINCA%20Food%20Security%20and%20Microfinance%20FINAL.pdf](https://www.fhi360.org/wp-content/uploads/drupal/documents/FIELD_Brief%20No%2011_FINCA%20Food%20Security%20and%20Microfinance%20FINAL.pdf)
64. **OECD.** n.d. Leveraging private finance for development. In: *OECD*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/leveraging-private-finance-for-development.html>
65. **FAO.** undated. Climate-smart agriculture. In: *FAO*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://www.fao.org/climate-smart-agriculture/en/>
66. **Marano, M.** 2022. Four steps to transitioning to regenerative agriculture. In: *The Rockefeller Foundation*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/perspective/four-steps-to-transitioning-to-regenerative-agriculture/>
67. **Orwothwun, C. & Qutieshat, A.** 2022. Agriculture value chain finance in Uganda: A brief review of literature. *Open Access Library Journal*, 9. <https://doi.org/doi:10.4236/oalib.1108645>
68. **Kisakye, S.** 2019. *The impact of value chain finance on agriculture productivity in Uganda: Case study of Kaliro Sugar Cane Outgrowers Association*. Kampala, Makerere University. PhD thesis.

69. **Ahabyoona, F. and Lubega, J.T.** 2018. Enhancing credit facilitation processes for agricultural cooperatives in Uganda: Decisions that matter. *International Journal of Technology and Management*, 3.
70. **Convergence.** undated. Convergence blended finance market data – Historical deals summary analysis. In: *Convergence*. [Cited 13 August 2024]. <https://www.convergence.finance/historical/deal-summary-analysis>
71. **OECD.** 2024. Blended finance. In: *OECD*. [Cited 9 May 2024]. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/blended-finance-principles>
72. **Convergence.** 2019. *Bridging the linguistics gap: Common terms defined differently by USAID and INVESTORS – Presented at PIVOT in-person meeting*. Toronto, Convergence.
73. **Convergence.** undated. Blended finance. In: *Convergence*. [Cited 17 May 2025]. <https://www.convergence.finance/blended-finance>
74. **USAID.** 2020. *USAID Invest blended finance starter kit*. USAID. <https://www.convergence.finance/resource/usaid-invest-blended-finance-starter-kit:-10-questions-for-mobilizing-private-capital-for-better-development-results/view>
75. **OECD.** 2018. *Making blended finance work for the Sustainable Development Goals*. OECD. [https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/making-blended-finance-work-for-the-sustainable-development-goals\\_9789264288768-en.html](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/making-blended-finance-work-for-the-sustainable-development-goals_9789264288768-en.html)
76. **Habel, V., Jackson, E., Orth, M., Richter, J. & Harten, S.** 2021. *Evaluating blended finance instruments and mechanisms: Approaches and methods*. OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, No. 101. Paris, OECD Publishing.
77. **Global Impact Investing.** 2013. *Catalytic first-loss capital*. Issue brief. Global Impact Investing. <https://thegiin.org/publication/research/catalytic-first-loss-capital/>
78. **Johnston, J.** 2019. *Blending with guarantees: Hope or hype?*. Convergence. <https://www.convergence.finance/news-and-events/news/5sx7ivKz7eNwZBILNRfN87/view>
79. **Bove, R., Nordhagen, S., & Zonnenberg, M.** 2023. *Innovative finance for nutrition*. Discussion Paper #14. Geneva, Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN). <https://doi.org/10.36072/dp.14>
80. **OXFAM, Development Initiatives & UK Aid Network.** 2019. *Innovation and effectiveness? Challenges, risks and opportunities for blended finance*. Guidance note. <https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/innovation-and-effectiveness-challenges-risks-and-opportunities-blended-finance>
81. **Convergence.** 2022. *Blended finance for food systems*. Data brief. Toronto, Convergence. <https://www.convergence.finance/resource/blended-finance-for-food-systems/view>
82. **Economist.** 2023. *Ending hunger: The role of agri-food financing*. Economist Impact report. <https://impact.economist.com/perspectives/sites/default/files/endinghunger.pdf>
83. **Transformational Investing in Food Systems.** 2023. *Food systems investing in East Africa: The roles of funds in financing food systems transformation*. [https://www.tifsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/TIFS\\_Investing-in-East-Africa-Food-Systems-Aug2023-Final.pdf](https://www.tifsinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/TIFS_Investing-in-East-Africa-Food-Systems-Aug2023-Final.pdf)
84. **FAO & AUC.** 2024. *Guide for the design and implementation of public–private partnerships for agribusiness development in Africa*. Rome, FAO.

## Table 17 sources

**Row 1.** Authors' (FAO) own elaboration based on FAO, IFAD & WFP. 2015. *Achieving Zero Hunger: The critical role of investments in social protection and agriculture*. Rome, FAO. <https://www.fao.org/3/i4951e/i4951e.pdf>

**Row 2.** Dalberg & KFW. 2018. *Africa agricultural finance market landscape*. [Cited 4 December 2024]. [https://agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resources/the\\_economics\\_of\\_agri\\_sme\\_lending\\_in\\_east\\_africa\\_final\\_report.pdf](https://agrilinks.org/sites/default/files/resources/the_economics_of_agri_sme_lending_in_east_africa_final_report.pdf)

**Row 3.** ISF Advisors. 2022. *The state of the agri-SME sector-Bridging the finance gap*. CASA. [Cited 5 May 2025.] <https://www.casaprogramme.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/the-state-of-the-agri-sme-sector-bridging-the-finance-gap.pdf>

**Row 4.** Laborde, D., Bizikova, L., Lallemand, T. & Smaller, C. 2016. *Ending hunger: What would it cost?* Winnipeg, Canada, IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development) and IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute). <https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/ending-hunger-what-wouldit-cost.pdf>

**Row 5.** Laborde, D., Murphy, S., Parent, M., Porciello, J. & Smaller, C. 2020. *Ceres2030: Sustainable solutions to end hunger*. Summary report. Cornell University, IFPRI and IISD.

**Row 6.** Laborde, D. & Torero, M. 2023. *Modeling actions for transforming agrifood systems*. In: J. von Braun, K. Afsana, L.O. Fresco & M.H. Ali Hassan, eds. *Science and Innovations for Food Systems Transformation*, pp. 105–132.

**Row 7.** Mason-D'Croz, D., Sulser, T.B., Wiebe, K., Rosegrant, M.W., Lowder, S.K., Nin-Pratt, A., Willenbockel, D., Robinson, S., Zhu, T., Cenacchi, N., Dunston, S. & Robertson, R.D. 2019. *Agricultural investments and hunger in Africa modeling potential contributions to SDG2 – Zero Hunger*. *World Development*, 116, 38–53. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.12.006>

**Row 8.** i) Shekar, M., Kakietek, J., Eberwein, J.D. & Walters, D. 2017. *An investment framework for nutrition: Reaching the global targets for stunting, anemia, breastfeeding, and wasting*. *Directions in Development Series*. Washington, DC, World Bank.; ii) ZEF (Center for Development Research of the University of Bonn) & FAO. 2020. *Investment costs and policy action opportunities for reaching a world without hunger (SDG2)*. Rome and Bonn. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cb1497en>; iii) Shekar, M., Shibata Okamura, K., Vilar-Compte, M., Dell'Aira, C. eds. 2024. *Investment Framework for Nutrition 2024*. *Human Development Perspectives Overview booklet*. Washington, DC, World Bank.

# GLOSSARY

<b>Agrifood system</b>	The entire range of actors and their interlinked value-adding activities involved in the production, aggregation, processing, distribution, consumption and disposal of food products, and the socioeconomic and natural environments in which they are embedded.
<b>Bank</b>	Financial institution, either privately or publicly owned, that is regulated as a deposit-taking institution by the central bank in its country of domiciliation.
<b>Blended finance</b>	The strategic use of development or concessional finance for the mobilization of additional finance, usually commercial private finance, towards sustainable development.
<b>Catalytic capital</b>	Financing provided with the intent to mobilize private sector financing. The definition of catalytic capital can vary widely. In this report, catalytic capital only refers to financial instruments priced below-market (concessional), with evidence of the intent to mitigate investment risks and/or enhance the expected returns for private sector investors.
<b>Commercial investment</b>	An investment that has the capacity to generate a risk-adjusted market-rate return and, therefore, presents no need for concessional funds or grants.
<b>Concessional capital</b>	Funds provided on below-market terms within the capital structure of a financial transaction to reduce the overall cost-of-capital for the borrower and/or provide additional downside protection to more senior investors (if in a first-loss position). Concessional capital can be provided through a diversity of financial instruments, including debt, equity, grant funding and mezzanine capital. The goal of concessional capital is to increase social and environmental impact, while for catalytic capital it is to mobilize private capital (in most cases, also to increase the impact of deals).
<b>Currency swap</b>	Agreement between two parties to exchange principal/interest payments of a loan in one currency for an equivalent loan in another currency, to hedge (at least partially) exposure to currency risk.
<b>Deal flow</b>	The rate at which investment offers are presented to funding institutions. This determines the number of investment opportunities at a given time to a particular company or investor, or within a particular region or market sector.
<b>Due diligence</b>	The process through which a potential buyer or investor carries out in-depth analysis of a target company.
<b>Financial close</b>	The stage during which the financing documents are signed, after the prior conditions for the availability of financing have been fulfilled.

<b>Financial instrument</b>	Legal agreement between individuals or parties involving any kind of monetary value.
<b>First loss cover</b>	An instrument, provision, or agreement that is used first if a business encounters loss and cannot repay its debts. While there are various methods, in the agricultural finance sector, the most used is when a percentage of the loan amount is provided to a reserve account (e.g. 10 percent or 20 percent of the loan amount), which can be drawn on to cover first losses.
<b>Fiscal subsidies</b>	Fiscal subsidies are budget transfers made by governments in the context of policy measures, projects and programmes to individual actors of the food and agriculture sector, such as farmers (fiscal subsidies to producers) or consumers (fiscal subsidies to consumers). Fiscal subsidies to producers aim to reduce production costs or increase farm income and can be granted depending on output, input use or use of other factors of production. Fiscal subsidies to consumers include transfers under social protection programmes (given to final consumers) and food subsidies to lower the cost of food (provided to intermediaries such as processors, traders and transporters).
<b>Grant</b>	A financial resource that does not have to be paid back. In some cases, a grant can be repaid if it successfully catalyses a commercial activity.
<b>Guarantee</b>	A risk-sharing agreement under which a guarantor agrees to pay part or the entire amount due on a loan, equity or other instrument to a lender/investor in the event of non-payment by the borrower, or loss of value in case of investment.
<b>Investment approach</b>	A broad method of financial instruments and preferences that are permissible for a certain investment manager.
<b>Mezzanine finance</b>	A hybrid of debt and equity financing that typically gives the lender the right to a share in the profits or to convert to an equity interest in the company in case of default.
<b>Non-bank financial Institution</b>	A lender that is not subject to central bank regulations as a deposit-taking institution
<b>Pari passu</b>	Two or more parties to a financial contract or claim are all treated the same.
<b>Philanthropic capital</b>	Capital from private sources invested as grants or at below-market rates of return.
<b>Private capital</b>	Capital from private sources that aims to generate risk-adjusted market rates of return.
<b>Public capital</b>	Sources of capital provided by the public sector (governments).

<b>Remittances</b>	Funds sent by people who are living and working abroad back to their home countries.
<b>Subordinated loan</b>	A loan (also called junior debt/loan) that has a lower priority for repayment than senior loans, but a higher one than shareholders.
<b>Senior loan</b>	A loan to a project or company that holds legal claim to the borrower's assets above all other debt obligations and shareholders. In the event of bankruptcy or foreclosure, it will be the first loan to be repaid before any other creditors or shareholders receive repayment.
<b>Structuring approach</b>	A specific combination of debt, equity, or grant capital used to finance an investment, including the priority of investors and lenders in terms of absorbing losses and earning a return.

# APPENDIX 1

## DATA TABLES

**TABLE A1**

Prevalence of undernourishment (percent)

	2000–2002	2004–2006	2009–2011	2014–2016	2018–2020	2019–2021	2020–2022	2021–2023
<b>World</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>7.8</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>9.1</b>
<b>Africa</b>	22.3	19.9	16.2	16.1	17.8	18.5	19.4	19.9
<b>Central Africa</b>	36.1	33.0	24.5	23.3	25.8	27.0	27.8	28.9
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	36.9	32.4	24.9	24.8	27.5	28.3	29.0	29.0
<b>Northern Africa</b>	8.0	7.7	6.2	5.6	6.1	6.5	6.9	7.5
<b>Southern Africa</b>	5.0	4.8	6.5	7.7	7.4	8.1	8.9	9.4
<b>Western Africa</b>	14.8	12.2	11.4	11.5	12.5	13.1	14.2	15.0
<b>Algeria</b>	7.5	6.2	4.1	2.6	<2.5	<2.5	<2.5	<2.5
<b>Angola</b>	67.4	52.2	22.8	14.0	18.0	20.5	22.1	23.2
<b>Benin</b>	17.2	11.4	9.8	9.2	11.5	10.8	10.4	10.3
<b>Botswana</b>	23.7	22.9	22.0	20.3	22.7	22.9	24.2	24.3
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	22.7	17.3	15.1	13.5	14.4	15.1	15.1	15.4
<b>Burundi</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	14.9	11.1	14.1	16.8	14.0	13.2	12.6	12.6
<b>Cameroon</b>	22.6	15.7	6.2	4.8	6.1	5.9	5.8	5.7
<b>Central African Republic</b>	38.2	38.7	24.7	24.0	21.4	21.8	22.7	23.5
<b>Chad</b>	38.4	34.6	25.1	25.8	29.7	31.8	33.6	35.1
<b>Comoros</b>	24.9	16.6	17.3	13.9	13.4	13.9	15.7	16.9
<b>Congo</b>	26.9	29.1	40.5	29.3	29.1	27.8	27.1	26.8
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	20.2	19.3	16.6	13.2	9.5	8.8	9.1	9.6
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	30.4	31.7	29.6	31.5	33.8	35.0	35.7	37.0
<b>Djibouti</b>	41.9	30.1	19.9	13.2	11.9	11.9	12.3	12.9
<b>Egypt</b>	4.8	5.9	5.2	6.3	6.7	6.9	7.6	8.5
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	10.4	9.5	21.0	15.8	11.6	11.3	11.6	12.4

**TABLE A1**  
(Continued)

	2000–2002	2004–2006	2009–2011	2014–2016	2018–2020	2019–2021	2020–2022	2021–2023
<b>Ethiopia</b>	46.6	37.0	21.9	14.4	20.9	23.0	23.5	22.2
<b>Gabon</b>	10.8	14.6	14.1	14.1	18.8	19.7	20.1	20.1
<b>Gambia</b>	17.9	17.6	8.9	11.9	15.9	17.1	19.3	20.5
<b>Ghana</b>	14.9	11.1	7.0	9.7	6.9	6.0	5.9	6.2
<b>Guinea</b>	17.9	16.3	17.4	12.8	11.7	10.4	9.9	10.3
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	15.7	16.4	21.0	30.0	30.7	31.7	32.4	32.2
<b>Kenya</b>	31.9	28.2	21.7	20.5	23.4	26.0	31.1	34.5
<b>Lesotho</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Liberia</b>	36.2	33.4	32.9	35.6	36.5	37.5	38.3	38.4
<b>Libya</b>	3.5	4.8	6.6	7.8	9.9	11.0	11.9	11.4
<b>Madagascar</b>	33.9	33.5	26.9	30.8	36.0	37.6	38.9	39.7
<b>Malawi</b>	23.3	21.3	13.6	15.5	18.5	19.0	19.4	19.9
<b>Mali</b>	16.6	13.1	6.6	4.8	4.7	4.6	7.1	9.6
<b>Mauritania</b>	8.1	9.1	7.0	6.7	7.0	7.5	8.3	9.3
<b>Mauritius</b>	5.8	5.2	5.2	6.8	7.2	7.2	6.7	5.9
<b>Morocco</b>	5.8	4.8	4.8	3.7	4.1	5.3	6.4	6.9
<b>Mozambique</b>	36.8	33.7	22.2	42.3	30.9	28.3	26.3	24.8
<b>Namibia</b>	15.6	20.0	29.2	21.8	19.1	19.1	20.5	22.2
<b>Niger</b>	23.2	19.0	15.9	13.3	11.0	12.0	12.5	13.3
<b>Nigeria</b>	8.8	7.0	9.2	10.5	13.6	15.1	17.0	18.0
<b>Rwanda</b>	37.7	36.9	35.7	34.7	34.9	34.7	33.2	31.4
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	15.4	10.3	16.5	18.1	16.3	15.5	15.7	16.4
<b>Senegal</b>	24.4	18.0	10.9	9.6	5.6	4.7	4.5	4.6
<b>Seychelles</b>	2.6	2.6	3.8	3.9	<2.5	<2.5	<2.5	<2.5
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	50.1	46.2	27.1	24.5	28.2	28.2	28.2	28.4
<b>Somalia</b>	70.2	70.0	71.4	60.0	53.3	51.1	50.7	51.3
<b>South Africa</b>	3.7	3.4	4.6	6.5	6.2	6.9	7.7	8.1
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	19.6	19.3	19.6
<b>Sudan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9.2	10.8	11.1	11.0	11.4
<b>Togo</b>	31.5	27.0	20.3	20.2	18.3	16.0	14.1	12.8
<b>Tunisia</b>	4.1	4.0	3.7	3.2	2.8	3.2	3.4	3.2
<b>Uganda</b>	21.0	18.6	20.4	33.3	37.3	37.1	36.8	36.9
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	32.6	28.4	24.1	21.9	23.7	23.5	23.9	23.8
<b>Zambia</b>	50.1	49.1	42.7	34.0	31.2	32.9	34.4	35.4
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	32.8	29.6	26.2	33.0	39.4	39.5	38.9	38.1

NOTES: The 2021–2023 average values reflect 2023 projections that are based on nowcasts. n.a. = data not available; n.r. = not reported.  
SOURCE: FAO, 2024. FAOSTAT: *Suite of Food Security Indicators*. [Accessed 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

TABLE A2

Number of undernourished people (millions)

	2000–2002	2004–2006	2009–2011	2014–2016	2018–2020	2019–2021	2020–2022	2021–2023
<b>World</b>	<b>807.3</b>	<b>788.3</b>	<b>605.7</b>	<b>559.0</b>	<b>602.5</b>	<b>653.1</b>	<b>700.6</b>	<b>722.0</b>
<b>Africa</b>	187.2	184.6	170.4	193.5	236.2	252.4	270.1	284.0
<b>Central Africa</b>	36.2	37.5	32.7	36.7	46.2	49.9	53.0	56.6
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	98.2	96.5	85.5	97.7	120.2	127.2	133.9	137.3
<b>Northern Africa</b>	14.0	14.6	12.9	12.9	15.1	16.2	17.7	19.4
<b>Southern Africa</b>	2.7	2.7	3.8	4.9	4.9	5.5	6.1	6.4
<b>Western Africa</b>	36.2	33.3	35.5	41.3	49.8	53.6	59.4	64.2
<b>Algeria</b>	2.3	2.0	1.5	1.0	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Angola</b>	11.4	10.2	5.3	3.9	5.8	6.9	7.6	8.3
<b>Benin</b>	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
<b>Botswana</b>	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.5
<b>Burundi</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
<b>Cameroon</b>	3.5	2.7	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
<b>Central African Republic</b>	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3
<b>Chad</b>	3.3	3.5	3.0	3.6	4.8	5.3	5.8	6.2
<b>Comoros</b>	0.1	<0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>Congo</b>	0.9	1.1	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.1	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.7
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	15.3	18.0	19.7	24.8	30.4	32.6	34.2	36.6
<b>Djibouti</b>	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>Egypt</b>	3.5	4.6	4.6	6.2	7.1	7.4	8.3	9.4
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>Ethiopia</b>	32.2	28.7	19.6	14.8	23.8	26.9	28.3	27.3
<b>Gabon</b>	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
<b>Gambia</b>	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6
<b>Ghana</b>	3.0	2.5	1.8	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.9	2.1
<b>Guinea</b>	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7
<b>Kenya</b>	10.2	10.1	9.0	9.6	11.9	13.5	16.5	18.7
<b>Lesotho</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Liberia</b>	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0
<b>Libya</b>	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8
<b>Madagascar</b>	5.7	6.3	5.8	7.6	9.9	10.6	11.2	11.8
<b>Malawi</b>	2.7	2.7	2.0	2.6	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.1
<b>Mali</b>	1.9	1.7	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.6	2.2

**TABLE A2**  
(Continued)

	2000–2002	2004–2006	2009–2011	2014–2016	2018–2020	2019–2021	2020–2022	2021–2023
<b>Mauritania</b>	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
<b>Mauritius</b>	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
<b>Morocco</b>	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.9	2.4	2.6
<b>Mozambique</b>	6.7	6.8	5.1	11.4	9.4	8.8	8.4	8.2
<b>Namibia</b>	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
<b>Niger</b>	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.5
<b>Nigeria</b>	11.1	9.9	14.9	19.3	27.7	31.6	36.3	39.4
<b>Rwanda</b>	3.1	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.3
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
<b>Senegal</b>	2.4	2.0	1.4	1.4	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8
<b>Seychelles</b>	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	2.4	2.6	1.7	1.8	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4
<b>Somalia</b>	6.4	7.3	8.6	8.3	8.5	8.4	8.7	9.0
<b>South Africa</b>	1.8	1.7	2.4	3.6	3.6	4.1	4.6	4.9
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.1	2.1	2.1
<b>Sudan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.5	4.7	4.9	5.0	5.3
<b>Togo</b>	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1
<b>Tunisia</b>	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
<b>Uganda</b>	5.2	5.2	6.6	12.5	16.0	16.5	16.9	17.4
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	11.5	11.2	10.9	11.5	14.2	14.5	15.2	15.6
<b>Zambia</b>	5.1	5.7	5.9	5.5	5.7	6.2	6.7	7.1
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	3.9	3.6	3.4	4.7	6.0	6.2	6.2	6.2

NOTES: The 2021–2023 average values reflect 2023 projections that are based on nowcasts. n.a. = data not available; n.r. = not reported, as the prevalence is less than 2.5 percent.

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: *Suite of food security indicators*. [Accessed 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

TABLE A3

Prevalence of food insecurity (percent)

	Severe food insecurity				Moderate or severe food insecurity			
	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023
<b>World</b>	<b>7.6</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>10.9</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>29.0</b>
<b>Africa</b>	17.2	18.9	20.5	21.6	46.3	50.8	54.2	57.7
<b>Central Africa</b>	n.a.	n.a.	36.2	37.6	n.a.	n.a.	71.7	76.7
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	22.0	23.8	25.6	25.5	58.5	62.9	64.2	65.4
<b>Northern Africa</b>	9.8	9.4	9.8	11.7	28.6	30.8	31.0	33.4
<b>Southern Africa</b>	9.1	9.3	10.4	10.9	21.5	21.9	23.7	24.1
<b>Western Africa</b>	11.2	13.9	16.0	17.8	39.7	46.9	54.6	60.7
<b>Algeria</b>	13.0	9.3	6.2	5.6	22.9	17.6	19.0	18.9
<b>Angola</b>	n.a.	24.0	30.4	31.9	n.a.	70.1	77.7	79.2
<b>Benin</b>	10.4	14.8	14.5	15.8	55.0	65.8	61.9	63.3
<b>Botswana</b>	18.4	23.1	25.4	26.4	46.5	53.1	55.6	54.8
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	n.a.	6.0	6.8	7.2	n.a.	39.1	40.1	40.7
<b>Burundi</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20.9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	70.8
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	n.a.	8.6	6.4	6.0	n.a.	36.4	35.4	34.3
<b>Cameroon</b>	22.3	28.1	26.7	25.4	49.9	57.0	55.8	59.6
<b>Central African Republic</b>	n.a.	n.a.	61.8	61.8	n.a.	n.a.	81.3	81.3
<b>Chad</b>	32.4	39.7	36.4	36.4	67.9	76.3	74.9	76.6
<b>Comoros</b>	n.a.	n.a.	27.4	27.4	n.a.	n.a.	79.7	79.7
<b>Congo</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	38.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	79.9
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	6.2	9.1	9.1	8.9	34.1	38.2	40.4	39.4
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	n.a.	n.a.	39.2	41.7	n.a.	n.a.	72.3	80.2
<b>Djibouti</b>	n.a.	n.a.	16.5	16.5	n.a.	n.a.	49.2	49.2
<b>Egypt</b>	8.4	7.4	7.1	10.4	27.8	31.2	27.3	29.8
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	n.a.	n.a.	14.0	17.2	n.a.	n.a.	59.4	55.9
<b>Ethiopia</b>	14.5	14.1	19.6	19.7	56.2	57.9	56.2	59.0
<b>Gabon</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Gambia</b>	n.a.	24.6	27.1	25.5	n.a.	54.3	58.0	59.0
<b>Ghana</b>	5.1	6.2	5.6	8.2	38.3	39.5	36.6	42.4
<b>Guinea</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	n.a.	8.3	8.7	9.0	n.a.	61.8	62.3	62.5
<b>Kenya</b>	15.0	23.4	26.1	28.0	50.7	64.4	69.5	72.8
<b>Lesotho</b>	n.a.	27.0	30.9	32.8	n.a.	49.7	54.4	56.7
<b>Liberia</b>	38.6	n.a.	37.3	37.3	79.7	n.a.	80.6	81.0
<b>Libya</b>	11.2	16.7	20.7	19.9	29.1	35.7	39.4	37.9
<b>Madagascar</b>	n.a.	9.5	10.3	14.9	n.a.	58.0	61.1	68.6
<b>Malawi</b>	47.7	48.3	51.0	53.5	78.1	78.8	81.3	81.7

**TABLE A3**  
(Continued)

	Severe food insecurity				Moderate or severe food insecurity			
	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023
<b>Mali</b>	n.a.	3.1	2.8	2.7	n.a.	25.2	21.9	20.0
<b>Mauritania</b>	4.6	5.9	7.2	11.6	26.3	35.9	45.3	61.2
<b>Mauritius</b>	5.2	6.8	9.1	10.2	13.0	20.7	28.2	31.2
<b>Morocco</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Mozambique</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Namibia</b>	28.8	31.3	32.6	31.9	53.2	56.4	57.9	56.8
<b>Niger</b>	n.a.	9.7	8.3	7.5	n.a.	50.0	50.2	50.3
<b>Nigeria</b>	11.0	15.1	19.8	22.6	34.7	47.1	62.9	73.9
<b>Rwanda</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	n.a.	n.a.	14.1	14.1	n.a.	n.a.	54.6	54.6
<b>Senegal</b>	7.5	6.8	5.1	4.0	39.0	35.1	31.6	29.4
<b>Seychelles</b>	3.2	n.a.	n.a.	3.2	14.3	n.a.	n.a.	14.3
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	26.7	32.4	31.5	32.3	75.8	83.0	86.7	88.6
<b>Somalia</b>	n.a.	n.a.	41.7	43.5	n.a.	n.a.	77.4	79.7
<b>South Africa</b>	n.a.	6.9	8.0	8.4	n.a.	17.4	19.0	19.4
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	63.7	62.3	63.2	n.a.	84.9	86.4	87.3
<b>Sudan</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Togo</b>	16.1	15.4	13.5	10.9	60.4	59.6	54.7	57.0
<b>Tunisia</b>	9.1	9.7	12.6	11.3	18.2	22.1	28.0	26.7
<b>Uganda</b>	21.5	24.9	23.2	23.0	66.3	75.0	72.5	71.2
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	20.6	24.9	25.8	25.4	48.9	56.1	57.6	58.2
<b>Zambia</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	35.5	34.2	31.3	26.0	64.7	66.7	73.0	70.7

NOTE: n.a. = data not available; n.r. = not reported.

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: *Suite of food security indicators*. [Accessed 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

TABLE A4

Number of food-insecure people (millions)

	Severe food insecurity				Moderate or severe food insecurity			
	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023
<b>World</b>	<b>568.0</b>	<b>666.8</b>	<b>804.6</b>	<b>868.6</b>	<b>1 611.1</b>	<b>1 877.2</b>	<b>2 168.5</b>	<b>2 311.7</b>
<b>Africa</b>	207.0	245.2	278.8	308.7	556.1	658.7	737.6	823.9
<b>Central Africa</b>	n.a.	n.a.	66.8	73.8	n.a.	n.a.	132.3	150.4
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	86.4	101.4	114.8	120.8	230.1	268.2	288.5	309.5
<b>Northern Africa</b>	22.4	22.7	24.7	30.4	65.4	74.6	78.0	86.9
<b>Southern Africa</b>	5.8	6.1	7.0	7.5	13.7	14.4	15.9	16.5
<b>Western Africa</b>	40.2	53.9	65.5	76.2	142.3	181.8	222.8	260.6
<b>Algeria</b>	5.2	3.9	2.7	2.5	9.0	7.4	8.2	8.5
<b>Angola</b>	n.a.	7.5	10.2	11.3	n.a.	21.9	26.0	28.2
<b>Benin</b>	1.1	1.8	1.8	2.1	6.0	7.9	7.8	8.4
<b>Botswana</b>	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.4
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	n.a.	1.2	1.5	1.6	n.a.	8.0	8.6	9.2
<b>Burundi</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9.1
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	n.a.	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	n.a.	0.2	0.2	0.2
<b>Cameroon</b>	5.1	7.0	7.1	7.1	11.5	14.3	14.8	16.6
<b>Central African Republic</b>	n.a.	n.a.	3.3	3.5	n.a.	n.a.	4.3	4.5
<b>Chad</b>	4.6	6.2	6.1	6.5	9.6	11.9	12.5	13.6
<b>Comoros</b>	n.a.	n.a.	0.2	0.2	n.a.	n.a.	0.6	0.7
<b>Congo</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4.8
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	1.5	2.3	2.4	2.5	8.0	9.7	10.8	11.1
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	n.a.	n.a.	36.4	41.3	n.a.	n.a.	67.1	79.4
<b>Djibouti</b>	n.a.	n.a.	0.2	0.2	n.a.	n.a.	0.5	0.6
<b>Egypt</b>	8.2	7.7	7.6	11.5	27.1	32.4	29.3	33.1
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	n.a.	n.a.	0.2	0.2	n.a.	n.a.	0.7	0.7
<b>Ethiopia</b>	14.9	15.7	23.0	24.3	57.6	64.4	65.9	72.8
<b>Gabon</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Gambia</b>	n.a.	0.6	0.7	0.7	n.a.	1.3	1.5	1.6
<b>Ghana</b>	1.5	1.9	1.8	2.8	11.1	12.2	11.8	14.2
<b>Guinea</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	n.a.	0.2	0.2	0.2	n.a.	1.2	1.3	1.3
<b>Kenya</b>	7.0	11.7	13.6	15.1	23.8	32.2	36.1	39.4
<b>Lesotho</b>	n.a.	0.6	0.7	0.8	n.a.	1.1	1.2	1.3
<b>Liberia</b>	1.8	n.a.	1.9	2.0	3.7	n.a.	4.1	4.3
<b>Libya</b>	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.3	2.6	2.6
<b>Madagascar</b>	n.a.	2.5	2.9	4.4	n.a.	15.6	17.2	20.3
<b>Malawi</b>	8.1	8.9	9.9	10.9	13.2	14.5	15.7	16.7

**TABLE A4**  
(Continued)

	Severe food insecurity				Moderate or severe food insecurity			
	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023	2014–2016	2017–2019	2019–2021	2021–2023
<b>Mali</b>	n.a.	0.6	0.6	0.6	n.a.	5.0	4.6	4.5
<b>Mauritania</b>	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.9
<b>Mauritius</b>	<0.1	<0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4
<b>Morocco</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Mozambique</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Namibia</b>	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.5
<b>Niger</b>	n.a.	2.2	2.0	2.0	n.a.	11.3	12.2	13.2
<b>Nigeria</b>	20.3	29.9	41.2	49.4	63.8	93.4	131.2	161.4
<b>Rwanda</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	n.a.	n.a.	<0.1	<0.1	n.a.	n.a.	0.1	0.1
<b>Senegal</b>	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.7	5.6	5.5	5.2	5.1
<b>Seychelles</b>	<0.1	n.a.	n.a.	<0.1	<0.1	n.a.	n.a.	<0.1
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	2.0	2.5	2.6	2.8	5.5	6.5	7.1	7.6
<b>Somalia</b>	n.a.	n.a.	6.9	7.7	n.a.	n.a.	12.8	14.0
<b>South Africa</b>	n.a.	4.0	4.7	5.0	n.a.	10.0	11.2	11.6
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	6.7	6.6	6.9	n.a.	8.9	9.2	9.5
<b>Sudan</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Togo</b>	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	4.5	4.8	4.6	5.0
<b>Tunisia</b>	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.6	3.4	3.3
<b>Uganda</b>	8.1	10.3	10.3	10.9	24.9	31.2	32.2	33.6
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	10.8	14.5	15.9	16.6	25.7	32.6	35.6	38.1
<b>Zambia</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	5.0	5.1	4.9	4.3	9.2	10.0	11.4	11.5

NOTE: n.a. = data not available; n.r. = not reported.

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: *Suite of food security indicators*. [Accessed 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

TABLE A5

Prevalence of food insecurity by sex (percent)

	Severe food insecurity				Moderate or severe food insecurity			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	2014–2016	2021–2023	2014–2016	2021–2023	2014–2016	2021–2023	2014–2016	2021–2023
<b>World</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>27.3</b>
<b>Africa</b>	16.2	20.7	17.2	21.3	43.9	55.9	46.2	56.9
<b>Central Africa</b>	n.a.	37.9	n.a.	37.0	n.a.	76.1	n.a.	76.9
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	20.5	24.9	23.0	25.8	56.8	65.0	59.7	65.7
<b>Northern Africa</b>	8.7	11.0	10.7	12.0	25.6	31.8	30.7	33.9
<b>Southern Africa</b>	8.0	10.1	9.8	11.3	19.5	22.9	22.7	24.6
<b>Western Africa</b>	11.8	17.7	10.7	17.9	40.0	60.7	39.5	60.8
<b>Algeria</b>	11.9	7.0	14.1	4.3	21.6	20.9	24.2	16.9
<b>Angola</b>	n.a.	30.4	n.a.	33.3	n.a.	76.2	n.a.	82.2
<b>Benin</b>	10.2	15.4	10.7	16.2	54.6	62.4	55.4	64.2
<b>Botswana</b>	16.3	24.5	20.6	28.2	43.0	52.2	49.9	57.4
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	n.a.	7.6	n.a.	6.8	n.a.	42.1	n.a.	39.3
<b>Burundi</b>	n.a.	20.2	n.a.	21.6	n.a.	69.7	n.a.	71.8
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	n.a.	6.0	n.a.	6.0	n.a.	34.3	n.a.	34.3
<b>Cameroon</b>	23.3	26.1	21.4	24.7	50.1	59.7	49.8	59.5
<b>Central African Republic</b>	n.a.	61.8	n.a.	61.8	n.a.	81.3	n.a.	81.3
<b>Chad</b>	31.7	36.7	33.0	36.2	66.1	76.3	69.8	77.0
<b>Comoros</b>	n.a.	26.4	n.a.	28.4	n.a.	79.5	n.a.	80.0
<b>Congo</b>	n.a.	37.1	n.a.	39.6	n.a.	78.8	n.a.	81.0
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	6.2	8.8	6.3	9.1	34.1	39.3	34.0	39.4
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	n.a.	43.1	n.a.	40.3	n.a.	80.7	n.a.	79.6
<b>Djibouti</b>	n.a.	17.6	n.a.	15.4	n.a.	49.3	n.a.	49.2
<b>Egypt</b>	7.0	9.0	9.9	11.7	23.2	27.1	32.3	32.5
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	n.a.	17.5	n.a.	16.9	n.a.	55.1	n.a.	56.7
<b>Ethiopia</b>	12.9	19.5	16.2	19.8	55.0	60.3	57.5	57.8
<b>Gabon</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Gambia</b>	n.a.	25.1	n.a.	25.9	n.a.	59.9	n.a.	58.1
<b>Ghana</b>	5.0	7.9	5.1	8.6	36.5	41.3	40.1	43.5
<b>Guinea</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	n.a.	9.0	n.a.	9.0	n.a.	62.5	n.a.	62.5
<b>Kenya</b>	13.7	26.9	16.3	29.1	47.3	70.3	54.1	75.4
<b>Lesotho</b>	n.a.	32.1	n.a.	33.6	n.a.	56.4	n.a.	56.9
<b>Liberia</b>	37.2	34.7	40.0	39.9	78.5	78.5	81.0	83.5
<b>Libya</b>	9.0	18.4	13.4	21.3	24.1	35.8	34.1	40.0

**TABLE A5**  
(Continued)

	Severe food insecurity				Moderate or severe food insecurity			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	2014–2016	2021–2023	2014–2016	2021–2023	2014–2016	2021–2023	2014–2016	2021–2023
<b>Madagascar</b>	n.a.	14.1	n.a.	15.8	n.a.	66.6	n.a.	70.5
<b>Malawi</b>	45.5	52.0	49.9	55.0	77.5	81.0	78.7	82.5
<b>Mali</b>	n.a.	2.6	n.a.	2.7	n.a.	20.4	n.a.	19.6
<b>Mauritania</b>	4.4	11.0	4.9	12.3	25.1	60.2	27.5	62.3
<b>Mauritius</b>	4.5	10.6	5.9	9.9	11.8	31.4	14.2	30.9
<b>Morocco</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Mozambique</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Namibia</b>	27.1	30.4	30.6	33.3	50.6	54.8	55.7	58.7
<b>Niger</b>	n.a.	7.3	n.a.	7.6	n.a.	49.8	n.a.	50.8
<b>Nigeria</b>	12.1	22.6	10.0	22.6	35.2	73.6	34.1	74.1
<b>Rwanda</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	n.a.	13.8	n.a.	14.4	n.a.	53.0	n.a.	56.2
<b>Senegal</b>	8.0	4.0	6.9	4.0	43.5	30.2	34.5	28.6
<b>Seychelles</b>	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	14.3	14.3	14.3	14.3
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	26.1	32.6	27.5	32.1	74.3	88.6	77.4	88.6
<b>Somalia</b>	n.a.	43.5	n.a.	43.5	n.a.	79.7	n.a.	79.7
<b>South Africa</b>	n.a.	7.8	n.a.	8.9	n.a.	18.6	n.a.	20.2
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	63.2	n.a.	63.2	n.a.	87.3	n.a.	87.3
<b>Sudan</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Togo</b>	17.8	11.8	14.5	10.0	62.2	58.5	58.6	55.6
<b>Tunisia</b>	8.8	11.8	9.5	10.7	18.3	27.0	18.0	26.4
<b>Uganda</b>	22.5	22.8	20.5	23.2	68.2	71.3	64.4	71.1
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	18.9	25.6	22.3	25.2	46.1	58.3	51.6	58.1
<b>Zambia</b>	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	34.9	25.3	36.1	26.8	64.0	70.2	65.4	71.2

NOTE: n.a. = data not available; n.r. = not reported.

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: *Suite of food security indicators*. [Accessed 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

TABLE A6

Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>27.9</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>22.3</b>
<b>Africa</b>	40.8	39.1	36.0	34.4	32.7	31.1	30.8	30.0
<b>Central Africa</b>	43.8	41.3	38.7	37.9	37.7	37.9	37.8	37.4
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	48.7	45.8	41.0	38.6	35.8	32.7	31.9	30.6
<b>Northern Africa</b>	27.3	25.2	24.4	23.5	22.5	22.1	22.0	21.7
<b>Southern Africa</b>	27.8	27.4	24.5	23.4	22.9	22.7	22.8	22.8
<b>Western Africa</b>	39.2	38.5	36.0	34.5	32.9	31.2	30.8	30.0
<b>Algeria</b>	22.3	18.1	13.6	12.1	10.7	9.4	9.1	8.6
<b>Angola</b>	46.5	33.9	30.8	31.8	35.6	41.4	42.4	43.6
<b>Benin</b>	34.9	36.1	35.2	33.9	32.9	31.9	31.4	30.4
<b>Botswana</b>	30.3	29.3	26.1	24.6	22.9	22.8	22.5	21.6
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	40.5	41.5	36.7	33.3	28.4	23.9	23.1	21.8
<b>Burundi</b>	63.1	60.6	57.7	56.5	55.9	56.2	56.3	56.5
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	17.8	15.6	13.8	12.6	11.4	10.2	9.9	9.4
<b>Cameroon</b>	37.5	37.0	33.7	32.1	30.5	28.5	27.9	26.9
<b>Central African Republic</b>	43.1	43.6	41.7	40.6	40.9	40.5	40.3	39.8
<b>Chad</b>	42.0	42.6	40.5	38.9	36.9	34.4	33.6	32.3
<b>Comoros</b>	43.9	41.8	35.5	31.9	27.2	21.7	20.6	18.8
<b>Congo</b>	33.7	30.9	25.5	23.1	20.9	18.5	17.8	16.5
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	32.6	33.5	31.4	29.6	26.9	22.8	21.8	20.2
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	46.0	45.7	43.7	42.7	41.8	41.4	41.1	40.3
<b>Djibouti</b>	33.7	35.8	32.2	29.6	26.1	21.5	20.5	18.7
<b>Egypt</b>	25.9	24.4	25.4	24.6	22.5	21.4	21.1	20.4
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	38.8	34.5	28.1	25.0	21.6	18.1	17.3	16.1
<b>Eritrea</b>	43.5	46.8	51.2	51.6	52.2	51.8	51.3	50.2
<b>Eswatini</b>	35.8	33.9	30.2	28.0	25.6	23.1	22.4	21.2
<b>Ethiopia</b>	57.0	51.3	44.7	42.1	39.5	36.6	35.8	34.4
<b>Gabon</b>	25.5	23.3	19.0	17.2	15.9	14.6	14.2	13.4
<b>Gambia</b>	27.8	27.1	24.2	22.3	19.8	15.7	15.0	13.6
<b>Ghana</b>	32.6	30.4	24.9	22.0	18.5	15.0	14.2	12.7
<b>Guinea</b>	33.0	35.5	35.0	33.7	32.2	29.8	29.1	27.9
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	33.8	32.0	30.3	29.3	28.8	28.5	28.2	27.7
<b>Kenya</b>	38.5	37.3	31.7	28.6	24.9	21.1	20.1	18.4
<b>Lesotho</b>	41.6	42.2	39.6	37.5	34.6	32.6	32.3	31.8
<b>Liberia</b>	44.9	41.3	37.0	35.0	32.6	29.2	28.0	26.6
<b>Libya</b>	18.4	21.2	26.3	30.0	37.7	47.9	49.6	52.2
<b>Madagascar</b>	55.2	53.1	49.2	47.3	45.0	41.4	40.4	38.6
<b>Malawi</b>	56.0	53.4	47.0	43.6	39.4	36.1	35.3	34.0

**TABLE A6**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>Mali</b>	39.5	37.0	32.7	30.7	28.6	25.6	24.9	23.8
<b>Mauritania</b>	39.3	32.1	27.3	26.0	25.1	23.8	23.3	22.1
<b>Mauritius</b>	12.6	10.7	9.4	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.8	8.6
<b>Morocco</b>	25.2	20.3	16.8	15.8	14.8	13.8	13.4	12.8
<b>Mozambique</b>	48.6	46.3	43.6	42.6	41.4	38.5	37.7	36.4
<b>Namibia</b>	29.7	29.4	26.1	24.0	21.2	18.3	17.8	16.8
<b>Niger</b>	53.2	51.0	47.8	46.6	46.0	46.6	46.8	47.4
<b>Nigeria</b>	41.7	40.9	38.8	37.7	36.7	35.4	35.0	34.2
<b>Rwanda</b>	48.5	49.1	44.8	41.2	36.7	32.6	31.6	29.8
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	31.3	27.1	21.2	18.8	15.6	12.0	11.3	10.0
<b>Senegal</b>	24.7	21.3	19.0	18.5	18.6	18.0	17.7	17.0
<b>Seychelles</b>	10.6	9.0	8.2	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.5	7.2
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	38.1	39.0	36.9	34.9	32.3	28.1	27.4	26.0
<b>Somalia</b>	33.0	33.9	30.1	27.6	24.2	20.3	19.4	18.0
<b>South Africa</b>	26.6	26.2	23.4	22.5	22.3	22.5	22.6	22.8
<b>South Sudan</b>	39.0	35.9	32.1	30.8	29.9	29.1	28.7	27.9
<b>Sudan</b>	39.3	37.8	36.5	36.0	36.2	36.5	36.4	36.0
<b>Togo</b>	32.1	31.0	28.7	27.3	26.0	24.1	23.5	22.3
<b>Tunisia</b>	12.6	10.9	9.3	8.8	8.6	8.8	8.8	8.6
<b>Uganda</b>	44.0	41.3	36.0	33.3	29.6	25.5	24.7	23.4
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	47.4	44.2	40.3	38.1	35.4	32.9	32.1	30.6
<b>Zambia</b>	51.8	49.4	43.7	40.8	37.6	33.2	32.3	31.4
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	32.8	34.8	33.5	31.1	26.8	23.1	22.5	21.6

SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2023. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition. UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates – Key findings of the 2023 edition*. New York, USA, UNICEF; Geneva, Switzerland, WHO and Washington, DC, World Bank. [Cited 15 May 2025.] <https://data.unicef.org/resources/jme-report-2023>

**TABLE A7**

Prevalence of wasting among children under 5 years of age (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>6.8</b>
<b>Africa</b>								5.8
<b>Central Africa</b>								5.6
<b>Eastern Africa</b>								5.0
<b>Northern Africa</b>								6.3
<b>Southern Africa</b>								3.5
<b>Western Africa</b>								6.7
Algeria	3.1			4.1		2.7		
Angola					4.9			
Botswana	5.9							
Burkina Faso			15.5	10.7	10.2	8.1	8.8	
Burundi	8.1	9.0	6.0			4.8	5.7	4.9
Central African Republic	10.4		7.4	7.4		5.4		
Chad	13.9		16.3		13.3	13.9	9.5	7.8
Comoros	13.3			11.2				
Congo		8.0						
Côte d'Ivoire				7.6				
Democratic Republic of the Congo			8.5					
Djibouti						10.6		
Egypt		5.3						
Equatorial Guinea	9.2							
Eritrea			14.6					
Eswatini	1.7		0.8					
Ethiopia	12.4	12.4				6.8		
Gabon	4.2			3.4			3.4	
Gambia	9.1		9.5	9.5			5.1	
Ghana								5.8
Guinea		11.0		10.0				6.4
Guinea-Bissau	11.8		5.9	6.2		5.1		
Kenya	7.4	6.9						4.5
Liberia	7.4		4.0			3.4		
Madagascar				7.5				
Malawi	6.8		4.0		2.8	3.8	2.6	
Mali			8.9		13.5	13.0	7.2	10.6
Mauritania	15.3			11.7	14.8	11.1	6.4	13.6
Morocco						2.3		

**TABLE A7**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>Mozambique</b>					4.4		3.9	3.8
<b>Namibia</b>	10.0							
<b>Niger</b>	16.2		15.8	18.2	13.6	9.8	12.0	10.9
<b>Nigeria</b>					7.3		6.5	
<b>Rwanda</b>	8.7	4.9	2.9	3.1	2.3		1.1	
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>						4.1		
<b>Senegal</b>	10.0	8.7		8.7	7.8	8.1		
<b>Seychelles</b>				4.3				
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	11.6	10.2	7.5			5.4		
<b>South Africa</b>					3.4			
<b>South Sudan</b>			22.7					
<b>Sudan</b>			15.4					
<b>Togo</b>			4.8	5.5				
<b>Tunisia</b>	2.9			2.8				
<b>Uganda</b>	5.0			4.2	5.8		3.6	
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>			4.9		4.5	2.1		3.1
<b>Zimbabwe</b>		7.2	3.2		3.3	2.9		

SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2023. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition. UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates – Key findings of the 2023 edition*. New York, USA, UNICEF; Geneva, Switzerland, WHO and Washington, DC, World Bank. [Cited 15 May 2025.] <https://data.unicef.org/resources/jme-report-2023>

**TABLE A8**

Prevalence of overweight among children under 5 years of age (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>5.6</b>
<b>Africa</b>	6.2	6.6	5.2	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.9
<b>Central Africa</b>	5.8	6.4	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	5.4	5.5	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6
<b>Northern Africa</b>	10.4	12.4	12.2	11.8	11.7	11.9	12.0	12.3
<b>Southern Africa</b>	11.1	11.4	12.1	12.3	12.2	11.8	11.7	11.4
<b>Western Africa</b>	4.5	4.7	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4
<b>Algeria</b>	12.8	15.4	14.6	13.5	12.2	11.7	11.7	11.9
<b>Angola</b>	2.7	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.6	3.7	3.9
<b>Benin</b>	2.7	2.8	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2
<b>Botswana</b>	9.8	10.0	10.3	10.4	10.5	10.0	10.0	10.1
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	2.8	2.9	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0
<b>Burundi</b>	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.5	3.1	3.2	3.6
<b>Cameroon</b>	8.0	10.1	6.9	7.1	7.9	9.1	9.5	10.5
<b>Central African Republic</b>	7.3	6.6	4.2	3.5	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.6
<b>Chad</b>	3.4	3.9	2.5	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2
<b>Comoros</b>	13.5	16.4	12.8	11.5	10.1	8.7	8.3	7.7
<b>Congo</b>	6.8	7.1	5.5	5.1	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.5
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	4.9	5.3	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	6.5	6.9	5.1	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.7	3.7
<b>Djibouti</b>	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	2.2	2.5	3.2
<b>Egypt</b>	12.1	14.8	15.7	15.7	16.2	17.3	17.8	18.8
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	7.9	9.8	8.7	8.5	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.2
<b>Eritrea</b>	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.6	2.8	3.0
<b>Eswatini</b>	12.8	12.2	10.6	10.1	9.2	8.3	8.1	7.9
<b>Ethiopia</b>	2.9	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.7
<b>Gabon</b>	6.1	6.9	6.3	6.2	6.0	5.7	5.6	5.4
<b>Gambia</b>	3.3	3.7	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8
<b>Ghana</b>	3.6	4.2	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9
<b>Guinea</b>	5.2	6.5	4.3	4.4	4.8	5.2	5.3	5.6
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	4.8	5.1	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.3
<b>Kenya</b>	7.4	6.9	5.0	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.8	3.8
<b>Lesotho</b>	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.1	7.0	7.0	6.9
<b>Liberia</b>	4.4	5.0	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.5	4.8	5.3
<b>Libya</b>	16.2	22.9	26.5	26.4	26.6	27.6	27.9	28.7
<b>Madagascar</b>	3.4	3.2	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
<b>Malawi</b>	12.1	9.7	5.7	4.9	4.2	3.8	3.8	3.9
<b>Mali</b>	2.8	3.0	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.0

**TABLE A8**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>Mauritania</b>	3.5	3.7	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0
<b>Mauritius</b>	8.8	10.3	8.3	7.8	7.2	6.9	6.8	6.8
<b>Morocco</b>	13.3	14.5	11.3	9.5	7.5	5.7	5.4	4.9
<b>Mozambique</b>	6.6	7.2	5.9	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.5
<b>Namibia</b>	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.5	5.0	5.1	5.3
<b>Niger</b>	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.1	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.7
<b>Nigeria</b>	5.6	5.6	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2
<b>Rwanda</b>	7.2	7.9	6.6	6.3	6.0	5.3	5.1	4.7
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	3.1	3.7	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.7
<b>Senegal</b>	3.1	2.8	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.3	2.6	3.4
<b>Seychelles</b>	10.4	12.4	10.5	9.9	9.4	9.2	9.1	9.1
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	4.7	5.3	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.5	4.7	5.2
<b>Somalia</b>	4.5	4.5	3.3	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7
<b>South Africa</b>	11.7	12.1	12.9	13.1	13.0	12.6	12.5	12.1
<b>South Sudan</b>	9.3	9.7	7.0	6.3	5.6	5.0	4.9	4.7
<b>Sudan</b>	3.6	3.5	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.7
<b>Togo</b>	2.6	2.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.2
<b>Tunisia</b>	4.0	7.4	11.4	12.7	14.8	17.6	18.2	19.0
<b>Uganda</b>	5.6	5.6	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	5.1	5.5	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6
<b>Zambia</b>	8.8	9.0	6.6	6.0	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.4
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	8.3	6.8	5.2	4.6	3.9	3.1	3.0	2.7

SOURCE: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2023. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition. UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates – Key findings of the 2023 edition*. New York, USA, UNICEF; Geneva, Switzerland, WHO and Washington, DC, World Bank. [Cited 15 May 2025.] <https://data.unicef.org/resources/jme-report-2023>

TABLE A9

Prevalence of anaemia among women aged 15 to 49 years (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2017	2018	2019
<b>World</b>	<b>31.2</b>	<b>29.9</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>29.6</b>	<b>29.9</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>44.5</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>38.8</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>38.8</b>	<b>38.9</b>
<b>Central Africa</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>47.4</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>44.5</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>43.2</b>
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	<b>38.8</b>	<b>35.9</b>	<b>32.2</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>31.3</b>	<b>31.5</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>31.9</b>
<b>Northern Africa</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>34.9</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>31.3</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>31.1</b>
<b>Southern Africa</b>	<b>35.1</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>30.3</b>
<b>Western Africa</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>55.4</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>52.9</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>52.0</b>	<b>51.9</b>	<b>51.8</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>35.2</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>32.9</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>33.1</b>	<b>33.3</b>
<b>Angola</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>46.9</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>44.6</b>	<b>44.5</b>
<b>Benin</b>	<b>62.1</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>55.2</b>
<b>Botswana</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>34.2</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>31.3</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>32.5</b>
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>52.6</b>	<b>52.5</b>
<b>Burundi</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>33.1</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>33.7</b>	<b>36.0</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>38.5</b>
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>25.8</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>24.3</b>
<b>Cameroon</b>	<b>42.3</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>40.9</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>40.6</b>
<b>Central African Republic</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>47.9</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>47.0</b>	<b>46.8</b>
<b>Chad</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>49.2</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>45.4</b>
<b>Comoros</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>35.8</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>33.8</b>
<b>Congo</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>54.4</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>49.2</b>	<b>48.8</b>
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>50.9</b>
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>44.1</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>42.4</b>
<b>Djibouti</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>31.3</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>32.0</b>	<b>32.3</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>34.5</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>31.0</b>	<b>29.7</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>28.3</b>
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>48.7</b>	<b>47.4</b>	<b>45.8</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>44.5</b>
<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>39.1</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>36.8</b>	<b>37.0</b>
<b>Eswatini</b>	<b>34.4</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>30.5</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>30.7</b>
<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>23.4</b>	<b>23.9</b>
<b>Gabon</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>55.3</b>	<b>54.0</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>52.4</b>
<b>Gambia</b>	<b>62.1</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>49.5</b>
<b>Ghana</b>	<b>49.0</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>40.7</b>	<b>37.8</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>35.4</b>
<b>Guinea</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>52.6</b>	<b>51.4</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>49.9</b>	<b>49.0</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>48.0</b>
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>49.9</b>	<b>49.1</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>48.3</b>	<b>48.1</b>
<b>Kenya</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>29.3</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>28.1</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>28.7</b>
<b>Lesotho</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>28.3</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>27.9</b>
<b>Liberia</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>48.7</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>42.4</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>42.6</b>
<b>Libya</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>28.9</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>29.6</b>	<b>29.9</b>

**TABLE A9**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2017	2018	2019
<b>Madagascar</b>	42.6	40.5	37.9	37.5	37.4	37.5	37.7	37.8
<b>Malawi</b>	37.9	36.0	31.5	30.6	30.4	30.8	31.0	31.4
<b>Mali</b>	62.9	61.0	58.6	58.2	58.3	58.6	58.8	59.0
<b>Mauritania</b>	48.7	47.7	45.9	45.1	44.2	43.7	43.5	43.3
<b>Mauritius</b>	18.6	18.7	18.7	19.2	20.7	22.0	22.7	23.5
<b>Morocco</b>	35.3	33.2	30.5	29.8	29.5	29.6	29.7	29.9
<b>Mozambique</b>	49.4	50.3	49.2	48.8	48.3	48.1	48.0	47.9
<b>Namibia</b>	30.4	27.5	25.1	24.7	24.5	24.6	24.8	25.2
<b>Niger</b>	51.8	50.0	49.0	49.1	49.3	49.5	49.5	49.5
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.8	57.1	55.3	54.9	54.9	54.9	55.0	55.1
<b>Rwanda</b>	25.1	22.2	19.0	18.3	17.8	17.4	17.3	17.2
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	51.9	49.3	46.4	45.7	45.0	44.5	44.3	44.2
<b>Senegal</b>	59.8	59.2	56.9	55.9	54.5	53.6	53.1	52.7
<b>Seychelles</b>	27.6	26.1	23.8	23.5	23.9	24.4	24.7	25.1
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	54.0	51.0	48.3	47.9	47.8	48.1	48.2	48.4
<b>Somalia</b>	47.9	46.6	44.6	44.0	43.5	43.3	43.2	43.1
<b>South Africa</b>	35.2	32.4	29.1	28.6	28.9	29.5	29.9	30.5
<b>South Sudan</b>	39.5	37.6	35.1	34.7	34.8	35.2	35.4	35.6
<b>Sudan</b>	42.9	40.2	37.4	36.8	36.3	36.4	36.4	36.5
<b>Togo</b>	49.7	49.3	48.0	47.4	46.7	46.1	45.9	45.7
<b>Tunisia</b>	31.5	30.9	30.3	30.4	30.8	31.4	31.7	32.1
<b>Uganda</b>	39.3	36.0	32.0	31.3	31.5	32.0	32.4	32.8
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	46.5	45.1	41.4	40.3	39.7	39.1	39.0	38.9
<b>Zambia</b>	35.6	33.6	30.9	30.5	30.7	31.0	31.2	31.5
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	33.9	32.8	30.9	30.0	29.1	28.8	28.8	28.9

NOTE: The estimates refer to women aged 15 to 49 years, including pregnant, non-pregnant women and lactating women and were adjusted for altitude and smoking. WHO defines anaemia in pregnant women as a haemoglobin concentration <110 g/L at sea level, and anaemia in non-pregnant women and lactating women as a haemoglobin concentration <120 g/L.

SOURCE: WHO. 2021. WHO global anaemia estimates, 2021 edition. In: WHO. [Cited 24 July 2024]. [www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia\\_in\\_women\\_and\\_children](http://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia_in_women_and_children)

TABLE A10

Prevalence of obesity among adults (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>15.8</b>
<b>Africa</b>	8.7	10.5	12.2	12.8	13.7	15.1	15.4	16.2
<b>Central Africa</b>	3.8	5.0	6.2	6.6	7.3	8.3	8.6	9.3
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	2.6	3.5	4.5	4.9	5.7	7.0	7.3	8.1
<b>Northern Africa</b>	18.8	21.9	24.8	25.9	27.7	30.0	30.5	31.7
<b>Southern Africa</b>	21.5	24.6	26.8	27.3	27.9	28.9	29.1	29.7
<b>Western Africa</b>	4.4	6.1	7.6	8.1	8.9	10.3	10.7	11.6
<b>Algeria</b>	13.4	15.6	17.8	18.8	20.2	22.3	22.8	23.8
<b>Angola</b>	5.3	6.7	8.1	8.5	9.3	10.4	10.8	11.5
<b>Benin</b>	4.5	6.2	7.7	8.1	8.8	10.0	10.4	11.2
<b>Botswana</b>	10.0	12.2	14.1	14.7	15.7	17.1	17.5	18.3
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	1.4	2.3	3.3	3.7	4.4	5.6	6.0	6.7
<b>Burundi</b>	1.6	2.1	2.7	3.0	3.4	4.2	4.5	5.0
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	6.7	8.8	10.6	11.3	12.4	14.2	14.7	15.8
<b>Cameroon</b>	6.8	9.2	11.2	11.8	12.5	13.8	14.1	14.9
<b>Central African Republic</b>	3.0	4.2	5.4	5.9	6.7	8.1	8.4	9.3
<b>Chad</b>	2.2	3.2	4.2	4.5	5.0	5.8	6.1	6.7
<b>Comoros</b>	5.7	7.7	9.8	10.7	12.2	14.4	15.0	16.3
<b>Congo</b>	5.1	6.3	7.1	7.4	7.7	8.1	8.2	8.5
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	4.5	6.2	7.7	8.2	9.0	10.4	10.8	11.6
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	2.3	3.2	4.0	4.4	4.9	5.8	6.1	6.6
<b>Djibouti</b>	3.8	5.1	6.5	7.1	8.2	9.8	10.3	11.3
<b>Egypt</b>	27.8	32.1	35.9	37.4	39.6	42.4	43.0	44.3
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	9.2	11.5	13.3	13.9	14.8	16.3	16.7	17.7
<b>Eritrea</b>	1.3	1.8	2.4	2.7	3.2	4.0	4.3	4.8
<b>Eswatini</b>	15.5	18.8	22.0	23.2	25.0	27.7	28.5	30.1
<b>Ethiopia</b>	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.8
<b>Gabon</b>	9.6	12.2	14.7	15.5	16.9	19.1	19.7	21.0
<b>Gambia</b>	3.9	6.1	8.5	9.4	10.8	13.0	13.6	14.9
<b>Ghana</b>	6.1	8.2	9.8	10.2	10.9	12.0	12.3	12.9
<b>Guinea</b>	2.7	4.0	5.4	5.9	6.8	8.2	8.6	9.5
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	4.1	5.8	7.3	7.9	8.7	10.2	10.6	11.5
<b>Kenya</b>	4.2	5.7	7.4	8.1	9.2	10.9	11.4	12.4
<b>Lesotho</b>	10.8	12.9	15.1	15.9	17.2	19.2	19.8	21.0
<b>Liberia</b>	4.9	7.1	9.4	10.3	11.8	14.4	15.2	17.0
<b>Libya</b>	24.3	28.1	30.9	32.0	33.5	35.4	35.8	36.7
<b>Madagascar</b>	1.1	1.5	2.1	2.3	2.8	3.5	3.7	4.3
<b>Malawi</b>	2.1	3.0	4.0	4.5	5.3	6.6	6.9	7.7

**TABLE A10**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020	2022
<b>Mali</b>	3.6	5.4	7.1	7.6	8.5	10.0	10.4	11.4
<b>Mauritania</b>	9.1	12.3	15.2	16.2	17.9	20.5	21.2	22.7
<b>Mauritius</b>	12.7	14.6	16.0	16.5	17.1	18.2	18.5	19.2
<b>Morocco</b>	11.3	13.5	15.7	16.7	18.2	20.2	20.7	21.8
<b>Mozambique</b>	3.0	4.2	5.5	6.1	7.1	8.8	9.2	10.3
<b>Namibia</b>	9.8	11.9	13.5	14.0	14.8	15.9	16.3	17.0
<b>Niger</b>	2.0	2.8	3.7	3.9	4.4	5.2	5.4	6.0
<b>Nigeria</b>	4.7	6.5	8.1	8.7	9.5	11.0	11.4	12.4
<b>Rwanda</b>	1.0	1.5	2.1	2.4	3.0	4.0	4.3	4.9
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	6.6	9.0	11.1	11.8	12.9	14.8	15.3	16.5
<b>Senegal</b>	4.5	6.1	7.3	7.6	8.2	9.3	9.6	10.2
<b>Seychelles</b>	19.1	22.1	24.4	25.1	26.2	27.9	28.3	29.4
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	3.6	4.9	5.7	5.8	6.1	6.6	6.8	7.1
<b>Somalia</b>	5.3	6.9	8.8	9.6	10.9	12.9	13.4	14.6
<b>South Africa</b>	22.8	25.9	28.1	28.6	29.2	30.1	30.3	30.8
<b>South Sudan</b>	2.9	3.8	4.8	5.3	6.1	7.4	7.8	8.6
<b>Sudan</b>	6.7	8.7	10.7	11.5	12.8	15.0	15.7	17.0
<b>Togo</b>	3.3	4.9	6.5	7.1	8.2	9.9	10.5	11.6
<b>Tunisia</b>	16.3	18.8	21.1	22.0	23.5	25.4	25.9	26.8
<b>Uganda</b>	2.0	2.7	3.7	4.2	5.0	6.5	6.9	7.9
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	3.7	5.1	6.7	7.5	8.7	10.8	11.4	12.6
<b>Zambia</b>	3.7	4.9	6.2	6.8	7.9	9.6	10.0	11.1
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	6.8	8.0	9.4	10.1	11.1	12.8	13.2	14.2

SOURCE: WHO. 2024. *Global Health Observatory (GHO) data repository: Prevalence of obesity among adults, BMI  $\geq$  30, age-standardized. Estimates by country.* [Cited 24 July 2024]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi--30-\(age-standardized-estimate\)-\(-\)](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi--30-(age-standardized-estimate)-(-))

**TABLE A11**

Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding among infants 0–5 months of age (percent)

	2000	2005	2012	2015	2020	2021	2022
<b>World</b>			<b>37.1</b>				<b>48.0</b>
<b>Africa</b>			35.4				46.7
<b>Central Africa</b>			28.5				44.7
<b>Eastern Africa</b>			48.6				60.3
<b>Northern Africa</b>			40.8				35.6
<b>Southern Africa</b>			n.a.				32.8
<b>Western Africa</b>			22.1				38.3
Algeria	12.6		25.4				
Angola				37.4			
Benin			32.5				
Burkina Faso			38.2		58.0	51.3	
Burundi	59.2						85.0
Cabo Verde		59.6					
Central African Republic	16.5						
Chad	10.1			0.1	15.0		7.4
Comoros	10.2		11.4				
Congo		19.1					
Côte d'Ivoire	8.5		11.8			34.0	
Djibouti			12.4				
Egypt	56.1	41.1				40.2	
Equatorial Guinea	20.3						
Eswatini	22.0						
Ethiopia	54.1	48.8					
Gabon	5.4		5.1		19.4		
Gambia	24.6				53.6		
Ghana							53.1
Guinea		27.0	20.4				
Guinea-Bissau	27.5						
Kenya	13.8						59.7
Lesotho	14.2						
Liberia	35.4						
Madagascar	40.7		41.9			54.4	
Malawi	44.0			59.4	64.1		
Mali				31.5	52.0	47.7	49.8
Mauritania	20.2			41.1	40.9		
Mozambique							55.5

**TABLE A11**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2012	2015	2020	2021	2022
<b>Namibia</b>	16.6						
<b>Niger</b>	1.1		23.3		21.2	25.6	24.5
<b>Nigeria</b>						34.4	
<b>Rwanda</b>	83.0	88.4		86.9	80.9		
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	53.1						
<b>Senegal</b>		30.9		33.3			
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	2.8	8.4				50.9	
<b>Togo</b>	17.4						
<b>Tunisia</b>			8.5				
<b>Uganda</b>	62.5						
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>				59.0			64.3
<b>Zimbabwe</b>		21.7		47.1			

SOURCE: UNICEF. 2024. Infant and young child feeding. In: *UNICEF*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/infant-and-young-child-feeding>

TABLE A12

Prevalence of low birthweight (percent)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020
<b>World</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>14.7</b>
<b>Africa</b>	15.5	15.0	14.6	14.5	14.2	13.9	13.9
<b>Central Africa</b>	14.0	13.5	13.0	12.8	12.5	12.3	12.2
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	15.5	15.2	14.9	14.7	14.5	14.1	14.0
<b>Northern Africa</b>	14.2	14.1	13.9	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.1
<b>Southern Africa</b>	16.9	16.7	16.5	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4
<b>Western Africa</b>	16.4	15.7	15.2	14.9	14.6	14.3	14.3
<b>Algeria</b>	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.2
<b>Angola</b>	17.4	16.5	15.9	15.7	15.5	15.5	15.5
<b>Benin</b>	18.8	18.3	17.7	17.5	17.1	16.6	16.4
<b>Botswana</b>	18.1	18.2	17.6	17.3	17.0	16.9	16.8
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	20.3	19.7	19.3	19.1	18.8	18.5	18.5
<b>Burundi</b>	15.6	15.4	15.2	15.1	15.0	14.8	14.8
<b>Cameroon</b>	13.3	13.1	12.9	12.9	12.7	12.5	12.5
<b>Central African Republic</b>	15.2	15.5	15.7	15.9	16.4	16.3	16.4
<b>Comoros</b>	25.5	25.0	24.4	24.1	23.8	23.2	23.0
<b>Congo</b>	12.8	12.4	11.8	11.6	11.5	11.9	11.9
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	19.4	19.4	19.3	19.1	18.8	18.4	18.3
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	12.4	11.9	11.3	11.0	10.7	10.2	10.2
<b>Eritrea</b>	16.0	15.7	15.4	15.4	15.3	15.2	15.2
<b>Eswatini</b>	11.1	10.8	10.7	10.6	10.5	10.3	10.2
<b>Gabon</b>	15.0	15.0	15.1	14.9	14.7	14.7	14.6
<b>Gambia</b>	14.5	14.2	13.8	13.7	13.6	13.3	13.2
<b>Ghana</b>	15.8	15.6	15.1	14.9	14.7	14.5	14.4
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	24.4	23.4	22.2	21.8	21.0	19.8	19.5
<b>Kenya</b>	11.7	11.3	10.9	10.8	10.6	10.1	10.0
<b>Lesotho</b>	15.0	14.8	14.8	14.8	14.7	14.5	14.4
<b>Liberia</b>	19.3	19.9	19.7	19.7	19.7	19.9	19.9
<b>Madagascar</b>	20.0	19.9	19.6	19.5	19.3	18.8	18.7
<b>Malawi</b>	16.5	16.2	15.8	15.8	15.8	15.6	15.6
<b>Mauritius</b>	19.4	19.6	19.3	19.1	18.9	18.7	18.7
<b>Morocco</b>	18.3	17.5	16.5	16.1	15.6	14.9	14.8
<b>Mozambique</b>	19.3	19.0	18.4	18.1	17.9	17.8	17.8
<b>Namibia</b>	16.4	16.3	16.1	15.9	15.7	15.6	15.6
<b>Rwanda</b>	9.1	8.9	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.4
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	10.1	10.3	10.6	10.6	10.8	11.0	11.1
<b>Senegal</b>	22.1	20.7	19.5	19.1	18.5	17.5	17.2

**TABLE A12**  
(Continued)

	2000	2005	2010	2012	2015	2019	2020
<b>Seychelles</b>	12.0	12.2	12.3	12.3	12.4	12.5	12.5
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	13.9	12.7	11.7	11.4	11.0	10.5	10.3
<b>South Africa</b>	17.2	17.0	16.7	16.6	16.6	16.6	16.6
<b>Togo</b>	15.8	15.6	15.3	15.1	14.7	14.4	14.3
<b>Tunisia</b>	7.8	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.2
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	12.0	11.3	10.7	10.5	10.2	9.8	9.7
<b>Zambia</b>	13.1	12.7	12.2	12.0	11.8	11.4	11.2
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	12.9	12.8	12.4	12.2	12.1	11.9	11.8

SOURCE: UNICEF & WHO. 2023. Low birthweight. In: *UNICEF*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/low-birthweight>

TABLE A13

Affordability of a healthy diet

	Proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet (percent)						Number of people unable to afford a healthy diet (million)					
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>40.3</b>	<b>38.0</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>35.4</b>	<b>3 062.3</b>	<b>2 916.1</b>	<b>2 823.4</b>	<b>2 968.0</b>	<b>2 876.4</b>	<b>2 826.3</b>
<b>Africa</b>	65.1	64.6	64.1	65.1	64.6	64.8	822.4	836.5	851.4	885.3	900.2	924.8
<b>Central Africa</b>	78.1	77.7	77.5	78.6	78.7	78.8	131.3	134.7	138.7	145.1	149.8	154.5
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	73.6	72.5	72.3	73.2	73.5	73.7	305.5	308.7	316.1	329.0	339.1	348.6
<b>Northern Africa</b>	36.9	38.1	37.0	35.7	31.7	31.5	87.7	92.4	91.4	89.9	81.2	81.9
<b>Southern Africa</b>	61.5	60.9	60.9	62.6	61.7	61.6	39.8	39.9	40.4	42.1	42.0	42.2
<b>Western Africa</b>	68.3	67.3	66.6	68.4	68.8	69.3	258.0	260.8	264.8	279.2	288.1	297.5
<b>Algeria</b>	17.8	17.0	16.4	18.3	18.7	19.7	7.3	7.1	7.0	7.9	8.3	8.8
<b>Angola</b>	62.7	65.1	66.8	70.1	71.7	72.2	18.9	20.4	21.6	23.4	24.7	25.7
<b>Benin</b>	78.5	69.9	63.2	61.6	60.2	56.8	9.1	8.3	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.6
<b>Botswana</b>	63.5	61.9	61.3	61.5	61.2	60.3	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	64.9	62.1	58.8	59.7	59.1	63.1	12.9	12.7	12.3	12.8	13.1	14.3
<b>Burundi</b>	89.6	87.9	87.2	88.1	88.3	89.6	10.0	10.1	10.4	10.8	11.1	11.6
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	30.0	28.9	27.3	35.5	33.4	30.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<b>Cameroon</b>	52.4	52.3	52.5	53.7	54.3	55.9	12.8	13.1	13.5	14.2	14.8	15.6
<b>Central African Republic</b>	86.9	86.1	85.7	86.1	86.5	86.7	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.8
<b>Chad</b>	63.0	60.4	57.1	59.1	59.0	60.8	9.5	9.4	9.2	9.8	10.1	10.8
<b>Comoros</b>	63.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	60.8	n.a.	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.5	n.a.
<b>Congo</b>	74.2	75.0	74.8	77.7	78.2	79.1	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.7
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	53.5	49.2	46.7	48.9	49.6	49.7	13.3	12.5	12.2	13.1	13.6	14.0
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	94.8	93.4	93.1	93.1	92.4	91.4	79.9	81.4	83.7	86.5	88.6	90.5
<b>Djibouti</b>	54.5	53.0	52.5	53.4	52.7	53.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
<b>Egypt</b>	53.0	54.2	49.4	44.9	42.3	44.4	53.9	56.2	52.2	48.3	46.2	49.3
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	68.9	67.6	67.0	67.5	65.1	65.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
<b>Ethiopia</b>	59.3	55.5	54.5	54.2	55.2	54.1	64.2	61.6	62.2	63.5	66.3	66.7
<b>Gabon</b>	32.0	32.6	33.1	34.8	36.3	37.3	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
<b>Gambia</b>	42.4	41.3	40.6	43.2	43.6	44.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2
<b>Ghana</b>	65.2	64.1	62.7	63.6	62.7	63.0	19.7	19.8	19.8	20.5	20.6	21.1
<b>Guinea</b>	37.4	36.9	36.1	35.8	36.8	37.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	5.0	5.2
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	62.5	61.6	58.9	62.6	63.8	64.0	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3
<b>Kenya</b>	71.7	72.0	73.7	77.0	78.8	79.2	35.1	36.0	37.5	40.0	41.8	42.8
<b>Lesotho</b>	69.9	71.0	72.1	75.9	76.3	76.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8

**TABLE A13**  
(Continued)

	Proportion of the population unable to afford a healthy diet (percent)						Number of people unable to afford a healthy diet (million)					
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>Liberia</b>	64.5	63.9	66.0	69.9	66.3	64.1	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.4
<b>Libya</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Madagascar</b>	92.8	93.0	92.7	93.8	93.6	93.6	24.3	25.0	25.5	26.5	27.1	27.7
<b>Malawi</b>	84.6	85.5	87.1	88.5	88.7	89.6	15.1	15.7	16.4	17.1	17.6	18.3
<b>Mali</b>	55.2	52.3	47.8	53.0	55.6	58.7	10.7	10.4	9.8	11.3	12.2	13.3
<b>Mauritania</b>	49.9	49.9	50.4	52.1	54.4	55.2	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.6
<b>Mauritius</b>	15.1	14.2	13.3	18.6	17.8	17.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
<b>Morocco</b>	13.0	12.4	11.7	13.8	12.0	12.7	4.6	4.5	4.3	5.1	4.4	4.8
<b>Mozambique</b>	84.9	85.3	86.5	88.6	89.2	89.3	24.3	25.1	26.2	27.6	28.6	29.4
<b>Namibia</b>	57.8	58.0	58.5	62.2	59.7	57.1	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5
<b>Niger</b>	85.8	83.9	83.2	84.7	86.8	86.3	18.7	18.9	19.5	20.6	21.9	22.6
<b>Nigeria</b>	74.3	75.1	76.0	78.0	78.5	78.7	143.8	149.0	154.5	162.5	167.4	172.0
<b>Rwanda</b>	80.1	76.6	74.9	78.0	74.6	75.7	9.8	9.6	9.6	10.3	10.0	10.4
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	49.0	48.7	48.8	49.0	49.3	51.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>Senegal</b>	54.3	48.7	47.1	48.6	47.5	49.5	8.2	7.6	7.5	8.0	8.0	8.6
<b>Seychelles</b>	40.0	40.2	36.3	40.1	38.8	45.3	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	62.2	62.3	58.2	60.5	61.8	62.5	4.8	4.9	4.7	5.0	5.2	5.4
<b>Somalia</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>South Africa</b>	61.0	60.5	60.4	62.1	61.2	61.2	34.6	34.7	35.1	36.5	36.4	36.6
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	92.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	10.0	n.a.
<b>Sudan</b>	45.2	50.0	56.7	56.3	41.6	33.7	18.4	21.0	24.5	25.0	19.0	15.8
<b>Togo</b>	62.4	54.2	50.2	52.0	54.0	54.6	4.9	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.7	4.8
<b>Tunisia</b>	7.7	7.2	6.9	8.1	7.3	7.3	0.9	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9
<b>Uganda</b>	74.3	73.0	72.1	72.0	71.4	72.5	29.8	30.3	31.0	32.0	32.7	34.2
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	76.4	76.0	75.1	75.6	75.2	75.5	43.0	44.1	45.0	46.7	47.8	49.4
<b>Zambia</b>	77.8	78.0	79.0	80.5	81.3	81.7	13.5	13.9	14.5	15.2	15.8	16.4
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	74.9	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	11.0	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.

NOTE: n.a. = data not available; n.r. = data not reported.

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: *Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD)*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>

TABLE A14

Cost of a healthy diet (PPP international dollars per person per day)

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>World</b>	<b>3.13</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.35</b>	<b>3.56</b>	<b>3.96</b>
<b>Africa</b>	3.07	3.09	3.12	3.18	3.41	3.74
<b>Central Africa</b>	3.14	3.12	3.12	3.17	3.33	3.67
<b>Eastern Africa</b>	3.08	3.03	3.04	3.13	3.49	3.79
<b>Northern Africa</b>	3.33	3.42	3.48	3.42	3.44	3.78
<b>Southern Africa</b>	3.27	3.28	3.34	3.45	3.66	3.97
<b>Western Africa</b>	2.88	2.96	2.99	3.08	3.28	3.65
<b>Algeria</b>	4.06	4.13	4.10	4.06	4.36	4.89
<b>Angola</b>	3.44	3.41	3.46	3.65	4.00	4.41
<b>Benin</b>	2.84	2.94	2.93	2.97	3.23	3.42
<b>Botswana</b>	3.13	3.09	3.10	3.20	3.31	3.56
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	2.67	2.78	2.73	2.82	3.04	3.57
<b>Burundi</b>	3.34	3.13	3.11	3.29	3.50	3.97
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	3.20	3.26	3.32	3.40	3.51	4.07
<b>Cameroon</b>	2.58	2.65	2.70	2.77	2.95	3.39
<b>Central African Republic</b>	2.96	3.03	3.08	3.12	3.27	3.53
<b>Chad</b>	2.75	2.66	2.59	2.74	2.86	3.27
<b>Comoros</b>	4.56	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4.55	n.a.
<b>Congo</b>	3.02	3.05	3.04	3.09	3.27	3.64
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	2.45	2.52	2.63	2.71	2.93	3.27
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	4.30	3.80	3.52	3.30	3.32	3.53
<b>Djibouti</b>	2.79	2.86	2.98	3.10	3.27	3.71
<b>Egypt</b>	3.83	3.88	3.88	3.73	3.88	4.55
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	3.67	3.75	3.79	3.83	3.97	4.32
<b>Eritrea</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Eswatini</b>	3.36	3.29	3.33	3.34	3.47	3.69
<b>Ethiopia</b>	2.83	2.86	2.99	3.10	3.37	3.72
<b>Gabon</b>	3.25	3.30	3.38	3.43	3.61	3.96
<b>Gambia</b>	2.65	2.71	2.75	2.80	3.00	3.31
<b>Ghana</b>	3.45	3.54	3.62	3.70	3.89	4.29
<b>Guinea</b>	2.26	2.39	2.48	2.56	2.75	3.06
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	2.95	3.03	3.11	3.20	3.44	3.73
<b>Kenya</b>	2.79	2.77	2.85	2.91	3.13	3.54
<b>Lesotho</b>	3.52	3.62	3.74	3.98	4.31	4.68
<b>Liberia</b>	3.08	3.09	3.18	3.37	3.34	3.50
<b>Libya</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Madagascar</b>	3.03	3.16	3.20	3.23	3.43	3.75
<b>Malawi</b>	2.46	2.53	2.70	2.84	3.03	3.43
<b>Mali</b>	2.87	3.00	2.93	3.02	3.19	3.58
<b>Mauritania</b>	3.73	3.86	3.95	3.99	4.27	4.86

**TABLE A14**  
(Continued)

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>Mauritius</b>	3.43	3.52	3.56	3.74	3.92	4.39
<b>Morocco</b>	2.60	2.64	2.65	2.69	2.79	3.14
<b>Mozambique</b>	2.81	2.77	2.84	2.97	3.26	3.60
<b>Namibia</b>	3.28	3.33	3.41	3.55	3.79	4.16
<b>Niger</b>	3.22	3.17	3.15	3.28	3.56	3.96
<b>Nigeria</b>	2.88	3.01	3.12	3.24	3.49	3.83
<b>Rwanda</b>	3.09	2.94	3.01	3.20	3.22	3.80
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	2.33	2.41	2.48	2.57	2.72	2.99
<b>Senegal</b>	2.66	2.73	2.77	2.83	2.98	3.38
<b>Seychelles</b>	3.51	3.47	3.46	3.32	3.62	3.88
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	2.69	2.80	2.70	2.74	3.00	3.32
<b>Somalia</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4.14	n.a.
<b>South Africa</b>	3.05	3.08	3.12	3.19	3.39	3.74
<b>South Sudan</b>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.97	n.a.
<b>Sudan</b>	2.53	2.70	2.96	2.82	2.12	1.86
<b>Togo</b>	2.46	2.50	2.52	2.59	2.86	3.18
<b>Tunisia</b>	3.66	3.74	3.82	3.83	4.03	4.46
<b>Uganda</b>	3.12	3.08	3.04	3.03	3.15	3.60
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	2.20	2.25	2.27	2.32	2.43	2.70
<b>Zambia</b>	2.73	2.79	2.88	2.92	3.20	3.53
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	3.46	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.

NOTE: n.r. = data not reported.

SOURCE: FAO. 2024. FAOSTAT: *Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD)*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>

## APPENDIX 2

# INDICATOR DEFINITIONS

### **Undernourishment**

Undernourishment is defined as the condition of an individual whose habitual food consumption is insufficient to provide, on average, the amount of dietary energy required to maintain a normal, active and healthy life. The indicator is reported as a prevalence and is denominated as “prevalence of undernourishment”, which is an estimate of the percentage of individuals in the total population who are in a condition of undernourishment.

Source: FAO. 2024. *FAOSTAT: Suite of food security indicators*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

### **Food insecurity as measured by the Food Insecurity Experience Scale**

Food insecurity as measured by the FIES indicator refers to limited access to food, at the level of individuals or households, due to lack of money or other resources. The severity of food insecurity is measured using data collected with the FIES survey module (FIES-SM), a set of eight questions asking respondents to self-report conditions and experiences typically associated with limited access to food. For purposes of annual SDG monitoring, the questions are asked with reference to the 12 months preceding the survey.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provides estimates of food insecurity at two different levels of severity: moderate or severe food insecurity and severe food insecurity. People affected by moderate food insecurity face uncertainties about their ability to obtain food and have been forced to reduce, at times during the year, the quality and/or quantity of food they consume due to lack of money or other resources. Severe food insecurity refers to situations when individuals have likely run out of food, experienced hunger and, at the most extreme, gone for days without eating. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity is the combined prevalence of food insecurity at both severity levels.

Source: FAO. 2024. *FAOSTAT: Suite of food security indicators*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FS>

### Stunting, wasting and overweight in children under 5 years of age

Stunting (children under five years of age): Height/length (cm) for age (months)  $< -2$  SD of the WHO Child Growth Standards median. Low height-for-age is an indicator that reflects the cumulative effects of undernutrition and infections since and even before birth. It may be the result of long-term nutritional deprivation, recurrent infections and lack of water and sanitation infrastructures. Stunted children are at greater risk for illness and death. Stunting often adversely affects the cognitive and physical growth of children, making for poor performance in school and reduced intellectual capacity.

Prevalence cut-off values for public health significance are as follows: very low  $< 2.5$  percent; low  $2.5$ – $< 10$  percent; medium  $10$ – $< 20$  percent; high  $20$ – $< 30$  percent; very high  $\geq 30$  percent.

Wasting: Weight (kg) for height/length (cm)  $< -2$  SD of the WHO Child Growth Standards median. Low weight-for-height is an indicator of acute weight loss or a failure to gain weight and can be the result of insufficient food intake and/or an incidence of infectious diseases, especially diarrhoea. Wasting indicates acute malnutrition and increases the risk of death in childhood from infectious diseases such as diarrhoea, pneumonia and measles.

Prevalence cut-off values for public health significance for wasting are as follows: very low  $< 2.5$  percent; low  $2.5$ – $< 5$  percent; medium  $5$ – $< 10$  percent; high  $10$ – $< 15$  percent; very high  $\geq 15$  percent.

Overweight: Weight (kg) for height/length (cm)  $> +2$  SD of the WHO Child Growth Standards median. This indicator reflects excessive weight gain for height generally due to energy intakes exceeding children's energy requirements. Childhood overweight and obesity is associated with a higher probability of overweight and obesity in adulthood, which can lead to various non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes and cardiovascular diseases.

Prevalence cut-off values for public health significance for child overweight are as follows: very low  $< 2.5$  percent; low  $2.5$ – $< 5$  percent; medium  $5$ – $< 10$  percent; high  $10$ – $< 15$  percent; very high  $\geq 15$  percent.

Source: UNICEF, WHO & World Bank. 2023. *Levels and trends in child malnutrition. UNICEF / WHO / World Bank Group Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates – Key findings of the 2023 edition*. New York, USA, UNICEF; Geneva, Switzerland, WHO and Washington, DC, World Bank. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/jme-report-2023>

### Anaemia in women aged 15 to 49 years

Definition: percentage of women aged 15–49 years with a haemoglobin concentration less than 120 g/L for non-pregnant women and lactating women, and less than 110 g/L for pregnant women, adjusted for altitude and smoking.

Prevalence cut-off values for public health significance are as follows: no public health problem <5 percent; mild 5–19.9 percent; moderate 20–39.9 percent; severe ≥40 percent.

Sources: i) WHO. 2021. Vitamin and Mineral Nutrition Information System (VMNIS). In: WHO. Geneva, Switzerland. [Cited 25 May 2021]. <https://www.who.int/teams/nutrition-and-food-safety/databases/vitamin-and-mineral-nutrition-information-system>; ii) WHO. 2021. WHO global anaemia estimates, 2021 edition. In: WHO. [Cited 24 July 2024]. [www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia\\_in\\_women\\_and\\_children](http://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/anaemia_in_women_and_children)

### Adult obesity

The body mass index (BMI) is the ratio of weight-to-height commonly used to classify the nutritional status of adults. It is calculated as the body weight in kilograms divided by the square of the body height in metres (kg/m<sup>2</sup>). Obesity includes individuals with BMI equal to or higher than 30 kg/m<sup>2</sup>.

Source: WHO. 2024. *Global Health Observatory (GHO) data repository: Prevalence of obesity among adults, BMI ≥ 30, age-standardized. Estimates by country*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. [https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi--30-\(age-standardized-estimate\)-\(-\)](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/prevalence-of-obesity-among-adults-bmi--30-(age-standardized-estimate)-(-))

### Exclusive breastfeeding

Exclusive breastfeeding for infants under 6 months of age is defined as receiving only breastmilk and no additional food or drink, not even water. Exclusive breastfeeding is a cornerstone of child survival and is the best food for newborns as breastmilk shapes the baby's microbiome, strengthens the immune system and reduces the risk of developing chronic diseases. Breastfeeding also benefits mothers by preventing postpartum haemorrhage and promoting uterine involution, decreasing risk of iron-deficiency anaemia, reducing the risk of various types of cancer and providing psychological benefits.

Source: UNICEF. 2024. Infant and young child feeding. In: UNICEF. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/infant-and-young-child-feeding>

### Low birthweight

Low birthweight is defined as a weight at birth of less than 2 500 g (less than 5.51 lbs), regardless of gestational age. A newborn's weight at birth is an important marker of maternal and foetal health and nutrition.

Sources: i) UNICEF & WHO. 2023. Low birthweight. In: UNICEF. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/low-birthweight>; ii) UNICEF & WHO. 2023. Joint low birthweight estimates. In: WHO. [Cited 24 July 2024]. [www.who.int/teams/nutrition-and-food-safety/monitoring-nutritional-status-and-food-safety-and-events/joint-low-birthweight-estimates](http://www.who.int/teams/nutrition-and-food-safety/monitoring-nutritional-status-and-food-safety-and-events/joint-low-birthweight-estimates)

### Cost and affordability of a healthy diet

The cost of a healthy diet (CoHD) is the cost of purchasing the least expensive locally available foods to meet the energy requirements and food-based dietary guidelines for a representative person within energy balance at 2 330 kcal/day. The CoHD is calculated using retail food price data from the 2024 series of the International Comparison Program (ICP), coordinated by the World Bank, which refers to 2021 prices. The cost of a healthy diet is converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors for private consumption.

The prevalence of unaffordability (PUA) estimates the percentage of individuals in a population whose disposable income, net of the amount needed to acquire all basic non-food goods and services, is lower than the minimum cost of a healthy diet. National estimates are obtained by contrasting the country-specific income distributions against a threshold ( $r$ ). The threshold  $r$  is obtained by summing the cost of a healthy diet in a country and the basic cost of non-food needs for the income group to which the country belongs. Specifically, the cost of non-food needs is calculated by multiplying World Bank international poverty lines by a share of total expenditure to be reserved for non-food basic goods and services that is specific to each income group. Along with the PUA, the number of people unable to afford a healthy diet (NUA) is computed by multiplying the PUA by the reference population size.

Source: FAO. 2024. *FAOSTAT: Cost and Affordability of a Healthy Diet (CoAHD)*. [Cited 24 July 2024]. <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CAHD>

## APPENDIX 3

# NOTES

For specific country notes, please refer to Tables A.1.1 and A.1.2 in FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2024. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024. Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms*. Rome, FAO. <https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en>

### **Prevalence of undernourishment**

Subregional and regional estimates were included when more than 50 percent of the population was covered. National estimates are reported as three-year moving averages to control for the low reliability of some of the underlying parameters, such as the year-to-year variation in food commodity stocks, one of the components of the annual FAO Food Balance Sheets, for which complete and reliable information is scarce. Subregional, regional and global aggregates are reported as annual estimates on account of the fact that possible estimation errors are expected not to be correlated across countries.

### **Food insecurity**

Subregional and regional estimates were included when more than 50 percent of the population was covered. To reduce the margin of error, national estimates are presented as three-year averages.

FAO estimates refer to the number of people living in households where at least one adult has been found to be food insecure.

Country-level results are presented only for those countries for which estimates are based on official national data or as provisional estimates, based on FAO data collected through the Gallup World Poll, for countries whose national relevant authorities expressed no objection to their publication. Note that consent to publication does not necessarily imply validation of the estimate by the national authorities involved and that the estimate is subject to revision as soon as suitable data from official national sources are available. Global aggregates are based on data collected in approximately 150 countries.

### **Child stunting, wasting and overweight**

For child wasting regional estimates, values correspond to the model predicted estimates for the year 2022 only. Wasting is an acute condition that can change often and rapidly over the course of a calendar year. This makes it difficult to generate reliable trends over time with the input data available – as such, this report provides only the most recent global and regional estimates.

### **Exclusive breastfeeding**

Regional estimates are included when more than 50 percent of the population is covered.

## APPENDIX 4

# COUNTRY GROUPINGS

FAO uses the M49 country and regional groupings, available at <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49>.

In this report, Central Africa refers to the M49 Middle Africa grouping.

The groupings are:

- **Central Africa:** Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.
- **Eastern Africa:** Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- **Northern Africa:** Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan and Tunisia.
- **Southern Africa:** Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa.
- **Western Africa:** Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

## APPENDIX 5

# INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

This annex provides the interview protocol used in this study on financing food security and nutrition in Africa. The protocol was designed to gather insights from key stakeholders with a focus on financiers, to understand the challenges and opportunities in mobilizing resources for food security and nutrition. These interviews – conducted by videoconferencing – aimed to identify best practices, barriers to effective financing, and innovative solutions to address malnutrition and food insecurity across the continent.

Additionally, representatives were interviewed for almost all the examples described in the Boxes to validate the descriptions provided and to gain in-depth knowledge of their lessons learned.

Given the diverse interviewees the author consulted, the interviews followed a dynamic structure around the questions listed below.

1. How to increase public funding and financing for food security and nutrition in Africa?
2. How to ensure the enabling environment can be improved?
3. How are the strategies and measures needed to enhance food security and improve nutrition in Africa aligned with resolutions of regional bodies such as the African Union and global trends such as building climate resilience?
4. Do you know any inspiring funds, initiatives, (R&D) projects and people who are sticking their necks out in financing food security and nutrition in Africa?
5. How to address the fragmentation of public resources?
6. Any other important aspects that come to mind?
7. Which derisking measures are relevant when financing the agrifood system in Africa?
8. Did you already start with capacity building for lenders?
9. Which three pieces of policy advice would you like to give to public authorities?
10. Are you an active or passive investor? Why?
11. What type of financial services do you offer?
12. In what type of companies do you invest?
13. How do you do your deal sourcing?
14. How do you experience financing the agrifood system in Africa?
15. What is your current AuM?
16. How do you distinguish yourself from other investors?
17. What are the top three challenges you're facing?
18. Can you describe the demand for financing for food security and nutrition as fully as possible?
19. How many deals have you done last three years in food security and nutrition, could you briefly describe them?
20. How do you experience the effectiveness of blended finance in practice?
21. Any other things that come to mind about financing food security and nutrition in Africa?



ISBN 978-92-5-140399-0



9 789251 403990

CD7981EN/1/04.26