The USA’s commitment to provide US$3.8 billion to UN-managed pooled humanitarian funds could reverse years of declining resources. But will this additional money widen access for African humanitarian organizations or primarily benefit established recipients? Funding information from four African crises reveals why the proportion of aid that reaches local organizations is only part of the story.
In December 2025 and May 2026, the U.S. announced US$2 billion and US$1.8 billion, respectively to UN-managed humanitarian funds across 21 countries. The combined total represents a commitment rather than confirmed disbursements, and the amounts that will be channeled directly to African organizations have yet to be established.
Country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) that are managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) allow contributions from different donors to be combined to finance humanitarian operations in individual countries. Over the last 15 years, CBPFs have disbursed over US$10 billion through UN agencies, international NGOs and national organizations.
Yet, according to ALNAP’s 2025 report, the allocations to CBPFs decreased from US$1.3billion in 2022 to US$910 billion in 2024, reflecting massively reduced contributions from Germany who, together with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, had been among the leading donors to CBPFs.
The US commitments totaling US$3.8 billion could reverse this decline and significantly expand the resources available through UN-managed humanitarian funding mechanisms.
The size of the announced increase means that the distribution of this funding is as important as the amount available. More money entering the system does not necessarily mean that more local organizations will gain direct access to funding.
In 2025, 46% of CBPF’s allocations went to local and national actors (LNAs), rising to 55% if sub-grants are included. Across the wider humanitarian funding system, just under 10% of international humanitarian funding reached LNAs directly and indirectly in 2024, and of this, only 3.8% reached them directly, according to research by Mike Pearson and Niklas Rieger.
These figures indicate that pooled funds are able to channel a substantially higher percentage of resources to local and national organizations than the wider humanitarian system, a fact repeatedly highlighted by international actors.
However, a 2026 analysis by ODI found that CBPFs frequently reached 10 or fewer local and national organizations per country. It also warned that the U.S. funding injection could reinforce concentration among established recipients.
The available country-level figures illustrate why the proportion of funding reaching local organizations is only part of the picture.
The Somalia Humanitarian Fund disbursed US$44.9 million to 61 local partners in 2025, but the 2026 humanitarian response plan sought US$852 million.
An independent evaluation found that of the 300 national NGOs, 91 were assessed as eligible for pooled funding in 2022, which increased to 123 in 2023. The evaluation also identified examples of international agencies undertaking repeated due diligence checks on local partners despite them already having been approved.
However, the number of organizations found to be eligible does not indicate how many applied, how many actually received funding or whether the same organizations repeatedly secured financing. This lack of statistics makes it difficult to determine whether access is truly broadening.
Sudan’s 2025 annual report reveals that US$10.4 million, or 6% of allocations, were awarded directly to national NGOs, but when all the tracked funding channels are included, 37% of funding reached national and local actors, up from 28% in 2024.
Sudan also has more than 700 Emergency Response Rooms across its 18 states, according to a published report by a Sudanese volunteer. These community-based aid networks demonstrate the reach of local humanitarian activity, but this does not necessarily lead to eligibility to receive direct pooled funding.
Documented barriers to receiving funding include registration obstacles, lack of security and the historic suppression of civic organizations. The question remains as to how these barriers affect the outcomes of the applications made.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country-level funding analysis found that local and national organizations received 62% of pooled-fund allocations in 2025. While this is a significant share, the analysis does not reveal how many organizations received money or how many first-time applicants were rejected or approved.
In South Sudan, local and national organizations received 45% of the pooled-fund allocations in 2025. The 10 largest local recipients accounted for 68% of local funding, according to the same country-level funding analysis. This concentration demands closer examination, but does not prove unfair selection.
These four examples demonstrate different aspects of the problem: eligibility in Somalia, the distinction between direct and indirect funding in Sudan, the limitations of headline allocation in the DRC, and recipient concentration in South Sudan. However, the limited available data is insufficient to truly assess localization.
For a national NGO, direct funding means being responsible for the main grant rather than merely implementing a program on behalf of an international partner. OCHA grant rules require applicants to complete registration, due diligence and capacity assessments covering financial management, governance and safeguarding aspects. These requirements serve legitimate accountability purposes, but costly documentation and weak audit histories can make applications more difficult for smaller entities.
In a published pooled-fund analysis, refugee-led organization advocate Najeeba Wazefadost commented that such funding can be “theoretically inclusive but practically inaccessible” because of registration, compliance and partnership requirements.
The same analysis reports that although women-led organizations are not rejected, only 9% of those surveyed in 2025 had received pooled funding of any kind.
UN agencies and established international NGOs may be better equipped to handle large grants, procurement requirements, security and reporting obligations, particularly when the humanitarian response must be launched quickly but this can lead to capable community responders having to work through intermediary agreements and having less influence on budgets and delivery.
Therefore, the questions are whether the eligibility criteria are proportionate to the size of the grant and the level of risk, whether existing assessments can be recognized across funding mechanisms, and whether smaller groups can qualify without the necessary checks being duplicated.
Widening direct funding requires action from both local organizations and humanitarian fund managers. National NGOs need reliable financial records, safeguarding policies and audit systems in place. Fund managers, in turn, should examine whether their procedures duplicate the required checks or prevent capable organizations from entering the system. Introducing proportionate eligibility requirements, smaller grants for first-time recipients and more flexible funding arrangements should also be considered.
A May 2026 audit-recognition initiative found that approximately 90% of the OCHA’s capacity-assessment questions could be answered wholly or partly through existing independent audits. Recognizing this could reduce duplication and administrative costs without compromising accountability.
Equally important is that fund managers publish data that shows not only where the money went, but also the number of organizations that applied, qualified and received funding, the number and proportion of first-time recipients, the share going to both the largest and small organizations, how many eligible applicants were unsuccessful and, when possible, the reasons why they were rejected. This would help to establish whether a commitment to localization can translate into broader access.
Ultimately, the success of humanitarian funding reforms should not be measured solely by the percentage of aid that reaches local organizations, but by how many organizations gain direct access, meaningful decision-making authority and the financial stability to sustain humanitarian operations.