From memorandum of understanding to market: Africa's high-stakes mineral gambit

From memorandum of understanding to market: Africa's high-stakes mineral gambit

Key reasons to read this article

  • Africa controls the minerals that are powering the electric vehicle revolution, but captures only a fraction of the profits. Why?
  • As a US$46 trillion battery market is emerging, two mineral-rich African nations are betting everything to claim a stake.
  • Their plans could be thwarted, however, as three global powers race to build rival “mineral corridors” from Africa.
  • The window is quickly closing as new battery technology could make cobalt less vital before Africa has time to scale up.

The global cobalt market fell into a tailspin early in 2025, with prices crashing to a nine-year low due to oversupply from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), leaving Western tech giants benefiting from cheaper inputs. Then Kinshasa slammed the door shut. By imposing a strict export quota, by the end of the same year, the DRC had both stabilized prices and signaled an end to the “dig and ship” era.

Now, the DRC and Zambia are attempting a structural shift through the DRC-Zambia Transboundary Battery Bloc, a cooperation agreement signed in 2022. Its goal is ambitious: build a transboundary special economic zone (SEZ) to stop exporting raw ore and start the domestic manufacturing of the high-value battery precursors that power the world’s electric vehicles (EVs), which is the main driver of global cobalt demand.

What is at stake?

Africa holds 30% of the world’s mineral reserves but captures less than 10% of the value they generate. The DRC and Zambia hold an estimated 70% of global cobalt reserves. For decades, the continent supplied the raw minerals, while China refined up to 80% of the world’s cobalt, capturing the lion’s share of the profits.

Despite holding the majority of global cobalt reserves, Africa captures minimal value, as refining and profits remain concentrated abroad.

Now the math might change. The EV battery market is predicted to skyrocket from US$8.8 trillion to US$46 trillion by 2050, according to UNECA modeling. By early 2026, the DRC’s export restrictions (96,600 tons through 2027, roughly half of the previous volume) had already pushed cobalt prices back to US$56,000 per ton.

Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi said the country was using minerals as “a real lever to influence this strategic market.”

The new scramble: Three corridors, three contracts

To meet their goals, landlocked DRC and Zambia have to ship the goods. Historically, minerals from these nations required journeys of up to 50 days by road to reach the sea. Now, three global powers are courting the two countries in a race to build a “mineral express” out of the continent, each in different directions and with a very different price tag.

The Western linkLobito Corridor was originally built in 1902-1931 and largely destroyed during Angola’s civil war. In 2023, the U.S., the EU, the DRC, Zambia, Angola, and financial institutions committed to develop almost 1300 kilometers of rail. In early 2026, the U.S. and the EU doubled down, with financial commitments made so far exceeding US$6 billion. The strategic goal? To link landlocked DRC and Zambia to the Atlantic and ensure a direct route to Europe and the USA. However, the Trump administration added an additional price for this backing, “a right of first refusal” on the minerals, with experts warning this may inadvertently sabotage the DRC’s own industrial ambitions.

The Chinese link – TAZARA – China, the world’s leading mineral processor, signed a 30-year concession through the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to revitalize the operational but aging 1860-kilometer-long TAZARA railway. The US$1.4 billion deal gives China an 80% stake and links Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. Experts have warned that the focus remains on feeding China’s domestic refineries rather than supporting Africa’s Battery Bloc.

Competing infrastructure projects led by the U.S., EU, China and Japan risk reinforcing raw export patterns rather than enabling Africa’s industrialization.

The Japan-backed Nacala Corridor is viewed as the main hope of the Battery Bloc. To link Zambia to Mozambique’s deep-water port, Japan has committed to invest US$7 billion to upgrade rail links. Tokyo’s approach focuses on “equitable outcomes”. Unlike the other two competitors, experts note that Japan is investing in the development of the entire value chain, from mining to refining, rather than just in raw material exporting, but this depends on processing plants being built first.

Plant build-out

While the DRC-Zambia ambitions remain high, the reality on the ground is moving at a slower pace.

In 2024, the DRC government signed a deal with a local company, Buenassa, and issued a US$3.5 million preparatory grant for the construction of a refinery. Under the initial agreement, the cobalt and copper refinery was to be operational by late 2027. However, updated projections show that only the feasibility study will be ready by late 2027, whereas production could start in 2029, in the best-case scenario.

In March 2025, the DRC launched the construction of the US$200 million Musompo SEZ in the cobalt-rich Lualaba province. The 900-hectare zone is predicted to attract US$2 billion in investments and create 85,000 jobs. Yet, by November 2025, momentum had slowed following government reshuffles.

Zambia has yet to break ground on any processing facility.

The involvement of both countries in the project is key. The DRC is believed to be better positioned for the construction of a manufacturing plant due to its control of over 50% of the world’s cobalt and investments in hydropower. Zambia’s contribution is equally important since its significant copper, nickel, and manganese reserves are key to the production of competitive mineral batteries.

The missing link at the heart of the Battery Bloc

But even if the plans become reality, a key structural issue remains.

The Lobito and TAZARA corridors reach the DRC and might be used by the USA, the EU, and China to ensure shipment. Nacala, which currently reaches Zambia, is making efforts to extend the railway link to the DRC as well. But a 2025 Ecofin Agency analysis concluded that all three corridors primarily aim to meet external mineral needs, serving foreign industries rather than being industrial enablers for African businesses.

The DRC and Zambia need a domestic rail link that prioritizes industrial integration over raw export.

Without integrated transport and processing capacity, the DRC-Zambia Battery Bloc may struggle to transform mineral wealth into domestic value creation.

Moreover, for the planned transboundary SEZ to function as a single industrial unit, the cost of moving goods across the border must drop. A dedicated rail link would help to lower logistics costs to a level that BloombergNEF estimates could make African-processed precursors globally competitive with Chinese exports.

Yet, despite the existing political will, the two governments lack funding. As it currently stands, no corridor reaches the ore it is intended to carry.

What happens IF the initiative works

Global revenues from copper, nickel, cobalt, and lithium are projected to reach US$16 trillion over the next 25 years. Sub-Saharan Africa could boost the region’s GDP by 12% or more by 2050 if it participates in the EV market, according to Eunice Kamwendo, UNECA Director for Inclusive Industrialization in Southern Africa

According to the African Development Bank, once fully implemented, the DRC-Zambia battery value chain project is expected to create over 40,000 direct jobs and 160,000 indirect jobs in both countries.

Africa’s opportunity to lead the EM supply chain is real, but it is narrowing fast as technology shifts away from cobalt dependence.

Africa’s annual foregone income tax revenue, lost to tax avoidance by multinational mining companies and estimated at US$470–730 million by the International Monetary Fund, would begin to be recovered.

Time is ticking for Africa

The timeline is unforgiving. Battery technology is shifting. By early 2026, lithium iron phosphate batteries, which contain no cobalt, accounted for more than half of all EV batteries produced globally.

For the bloc’s ultimatum to hold, it must materialize before the chemistry transition removes dependency on high performance. But the processing facilities remain unbuilt. No corridors reach the mines. And the same cobalt Kinshasa is reserving for the African industry has been partially pledged to Washington.

The DRC and Zambia do have genuine leverage. What remains unclear is whether the infrastructure, the energy, and the political consistency exist to use it before the window closes.