In a historical period marked by unrest, conflicts, and wars, this October has brought a sliver of hope in the Middle East as Israel and Hamas agreed to implement the first phase of a U.S.-brokered cease-fire and hostage-release plan. While the cease-fire is fragile and has seen certain violations, it’s time for the international community to coordinate efforts to foster the conditions in which to restore services, uphold justice, support reconciliation, and plan for long-term state-building and economic resilience. What challenges could impede Gaza’s reconstruction under this scenario? In our latest “Experts’ Opinions” piece, analysts from around the world share their thoughts regarding the priorities of international development in the Middle East, and the role of major donors in its future.
Key Takeaways:
- The agreement between Israel and Hamas is the most important step towards a ceasefire in Gaza since the hot phase of the conflict that has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of people in the region.
- Hamas and Israel have accused each other of violating the incipient ceasefire since it came into effect earlier in October.
- According to experts, the proposed Gaza peace plan, if successfully implemented, could fundamentally reshape international development priorities in the Middle East by shifting the focus from humanitarian crisis response to long-term state-building and economic resilience.
- The U.S.-led “Board of Peace” marks a turning point in aid governance, offering a chance to rationalize existing funding through joint programming, pooled and blending funds – including private-sector instruments – and regional coordination platforms to align diplomacy, security, and development under one strategy.
DevelopmentAid: How could the Gaza peace plan reshape international development priorities in the Middle East, from humanitarian response to long-term state-building and economic resilience?
“The Gaza peace plan opens a fragile but strategic window to move from emergency relief to structural development. Its sustainability depends on sustained pressure on both parties and genuine Palestinian ownership. A credible process would rebuild infrastructure, institutions, and the economy, anchoring resilience in local legitimacy. Yet the plan’s impact extends beyond Gaza. Each phase must connect to a regional dynamic where development drives peace and demands stronger coordination among international, regional, and local actors through joint planning, regional infrastructure, and cross-border trade initiatives. As Israel reasserts its economic and logistical role, it supports gradual normalization with Arab states through energy, trade, and security partnerships. An integrated development approach can reshape regional geopolitics toward stability if grounded in inclusiveness, coherence, and shared accountability. For donors and operators, addressing collective memory and intergenerational narratives of violence remains crucial – an under-addressed dimension of resilience, without which reconstruction risks sustaining the roots of future conflict.”
“As several scholars and Middle East experts have pointed out since the release of the 20-point Gaza plan on 29 September 2025, it is hard to define it as a comprehensive “peace plan” or a structured “roadmap for peace”. What we have witnessed in the past two years is far from resembling a conflict. It has been a genocidal campaign perpetrated by the State of Israel against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, coupled with rising settler violence (often with IDF complicity) in the West Bank. To date, according to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, Israel’s military operation has caused over 67,000 civilian casualties, nearly a third of them under 18. Several humanitarian actors warn that the toll could be far higher – up to 200,000. Following each strike, not all the corpses have even been recovered from Gaza’s rubble. In the West Bank, according to the UN OCHA, settlers have perpetrated more than 3,000 violent incidents against Palestinians since 7 October 2023. Even putting aside the pre-October 7 de facto apartheid of Palestinians, we are now left with a polarized and ever-radicalized picture. When it comes to international development priorities in the region, it is essential to start from these figures. The impunity of such actions and delayed diplomatic efforts, combined with Israel’s unlawful occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem since 1967 (as per the International Court of Justice advisory opinion issued in July 2024) set a fragile stage for reshaping the future of international development cooperation. Regarding Gaza, the plan resembles a sequence of “blueprints” linking humanitarian response to demilitarization, governance, and economic recovery. In the short term, aid distribution, protection, medical care, demining, and shelters will likely be the priorities. Medium-term goals focus on targeted capacity-building for a transitional administration, while long-term actions should foster economic resilience and peacebuilding. Yet several points remain problematic: 1) ensuring the local legitimacy of the humanitarian response amid polarization; 2) vague timelines for Hamas demilitarization and police training; 3) the risks of tying development to political benchmarks. Such conditions could weaken local ownership and raise reputational dilemmas for international actors. NGOs may also be caught between reconstruction contracts and limited absorption capacity. The overall risk is a gradual shift from UN-backed humanitarian mechanisms to politically driven reconstruction efforts. On a positive note, the Gaza plan enjoys regional backing and is part of a broader strategy to “bring peace” to the Middle East. However, inviting Arab partners to contribute does not address Palestinians’ right to self-determination – still a root cause of regional instability. In the long term, Gulf donors are expected to finance infrastructure and promote economic resilience, using Gaza as a “testing ground” for future interventions. Yet humanitarian actors warn that such “opportunities” risk diverting resources from ongoing crises in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria as donors reallocate funds toward high-visibility U.S.-led projects.”
“The proposed Gaza peace plan, if successfully implemented, could fundamentally reshape international development priorities in the Middle East by shifting the focus from humanitarian crisis response to long-term state-building and economic resilience. Instead of continuous emergency aid, international actors could move toward structured development partnerships emphasizing institutional strengthening and sustainable reconstruction – similar to post-conflict transitions in the Western Balkans. Central to this shift would be reforming Palestinian governance: promoting transparency, combating corruption, and professionalizing public administration. Economic resilience would rely on gradually integrating Gaza into regional trade networks with Egypt, Jordan, and Israel through infrastructure, energy, water, and digital economy projects, thereby reducing external aid dependency. Development efforts would also need to foster social cohesion, reconciliation, and community recovery especially through education and civil society initiatives that address war-related trauma. Overall, the peace plan could mark a strategic transformation in how the international community engages with the region: moving from reactive humanitarianism toward building sustainable state institutions and self-reliant economic systems that enhance both regional stability and long-term prosperity.”
DevelopmentAid: What opportunities and risks does the plan create for international actors, UN agencies, development banks, and NGOs, now expected to operate under a “Board of Peace” led by the US?
“The U.S.-led “Board of Peace” marks a turning point in aid governance, replacing the UN’s slow, fragmented system with a centralized transitional body chaired by a Western power. It offers a chance to rationalize existing funding through joint programming, pooled and blending funds – including private-sector instruments – and regional coordination platforms to align diplomacy, security, and development under one strategy. However, this model raises legitimacy and perception challenges. Moving away from multilateralism risks political control over aid and a Western framing of regional priorities. Its credibility depends on transparent governance, balanced representation, and the meaningful participation of Arab, Palestinian, and Israeli partners in defining priorities and overseeing implementation. For donors and operators, success will hinge on turning coordination into genuine collective ownership to ensure that the peace process delivers inclusive, long-term recovery rather than dependency or renewed polarization.”
“According to point 9 of the plan, Gaza would be governed under two layers: a Palestinian interim technocratic, apolitical, and transitional committee overseen by the Board of Peace (BoP) led by Trump, other Heads of State and Government, and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. Point 15 also calls for the “swift establishment and deployment” of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, to which the IDF would progressively hand over the territory and which would train local police. These measures should technically enable UN agencies, development banks, and NGOs to resume operations, access funds, and implement large-scale infrastructure, demining, and livelihoods programs. However, several humanitarian actors stress that the plan contains vague timelines, undefined roles, and conditional commitments that allow parties to endorse it politically while resisting its technical components behind closed doors. Normally, the oversight of a technocratic government would lie under the UN or a neutral coalition. The creation of the BoP – an unprecedented mechanism in such contexts – recalls colonial governance models and could complicate how international actors engage (and are perceived) on the ground. As for the technocratic layer, corruption and the lack of legitimacy remain serious risks. Moreover, although Israel is expected not to occupy Gaza, it will still maintain its security perimeter. As per the ambiguity surrounding the Hamas demilitarization, this could prolong a de facto occupation, complicating international operations. Experts such as Prof. Marc Weller (Chatham House) have noted that missions of this scale usually take months, if not years, to develop mandates and operational procedures. Since this will not be a UN-led mission, even with a Security Council mandate, it remains a complex and unprecedented case. Balancing internal opposition – including Hamas holdouts – while creating a trusted civilian police force will be a major challenge. On the humanitarian front, the plan could nevertheless create opportunities to channel large funding and coordinated financing, including from private sector partners. However, the risk of duplication, politicization, and weak accountability mechanisms remains high. Finally, as a counter-terrorism expert, I was struck by the first point of the plan, which declares that Gaza will be “a deradicalized terror-free zone”. Radicalization to violence is a complex cycle, and nothing is “clear-cut” in this respect. Even from a taxonomical perspective, outlining what a “deradicalized zone” would look like shows little understanding of two decades of counterterrorism and preventing violent extremism (PVE) work worldwide since 9/11. Considering that Hamas recruitment has accelerated in the Strip since October 7, disarmament alone will neither eliminate Hamas as a political actor nor reduce the risks of radicalization among suffering civilians. Hamas still enjoys public support in Gaza, even more so after two years of devastation. In the medium and long term, it is difficult to envisage any solid PVE-related intervention by the international community in the Strip, including those targeting former prisoners. As the Second Gulf War and the subsequent rise of ISIS should have taught us, when actors are denied any stake in the process, violence can appear as the only means to regain influence.”
“The U.S.-led Board of Peace introduces a new centralized coordination model that offers both significant opportunities and serious risks for international actors such as UN agencies, development banks, and NGOs. On the positive side, it promises faster decision-making, more concentrated funding, and stronger political and security guarantees, potentially enhancing field safety and enabling large-scale reconstruction projects. The plan could also foster new forms of cooperation between multilateral development banks – including the World Bank, EBRD, and Islamic Development Bank – and the private sector, aligning economic recovery with investment-driven development. However, these advantages are counterbalanced by notable risks. Replacing the traditional UN coordination framework could weaken multilateral legitimacy, reduce transparency and neutrality, and fragment the international development system. The dominance of U.S. leadership may generate political mistrust among regional actors such as Iran, Turkey, and some Arab states, limiting inclusive participation. Furthermore, competition for funding and influence might constrain the autonomy of NGOs and UN agencies, reducing space for civil society engagement. In conclusion, the Board of Peace model combines efficiency with political sensitivity. Its long-term success will depend on maintaining a balanced, transparent, and inclusive governance structure that respects multilateral principles while leveraging the advantages of U.S. leadership.”
Should the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and the 20-point proposal move forward, demand will spike across humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction opportunities in the international development job market. To ensure experts don’t miss any opportunities, DevelopmentAid has created the Individual Professional Membership, which offers more tools for candidates when searching for openings. For example, as a developmentaid.org member, an expert can view, filter, and access over 4,500 job openings. Another way to explore opportunities is by looking for short- or long-term consultancies through open tenders and grants for individuals. The platform also offers access to major donors and organizations that can be approached directly by sending a CV and background information. Candidates can target funders and pipelines such as the World Bank, EBRD, UN, IsDB, EU, and Gulf donors for Gaza recovery windows. All these advantages and more can be accessed with just a single click.
