Will the U.S.- style ICE model cross the Atlantic? Implications of the new EU Return Regulation | Experts’ Opinions

DevelopmentAid: Is the EU creating its own version of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement through the new Return Regulation?

“The European Union is not creating a direct replica of ICE, but it is moving into a very familiar territory where migration is governed increasingly through enforcement, surveillance, and control rather than protection. If we look historically, Europe has always framed migration through management, from the Schengen system to the Dublin Regulation, but what is happening now feels like a qualitative shift. The new Return Regulation expands detention, accelerates deportations, and brings migration control deeper into everyday life through data sharing and policing practices. And when you compare this with what we are seeing on the ground, for example, proposals of fully enclosed centres with restricted movement and fast-track deportations, it becomes clear that the question is not whether the EU is building ICE, but whether it is reproducing its logic in a European form. ICE emerged in the United States after 9/11 as part of a broader securitisation of mobility, and today we see similar dynamics in Europe where migration is increasingly treated as a matter of internal security rather than human mobility. So structurally the EU remains decentralised, but functionally it is drifting toward a system where people are processed, contained, and removed with growing efficiency, and that is where the comparison becomes uncomfortable but very real.”

“The EU is not reproducing ICE in a literal institutional sense, but the direction is clear: migration governance is becoming more enforcement-led, more standardised, and more oriented toward removal. The proposed reform expands the reach of return decisions across member states and strengthens the operational logic of detention and enforcement. What is politically significant is not only the legal reform itself, but the wider shift it reflects: a move away from a protection-centred approach toward a security-centred one. This is unfolding in a context where anti-immigration narratives and restrictive political pressures increasingly shape policy choices. From a feminist perspective, the concern is not only about control, but about whose mobility is treated as a threat and whose rights become more easily negotiable.”

“Rather than designing or developing its own system similar to that of the United States, the European Union has understood and assessed the risks it faces in the new global dynamics, including drug trafficking and irregular migration. This is why now is the opportune moment to implement regulations, controls, and adopt measures to mitigate these threats that destabilize the region’s security.”

“Recent policy developments suggest that the European Union is strengthening its approach to migrant returns, raising comparisons with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. While the EU is not creating a centralized body like ICE, the direction is clearly shifting. Enforcement remains largely with Member States, supported by coordination through Frontex, but the emphasis on faster procedures, extended detention, and stronger return coordination reflects a more control-oriented approach.”

“Aside from the more recent anti-migrant practices by the United States of America, the EU has – for nearly 2 decades now- been in the practice of externalizing its borders through an equivalent of the U.S. Safe Third Country Agreements. Therefore, the new return regulation is an added layer further complicating the EU violations of international law, namely the principle of non-refoulement.”

“The European Union’s newly approved return regulation marks a troubling departure from its long-held commitment to rights-based migration governance. With provisions enabling offshore deportation centres, detention periods of up to two years, and virtually permanent entry bans, the regulation represents the cornerstone of a broader rightward shift in European migration politics. The uncomfortable question now demands an honest answer: is the EU fashioning its own version of America’s enforcement-heavy immigration apparatus? Migration is, at its core, a human right shaped by push and pull factors that no regulation can abolish. People flee conflict, poverty, and climate collapse; they also move toward opportunity, filling labour gaps that destination economies desperately need. Yet the new framework imposes strict obligations on returnees and introduces criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for non-cooperation is a posture that treats structural displacement as individual deviance. The economic dimension deserves far greater scrutiny. Whether migration is regular or irregular, it generates value for host countries, for communities of origin, and for migrants themselves. When regular pathways fail, people inevitably turn to asylum systems not out of opportunism, but out of necessity. Punitive enforcement does not resolve this; it merely drives vulnerability underground. Moreover, sixteen UN independent rapporteurs have warned that the regulation risks violating the principle of non-refoulement and weakening procedural safeguards are concerns the EU cannot dismiss if it wishes to remain a credible development and human rights actor. Conditioning aid on deportation cooperation transforms partnership into coercion, eroding trust with the very nations the EU claims to support. Deportation is not a solution. It is a symptom of policy failure and one that far-right parties will eagerly exploit. The EU must resist this trajectory before its migration framework becomes indistinguishable from the systems it once criticised.

DevelopmentAid: What might be the consequences of this shift toward stricter return enforcement for the EU’s role as a global development actor, particularly in partner countries expected to receive increased numbers of returnees?

“The consequences are profound because this shift risks transforming the EU from a development partner into a migration control actor that exports its priorities outward. Historically, European development policy was framed around stability, poverty reduction, and governance, but in recent years, we have seen a gradual merging of development and migration agendas, from the EU Trust Fund for Africa to various mobility partnerships. The new return-focused approach takes this further by encouraging deportations to third countries and the establishment of return hubs in regions that are already under pressure. In practice, this means that countries along migration routes, including the Western Balkans, are expected to absorb returnees without having the infrastructure to support reintegration. Instead of addressing structural issues such as employment or social inclusion, the focus shifts to containment, which can destabilise local communities and strain already fragile systems. Over time, this risks undermining the EU’s credibility because development cooperation begins to look conditional, tied less to shared goals and more to migration control objectives. What we are witnessing is not just a policy adjustment but a redefinition of what development means in the European context, and that raises serious questions about long-term partnerships and trust.”

“A stronger focus on return enforcement risks reshaping the EU’s role from a development partner to a migration-management actor. When development cooperation becomes increasingly linked to containment and return objectives, it can undermine trust with partner countries and shift priorities away from locally driven development agendas. In practice, this may place additional pressure on countries already facing economic and social constraints to absorb returnees without adequate support systems. It also risks reinforcing unequal power dynamics, where cooperation becomes conditioned by compliance. Over time, this could weaken the EU’s credibility as a partner committed to equitable and rights-based development.”

“The consequences of these measures could be framed within commercial aspects; however, states have been demonstrating resilience in the face of changing global dynamics, which compels them to take reciprocal security measures, exchange information, and make economic adjustments, among others.”

“The shift toward a more coercive return system is a troubling departure from the EU’s history as a champion of human rights. Drawing inspiration from the enforcement-heavy ICE model in the U.S. risks prioritizing numbers over human lives. In my view, returning a migrant without clear, probable cause or a transparent legal reason is more than just a policy shift—it is a violation of the fundamental right to safety. During my time working in Protection and Child Protection, I have seen that the most effective migration management comes from kindness and integration, not detention. The EU has a long-standing reputation for being a humane and compassionate actor on the global stage; it should be returning to those values rather than expanding detention periods. If the EU moves toward a system focused solely on “higher return rates,” it risks undermining its own human rights commitments and damaging its relationships with partner countries. We must ensure that the dignity of the individual remains the priority, rather than the speed of their removal.”

“This evolution has implications beyond Europe. Stricter return enforcement will place additional pressure on partner countries expected to receive returnees, many of which already face economic and social constraints. Without strong reintegration systems, returns risk becoming temporary solutions, with individuals struggling to rebuild their lives or attempting to migrate again. At the same time, linking migration control more closely to development cooperation may affect how the EU is perceived, shifting its image from a long-term partner to a more transactional actor.”

“Any decision related to international development, and more specifically to migration policies, must be firmly grounded in a balanced partnership approach, benefiting both migrants and host states. Europe has a strong historical tradition of protecting human rights. However, the use of coercive systems tends to undermine these foundations by infringing upon fundamental rights enshrined at the international level. Current developments toward more security-oriented management models, inspired by external frameworks, appear to reveal practices that have already existed but remained less visible. This increased visibility may nonetheless allow for a more accurate assessment of the situation and facilitate a more structural approach, particularly by addressing the root causes of population displacement and the right to mobility within a legal and human-centered framework. The potential consequences of these developments raise concern: increased dehumanization of reception systems, the emergence of informal parallel mechanisms, and a deterioration of health indicators, particularly in the field of mental health. In addition, there is a risk of a hardening of international cooperation dynamics, to the detriment of principles of solidarity and reciprocity.”

“Again, well before the U.S. has -under the current administration, started engaging with some African countries in unfair bilateral development finance agreements riddled with resource extraction and health-data mining and appropriation, the EU had already signed bilateral migrant return and deterrence agreements with countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Sea. This has been coupled with the systematic and steady shrinking of EU development funding towards African countries. The use of migrants as a bargaining chip is neither new nor an invention of the United States. It has increasingly been instituted and practiced by the EU through laws, regulations, programs, and actions.”

DevelopmentAid: Do higher return rates risk hindering the EU’s human rights commitments?

“There is a real and growing risk that higher return rates, especially when driven by political pressure to demonstrate control, will undermine human rights in practice even if legal commitments remain intact on paper. Europe has a long tradition of embedding rights into its legal framework, from the European Convention on Human Rights to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, but history shows that rights often erode not through formal repeal but through everyday implementation. When detention periods are extended, when appeals are no longer automatically suspensive, and when cooperation expands to countries with weaker protection systems, the space for rights begins to shrink. We have seen similar dynamics before, for example, in the externalization policies of the 2010s, where responsibility was shifted to countries like Turkey or Libya, often with serious consequences for migrants. Today, as return rates become a central metric of success, the system risks prioritising speed and efficiency over individual assessment and due process. Moreover, when that happens, principles like non-refoulement or proportionality are no longer guaranteed in practice. The danger is not that the EU abandons its values outright, but that it gradually normalises exceptions to them, and once exceptions become routine, the entire framework of protection starts to weaken.”

“Higher return rates, particularly when driven by political targets, can create tensions with human rights commitments. The key issue is not only the return itself, but the conditions under which it is implemented and the safeguards in place to ensure dignity, safety, and due process. From a protection and feminist lens, these dynamics often exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, particularly for those already marginalised. If safeguards are weakened or inconsistently applied, there is a risk of normalising practices that fall short of the EU’s stated commitments, widening the gap between policy and practice.”

“The issue of human rights is a variable that is gaining increasing importance in all areas of international relations and is directly linked to all actions of states.”

“There are also important human rights considerations. Higher return rates are not inherently problematic, but they increase the risk of gaps in implementation, particularly when speed becomes a priority. Safeguards such as access to legal support, individual case assessment, and dignified return conditions must remain central. Without this balance, efficiency gains may come at the cost of the EU’s rights-based commitments.”

“The interception of migrant vessels at high seas, and the denial of due process before removal to third countries, are in clear violation by EU countries of their human rights commitments, as documented by the European Court of Human Rights. Another major concern with the EU externalization of its border through bilateral processes (Khartoum, Tripoli, etc.) is the growing body of para-military groups operating on behalf of some African governments e.g., the Rapid Support Forces, acting as the Government of Sudan’s implementation arm of the Khartoum Process. Does the EU want its money to finance African militias that constantly violate human rights? Doesn’t the Union want to invest in health, education, and gender equality in Africa?”

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